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**ECONOMICS
OR
POLITICAL ECONOMY?**
A Study Guide in five lessons

John East

LAWRENCE & WISHART

Price One Shilling

ECONOMICS OR POLITICAL ECONOMY

A Study Guide

by

JOHN EAST

LAWRENCE and WISHART
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INTRODUCTION

It is widely agreed that Marxism is a method and not a dogma, but a great many who accept this point of view do not act upon it in practice. Nowhere is this more true than in the field of economics or political economy: in fact, many seem to think that these two are separate subjects. Far too many students, for example, study economics in the lecture-room by day and political economy in student societies or political discussion groups by night; while trade unionists frequently accept the standpoint of Marxist political economy and then forget all about it in discussing with employers the 'economics' of wages.

Such a divorce can lead to nothing but disaster. Marxism can and must be applied to every field of human knowledge and human activity. The only result of setting up economics and political economy in two distinct compartments is, on the one hand, to allow the theories of capitalist economists and the results which flow from them to pass uncriticised and unchallenged, and, on the other, to narrow the application of Marxism and to turn it into the very dogma which its opponents maintain it to be.

The assumption in this Study Course is that readers will be acquainted with the elements of Marxist political economy and will have some knowledge of, or interest in, bourgeois economics. Elementary concepts will not, therefore, be explained, but there will be continual reference to the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc. It is hoped that this method will avoid the necessity of expounding elementary political economy, for the study of which Courses already exist,¹ but will stimulate serious study of the original texts of the classical Marxist writers, for which there is literally no substitute.

Stage by stage through the course, there will be critical references to the writings of the bourgeois economists. It should be made plain, however, that no attempt will be made to pursue in all its detail the niceties of bourgeois theory, which will be reduced to its essentials.

It is hoped that this course, which is based on notes used in leading a discussion group made up largely of students of economics, will be useful to other students; to trade unionists and workers who are seriously interested in political economy; to W.E.A., N.C.L.C. and Co-operative tutors; and to political discussion group leaders.

¹ See e.g. Maurice Dobb, *The Economics of Capitalism*.

LESSON I

THE LAW OF VALUE

*"The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplied it with all the necessities and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consists always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations."*¹

ADAM SMITH.

*"Every child knows that a country which ceased to work, I will not say for a year, but for a few weeks, would die. Every child knows, too, that the mass of products corresponding to the different needs require different and quantitatively determined masses of the total labour of society. That this necessity of distributing social labour in different proportions cannot be done away with by the particular form of social production, but can only change the form it assumes, is self evident. No natural laws can be done away with. What can change, in changing historical circumstances, is the form in which these laws operate. And the form in which this proportional division of labour operates, in a state of society where the interconnection of social labour is manifested in the private exchange of the individual products of labour, is precisely the exchange value of these products. The science consists precisely in finding out how the law of value operates."*²

KARL MARX.

SINCE the breakdown of the system known as primitive communism in which there was production for direct use, and in which a man was unable to produce more in a day than was needed for his own bare subsistence, production has been both a continuous and a continually-changing social process. Each producer has come to specialise more and more in his own line, division of labour has developed, and exchange has gradually assumed greater and greater importance. Articles produced not for the consumption of the producer, but for exchange, whether through barter or with the aid of a medium of exchange known as money, are called commodities.³

A commodity has two properties. In the first place, it has use value; it would be senseless to expend the resources of society on the prōduc-

¹ *The Wealth of Nations*, Introduction

² *Letter to Dr Kugelmann*, July 11th, 1868

³ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Chap. I, Sec. I. (Note: All page references to Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, are to the edition published by Messrs Allen and Unwin and edited by Dona Torr).

tion of articles which were of no use to anyone. In the second place, it has *exchange value* (or simply *value*, as it is called); in other words a certain proportion of the resources of society have been expended on its production and it can command in the market an equivalent amount of the resources of society. Now it is obvious that no one is going to exchange one set of use values for another set exactly similar. It is equally obvious, however, that no one is knowingly going to give up an amount of exchange value without receiving an equal amount in return.¹

Since under social production exchange must take place according to some definite rules, or laws, some yardstick or measure of value must be found; and this is accomplished by the *law of value*. In Marx's own words, "the value of any article is the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour time socially necessary, for its production."²

The essential character of any society is determined by its *mode of production*. This means, on the one hand, its *productive forces*—that is to say, its tools and productive technique and the skill of its labour force; and, on the other, its *production relations*—that is to say, the relations between the main classes in society.

The relation between the two main classes in capitalist society, which has so far been the subject of the principal investigation of political economy, is an *exchange relation* (see Lesson 2). Workers and capitalists exchange labour power and the means of subsistence, and therefore the first problem which must be analysed, and the first problem tackled by Marx, is that of exchange, which necessarily takes a quantitative form and is in the first place a quantitative relation between products. Since it *appears* to be no more than this, the bourgeois economists, e.g. Professor Robbins, in fact make "relationships between men and economic goods" the kernel of their definition of economics. Hidden behind this relationship, however, is a specific, historically conditioned relationship between producers, i.e. a relationship between classes. This is what is meant when Marxists state that value is a social relation.³

The function of the law of value, then, is more than to explain the division of income between classes. It is to explain how this division of income takes place by laying bare the whole relationship of class exploitation, and to explain the changing relations between the two great classes in capitalist society.

In addition to this function the law of value has another, a purely quantitative one. It is a general guide to, and the basic explanation of, the ratios at which goods exchange in the market. It is the explanation of the quantities of goods of different types which are produced at different times. It explains how the resources of society are allocated among different lines of production.⁴

Nevertheless, the law of value, like any scientific law, is an abstraction (see Lesson 5). It is a great mistake to confuse the general law

¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. 1, Sec. 2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³ Cf. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 99.

⁴ Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, p. 1,026.

underlying any given process with the detailed account of the isolated phenomena that contribute to that process. This is particularly true in the case of individual exchange ratios; and a misunderstanding of this point has been the cause of, or at least the occasion for, countless "refutations" or "revisions" of Marx. Whereas *under conditions of simple commodity production*¹ commodities do tend to exchange more or less exactly in proportion to the amount of socially necessary labour embodied in their production,² *under the conditions of competitive capitalism* commodities tend to exchange at their price of production; while *under the conditions of monopoly capitalism* there tends to be a still further divergence between prices and values (see Lesson 3).

Moreover, at all stages of history prices are subject to temporary fluctuations according to the workings of the law of supply and demand.³ Under conditions of monopoly capitalism, with its severe and prolonged crises, there may at times appear to be no relation at all between prices and values. Under Socialism the workings of the law of value are still further modified, since for the first time the operation of economic laws are subject to conscious control and regulation.⁴

The labour theory of value has the status of a scientific law. As such its operations vary tremendously according, in the first place, to the particular historical system and, in the second, to many and varied additional forces. These features of the labour theory are in marked contrast to the theories of value of the bourgeois economists.

There have been and still are many and varied objections to the labour theory of value. One, that it offers no explanation of exchange ratios under developed capitalism, has already been dealt with. Another is that Marx neglected demand. But, as he points out, it can be safely neglected, since, to produce values, use values must be produced; and "use value as such lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy"⁵, while demand is itself regulated by the distribution of incomes, which in turn are the result of class relations. Several other objections are dealt with specifically by Marx himself.⁶

The labour theory of value as first propounded by Ricardo was defective because it failed to explain where profit came from. Marx, however, in developing the theory, was able to provide the explanation by making the crucial *distinction between labour and labour-power*⁷ (see p. 11). As a result, the labour theory of value, which had originally been an indispensable tool of any serious political economist, now became an explosive, dangerous weapon. Significantly, therefore, bourgeois economists in three different countries, England, France

¹ Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, pp. 9-12, Engels, *On Capital*, pp. 102-6.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 103-6.

³ Cf. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, p. 190 and Chap. 10.

⁴ Cf. Leontiev, "Political Economy in the Soviet Union," in *Science and Society*, Spring, 1944.

⁵ Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 44 et seq.

⁷ Karl Marx: *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 248.

and Austria, propounded independently and simultaneously in 1871, within a few years of the publication of the first volume of *Capital*, a purely subjective theory. As Jevons put it, absolutely dogmatically, "value depends entirely upon utility." Utility was conceived to mean utility to an individual "at the margin," and was expressed in the demand on the market for the last, or "marginal," unit of the commodity in question which was bought. On this basis, the value was determined by what was paid for the marginal unit (since there is only one price for a commodity in a free market) which equals the marginal utility to the individual.

The truth is that the subjective theory was not and is not a contribution to clarifying the economic laws of capitalism. It was proposed as a conscious attempt to justify capitalist society by providing an alternative to the labour theory of value, which, as Marx had shown, revealed capitalism to be a class system based on exploitation.

The main objections to the subjective theory of value may be summarised as follows.

1. It does not deal with social relations or start from the process of production, but simply describes the relations between things and individual consumers in the market.

2. It cannot solve the problem of the allocation of resources, except in terms of abstractions remote from real life. As soon as a real problem of allocation arises, there is a demand from all sides for a man-power budget, which in fact amounts to an admission of the labour theory of value.

3. It can only deal with individual market relationships. Moreover, even in dealing with these, it makes assumptions as to the process of economic calculation by an individual in the market which bear little or no relation to the way in which ordinary people actually behave.

4. It breaks down because subjective utility is not a standard of measurement independent of what is being measured. The argument of economists who accept this theory runs as follows: Given the supply, price (and therefore, disregarding temporary fluctuations or changes in the value of money, value) is a function of demand, therefore, since demand is a measure of subjective utility, subjective utility is the determinant of value. But if, apart from temporary fluctuations, demand is *not* the determinant of but is determined by market price, or if, as an acute bourgeois economist has put it, "the demand curve . . . infringes the first canon of behaviour for a demand curve [and] it is not independent of the supply curve of its own commodity"¹ (and this is frequently the case under modern conditions of advertising and sales racketeering), subjective utility has failed as an independent measuring rod.

5. A further difficulty, recognised by the Lausanne school of economists in 1902, is the impossibility of conceiving of utility as a quantity, and therefore of making comparisons of utility as between

¹ John Robinson, *Economics of Imperfect Competition*, p. 117.

persons, or even of believing demand to be a function of utility at all. According to this school demand is determined by empirically observed preference scales, which are not, however, held to be grounded in anything. However, either this is the marginal utility theory again by the back-door, or it is a tacit admission that the search for a theory of value has been abandoned. Many modern bourgeois economists try to do without any theory of value at all and simply discuss price formation. It follows, therefore, that they cannot even begin to tackle the really important questions of political economy.

LESSON II

THE ORIGIN OF PROFIT

THE preconditions of capitalism are: firstly, the development of commodity production to a high level; secondly, the existence of "free" labour, i.e. labour-power which has itself become a commodity; and thirdly, that accumulation of *money capital* must have taken place over a considerable past period.¹ This process of primitive accumulation, as Marx called it, occupies an historical period, in England from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century. It consists, on the one hand, of transforming serfs into peasants working their own land and then, by means of enclosures, etc., into landless labourers, or proletarians; and, on the other, of accumulating a stock of money capital, partly by trading, partly by direct robbery and piracy, e.g. the exploits of Columbus, Drake and Raleigh.²

The characteristics of capitalism are the ownership of the means of production by a definite class in society; the exploitation of wage labour; and production carried on for private profit by a great many producers operating independently of each other, with no central plan.³

Labour-power is the ability to work, as distinct from labour, which is the creator of value.⁴ Labour-power being a commodity, its value is determined like that of any other, by the number of hours of socially necessary labour time required for its production (and reproduction). In other words, its value is the value of the worker's subsistence; in determining which, social and historical factors have always to be taken into account. These factors depend on the effectiveness of working-class organisation, as well as on the standards of living habitually tolerated by a given society. Thus the value of labour-power changes from time to time and from place to place, owing to the class struggle, the results of which become incorporated in the *historically necessary* standard.⁵

The bourgeois economists' theory of wages is a corollary of their subjective theory of value. They argue that the only wage at which equilibrium is possible under competition is that which equals the value of the marginal product of the workers employed. In fact the theory does little more than recognise that capitalists will continue to employ additional workers so long as an extra profit can be made from their employment. Implicit in this theory is that the worker is paid what he

¹ Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, p. 18.

² Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Part 8.

³ Leontiev, *Political Economy*, p. 92.

⁴ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 145, and 156 ff.

⁵ Marx, *Value, Price and Profit*, Chaps. 9, 13 and 14.

is worth, no more and no less, and that the distribution of the social income is therefore just. It is therefore further argued by many bourgeois economists that if workers, through trade union action, for example, demand a wage higher than that equal to the value of their marginal product, unemployment will result, since the additional cost incurred by taking on one more man is not covered by the additional revenue obtained.¹

- ✓ In order to obtain surplus value, "Money bags must find in the market a commodity whose use value possesses the peculiar property of becoming a source of value."² Since the commodity, labour-power, fulfils this condition, the creation of surplus value is in accordance with the law of value.³

A theory of profit satisfactory even to themselves, has never been produced by the bourgeois economists. Reference has already been made to Ricardo's failure to solve the problem. For Marx, of course, the origin of profit, using the term to include the whole of capitalist revenue, or surplus value as he called it, was the central problem, since it is the key to exploitation. There seems no need to comment at this date on Senior's notorious abstinence theory, which attempted to explain profit as a reward for the service provided by capital, abstinence being the sacrifice provided by the capitalist, comparable to the toil and sweat of the worker. However, many subsequent theories, couched in terms of the marginal productivity theory, have been little more than refined versions of the same thesis. For instance, it makes little difference *theoretically* whether the capitalist is supposed to be rewarded for *abstaining* from squandering his profits on riotous living, or for his courage and magnanimity in *risking* his capital in investment. All such theories assume that capital and labour, since they both provide a service, are both entitled to a reward, and that both rewards can be determined on the same principle of the marginal contribution to production.

As capitalism developed, a distinction had eventually to be made between the salaried manager and the risk-taker. But while some theorists agreed that the latter was entitled to any surplus left over, others were reluctantly compelled to argue that there were no surpluses. For example, the writer of the most thorough and exhaustive treatise on profit, having finally established a category of *pure* profit, concludes that he "is strongly of the opinion that business as a whole suffers a loss."⁴

Capital is not, as bourgeois economists would have it, simply instruments of production as such. It is instruments of production within a specific system of social relations, i.e. of property relations. A tractor owned by a peasant farmer working for himself, or used in a Soviet

¹ For a fuller examination of all these arguments, cf. articles by John East in the *Communist Review*, June and July, 1946.

² Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 145.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴ Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*, p. 365.

collective farm, is not capital; it is capital only if it is owned by a capitalist farmer employing wage labour.

• Moreover, while Marxists distinguish between *variable* capital, which is that part of capital devoted to the purchase of labour-power (i.e. wages) and all the remaining part laid out in production, which is called *constant* capital, bourgeois economists distinguish between *fixed* and *circulating* capital. And it is important to note the difference between these distinctions. For, whereas *fixed* capital means everything but that which is laid out for *labour-power and raw materials*, *circulating* capital includes the cost *both* of labour-power and of raw materials. Thus the latter distinction effectively conceals the source of surplus value.

• *Absolute* surplus value is increased by increasing the length of the working day, while *relative* surplus value is increased by decreasing the labour time necessary to produce the worker's subsistence, i.e. by improving the technique of production of consumption goods.¹

• The purpose of capitalist production is to produce profit, not merely in order to increase thereby the private consumption of capitalists, but in order to accumulate as much capital as possible so that still greater masses of labour-power can be set in motion in the next cycle of production and so that still more profit can be made. But the process of accumulation leads to technical progress, which results in the higher *organic composition of capital*, i.e. in a higher proportion of constant to variable capital. The consequence is that the relative, if not the absolute, demand for labour-power falls off, and there is unemployment. This process was called by Marx the recruitment of the industrial reserve army and is the means by which the "pretensions of the labouring class" are kept in check.² In other words the perpetual reserve of unemployed labour-power acts as a means of preventing the bargaining position of the trade unions from becoming too strong and therefore of preventing wages from rising too high.

¹ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Parts 3 and 4; Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, p. 19.

² Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, pp. 625-55.

LESSON III

THE DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS VALUE

UNDER industrial capitalism, commodities exchange, not at their values, which are made up of constant capital, variable capital and surplus value ($c+v+s$), but at their prices of production ($c+v+p$), which are the cost of the constant and variable capital embodied in them, with the addition of the average rate of profit, p . The average rate of profit is formed through an equalising process due to the working of competition. Commodities manufactured with capital of a low organic composition produce a more than average amount of surplus value and vice versa, but competition between capitals leads to all *earning* the same rate of profit.¹ In Marx's own words "What competition is striving to produce between the various masses of capital—differently composed and invested in different spheres of production—is capitalist communism, namely, that the mass of capital belonging to each sphere of production should snatch an aliquot part of the total surplus value proportionate to the aliquot part of the total social capital which it forms."²

The process can be illustrated as follows:

	<i>Value of the product</i>	<i>Rate of profit, per cent.</i>	<i>Rate of surplus value, per cent.</i>
(1) $c80+v20+s10=$	110	10	50
(2) $c50+v50+s25=$	125	25	50
(3) $c70+v30+s15=$	115	15	50
(4) $c90+v10+s5=$	105	5	50
Total Capital ($c+v$)=400.	Total Profit (s)=55.		

Here, the uniform average rate of profit, which competition will tend to establish, will be $13\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. Since, however, the price of production is $113\frac{3}{4}$, ($c+v+p$), capitalists (1) and (4) will be selling their products above value, and capitalists (2) and (3) below value.

It may be asked why the capitalist does not try to use more variable capital and thus earn a higher rate of profit. The reason is that he is continuously striving to increase his productivity, both to get ahead of rivals and to prevent him being driven out of business, and this normally means introducing improved technique, which increases the organic composition of capital.

¹ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chaps 8, 9 and 10.

² *Marx-Engels Correspondence*, p. 243.

The process of the formation of the average rate of profit which has been described affects the distribution of surplus value; but not its total amount. The principal effect of monopoly is very similar. Although in conditions of monopoly commodities exchange at rates still further removed from values, the total of surplus value produced remains the same. This means that the monopoly capitalists get more than their share at the expense of the weaker and smaller capitalists.¹

Interest is the price of loan capital, credit, or cash. It is part of the total of surplus value, and is not in any sense a necessary reward of a factor of production, as most bourgeois economists maintain. It is an historical and institutional factor, and its level is regulated by demand and supply.² Supply is controlled by the banking system and is now, owing to the nationalisation of the Bank of England, to a considerable extent capable of being controlled by the Government. Demand is partially under control through the control of investment, etc.

The bourgeois theory of interest is not easy to disentangle owing to the confusion in the minds of many bourgeois economists between profit and interest. The most distinguished propounder of the theory of interest is generally held to be Bohm-Bawerk, an Austrian aristocrat who wrote in the eighties and nineties of the last century, and who deliberately set himself the task of resisting Marxism. His theory of interest is a subjective one which follows directly from the marginal utility theory of value, and is based on a belief that individuals overestimate future resources and underestimate future wants, thereby increasing the marginal utility of present goods as compared with their marginal utility in the future. The existence of this time preference means that, to obtain a supply of present in return for future goods, interest has to be paid. Although Bohm-Bawerk also puts forward a technical reason for the existence of interest, on the ground that the increasingly "capitalistic," or 'roundabout' methods of production account for a price for present in terms of future goods, the subjective grounds are the kernel of the argument.

It is arguable whether, in fact, this type of time preference exists; many economists now believe it does not. The real issue, however, which is completely evaded, is that there is no explanation of where interest comes from. Values must be produced by somebody, and the truth is, of course, that interest is part of surplus value.

Modern economists, and in particular the Keynesian school, have propounded a theory of interest not unlike the Marxist theory. Interest, they consider, is quite simply the price of cash or credit or capital in

¹ On the other hand the fact that monopoly raises the general level of prices means that real wages are reduced and unless there is a corresponding rise in money wages, the total of surplus value is increased. This process can perhaps best be thought of as a temporary (or permanent) reduction of wages below the value of labour-power. The process is also similar to that in which, owing to his superior technique, the capitalist producer obtains extra surplus value in unequal exchange with peasant or colonial producers.

² Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chap. 22.

money form, and is regulated on the one hand by the quantity of money and on the other by "liquidity preference," which means the demand for cash, either for transactions, for speculation, or as a hoard. Moreover, they recognise that interest is part of the general revenue of the capitalist class and that, if the rate of interest can be reduced, there is all the more for business profit.

Rent, which means the rent of land and must be distinguished from house rent which also includes interest and profit,¹ also comes out of surplus value. There are two kinds. First, there is *differential rent*, due to the fact that there are natural differences owing to the differing fertility of soil, or to the particular location of the land in question. Now since the price of agricultural produce is determined by what is produced on the worst soil in use, everything produced on better soils earns a rent which goes to the landowner, where he is a different individual. If the producer and the landowner are one and the same person, the producer keeps the rent himself. This category of rent persists as long as capitalism continues.

The second category of rent, *absolute rent*, is earned on all land, including marginal land. It arises owing to the private ownership of land, and can therefore be abolished, even under capitalism, by the nationalisation (without compensation) of land. The existence of this rent is due to the private monopoly of land which results in the employment in agriculture of capital with a low organic composition. As a consequence a higher than average amount of surplus value is produced by labour in agriculture. More capital would, therefore, be attracted into agriculture if capital were free to move in. This cannot happen, however, owing to the private monopoly of land. The private ownership of land, and the consequent occurrence of absolute rent is the basic reason why capitalist agriculture (and to a less extent building) is backward. The excess surplus value produced is scooped off as rent and, in the struggle to keep going at all and to effect some improvements, the agricultural capitalist is driven to forcing down wages below the value of labour-power.²

The modern bourgeois theory of rent states that any excess over the reward of a factor of production which is required to make that factor remain in its existing employment and not seek employment elsewhere is rent. The theory is a corollary of the marginal productivity theory (see pp. 9-10), and like all bourgeois theory makes no *qualitative* distinction between the factors of production: land, labour and capital.

¹ Cf. Engels, *The Housing Question*, p. 40

² Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, pp. 22-6, Matthews, *Communist Review*, March, 1946.

LESSON IV

REPRODUCTION AND CRISIS

A DISTINCTION must be drawn between means of production, such as machinery, raw materials etc., goods not for direct consumption; and means of consumption.¹ A distinction must also be drawn between simple reproduction, where everything that is produced, except what is required for depreciation, is consumed, and extended reproduction, where the second cycle of production is larger than the first, the third larger than the second, and so on.²

The motive force of capitalist production is profit, and is, therefore, the drive to accumulate (owing to the desire for gain, on the one hand, and the fear of competition, on the other), since the consumption of the capitalist class is necessarily limited. The expansion of capital through the accumulation of surplus value is called the *concentration* of capital.³ The merging of capitals is called the *centralisation* of capital.⁴ These processes are inevitable and lead to a steady tendency towards monopoly, which leads to restriction of production and high prices. On the other hand monopoly capitalism is also the highest stage of capitalism and therefore the material preparation for socialism.

Reproduction consists of three stages:

- (1) The purchases of means of production and labour-power.
- (2) The process of production itself.
- (3) Realisation, or sales

Stages (1) and (3) are part of the circulation process.

The conditions of realisation for simple reproduction are that, since from the mass of capital goods, $cI + vI + sI$, vI and sI must be exchanged for consumption goods, and since from the mass of consumption goods $c2 + v2 + s2$, $c2$ must be exchanged for capital goods, the constant capital in the consumption goods department must exactly exchange for the variable capital and the surplus value in the capital goods department ($c2 = sI + vI$).

The conditions of realisation for expanded reproduction are similar but more complex. Items which represent a demand for constant capital must be equated to the total output of constant capital, and similarly for consumption goods. Thus the variable capital in the capital goods department, plus surplus value consumed in this department, plus surplus value added to variable capital in this department,

¹ Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, p. 19.

² Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 577-98.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 639.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 640, Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 14-27.

must exactly exchange for the constant capital in the consumption goods department plus the surplus value added to constant capital in this department ($vx + sx + vx = c_2 + sc_2$).

These conditions of equilibrium can never be maintained under capitalism. The complicated conditions required in the second equation cannot be satisfied indefinitely under "anarchistic" conditions. The reason lies in the basic contradiction of capitalism, the contradiction between the increasing socialisation of production and private appropriation, of which other expressions are the contradictions between planning in the factories and an unplanned market, and between the unlimited tendency to expansion of production and the relatively limited power of consumption.

Accumulation is, therefore, always increasing the productive forces; improved technique is reducing relatively the amount of labour-power employed; the mass of products appearing is expanding relatively to the total wages paid, on which—immediately or ultimately—the market depends; and sooner or later the insufficiency of the market at some point in the system will be such as to check the turnover of capital and precipitate a crisis.

In addition to this fundamental cause of crisis, the rate of profit has a tendency continually to fall, even if values which have been produced can be realised. The ratio $\frac{s}{c+v}$ is lower than the ratio s/v and is lower the higher the ratio of c/v . Hence if c becomes larger relative to $s+v$ the rate of profit must fall. To set against this tendency, however, there are what Marx called certain counteracting cases:¹

(1) The rate of exploitation can be increased by increasing absolute surplus value. (see Lesson 2).

(2) The rate of exploitation can be increased by increasing relative surplus value.

(3) Constant capital can be decreased by using cheaper machinery and especially cheaper raw materials.

(4) Labour-power can be paid less than its value.

(5) Foreign trade makes it possible to seek higher rates of profit abroad and, by favourable terms of trade, to cheapen the elements of subsistence or of constant capital.

(6) The rate of turnover can be increased.

The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is one of the contradictions of capitalism. Marx describes crisis as the manifestation of *all* the contradictions of capitalism. Each specific crisis, however, has its own specific features.

There have been countless explanations of crisis, or the trade cycle as they prefer to call it, from the bourgeois economists, but all are doomed in advance in that they do not start from the necessary turnover of capital, that is to say, from the very nature of capital itself.

¹ Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, Chaps. 13 and 14.

Many of the theories are couched in psychological terms, and are based on the optimism or pessimism of the capitalist. For instance, such notions as an undue "propensity to save," or a falling "propensity to consume," have now become familiar. Others, not as a rule propounded by "respectable" economists, but by business men, quite frankly argue that since overproduction is apparently the main phenomenon of crisis, various forms of restriction are necessary.

More recently, however, the main contending bourgeois schools have been, on the one hand, those who argue that difficulties arise because wages rise too high and that business accordingly becomes unprofitable, with the obvious practical corollary; and on the other hand, those who argue that there is under-consumption and that consequently wages must, in the interests of both capitalists and workers, be raised. The first theory ignores the market problem. The second fails to recognise the gigantic proportions of the basic contradictions of capitalism; the fact that wages are costs to the capitalists, and that the capitalist is impelled by the very nature of capitalism to drive to reduce costs. Nevertheless the second theory, in whatever form it is put forward, and particularly as propounded by some of the more progressive followers of Keynes, would, if put into practice, be in the interests of the workers. It is clear, however, that though the progressive raising of real wages may keep crises at bay, this could only be effected as the result of a continual struggle against capital, leading, if it is to be successful, to bigger and bigger inroads into the power of capital itself, from the invasion of "managerial rights," to the taking over of firms and other ruthless measures.

LESSON V

THE METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

POLITICAL economy is defined by Lenin as the "science dealing with the developing historical systems of social production."¹ Marx states in his introduction to *Capital*, that his aim is "to lay bare the law of motion of modern society." These definitions should be compared with that of economics as the "relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."² The Marxist definitions characteristically lay emphasis on motion and historical change.³

Since the political economist has "neither microscopes nor chemical reagents,"⁴ he has to resort to the method of abstraction, and the use of successive approximations, as in physics. The Marxist method is historical, dialectical and scientific. The use of the historical method does not mean, as it meant to the German historical school of the nineteenth century, the rejection of the deductive method, the abandonment of the search for economic laws, putting in their place merely the study of economic events and economic institutions. It does not, that is to say, mean the adoption of a purely empirical approach. It does mean the actual study of economic systems, which are subject to continual change and development by the clash of opposing forces, and the search for economic laws; while at the same time recognising that such laws are not necessarily valid for all economic systems, and that they are, in fact, dependent on the social relations of the particular social system in which they operate.⁵

The method employed by the scientist is to study his material either under natural conditions or, more usually, under carefully controlled experimental conditions; to induce from the behaviour of his material certain hypotheses, to test these hypotheses out under many different conditions, and to call those that survive "laws," which can gradually be built up by introducing more and more of the complications of the real world, until there is gradually, "successively," a closer approximation to reality. From such laws, deductions can then be made about the behaviour of a material substance, for example, under particular conditions. The same method is used by Marx in *Capital*, through the use of abstraction. But whereas the natural scientist uses laboratory experiments, in which whatever is being studied is capable of physical

¹ Lenin.

² Robbins, *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science*.

³ Cf. Stalin, *Leninism*, pp. 600-18

⁴ Marx, Preface to First Edition of *Capital*, Vol. 1.

⁵ Cf. Stalin, *op. cit.*

isolation, as well as abstraction, the social scientist, since he cannot isolate what he is studying by laboratory experiment, must rely mainly on abstraction.

Once this is grasped, most of the difficulty about the relation between the three volumes of Marx's *Capital* disappears. In Vol. I, the subject, capitalist production, is dealt with on a higher level of abstraction than in the two subsequent volumes. This is done in order to establish the basic laws, and particularly to deal thoroughly with the fundamentals of the law of value, and of the basic process of exploitation. In the second volume the circulation of capital ("Capitalistic Circulation") is dealt with, and finally, in Vol. III, at a lower level of abstraction, the actual features of competitive capitalism, as it then was, are discussed under the general title of "Capitalist Production as a Whole." Moreover, the theory that commodities exchange at their prices of production, which is the key to the working of developed competitive capitalism, depends on the law of value which was worked out at a higher level of abstraction in Vol. I, since the explanation of profit is impossible without the law of value (see Lesson 2). The three volumes are therefore part of an integral whole which was worked out generally by Marx by the time the first volume was completed.¹

Bourgeois economists also make use of abstractions, at a high level, and there is nothing illegitimate about this. The real question at issue is: what abstractions are made and where do they lead. To answer this it is necessary to consider what is the nature of the problem under consideration and what are its essential elements. For Marx, the problem is to discover the law of motion of capitalist society; the essential elements of the problem are those underlying and expressing themselves in class conflicts. This is not so very different from the problem which Ricardo sought to tackle, though he was concerned with the conflict between landlord and capitalist, as seen from the standpoint of the latter.

Marx begins by leaving on one side all relationships except that between capital and labour, and this relationship he isolates and investigates by considering the phenomena of exchange, by means of a long and abstract dissertation, in the first chapter of *Capital*, on commodities and value. Whatever the abstraction, however, it is essential that it should not retreat from, but illuminate the real world, even although it cannot ever completely reflect the real world, since "the concept of a thing and its reality, run along side by side like two asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never meeting."²

Not only, therefore, are the abstractions used in the first volume of *Capital* (such as only two classes, a perfect market, homogeneous labour, equal compositions of capital and so on), selected in such a way as to enable the law of motion of capitalism to be discovered; but despite the abstract and provisional character of this part of the

¹ Cf. Marx-Engels, *Correspondence*, pp. 215, 240-5.

² Engels, *On Capital*, p. 137.

book, there is a wealth of illustrative data on every page, from blue books, factory inspectors' reports, and newspapers.

Bourgeois economists, on the other hand, use abstractions which distort the real world, since for them the central problem is a different one. The main feature of their economic theory is that it abstracts from social relations, from the whole social system in which it operates. Property relations and the distribution of incomes, historical influences and social conventions, are considered to have no bearing on consumers' preferences as reflected in demands on the market. Moreover, there is an almost exclusive concentration on minute problems of exchange between individuals, as an end in themselves, and in such a way that the results can throw little light on the larger problems of the real world (see Chapter I). Yet bourgeois economists claim that their system is equally valid for every historical system.

Marxists, therefore, study the particular laws and characteristics of each system. Marx in *Capital*, for example, was concerned primarily with the system of industrial capitalism, mainly on the basis of what it was in England in his time. Lenin made a careful study of the development of capitalism in Russia,¹ which was of quite fundamental importance in the early development of a correct political strategy there, especially in combating the Narodniks.² Lenin later made his famous analysis of the state of capitalism in his time, monopoly capitalism and imperialism.³

The Soviet economists study concretely the economic laws and economic problems of socialism.⁴ This question of the economic laws of socialism was one which was quite naturally not dealt with by Marx in the least dogmatically, or in more than the broadest outline.⁵

Bourgeois economists, on the other hand, have, of recent years, devoted a great deal of attention to the question of the "economics" of socialism, starting from their unchanging and "universally valid" laws. Some have come to the conclusion that socialism is impossible, while others feel that provided it behaves quite like capitalism, tidied up a little, it will be able to work. All seem to be agreed, however, upon one thing, that to an economist, the actual experience of the Soviet Union is totally irrelevant.⁶

Both Marxist political economy and economics claim to be scientific, and this short examination of their respective methods establishes clearly the claims of the first, but not of the second. The real test, however, is the test of practice, and it is here that Marxist political

¹ Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 221 *et seq*

² Cf. *History of the C P S. U (B)*, p. 11.

³ Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 5 *et seq*

⁴ Cf. Leontiev, "Political Economy in the Soviet Union," *Science and Society*, Spring, 1944

⁵ Cf. Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, p. 11.

⁶ Cf. Dobb, "Economists and the Economics of Socialism," *Modern Quarterly*, April, 1939.

economy establishes its complete superiority, not only as a means of explaining the subject matter with which it deals, but also as a means of making predictions about likely future developments. Economics, on the other hand, has proved itself a broken reed. It has been unable to explain crisis; it has ignored war; above all, it has been indifferent to Socialism. It has come to be recognised for what it is, a system of apologetics for capitalism. The late Lord Keynes, himself undoubtedly the greatest economist of recent times, nevertheless was sharply critical of economics when he wrote: "That it could explain much social injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of progress, and the attempt to change such things as likely to do more harm than good, commended it to authority. That it afforded a measure of justification to the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted to it the support of the dominant social force behind authority."¹ Yet it seems to have escaped his attention that the same conclusion had been reached sixty years earlier by Marx, who expressed himself even more pungently. In the Preface to the Second Edition of *Capital* Marx wrote of the bourgeois economists: "In place of disinterested enquirers, there were hired prize-fighters; in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetic."²

¹ *The General Theory of Money*, p. 33

² *Capital*, Vol. I, p. xxiii.

SHORT READING LIST

(References to the following and to other books are given in footnotes throughout the text)

Lesson I

- *LEONTIEV, *Political Economy*, Chap. 3.
- *MARX, *Letter to Kugelmann*, July 11th, 1868
- ENGELS, *On Capital*, Supplement, Vol. 3, of *Capital*
- MARX, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Part 1.
- DOBB, *Political Economy and Capitalism*, Chap. 1.
- SWEFZY, *Theory of Capitalist Development*, Part 1.
- VERULAM, in *The Modern Quarterly* (Spring, 1947)

Lesson II

- *LEONTIEV, *Political Economy*, Chaps. 2, 4, 5.
- *MARX, *Value, Price and Profit*.
- *DOBB, *Wages* (Cambridge University handbook)

Lesson III

- *LEONTIEV, *Political Economy*, Chaps. 6 and 7.
- *LENIN, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, pp. 22-6.
- LENIN, *Selected Works*, Vol. 12, "Law of Diminishing Returns."
- *MATTHEWS, *Communist Review*, March, 1946, "Capitalism in Agriculture"
- *ROLL, *History of Economic Thought*, Chap. on Marx.

Lesson IV

- MARX, *Theorien über den Mehrwert* (now being translated into English as *Theories of Surplus Value*).
- *LEONTIEV, *Political Economy*, p. 138 and Chap. 8.
- *DOBB, *Marx as an Economist*
- VERULAM, *Production for the People*, Chap. 8.
- BURNS, *Imperialism* (L.R.D.), chap. on Crisis.
- WINTERNITZ, *Problems of Full Employment*.

Lesson V

- LEONTIEV, *Political Economy*, Chap. 1.
- DOBB, *Marx as an Economist*.
- DOBB, *Introduction to Economics*.
- DOBB, *Political Economy and Capitalism*, Chaps. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6.
- SWEFZY, *Theory of Capitalist Development*, Part 1.
- ENGELS, Preface to *Capital*, Vol. 2 (excerpt in *On Capital*, p. 36).
- FEUER, "Dialectics and Economic Laws," in *Science and Society*, Autumn, 1941.

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For contents of numbers March to December, 1946, see January, 1947.

PREVIOUS NUMBERS IN 1947

JANUARY: *Prospects for 1947*, Harry Pollitt; *The Crisis in India*, R. Palme Dutt; *Economic Outlook in the United States*, Frank Russell, *Communism and Art—a Controversy*, F. D. Klingender; *Catholics in Politics and Trade Union*, Olive Parsons; *Consulting With Lenin*, Alex Massie, *Control of Building Materials*, David Hall.

MORE PRODUCTION OR BREAKDOWN

JOHN FREDERICK

DELAY AND SLACKNESS are as deadly to our hopes as active ill-doing. The menace of under-production, like dry rot in the home, undercuts our prosperity. Production is no longer a question for the boss. It affects the workers more closely. The fact that shortages exist now, over 18 months after the close of the war, is more important for the working-class housewife than it is for Colonel Bogus at the Ritz. The lack of production concerns the trade unionist with his eyes set on more real wages and shorter hours, or the Labour man who wants to see social security in generous amplitude, far more than the Stock Exchange or merchant classes, who can snatch a living from a corpse. Production is the responsibility of the workers. Not only their own immediate gratification—more shirts, more eggs, cheaper houses, more leisure—depends on getting more production, but their hopes of a Socialist Britain, holding its head up decently in a comity of nations. British economy, as a result of Toryism and imperialism, was a flash thing, its basis corrupt because it lived on exploitation. But we are all in British economy. Unless it is, so to speak, made seaworthy, able to chart a course under its own power, then it will be a poor, buffeted thing, liable to be taken in tow or left to sink. We must get power up. Once we do this, once the whole machinery available to us in our factories, our mines and our rails, our fields and our seacoasts, is made fully productive there is no limit to where we can go. But time is running out. The spending of the American loan is only one, almost a minor, aspect of the matter. But we must not underestimate this. The import/export position, with the heavy dependence on imports from dollar countries and the coming convertibility of sterling, is the immediate touch-off point. Nor does it all depend on the miners. Putting matters straight, however, must go to the heart of the matter—production.

Time is short. The danger points are complex. The penalty of drifting is not only unemployment and submergence in an American slump, but a permanent state of shortage and low standards of life. Prosperity in two or three years time depends on decisions taken now as to allocation of labour power, of efficient use of labour power. Re-equipment is needed in industry and agriculture. And this takes time.

If we take the U.S.A. we find that output per man hour before the war was about three times the British figure. The American operative

had at his disposal an average of 4.91 h.p. compared with the British operative's 2.37 h.p. (P.E.P. Broadsheet No. 260). British consumption was 80—90 per cent of the American; a higher rate than one would expect, due to a number of factors, some of which (a big income from colonial exploitation, e.g.) no longer exist. This comparison is not made as an incentive to competition—that indeed hardly arises! What the comparison shows is that there is an immense leeway to be made up before (as *The Times* City Editor warns) investment in mechanisation becomes uneconomic (i.e., the dead labour embodied in capital equipment is worth more than exploitation of new living labour).

The reason why the key urgency of productivity is not seen is that the workers fear unemployment. They have seen that profits go up and a slump follows increased production. How productivity can be increased without this happening is (in spite of the Government's wages-stop propaganda) a point of great importance. But the fact remains, to quote P.E.P. again, that "It is, of course, obvious that only increased output can raise *real* wages, once the possibilities of profit-squeezing have been exhausted."

This is true, and we are finding it out now—in coal shortage, housing starvation, general lack: only some 70 per cent of pre-war consumers' standard being reached.

Now it is not easy to get production going in this country. A heavy social structure is clamping us down. But consideration of the present situation makes it clear that we shall not get higher production if it is left to the boss. Britain can be submerged—with a parasitic growth of rentier capital still aloft and glistening like an evil thing. Remember the boss still wants unemployment. Remember the boss got out of trouble after the First World War. He has his troubles now, but he can adjust himself to them. He has, first, an active dominant imperialist rival, all powerful in the capitalist world, the U.S.A. He has, secondly, lost a great deal of his imperial possessions and lost all but physical control of the colonial masses: it is also doubtful for how long he can afford to maintain police control of them. He has lost a large number of his reactionary allies on the Continent. His political apparatus can no longer hold the people at home.

On the other hand, capitalism is still the dominant economic force in this country. Profits are rising. There is a vast accumulation of unspent profits. An enormous drain is filtering away to the owners of property, though the cheap money policy of the Government is lowering this menace. Capital values are rising steadily.

Under these circumstances the dominant capitalist policy is to use, to ally themselves with, the leading caucus in the Labour Party and

to rebuild the profit-making apparatus under cover of Socialist and moral anti-Communist slogans. The reactionary wing at the same time prepares for a showdown, in alliance with fascists, the clerical reaction and general Tory blackguards.

Now this dominant tactic of the capitalists in the present state of British economy raises a definite problem of production which can be formulated somewhat like this: can the profit motive, i.e., the free play of the market, operate the economic machine successfully? The small men are being squeezed out. The big men are running the bureaucratic and on the whole inefficient trusts. The administrative machine of the Labour Party caucus is too much drawn from the trust managers and upper grade civil servants. It can be argued that the ordinary capitalist incentives are weakened and a bureaucracy of trust bosses and Government bosses substituted.

But this alone cannot provide an efficient substitute. Evidence can be seen in the industries about to be nationalised. The delays and hesitations are crippling us. Profits go up, bank deposits reach record levels, dividends are regularly paid—on a somewhat higher scale—but there is little enough evidence of a guiding hand fructifying the country.

Now what has this meant?

In the first place, it has meant that the *militarists* are able to get away with economic murder. They are still able to retain armed forces and supply departments of one and three-quarter millions; a potential loss to the National Income of about £500 millions in 1938 £s, or about 9 per cent of the National Income. Bringing back a million men would go a long way towards breaching the £1,000 millions gap, of which the Government complains, between income and supply.

In the second place, it means that much of the force dealing with industry is lost. Nationalisation progress is winning away important sectors of the economy from capitalism: when steel is nationalised a central breach will have been made. The land and planning proposals carry the assault into the sacred land now inhabited largely by insurance companies. The fuel and power and transport proposals clear more inefficiency and bungling property rights out of the way. But they are late, and do not yet create enough new feeling and drive and opportunity for workers' initiative. There has been bad fumbling over housing because of the retreat before profiteering interests; persuasion of the cotton masters is taking too long; and the handling of the direction of non-nationalised industry, the flood of forms, the maintenance of the existing and overlapping merchanting organisation, the lack of organisation of the engineering industry are further

hampering production. Agriculture is allowed to slip back. The danger of allowing an interim state of affairs to be prolonged is extreme. It gives the enemy time to reinforce.

In the third place, it means there is no overall plan or guidance. On the one hand we have the experience over the exports drive: no long-term plan, no provision for the years ahead, no chance of reaching the target by this means. On the other hand, there is no national plan. It is true that eighteen months after the Election, we have a White Paper, hatched in secret with an inadequate staff and no industrial consultation. But this much-boosted "plan" provides the wrong solution. It casts much of the blame on the miners, whines at the cost of the social services, accepts the present set-up of manpower as God ordained, fixes a too low investment target, tries to enforce a wages stop, and growls at the engineers.

Now what is really needed to step up production? What lines of development can be taken, which are in touch with reality: ordinary preachifying is not realistic—the trade union leaders are much more realistic on this matter than some of the Labour politicians. But first let us put down the four ways in which production can be increased. One way is to get more workers. The Army can be reduced, and if the men who return go into vital industry and not into garages or luxury stores or dog tracks, or hang about waiting to buy a shop, each will add automatically some £400 a year to the National Income. A clearout can be made of the great number of people who survive by not working: both among the rich and among the "corner boys." As Arthur Horner asks: who are all the rest of the people at races and football matches when the wicked miners go to them? There is a surprising number of such people. Then again many women can be induced to come back to industry—if they have equal pay, nurseries, time off for shopping and so on.

This gross addition to the labour force is not enough in itself; it has to be combined with plans to see that the labour force goes where the need for production is greatest.

A second way of increasing production is to make the workers work harder. More toil and sweat. Actually, there is very little in this. By and large, the workers are working as hard as they can: or are likely to without changes in central direction.

Thirdly, organisation: a more adequate and even flow of raw materials, standardisation of materials, more workable materials and cutting down of unnecessary production patterns; elimination of unnecessary accidents, provision of health services, efforts to cut out fatigue, provision of welfare, etc. Now on this point there is no doubt that great difficulties are faced by this country. The raw

material position is very short. And shortages here are the indicative mark of the breakdown over imports—or of lack of exports to pay for them. Major metals, textiles, timber, paint materials, particularly linseed oil are very short. And, of course, coal. Now, while this calls for an export trade policy, it also calls for a drastic planning policy for distribution at home. (The same thing applies to food.) The hold-up which arises from the rigmarole of the distributive capitalists, the old-established "I know you, old fellow" technique, the cast bound methods of the big cartels, are wasting good transport and holding up the application of necessary priorities. We are paying, too, for the interregnum on the railways.

The fourth way to increase production, is the provision of more physical capital equipment, new real investment (as distinct from financial capital issues), i.e., added mechanisation, more horse-power per worker. It is in this connection that the constant drive against engineering is so ridiculous (and, for different reasons, why the attack on the size of the building force is out of place). Unless engineering, which after all came out of the war pretty well tooled up and efficient, is allowed to provide the necessary mechanisation, the pushing of more workers from engineering into other industries will lead to nothing. Engineering is "over-manned" because not enough investment planning is undertaken. On this point we may ask: what is the Government's policy? How much manpower are they designing to put into investment? A low investment policy now can hold us back decisively in 1949 and 1950. Of course, how much can go into investment and how much into consumption depends partly on productivity. It depends also largely on policy. The "gap" between the total of private incomes and the total of consumers' goods can be bridged by an investment policy.

Taking calculations by Barna (L. and C.E.S., October, 1945), a programme of investment on a modest scale, i.e., about 25 per cent gross above the 1938 level, would give an annual investment of £750 millions against £650 millions before the war (excluding houses). A heavier policy of investment would give £960 millions: this means doubling the net rate of fixed capital investment in 1938, and even so, it is doubtful if Barna made enough allowance for agricultural mechanisation. Taking a price increase of 60 per cent since 1938, the heavy investment programme would cost £1,500 millions, and the light programme £1,100 millions. The labour force involved would be between 1,280,000 (light) and 1,500,000. But it is potty economy to lessen the numbers now on investment for the benefit of consumption—where there are shortages now, when a policy of heavy investment brings cumulative returns.

It is clear that we need measures of policy, and the workers have to *understand and agree with this policy.*

To get agreement on this policy, certain things have clearly got to be done.

A policy for production turns on two main matters:—First, on planning. A decision must be taken as to the amount of labour, time and materials the country can spare to handle the amount of mechanisation, and new equipment. Once this decision is taken, effort must be made to put it into effect. A schedule must be drawn up, a definite plan around which the strength of the movement can be rallied. But to vitalise this, to get real control as opposed to paper plans, it may well be necessary for the Government to give the orders, provide the cash, appoint inspectors, check prices, study qualities, and so on. How far is this happening? Very little. During the war it was the fact that the Government paid that made the difference. (We need to remember the complete flop of the rearmament programme before the war, under much the same conditions as exist now.) But an announced scheme is necessary.

Secondly, as to trade union and workers' responsibility for production, no-one thinks, pretends or wants to talk about full control—"workers' control" and so on. But more is needed than is so far agreed. It is not just a question of workers' and trade union representation on Boards of nationalised industries. It is also one of real powers of interference and planning in non-nationalised industries. At present the various Councils set up are advisory, and bodies making decisions after the event. They shuffle papers. And responsible trade union leaders are getting fed up. Meanwhile, active and responsible people are getting the sack from the factories.

Moreover, workers' responsibility, knowledge and interference are the guarantee that slump will not follow higher productivity. But it is necessary that the workers feel that the Government is going to handle the slump, if sufficient productive power is got up to enable Britain to play a role at all. Under-production, under present circumstances, is no guarantee against a slump. As we found with coal and transport, it leads to unemployment.

It is, however, necessary to be clear that the Government's wages-stop policy ("no upgrading" of better-paid occupations), their perpetual fear of the rising of the aggregate amount of wages (with no reference to profits or to the rate of productivity) can gently but effectively stifle the drive for production.

For unless the co-operation of the workers is brought to bear, the production drive we want will never take place. In this lies the difference between the active members of the trade union movement

and the formal "democratic" £1,500-a-year Social Democrats. Unless the Government can be forced to accept this as a priority, the sole leading priority that matters, the lever which will upset the present capitalist dominance: we can accept the fate of this country as certain. The line of argument is put by Mr. Bussey, a typical representative of the new line of thought in trade unionism: "The success of any national plan for manpower will depend to a large extent on the active participation of the trade unions."

This is the way in which we shall call in the new world to redress the balance of the old. The employers have held on to "managerial functions" for too long. This insistence on the old forms of power blocks the way forward to efficiency—production depends on democracy, in peace as it did in war.

EASTERN AGRICULTURE AND BRITISH TRADE

ARTHUR CLEGG

THE REASON why agriculture in the Far East is different from British agriculture lies not in the difference in crops grown, nor in the size of farm (which averages from 2 to 3 acres in most Far Eastern countries against an average of 83 acres for England and Wales), but primarily in the form of exploitation. It is the similarity in the form of exploitation which enables the countries of the Far East and South-East Asia to be dealt with together, despite local peculiarities.

The typical working farmer in Great Britain gets his income first as a wage for his own labour and second as a return on capital invested in his farm. Even if the only labour on the farm is that of the farmer and his wife (and this is the case in two-fifths of British farms) they still get both this wage and the return on capital from their own labour. If they did not, then they would soon turn to another occupation where they could get an average wage and invest their capital where they could get a return from someone else's labour. Landlordism is very prevalent in Britain and rent is a heavy burden on the farmer, but the landlord receives a capitalist rent determined by the difference in the productivity of the particular piece of land and that of the worst land in cultivation, plus an element determined by the degree of monopoly in land. Should the landlord try to exceed this market-determined rent then, in the long run, his tenants will leave the land and find alternative occupations for their labour and capital.

In Far Eastern countries, however, the function of rent is to take from the farmer all the produce of his land above the very minimum necessary for subsistence, and often more. It is a feudal rent. While the peasant is not tied to the land as a serf, his mobility is restricted by the necessity of growing crops on irrigated land (rice, above all, needs irrigation and elaborate irrigation is entirely beyond the means of a lone peasant) and by the lack of alternative occupations to agriculture, due to the lack of industry. Thus the landlord is able to keep his peasants down to the minimum subsistence level, and even below because, once driven from the land, they and their families face starvation. The peasant prefers to be half-starved, rather than completely starved. That is the essence of it.

The dependence of the peasant on irrigation has enabled China to maintain a feudal system of exploitation for centuries without the necessity for legal forms of serfdom, as in feudal Europe. Individual ownership of land, plus the dispossession or imprisonment of tenants for non-payment of rent, was all that was necessary to maintain the system.

The produce of the tenant farmer is divided between his landlord and himself on a percentage basis. The proportion naturally depends on the fertility of the land and may vary from 20 per cent of produce to the landlord from poor land up to even 90 per cent to the landlord from the best land. In the Philippines the average proportion to the landlord before the war was about 50 per cent, in Japan about the same, in China and Korea the average was nearer 60 per cent to the landlord. The purpose is everywhere the same: to take all the produce above the lowest possible subsistence level. In addition to rent, the tenant usually has additional obligations such as to transport the landlord's share of the crop to the landlord's barn, and to pay various taxes.

Since the farms are small and the rate of exploitation high, landlords with small estates are common. After all, if a peasant family can eke out an existence on 40 per cent of the produce of a farm of two and a half acres, a landlord family can live quite comfortably from 60 per cent of the produce of an estate of seven and a half acres worked by three tenants. Thus in both China and Japan there is a large class of small landlords. In China in the 1920s one calculation put the number of small landlords or gentry at 200,000 to 300,000.

The prevalence of small landlordism, however, does not exclude the existence of large estates. In China, the same calculation gave a figure of 30,000 for the total of big landlords. In South China estates of 3,300 acres are not uncommon. In a recent article in *Pacific Affairs* on Manchuria (where wheat, not rice, is grown), A. J. Grajdanzev stated that at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century "huge

estates were formed which in size were comparable to the estates of the German Junkers." He quotes instances of estates ranging from 29,000 acres to 405,000 acres. In Japan before the war estates were not of this magnitude, but 3,415 individuals owned 122.5 acres of land or more. They had altogether 620,000 tenant families on their estates. In the Philippines, in central Luzon, approximately one per cent of the population held 99 per cent of the land. In some cases as many as 30,000 tenants farmed the land of one owner.

The second feature of the system is that the feudal form of exploitation is closely tied to a money economy. The landlord, receiving all the crops above subsistence level, usually has a surplus above the requirements of his own family. He sells this rice to buy the manufactured goods and luxuries he desires. In the past this led to the rise of a wealthy though subordinate merchant class in China. At the present it explains the close link between merchants and landlords in countries such as China. Discussing feudal Europe, Maurice Dobb in his *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* states (pp. 17-18) "the appearance of a purely merchant class will have of itself no revolutionary significance . . . Since its fortunes will tend to be bound up with the existing mode of production, it is more likely to be under an inducement to preserve that mode of production than to transform it." This is especially true of Chinese merchants.

Apart from small supplies of rice from owner-peasants the landlords thus control the marketable rice. Their custom is to withhold it in order to force up prices. Today one hears much of food shortages in Japan and the American zone in Korea. These are due not so much to actual food shortage, but to hoarding by the landlords against a rise in price, and the reluctance of the American authorities to take action against such landlords.

An example of the way the system works is provided by the following table on the position in Korea from A. J. Grajdanzev's *Korea Divided*. After the division of the harvest, according to a Japanese investigation in 1932, the following was the distribution of rice between landlords and tenants (in bushels):

	per family	per person
Landlord	3,646	627
Tenant	121	22

Since the food needed per person per year as a minimum diet is put at 55 bushels, it is clear that only the landlord family has rice to sell, while the tenant has to live on inferior grains and what other supplementary foods he can scrape together.

The third feature of Far Eastern agriculture derives from the existence of a money economy. The peasant (whether tenant or owner)

is not entirely self-sufficient. He needs to buy a few simple necessities: salt, farm or household implements, clothes. For these he needs money. To get it he must sell a little of his grain, or the products of some household industry or of silk cultivation, or borrow it. The appearance of factory-made textiles in the Far East in the 19th and 20th centuries dealt household industries a great blow, and seriously reduced the money income of most peasant households, both of tenants and of peasants owning their own land. This has been followed by a great rise in indebtedness, so that modern agricultural writers, such as V. Liversage in *Land Tenure in the Colonies*, can say "In the East the village moneylender is the indispensable basis of rural life." In Malaya the smallholder is "normally overwhelmed" by "his immense load of debt." In Java if peasant accounts with moneylenders were to be liquidated, said an article in the *Bulletin of the International Institute of Agriculture* (2.2.16), "an immense majority of the people would have to be declared bankrupt. Only at rare or short periods, as immediately after the harvest, could the normal Javanese cultivator show more assets than liabilities."

The rates of interest paid to these moneylenders are, of course, gigantic. R. H. Tawney, in his *Land and Labour in China* states "Interest at 40 to 80 per cent (per year) is said to be common; interest at 150 to 200 per cent not unknown." But even higher rates of interests prevail in some areas. Fei Hsiao-tung in *Village Life in China* records how in Yangtze delta villages, "The person who borrowed 7 dollars in one October will repay 48 dollars in the next October. The rate of interest is thus about 50 per cent per month on average." If the debtor cannot pay then he hands over the title deeds of his land and becomes a tenant. It is this system of moneylending at extortionate rates which is more than anything responsible for the steady growth of landlordism in Far Eastern countries in the last fifty years, and especially for the growth of absentee landlordism. The moneylender may take over the land of the debtor out in the country, but he himself prefers to live in the town and send his agents out to collect the rent.

These three features of small landlordism, landlord control of the marketable surplus, and moneylending leading to the growth of landlordism have long existed in countries such as China. It is important to ask how imperialism and the appearance of foreign monopoly-capitalist concerns in the Far East affected the system. The effect of factory-made textiles on household industries and in speeding the growth of landlordism has been mentioned, but this by no means exhausts the story.

Imperialism has not destroyed the old social relations, rather it has sought to preserve them, to prevent the growth of industry which could

provide an alternative employment to agriculture, and to superimpose its own exactions upon the already existing exactions of the landlords.

In the first place these exactions took the form of downright robbery, such as the indemnities which China had to pay for being conquered in sundry wars. Scarcely less concealed was the method of forcing loans on these countries at high rates of interest secured on taxes. Both these methods did not disturb rents, but added to the tax burden carried in the last analysis by the peasants.

Even more important have been the exactions of the foreign monopoly concerns from their own operations. Just as factory textiles disturbed peasant budgets and drove peasants increasingly to the moneylenders, so the appearance of foreign banking concerns in Asia meant a tie between the village moneylender and the foreign bank. Many village moneylenders are linked by accounts and credits with foreign banks such as the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. While the actual amount advanced to any moneylender may be small, it is essential to his business, a guarantee of his respectability. Thus today in most eastern countries back of the moneylender stands the big bank, drawing high profits from the moneylenders' business.

A second method of additional exploitation is that of establishing buying and selling monopolies.

The supreme example of this was the complete monopoly in the purchase and sale of rice established by Steel Brothers Ltd., in Burma in the 1920s. While this monopoly is not so obvious today, the great rice mills in Burma are still controlled by Steels and other British concerns and the monopoly is none the less a fact. In China, at one time, Standard Oil established a monopoly of oil sales, and it seeks to do so again.

In parts of China the British-American Tobacco Company achieved another kind of monopoly during and following the First World War. Through their compradors (Chinese buying agents), by bribing landlords and by offering peasants in Shantung and Honan provinces good prices for turning over to tobacco growing, they established tobacco growing over wide areas. Then the prices began to come down. Since the vast majority of the peasants were too poor to dig up the tobacco and buy seed to turn back to their old crops they were in the grip of the company and had to take what prices it offered; while the landlords, drawing their revenues from the company prices, were turned into agents of the British-American Tobacco Company.

Such examples could be repeated but are sufficient to show the way in which imperialist exploitation is additional to old methods, and how the interests of the imperialist concerns, the landlords and the moneylenders are merged.

The consequence of this additional exploitation is the further impoverishment of the peasants. Of China, Professor Fei Hsiao-tung writes:

"The essential problem in Chinese villages, putting it in the simplest terms, is that the income of the villagers has been reduced to such an extent that it is not sufficient even to meet the expenditure in securing the minimum requirements of livelihood. It is the hunger of the people that is the real issue in China."

In Korea, A. J. Grajdanzev calculates that the "average consumption of rice was almost halved in 20 years," declining from 38 bushels in 1915-19 to 22 bushels per head per year in 1934-38. The peasants could not make up all this decline even from eating poorer grains, for the per head consumption of all cereals (including beans) also declined in the same period.

The increasing impoverishment of the masses of Far Eastern peoples in the past fifty years is one of the foremost facts of recent world history. In India and China in the 1930s average income per head was already under £5 per year and still declining.

In the 19th century the exploitation of these countries produced fat pickings for the imperialists. But so heavy has been the weight of the double exploitation that in the 20th century the impoverishment of these masses has reacted on the trade of the imperialist concerns themselves. They have destroyed and are destroying their own markets. This is most easily seen in relation to textiles. The *Memorandum on the Cotton Industry* published by the United Textile Factory Workers' Association in 1928 stated:

"In the Report of the Indian Tariff Board (1927) it is shown that Indian consumption of cotton textile piece goods per head has fallen by no less than 14 per cent (comparing 1913-14 with 1925-26). This is the total decline, taking into account both imported and home produced piece goods, and it proves conclusively that the reduced purchasing power of the Indian workers is a fundamental factor in the British exports decline."

When it is remembered that more than half the population of the world live in conditions similar to those described above, the importance of this problem cannot be belittled. The impoverishment of Eastern peasants exercises a drag on the whole world economy, and is one of the major contributory causes of economic crisis—overproduction in relation to the restricted consumption of the masses.

In Britain today we hear much about the need to expand British trade as part of a world trade expansion. What is not appreciated is that neither British nor world trade can expand much unless landlordism and imperialism are destroyed. It is clear from the above that

these twin problems present a challenge not only to Eastern peoples but also to the British Labour movement, for the future prosperity of Britain and of the British workers necessitates their solution. A second article will deal with what can be and must be done.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

JAMES KLUGMAN

IN THE COURSE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR and the period that has since gone by, a new life dawned for the peoples of the greater part of Eastern Europe. In Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, the people have developed new popular democracies, democracies which no longer serve as covers for the rule of a small minority of the people, but in which the great majority of the people are themselves the decisive factor. In Rumania and Hungary, the people are engaged in sharp conflict with the old ruling classes, with the aim of establishing democratic States of a similar popular type. In none of these countries is the struggle over. In all, the old ruling classes, remnants of fascism and reaction, are fighting hard to retain or retrieve their privileged positions. Their actions range from terrorist assassinations to undercover work in the peasant parties and disgruntled gossip in the big cafes. In face of the determination of the people to move forward through popular democracy to Socialism, East European reaction looks more and more to foreign imperialism to stay the course of history.

The struggle is not over, but the people have won important victories, and these developments are of world-wide significance. Well-nigh one hundred million people, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Rumanians, Hungarians, speaking a dozen languages, with very varying histories and cultures, Catholics, Orthodox, Moslems, and Jews, peasants, workers, artisans, small traders and intellectuals have removed from power their old reactionary governments and have established broad, popular governments of a new type. Countries of desperate poverty are now, despite vast war losses, moving forward on the road to prosperity, and countries formerly bereft for the most part of the most elementary civil rights are now havens of great trade unions, youth and women's organisations, cultural and popular organisations of every sort. Former centres of national

oppression are now based on the full equality of peoples. What were centres of foreign imperialist intrigue and influence have become or are becoming popular democracies; Eastern Europe, historic cockpit of war, has become, apart from Austria and Greece, a grouping of friendly nations, a stable basis of European and international peace.

Schematisation must be avoided. There are many economic, social, cultural and historical differences between these countries. But there are certain underlying similarities in their recent development. They are countries where, in the words of Dimitrov, "as a result of the war and under the influence of the great work of the Soviet Union, a deep change has been wrought," where the large landed estates have been abolished, a considerable part of the means of production has become State property and the State itself is not an apparatus of the rich for the suppression of the working people, but operates in the interest of the latter.

Under what conditions have these peoples' democracies developed?

First, in the course of the war the old ruling-class landowners and bankers, industrialists, heads of the Civil Service, Army, open and secret police, members of the Royal Family, were, with few exceptions, discredited. They were revealed to their own people as traitors who had sold their country to the Axis, who defended their own class interests at the expense of the interests of the nation. With the final defeat of Hitler, therefore, the position of the ruling class was immensely weakened. In some cases, as in Yugoslavia, the old State machinery had disintegrated or become absorbed by the occupation forces; in all it was severely shaken. The old ruling classes fled the country, went into hiding or retirement, or, in many cases, sought cover for their intrigues in the opposition Parties (such as Peasant and Liberal Party in Rumania) or in the right-wing of democratic parties.

Secondly, under the leadership of the Communist Parties, the working class, the whole working people, the vast majority of the people found new unity. Working-class unity in action was achieved in all these countries as a basis for wider unity. The fight for the defence of the nation against fascist aggression or domination and for the reconstruction of the country was carried out by the working people under the leadership of the Communist Parties. The people fought simultaneously against foreign fascism and internal reaction. During the war or in the immediately following period, the people built or began to build a State that operated in their interest, the interest of the 90 per cent of all those who do the useful work, together with an Army, police force and Civil Service that would serve the people and not reaction. This process found its highest development in Yugoslavia, where the whole people were mobilised

in the Partisan Resistance Movement and where the National Liberation Committees, elected by the people, laid the basis for the future people's State.

The extent to which the historic State forms were taken over and adapted in the new popular States, varies from country to country, but in all the fight for the further democratisation of the State, the further participation of the people in every side of its activities, is still in progress. The new democratic States made it possible for the first time to hold really democratic elections. Women and soldiers voted mostly for the first time, electorates were far larger than ever before, the vast majority of the people discussed, considered, and voted. These elections gave stability to the new regimes, giving large majorities to the Popular Fronts or Coalitions, except in Hungary, where the working-class Parties nevertheless gained a substantial minority and the majority Smallholders Party included a progressive section. These elections, in their turn, made it possible to take further steps to democratise the State and the old contradictions between Parliament and the people, the people and the State began to disappear. New Constitutions giving binding legal status to the achievements of the people have been elaborated or are in process of elaboration.

Thirdly, a democratic solution was applied to the national question. National hatred which used to divide East European countries between themselves and national oppression, by which the reactionary governments used to divide their own peoples, were broken or weakened by common resistance to Axis domination and internal traitors. National equality is embodied within all the new laws and constitutions, and racial chauvinism has become a crime by law. Many difficulties, of course still exist, such as the remains of national chauvinism in Slovakia and Hungary. National prejudices cannot be driven from peoples' minds in a few months or a few years. But the basis has been laid, economic and political, for new friendship between all peoples of the new democracies.

Fourthly, the economic basis is being laid for the new peoples' States. Agrarian reform laws have divided up the big estates, ended the bondage of hundreds of thousands of land-starved, impoverished peasants, and given the land to those that cultivate it. In varying degrees, in all these countries, the natural resources, communications, banks and credit institutions and key industries have passed or are passing into the hands of the people. Before the end of 1946 over 80 per cent of all Yugoslav industry, 90 per cent of Polish, over 60 per cent of Czechoslovak, and over 70 per cent of Bulgarian industry had been nationalised. In Hungary, many key industries and all communications are State owned. With popular support reconstruction

is in full swing in all the new democracies; Co-operatives, producing and consuming, are being developed, above all on the land. On this basis, the possibility arises for planning the economic destiny of the country. With important positions held by the State and Co-operative sectors of economy, and with measures of control over the private sector (such as wages and price control, taxation policy, control of investment and foreign trade), a planned economy has become possible. In this way, the Three-Year Plan in Poland, the Two-Year Plan in Czechoslovakia, the Five-Year Plan in Yugoslavia, the Two-Year Plan in Bulgaria, the Three-Year Plan in Hungary, the Albanian economic plan, the Rumanian plans for electrification and development of industry are either in operation or in process of elaboration. The restrictive domination of foreign capital which often held back industrial development in Eastern Europe was ended for the most part after the defeat of Hitler. Foreign loans and foreign capital investment are welcomed, but will no longer be allowed to dominate or restrict the national economies.

The essential nature of these new democracies is that power has been removed from the small clique and groups of the ruling classes, the 5—10 per cent, the bankers, landowners, big businessmen, leaders of the Army, Civil Service and Police Force, and that the vast majority of the people, the 90 per cent, the workers, peasants, craftsmen, small traders, intellectuals have become, or are becoming, the decisive factor in the State. As Georgi Dimitrov said in a radio speech on September 7, 1946:—

"Bulgaria will not be a Soviet Republic, but she will be a people's Republic in which the leading part will be played by the overwhelming majority of the people, workers, peasants, craftsmen and intelligentsia. No dictatorship will exist in it, but the decisive factor in the Republic will be the working-majority, the people of useful work, and not big speculative capital and a minority of politically and morally rotten individuals."

In relation to the preparation of a new Constitution for Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister Gottwald, in December, 1946, said:—

"We are no longer a republic of the old parliamentarian-democratic type, a bourgeois-democratic Republic; nor are we a Socialist Republic. We have created a new specifically Czechoslovak type which lies between both above-mentioned systems. It is best to apply the term 'democratic people's republic.' It would be wrong to use the old term in the new Constitution and equally wrong to talk of a Socialist Republic, a term which would, in fact, not truly describe our republic as yet."

"What is the basis of this new democracy?" said Marshal Tito,

speaking of the new Yugoslavia to a mass meeting on October 22, 1946, "and what distinguishes it from Western Democracy?"—

"Our democracy is not a phrase, not something only quoted in official documents. No, in our country it is a reality, at the basis of which is the correct solution of the social and national problem. What sort of a democracy is it over there, if, in normal peace-time, alongside full shops and stores and an abundance of everything, a tremendous part of the nation has no opportunity of availing itself thereof and improving its standard of living . . . Our democracy, however, has no such basis. It has created new conditions for the working class. In our democracy they have no longer to fear unemployment and the future, because the necessary safeguards have been assured. Our democracy has also created a new co-operation between all classes of our people, between the workers, peasants and the people's intelligentsia."

"The basis of Peoples' Democracy," stated Comrade Revai at the Third Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party, "is the association of labour and peasantry against greedy big business and other reactionary layers of society."

What road to Socialism is envisaged by those who have developed or are fighting to develop the new types of popular democracy in Eastern Europe? Dimitrov said:—

"Every nation will effect its transition to Socialism not by a mapped-out route, not exactly as in the Soviet Union, but by its own road, dependent on its historical, national, social and cultural circumstances."

With the new relation of world forces and with the passing of power from reaction to the people, new perspectives for the development to Socialism open before the East European democracies.

These are not perspectives which mean that Socialism will be given on a plate to the East European peoples, but perspectives of further class struggles on the basis of gains already made. The struggles now in progress in all these lands, for the reconstruction of the country, for the fulfilment of the economic plans, for the further development of the popular democratic State, for the further isolation of the old ruling class, are steps in the new path to Socialism.

At a meeting at Warsaw on November 30, 1946, Gomulka, Secretary-General of the Polish Communist Party, said:—

"We have chosen our own Polish way of development which we have styled the way of the People's Democracy. In this way and under these conditions the dictatorship of the proletariat and even less the dictatorship of one Party is neither indispensable nor advisable. We consider that the country should be ruled by a coalition of all democratic Parties closely and harmoniously co-operating together."

Speaking at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in September, 1946, Klement Gottwald discussed the same problem. He said:—

“Experience and the classical Marxist-Leninist teaching show that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the setting up of Soviets is not the only way leading to Socialism. Under certain conditions it can be achieved in a different manner. The defeat of fascism and sufferings of the nations have revealed in many nations the true face of the ruling-class and at the same time increased the self-confidence of the people. In such historical moments new ways and possibilities appear . . . We have already advanced a certain distance on our specific Czechoslovak road to Socialism. We have learned to walk on this road and shall go forward towards our aim with still greater determination.”

Speaking at the Congress of the Bulgarian Workers' (Communist) Party in February, 1946, Georgi Dimitrov discussed the problem of the road to Socialism:—

“ . . . the existence of so great a Socialist State as the Soviet Union, and the historic democratic revolutions which have been taking place in so many countries since the war, raises the question of the creation of Socialism for many countries, not as a question of the struggle of the working-class for Socialism against the remaining productive social strata in the country, but, on the contrary, as a question of the co-operation between the working-class with the peasants, craftsmen, intelligentsia and the progressive strata of the people. When one day the question of a transition from the present social organisation to a new socialist order arrives in this country as well, then the Communists, leaning on the people, will build a new socialist society, not in the struggle against the peasants, craftsmen and intelligentsia, but together with them. In short, it will be the historic work of the entire people. This course of social development, comrades, may to some appear slower than the policy of “take up your arms, hit right and left, and set up your dictatorship!” However, the former course is not only possible and realistic, but it is also undoubtedly less painful for the people.”

The essence of these discussions has been to show that even within the new democracies the roads to Socialism will vary widely, that even in these countries there will be important differences in relations between Parties, use and adaptation of historical forms of local and national government, tempo of agricultural and industrial reform. However, in general terms, it is possible to say that in the new world situation, where peoples' democracies have been developed, the transition to Socialism may come without further revolution, without

dictatorship of the proletariat; but in each case this depends on the continued struggle of the people against the old ruling classes, the remnants of fascism and reaction.

The second decisive factor is the new relation of world forces, the new strength of the working class and progressive movement, of the national-liberation forces in the colonies and, above all, of the new and vast moral and material influence of the Soviet Union. The position has changed since 1917, and the very factor of the successful proletarian revolution of the Soviet workers, and of their period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has made possible a different development for many countries. The Soviet Union acts as a true friend to the peoples of the new democracies and, together with the progressive forces which have been immensely strengthened in all countries, guarantees them against foreign imperialist intervention and makes it possible for them to develop their own forms of government and to follow their own specific roads of development.

It is clear that the road to Socialism in Great Britain will be neither the same road as that of the Soviet Union, nor as that of the new democracies of Eastern Europe. Thus far, under the Labour Government, the capitalist State apparatus and the apparatus of imperial domination have remained untouched. But we can learn much from the study of these countries, above all from the heroic and leading role of the Communist Parties. It was their fight for the unity of the whole people in defence of the interests of the nation when the old ruling classes were revealed as quislings and traitors, their struggle for reconstruction, their initiative in the elaboration of national economic plans, their profound understanding of Marxist theory and of their own national history and culture that enabled them to find their own specific forms of popular government and their own specific road to Socialism. We must understand, too, that it is the specific responsibility of the British people to make impossible the efforts of international reaction to interfere with the peaceable way forward of the East European democracies, and to cement the closest relations of friendship and collaboration with the peoples of these new popular democratic States.

TRUSTEESHIP

MICHAEL CARRITT

THROUGHOUT Lenin's writings there is emphatic insistence on the right of nations, including the oppressed colonial peoples, to self-determination and the duty of the workers in the "advanced" countries to help and promote their struggle for freedom.

If the colonial struggle for liberation raised no more than a question of justice and equity, then there would not have been a fundamental difference between Lenin and the Social Democratic leaders of the Second International on the national and colonial question. For Social Democracy admitted the injustice of national oppression but, as far as Asiatic and African colonies were concerned, believed that a wiser, more farsighted, and more human colonial administration could remove the injustice. It was not imperialism that was to blame but the unnecessary crudity of its methods. These the Liberal humanists and the Social Democrats would revise and reform.

On the contrary Lenin's main argument for national self-determination followed necessarily from his analysis of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, finance capital in the era of its decay, in the era of imperialist wars and of the on-coming proletarian revolution. The struggle of the colonies against imperialist oppression was therefore an integral and very important part of the world struggle against monopoly capitalism. In so far as they helped to promote this struggle for liberation, the workers in the "advanced" countries were striking a blow at their own oppressors and helping to undermine the whole basis of their "own" capitalism and sapping the source of its power to exploit them. A nation which oppresses other nations can never be free.

The whole charge of opportunism levelled against the Social Democratic leaders was that they believed immediate gains could be won for a privileged section of the workers as a result of an expanding and prosperous imperialist system; consequently they could not urge these same workers to join hands with the colonial movements in trying to kill the golden goose of imperialism; in effect, therefore, whilst urging reforms of the "worst aspects" of imperialism, they helped to strengthen the power of monopoly capital to exploit black and white workers alike.

In justification of its opportunism, Social Democracy advocated the theory that the rule of backward countries by imperialist powers, however unpleasant in its immediate results, created the necessary conditions for economic and industrial development (and hence the growth of an industrial proletariat and Socialist movement) in the colonial countries.

The experience of half a century has belied these comfortable theories; imperialist tutelage has not permitted any economic or political development, and so far from being a substitute for the bourgeois democratic revolution succeeds only in creating a united movement of revolt against the colonial conditions which it creates.

The national self-determination of all subject people is, therefore, today still a central issue in the struggle against world reaction and for peace, democracy and social progress. Socialists are perfectly well aware that in the modern world with its highly organised exchange of commodities and interdependent economy, the fragmentation into national units is a hindrance to scientific economic planning on a world scale. But the unity which capitalism seeks to achieve consists in a forcible subjection which breeds its own destruction by giving birth to the national movements of revolt against oppression. The nations of the world can only be brought together into lasting unity after they have first been liberated.

The conception of trusteeship must be examined against the background of these established principles of Socialism. If by trusteeship is meant a new-fangled alternative to self-determination supposedly suitable to a new world situation; or if by trusteeship it is intended to impart a new morality to the old machinery of colonial administration, then it would be only another "reactionary consolation of the masses" in order to "distract their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present." (Lenin).

Trusteeship is no new conception. The contradiction within the Social Democratic and Liberal humanism which desires to alleviate the sufferings of subject people but at the same time accepts the imperialist system, makes them an easy prey to a slogan like trusteeship which sought to show that the welfare and development of the colonies was a sacred trust imposed upon the imperialist countries. The African or other colonial subject is naturally cynical about this elaboration of the theory of the White Man's Burden which not only makes the unwarranted assumption of his natural inferiority but shifts to his shoulders the responsibility for backwardness which is aggravated by the imperialist system of administration.

The end of the First World War saw a tremendous upsurge of the revolutionary movement throughout the world, not least in the colonies, where Allied promises of "independence" and self-determination had been rashly made in order to win support for the Allied cause. Not only the people in the colonies demanded these promises to be implemented, but there was a growth of Liberal idealism and internationalism which found expression in the League of Nations. To confuse the Liberals and to prevent these new developments from assuming dangerous proportions the imperialist powers began to pay serious attention to the idea of trusteeship and incorporated it within the mandate system of the League of Nations as part of the post-war settlement. Territories taken over by the Allies

from the ex-enemy powers were to be held "in trust" with responsibility for their good government, for the promotion of native interests, and for the "open-door" in trade. In this way it was sought to turn aside the accusation of territorial aggrandisement and to divert the growing popular opposition to imperialism.

In practice the mandate system proved to be not a substitute but a cover for imperialist aggrandisement. The League of Nations Articles piously laid down principles for administration which every colonial administrator readily accepted in theory; they paraded the paramountcy of native interests and welfare in general terms, but failed to set up machinery to enforce it. As a result the standard of social services, education, health, etc., was no better, and even worse, than in "ordinary" colonies. In the mandated territories of South West Africa, Syria, Samoa, Palestine and Iraq the machine gun, bombing plane and mass imprisonment were freely used in order to suppress popular national movements organised to demand democratic rights and civil liberties. When the Permanent Mandate Commission received petitions of complaint about these events it replied that it could only take cognizance of complaints which came through official channels and that it was constitutionally unable to send representatives to carry out an inspection on the spot.

The balance of class forces in the world being what it was between the two world wars, it was not difficult for imperialism thus to manipulate the mandate system and to trade upon the confused humanitarianism that wanted to "internationalise" the colonies and to treat colonialism as the acceptance of a sacred trust. This confusion was made all the easier by the Labour leaders' faithfulness to the Social Democratic fallacy that trusteeship was an alternative to self-determination.

But with the military defeat of Fascism in 1945, the world presents a new picture with an entirely new balance of class forces.

In this new world situation can trusteeship be used in appropriate circumstances in order to *end*, rather than as in the past to excuse or "reform", imperialism?

Chapters 11, 12 and 13 of the United Nations Charter are concerned with the trusteeship system. It would be easy to regard the formulations of the Charter as no more than the pious declaration which imperialism is always prepared to make in response to popular democratic pressure. But it would be fatal to overlook the fact that it is the Soviet Union, admitted champion of colonial self-determination, and the new democracies who have no imperialist leanings, that have fought consistently at San Francisco, in London and now at Lake Success to make the Articles of the Charter which deal with trustee-

ship capable of really being used as weapons for the speediest liberation of the existing mandates and the present ex-enemy colonies.

Thus, in the face of strenuous opposition from the imperialist powers and their satellites, the Soviet Union fought for the definition of trusteeship to include the objective of independence. In the end a compromise formula had to be accepted which laid down "progressive development towards self government or independence as can be applied to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned". Unsatisfactory and confusing as this compromise is, it nevertheless results in a formulation more concise and comprehensive, and more political in character, than the corresponding passage in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Other important improvements on the Covenant are that the Trusteeship Council will not simply be a committee of imperialist powers but will include Russia and China, and further, that it will have the right to hear complaints and to carry out inspections.

When the Preparatory Committee of UNO met in London at the end of 1945, it became clear that British imperialism was a little nervous at the way in which the trusteeship proposals were being utilised by world democratic forces in order to prevent a repetition of the League of Nations mandates farce. In order to prepare the ground for a Middle East anti-Soviet bloc, Mr. Bevin hastily bestowed a spurious "independence" (with continued military occupation) on the mandated territory of Transjordan; the question of Palestine was reserved on the ground that discussions were taking place; and no decision was reached over the future of ex-enemy territories because on the one hand America had in mind to annexe the Pacific Islands whilst Mr Bevin was paralysed with fear at the prospect of the Soviet influence upon the national movements in the countries lying along Britain's strategic life-line to the Far East. Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand offered to hand over (subject to certain reservations) their strategically unimportant colonies to the Trusteeship Council, but the meeting dispersed without having constituted the council.

On the outcome of this conflict between the progressive forces and the imperialist powers within the United Nations will depend whether the trusteeship system can serve to help the colonial liberation movements or whether it will again be used to confuse the struggle and cloak new forms of exploitation. Neither the articles of the Charter nor the rules governing its procedure are more than paper resolutions if considered apart from the relative strength of the forces engaged in the struggle around the question of establishing a Trusteeship Council. But the very sharpness with which the struggle is being

conducted is in striking and welcome contrast to the easy complacency with which the imperialists voted themselves into the position of trustees after the First World War.

At Lake Success the Soviet representative, N. Novikov, challenged the whole proceedings in so far as the draft trusteeship agreement submitted by the British and the other imperialist powers had not been agreed to by the "countries directly concerned" as laid down in the Charter. Novikov claimed that not only Russia and China, as future members of the Trusteeship Council, were "directly concerned", but also other smaller countries not excluding the colonial people themselves. He disputed the right of the imperialist powers to treat mandated territories as chattels in whose future they alone were directly concerned.

The support of the Committee on Trusteeship was gained also for Novikov's contention that the draft trusteeship agreements were open to criticism because they claimed to administer the trusteeship territories as an integral part of the territorial possessions of the imperialist countries instead of as trusts subject to international justification and the final responsibility of the Trusteeship Council.

Novikov also drew attention to the lack of any time limit for the period of trusteeship or even for any revision of the agreements in accordance with the proposed progress of the territory toward self-government or independence. The Trusteeship Committee accepted his amendment which called for revision of trusteeship agreements after ten years, but it was met with the united opposition of the Anglo-American bloc in the Assembly.

The struggle to give effect to a real system of trusteeship still goes on within UNO. Whilst it would be short-sighted to underestimate successes already achieved by democratic forces or to exaggerate the manœuvring power of imperialism in its efforts to subvert the trusteeship principle, nevertheless decisive factors in the struggle for colonial liberation lie in the colonies themselves. The role played by the Soviet Union and other democratic countries in UNO has given tremendous impetus to the colonial movement. A tremendous responsibility also lies upon the British working class to influence the Labour Government's policy in these international councils so that it begins to pull its weight for a *real* trusteeship that will be an alternative to imperialism instead of an alternative to self-determination.

In the last resort self-determination will be achieved in so far as each colonial country develops its own necessary national forces. Such development has taken place in many colonies, notably Burma and Malaya, with exciting rapidity since 1939. No longer can Africa or the

West Indies be regarded as complacent political backwaters amenable to endless exploitation. The phenomenal increases in trade union organisations and the striking role played by the colonies in the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions are evidence that a transformation has taken place which places the colonial question right in the centre of the problems with which world labour is concerned. Above all, the growth and successful leadership of Communist Parties in the colonial countries is a bulwark against compromise and confusion in the national movements and an indication of the political maturity reached by the oppressed colonial peoples.

Whilst these are not decisive factors in the colonial struggle, the workers in the "advanced" imperialist countries can play no small part in helping forward the colonial liberation which will contribute to their own prosperity and social advance. In the new world situation, with the victorious progress of the people against reaction in one country after another, a new opportunity is given for the working class to give this support by strengthening and making a reality of the Trusteeship Council of UNO. For if the Trusteeship Council can in fact be made, by the weight and force of democratic and working-class opinion throughout the world, a stepping stone to self-determination instead of a pseudonym for imperialism, then a staggering blow will have been struck at the very basis of all imperialist exploitation and the hypocrisy of the "sacred trust" of imperialism will have been exposed.

LENIN: THEORETICIAN OF REVOLUTION

CHRISTOPHER HILL

ON THE morning of November 8, the head of the Government declared "we are starting to build Socialism." He announced as his programme: workers' control over production and distribution of goods; national control of the banks; the transfer of the land to those who cultivate it. The Legislature put this programme into effect *the same afternoon*. In the next few days it also passed laws abolishing all inequalities throughout the Empire, whether based on class, sex, nationality or religion; and nationalised banks, railways, foreign trade and some of the big key industries.

No, this was not Mr. Attlee addressing the House of Commons; it was Lenin, and the legislature which got such a move on was the

Congress of Soviets. The date was 1917. Eighteen months' experience of the Labour Government, however, enables us to appreciate better the scope, daring and confidence of the Bolshevik programme, as well as the speed with which it was put into effect. Russia in 1917 was of course a very different country from England today; it was far easier for the Bolsheviks, after a victorious revolution, to proceed straight to the building of Socialism than it is for the Labour Government working through Parliament. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the approach of Lenin and Mr. Attlee to their problems, which derives principally from the clarity of Lenin's analysis of the situation and the resoluteness of his actions in dealing with what he saw, on the basis of this analysis, as the vital tasks facing his Government. It is the object of this article to consider Lenin's approach to some of the problems of the country in which he led the way to Socialism.

Lenin's leadership was based on the closest analysis of the *facts* of any given situation. He was the farthest that can be imagined from an arm-chair philosopher. In pre-war Russia, for instance, 80 per cent of the population were peasants: the problem of relations with the peasantry was of supreme importance for the proletariat in working for its revolution. Revolutionaries before Lenin (the Narodniks, for example) had theorised about the Slav soul, idealised the village commune, and announced that Russia would produce a special kind of peasant Socialism which would enable the country to avoid the historical phase of capitalism. Lenin collected all the blue books and statistics available, and proved conclusively from them that capitalism was already developing in Russia and that the village commune was being dissolved: the peasantry was being divided into a handful of kulaks and rich peasants, whose interests were identical with those of the bourgeoisie, and a vast mass of middle and small peasants whose interests were not dissimilar from those of the working class.

This brilliant statistical analysis, published in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899) and *The Agrarian Problem* (1908) was the foundation of the Bolshevik tactics towards the peasantry, which won mass peasant support not only for the October Revolution in 1917, but also in the sterner tests of civil war and foreign intervention in the four years which followed. The ultimate triumphant justification of the tactics was the complete success of collectivisation and the loyalty of Soviet collective farmers in face of the Nazi onslaught in 1941.

Lenin's technique of analysis of the agrarian situation has been successfully applied in China, and is today being applied in Eastern

Europe. It is applicable in other areas where a peasant population predominates—for instance, India and the Middle East. Facts, as Lenin was fond of saying, are stubborn things; and the basis of Communist agrarian policy in these countries is factual analysis. Shortly after the October Revolution Lenin declared :

“Only if we succeed in proving to the peasants *in practice* the advantages of social, collective, co-operative . . . methods of cultivating the soil . . . will the working class, which holds State power, be able . . . truly and enduringly to win over the peasant millions (*Selected Works*, VIII, p. 198). The point is that the peasants should be firmly assured that there are no more landlords in the country, that they must themselves arrange their own lives.” (*Selected Works*, VI, p. 409).

Only so could the peasants, oppressed by so many centuries of landlordism, rise to understand the possibilities which the revolution had laid open for them.

Take another instance : Lenin's attitude to the Party. At the Conference of 1903 two views were put forward about Party organisation. One was defended by the Mensheviks, mostly emigré intellectuals. They had been impressed by the German Social Democratic Party, then the strongest in Europe; and they wanted to imitate its structure. Lenin already had his doubts about social-democratic parties of the German type. He thought they watered down the principles of Marxism in order to win the support of voters in parliamentary elections.

The whole history of German Social Democracy since that date has shown how right Lenin was. But in 1903 he concentrated not on attacking the German type of Party *as such* but as inapplicable to Russian conditions, where there were neither elections nor parliament. Lenin was an emigré too, but he kept in sufficiently close touch with affairs inside Russia to be aware that all the Menshevik talk about “democracy” was, *in the given conditions*, so much hot air. Is it possible in Russia, he asked, “for all the revolutionaries to elect one of their members to office when, in the very interests of the work, he *must* conceal his identity from nine out of ten of these ‘all’ ? . . . The only serious organisational principle the active workers of our movement can accept is strict secrecy, strict selection of members, and the training of professional revolutionaries (*Selected Works*, II, pp. 154-5). That was always the test for Lenin : his theory was always measured by practice.

“There is a great deal more revolutionary thought in this institution than in all your revolutionary phrases,” wrote Lenin on another occasion (*Collected Works*, XX (1), p. 102). What was the institu-

tion? It was the most important of all for the later development of Russia—the *Soviet*. We are so used now to talking about the Union of *Soviet* Socialist Republics that it hardly occurs to us to ask how the Soviets grew up. Again it was Lenin's close attention to the development of events in Russia that enabled him to spot the enormous possibilities of this institution.

Before the Bolshevik revolution the Soviets, councils of delegates from working-class organisations, were the only spontaneous democratic organisations in Russia. No political theorist or drafter of constitutions called them into existence. They just grew—first of all among the factory workers; but they had deep roots in the old Russian traditions of self-government, of which the village commune and the Artels of small producers are the most obvious examples. Because of this the Soviet principle could easily be extended to any genuine community, whether it was a factory, a village, a regiment or a battleship. Voting by show of hands in public meetings, with right of recall and indirect elections to higher bodies, made real democracy possible for the illiterate masses in a way that the ballot box could not have done at that date.

It was this deep mass basis that gave the Soviets their strength; it was Lenin who first demonstrated their importance. "The quintessence of the Soviet system," he wrote, "lies in that the permanent and sole basis of the whole State system, the whole State apparatus, is the mass organisation of precisely those classes that were most oppressed by capitalism . . . who are now drawn unfailingly into constant and indeed decisive participation in the democratic administration of the State" (*Selected Works*, VII, P. 231). Lenin's analysis of the way in which the ruling class wields its power enabled him to see that this was the heart of the matter in Russia in 1917. "Even if you write the most ideal laws—who will carry them out?" he asked in April, 1917; and he answered "the same old officials—and they are tied to the bourgeoisie" (*Collected Works*, XX (1), p. 102). The Civil servants demonstrated the truth of Lenin's dictum by going on strike the day after the Bolshevik revolution had transferred power to a party which meant business.

Another instance from a different sphere. In 1914, the First World War broke up the Second International, drove the Left-wing Socialists underground in all the belligerent countries, and seemed to have drowned their ideas in jingo patriotism. Many of Lenin's party comrades despaired, others succumbed to the fashionable chauvinism. Lenin settled down to study and analyse the facts, just as he had studied the peasantry during his Siberian exile 20 years earlier. The result of his work was *Imperialism*, published in 1916. Here for the

first time Lenin fully analysed the monopoly stage of capitalism which he called imperialism, and laid a satisfactory theoretical basis for a new international policy for Socialists based on the *facts* of the epoch in which they lived.

Connected with this line of thought were the writings of Lenin and Stalin on the national and colonial problem. Starting from the *facts* of the Russian Empire, where nearly half the population consisted of peoples of "inferior" nationalities, and carefully surveying the historical experiences of movements for national liberation in other countries, Lenin and Stalin laid the basis for Bolshevik national policy. This has achieved remarkable successes, not only in winning the support of the non-Russian peoples for the October Revolution and the Soviet State, but also in stimulating the economic and cultural development of the more backward peoples of the U.S.S.R. More recently the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Communist Parties have applied a similar policy to the national problems of their own countries with equal success. One wishes that the leaders of the British Labour Party had an equally clear understanding of their duties towards the colonial peoples and an equally clear sense of how these colonial peoples could be used as allies against the real enemy at home. Then they would not allow the British delegates to the United Nations Organisation to oppose Soviet recommendations on trusteeship for backward peoples, recommendations which are the logical outcome of Lenin's work on the subject.

These instances of Lenin's use of Marxism as a guide to action have been given to illustrate his *approach* to political problems. First collect the facts. Then analyse them in the light of the principles of Marxism and the historical experience of your own and other countries. Then draw your conclusion, always bearing clearly in mind the main ultimate objectives of policy, to which on occasion other considerations may have to be subordinated. It was in this sense that Lenin said: "Bolshevism may serve as a model of tactics for all" (*Selected Works*, VII, p. 183). But he also said: "Do not copy our tactics, but think out for yourselves the reasons why they assumed those peculiar features, the conditions that gave rise to them and their results" (*Selected Works*, IX, p. 205).

Some of the peculiar features of Bolshevik tactics were due to the conditions under which the Bolsheviks had to work. Tsarist Russia was a police State, and for nearly the whole period of its existence before the October Revolution the Bolshevik Party had to work underground. But Lenin always insisted on the importance of making the fullest use of such inadequate democratic institutions as existed.

After 1917, some Communists in Western Europe, in reaction

against the treacheries and failures of the Social Democratic Parties, thought they were following Bolshevik tactics in refusing to work in parliamentary and trade union organisations. Lenin wrote *Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, to persuade them that they must make use of all existing institutions of bourgeois democracy in order to give a lead to the masses. And that was 25 years ago, before the achievements of the U.S.S.R. and the victories of democracy in the war against Nazi Germany had transformed the world situation.

Lenin laid down once for all that Socialism was impossible without democracy since "(1) the proletariat cannot achieve the Socialist revolution unless it is prepared for this task by the struggle for democracy; (2) victorious Socialism cannot retain its victory and lead humanity to the stage when the State withers away unless it establishes complete democracy" (*Collected Works*, XIX, p. 261).

Lenin always realised that different countries would approach Socialism in different ways. "In Europe it will be immeasurably more difficult to start [a Socialist revolution], whereas it was immeasurably easier for us to start; but it will be immeasurably more difficult for us to continue the revolution than it will be over there" (*Selected Works*, VII, pp. 289-90). He was convinced that "all nations will reach Socialism; that is inevitable. But all nations will not reach Socialism in the same way" (*Collected Works*, XIX, p. 256). For this reason "Communism cannot be imposed by force" (*Selected Works*, VII, p. 345).

Lenin thought of a revolution as a historical period, not a single event. The English bourgeois revolution began in 1640; but most of the democratic reforms even of the nineteenth century were still only "completing the bourgeois-democratic revolution." Lenin ridiculed "those who imagine that in one place an army will line up and say 'we are for Socialism,' and in another place another army will say 'we are for imperialism,' and that this will be the social revolution. . . . Whoever expects a 'pure' social revolution will never live to see it" (*Selected Works*, V; p. 303). Each country, he held, "will introduce a special feature in the form of democracy it adopts, in the form of the proletarian dictatorship, and in the rate at which it carries out the reconstruction of the various phases of social life." "In a small State adjacent to a big State in which the social revolution has been accomplished, the bourgeoisie might even surrender power peacefully" (*Collected Works*, XIX, p. 256).

COMMUNIST REVIEW

MARCH
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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JANUARY: *Prospects for 1947*, Harry Pollitt, *The Crisis in India*, R. Palme Dutt; *Economic Outlook in the United States*, Frank Russell; *Communism and Art—a Controversy*, F. D. Klingender, *Catholics in Politics and Trade Unions*, Olive Parsons, *Consulting With Lenin*, Alex Massie, *Control of Building Materials*, David Hall.

FEBRUARY *More Production or Breakdown*, John Frederick; *Eastern Agriculture and British Trade*, Arthur Clegg; *People's Democracies of Eastern Europe*, James Klugman; *Trusteeship*, Michael Carrutt; *Lenin—Theoretician of Revolution*, Christopher Hill.

We regret that publication has been delayed by the fuel situation. We hope that the April number will be out at the usual date.

TOWARDS A PEOPLE'S PLAN

J. R. CAMPBELL

SINCE THE Labour Government assumed office we have now been told from innumerable platforms that Great Britain is pursuing a "middle way" between the completely planned economy of the Soviet Union and the laissez faire economy of the United States.

The Government White Papers recently issued enable us to form some judgment of how the policy of the middle way is being applied. It cannot be said that they give justification for optimism much less enthusiasm.

Shortage of labour in the coal, foundry, and building materials industries is holding up the progress of the entire economy and creating unemployment in the midst of a pent-up demand for goods. The vital consumers industries are starved of labour and the end of consumers rationing is not yet in sight.

The essence of the Government's economic policy we are told is the nationalisation and the intensive reorganisation of the key industries of coal and power, transport and steel. The high efficiency of those industries under nationalisation will, it is argued, provide a stimulus to the whole industrial system. The State in possession of those industries, and in control of credit, investment and raw materials would be in possession of the necessary control levers to control the capitalists in the private sector to conform to its purposes.

By July, the Labour Government will have been in office two years and only one of those key industries—coal—will be operating under national ownership. For 18 months there has been an interregnum in this industry, where managements have been sitting back and refraining from carrying out much needed measures of re-equipment. Even now when the Coal Board has taken over, re-equipment for reasons which we will deal with later is likely to be very slow indeed unless vigorous emergency measures are taken.

Yet the Coal Board is fortunate. It has at its disposal the Reid Report—a comprehensive survey of the industry with concrete suggestions for reorganisation. Take, however, the Transport Board. It will come into operation early in 1948. It will not have at its disposal any plan for reorganising transport, and there will be great temptation to delay decisions on reorganisation until a survey of the industry has been made. The same considerations apply with greater force to electricity and to steel.

One of the most extraordinary features of the whole situation is the Government's attitude to the engineering industry. It pays lip-service to the need for the reorganisation of the mining, electricity, transport and steel industries, and yet takes no steps to control the engineering industry and ensure that the necessary capacity would be devoted to the manufacture of the equipment, which those vital industries require. Thus the Coal Board might have the best re-equipment plan in the world, but the mining machinery firms in Great Britain are simply not capable of supplying the needed equipment in a reasonable period of time.

Indeed, so low is the production of mining machinery, that the Government does not list it under a separate category in its monthly Digest of Statistics.

With regard to textile machinery production, the Digest shows that it has now reached the level of some £8,000,000 per annum, half of which is being exported.

Even if we were able to contemplate a certain cut in exports, it is clear that this industry is quite incapable of supplying the necessary machinery in time.

What kind of planning is it, which talks loudly about the need for re-equipping our industries, and does not take steps to ensure that the machinery necessary for this purpose will in fact be produced?

In a number of recent speeches, Mr. Morrison has described with love and affection the so-called planning machinery which is now in operation. There is a Central Planning Committee consisting of the heads of the chief economic departments, the Central Statistical Office, the Economic Section of the Cabinet Secretariat and the office of the Lord President of the Council. As far as can be seen, this Central Planning Committee is really a co-ordinating committee, harmonising the sectional plans of Government departments, and not a body which has either the time, the power or the personnel, to survey the workings of the economic system and to formulate plans for guiding it in the requisite directions.

Mr. Chris Mayhew, M.P., who was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Mr. Herbert Morrison, and who therefore saw something of the workings of this machine, has described the working of this machine in relation to investment policy.

"The procedure used by the Labour Government for framing its Investment plan is not unlike that used for the Man-Power plan. Government departments are asked to supply the Central Planning Committee with the investment programmes for a future year covering those sectors of the economy for which they are responsible. For

example, the Ministry of Fuel and Power might put in a £30 million programme for the coal industry, the Ministry of Health £300 millions for housing, and the Board of Trade £20 millions for the textile industry. These programmes cover not only new capital expenditure required—e.g., new machines and buildings—but also the repairs and renewal of old capital. The total demand might come to £2,000 million at current rates.

"All these programmes are received and put together by the Investment Sub-Committee of the Central Planning machine, which then has an overall picture of intended capital expenditure" (*Socialist Economic Planning*, Fabian Society).

The planners, according to Mr. Mayhew, then decide what the total investment should be in the light of prevailing circumstances.

"Once the total investment figure is agreed, sectional programmes are scaled up or down, according to estimates of productivity and the importance of a particular programme, until this level of productivity is achieved."

This is surely the picture of a Government "more planned against than planning." What does this machine really do? It takes steps to see that a balance is kept between the amount of resources devoted to the production of consumers' goods and the amount devoted to investment. It then arbitrates between the demands of the various industries, cutting their investment programme down here, and suggesting that they should extend it elsewhere. In short, the investment plan is really made by the capitalists who inform the appropriate Ministry what their intentions are. The Government planning machine then works to ensure that the total amount of investment outlay is not too great and that each industry gets a fair share of whatever re-equipment is available. In short, the planning appears to consist of an attempt to reconcile sectional capitalist plans and not an attempt to get industry to conform to a plan which is worked out by the Government. No wonder that machinery is now being produced for the chocolate industry in advance of the mining and textile industries.

No doubt this method of control is, in the aftermath of the war, preferable to a free for all scramble and wild cat speculation. It will prevent many harmful things being done. But it does not guarantee that the necessary good things are done on time.

A feature of this type of planning is that it takes place on top and in secret. Nobody but the Government and perhaps the big indus-

trialists can see the picture as a whole. The British people are not let in on this "top secret."

If planning is to be effective it must be brought into the open.

We need much more than a small planning committee of harassed heads of Government departments, maid of all work politicians, assisted by some overworked economists.

The time has now come to set up a real planning commission composed of trade unionists and technical experts, as well as civil servants and industrialists. This commission must have sub-commissions of men and women with industrial experience in each of the main branches of industry.

It should have clearly defined links with the trade union movement, the employers' associations, the Regional Boards, as well as the Joint Production Committees in the larger factories. It must enlist the advice and part-time help of men who have personal knowledge of the problems of particular localities and industrial factories of importance. It should naturally concern itself not only with drawing up general plans, but with their supervision and implementation.

This commission could be built around the existing Central Planning Committee, which will have to carry on with such planning as is possible while the full planning organisation is being developed. In short, we need an interim plan while the long-term plan is being elaborated.

One of the first things that should be made clear in an interim plan is the production targets for the major industries.

The Government's second White Paper, which I examined in the *Daily Worker* of February 22, is quite inadequate as a plan. It cannot help to make either workers or managements aware of what production targets they should aim to reach.

If there is going to be a real production drive, the workers must know what their particular industry and particular factory is supposed to do, and joint production machinery must be set up in order to drive for the achievement of the individual factory and industrial targets.

Further, the Government must be prepared in the last analysis to impose a wage policy which ensures that labour goes to where it is most needed. Fractious and obstructive opposition to such a policy of differential wages and conditions must be overcome.

There are three ways of allocating labour. There is the familiar Tory way of creating an unemployed army so that workers prodded by hunger will go even to the so-called unattractive industries. There is direction of labour, which interferes with the freedom of the

worker to choose his job, which the T.U.C. has rightly objected to, and there is the method of inducing labour to go where it is most needed by methods of inducement on which the T.U.C. has not yet made up its mind.

Obviously, if one rejects the first two methods, only the third remains, and the Government is simply undermining itself and making nonsense of the whole idea of planning, and imperilling the country if it refuses to apply it.

Next, the Government must make up its mind to have a re-equipment policy in which it lays down the industries which are to receive prior consideration and organises the engineering industry in order to ensure that they get it. It is better to ensure that a really efficient job is done in priority industries than to get little bits of re-equipment done haphazard throughout the entire system while no really outstanding piece of re-organisation takes place anywhere.

This, of course, means that the engineering industry must be brought within a really effective system of State control. To refrain from doing so is not only to make a mockery of all the talk of re-organisation, but to invite disaster. Everyone knows that there is scope for the development of light engineering for the production of durable consumer goods. There is every reason to believe, however, that an unconscionable number of firms is engaged on this type of production without consideration of the present situation of the country or even the future prospects of this industry, and some of them are settling in the depressed areas. The result is that labour is being wasted now without good prospects of employment being created for the future. Clearly engineering capacity must be allocated on the basis of first things first.

Beginning with the engineering industry and the industries which are scheduled for priority in re-organisation, the Government must establish an inspection and progress staff for all key industries (analogous to the staffs employed by supply departments on munitions production during the war).

The services of such staffs should be made available to joint production committees as well as managements for seeing that help is provided for overcoming bottlenecks threatening production, technical difficulties, placing of sub-contracts, etc.

The aims of the interim plan can only be achieved if the managements of industrial undertakings exert themselves to this end. The labour movement must adopt the standpoint that it is the clear responsibility of the Government to see that managements use their powers to further and not to sabotage its aims.

While the problems of management in the public and the private

sections of industry are different, the principle of full consultation between managements and workers must apply to both.

Joint committees should be given legal status and a legal right of full information on production plans, orders, costs, profits, etc.

It should not be the function of the unions to assume responsibility for managerial decisions, but it is their duty to expose the shortcomings of managements. For the Government must unhesitatingly deal with any directorial or managerial inefficiencies and sabotage when they are brought to light. At the same time, both the Government and the unions must make wholehearted efforts to obtain the co-operation of managers and technical experts who have a genuine contribution to make to the organisation of production.

These are the first steps in a genuine people's plan.

WALL STREET IMPERIALISM CHECKED

WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

THE MASSES of the American people are generous and democratic and they have a sense of solidarity with the war-devastated peoples. Consequently, when the war ended, they undoubtedly expected that the United States, undamaged by the war, would use its vast economic power and political prestige in a democratic spirit to help repair the devastation of the war. They took seriously the Rooseveltian anti-fascist slogans under which the war was fought, and they looked to this country to fulfill its responsibilities by taking a leading part in the creation of a progressive, prosperous and democratic world.

But Wall Street big business had quite different ideas and plans. It saw a golden opportunity for huge profits in the ravaged condition of other countries, and it set out to take full advantage of this situation by utilising America's great power to establish our imperialist control of the world. Hence, hardly had President Roosevelt died and the war been ended than these big business interests, using the Truman administration as their pliable tool, launched a blitzkrieg diplomatic offensive aimed at immediately making the United States, or more properly, its big trusts, the masters of the world. Specific objectives of the drive were to halt the world-wide drift of the peoples to the left, to beat down the rising wave of democracy in Europe, to smother the fires of revolt in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and especially to intimidate the Soviet Union and reduce it to a second-class power. American big business strove to create an all-powerful Anglo-American alliance (with the U.S. in full command) that would run the United Nations as Wall Street saw fit.

The Wall Street imperialists have made no little progress in their reactionary programme. They have a "standardised arms" agreement with Great Britain, and they have constructed an Anglo-American bloc of capitalist States that usually controls the majority in the United Nations. They have held on to air and naval bases far and wide which enable American bombers and warships to dominate the airways and oceans of the world. They have made Japan into a puppet of the United States. They have kept Franco in power, preserved a rotten royalist regime in Greece, protected Nazi business men in Germany, and strengthened every reactionary party in Europe. Together with the Vatican and the opportunist Social Democrats, they have made themselves objects of the fervent hopes of every fascist in the world.

Especially on the domestic scene, in the United States, the Wall Street imperialists have scored important victories. They have secured control of both Houses of Congress, bridled and saddled the Truman administration, defeated the miners in their national strike, launched an unparalleled orgy of profit-grabbing, plunged the United States into the deepest militarisation it has ever known in peace time, and filled the country with such a dense fog of sabre-rattling, Red-baiting and Soviet-hating as to confuse millions of our citizens on domestic and foreign questions.

Nevertheless, the drive of the American reactionaries for world control is far from having achieved the blitz success they had planned for it. This is because their imperialist campaign has met with such powerful resistance in various countries that it has been distinctly slowed down. It is too early to say yet that the world drive of American imperialism has been definitely defeated, but certainly its time schedule has been ruined and it is meeting with mounting difficulties on many fronts. The get-tough-with-Russia policy has proved a failure. The war-racked, post-war world is showing itself not to be the easy victim that Wall Street calculated on.

The imperialists based great hopes upon the war-scare which they launched immediately after V-J Day. Brandishing the atom bomb, conducting military manoeuvres in Canada and naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean, sending our bombers on spectacular world flights, adopting a gigantic peace-time military budget, filling the world with "screaming-eagle" speeches, they publicly threatened the U.S.S.R. with an immediate "defensive" war. The whole purpose of this outrageous jingoistic campaign was to frighten the Soviet Union and to force it to knuckle under to the demands of the Anglo-American delegates in the United Nations.

But, surprising the imperialists, the Russians sturdily stood their ground. It so developed that, if need be, they also could get tough. Not only that, but lots of Americans, as evidenced by Wallace's celebrated speech in Madison Square Garden, also did not like the get-tough-with-Russia policy, and said so plainly. Finally, Stalin dramatically deflated the whole fantastic war-scare by calmly declaring there was no imminent danger of war. This left the war-mongers with an exploded balloon in their hands, plus a most inconvenient, world-wide, Soviet-initiated demand for a radical reduction in armaments all round.

The imperialists have hardly fared any better with their aggressive loan policy than with their threats of war. Their original idea was that with their monopoly of financial credits they could compel the rest of the world to do their bidding. Whoever would not sign on the dotted line for the political and economic conditions Wall Street saw fit to impose would get no funds with which to rebuild their shattered economies. But this imperialist weapon also was not as effective as planned. The peoples of the world are not peddling off their birthright for Wall Street's mess of pottage.

Congress voted the British loan in the shamelessly-expressed hope that it would be the means of checking the spread of democracy, the nationalisation of industry and the growth of Communist Parties and Socialism in Europe. It was an unvarnished investment in Wall Street's "free enterprise." But obviously the loan has failed in its political purpose. Its hard terms have even considerably antagonised large sections of the British people, and it has distinctly not defeated European democracy and Socialism. The billion-dollar loan to France, brazenly solicited by Leon Blum as a weapon against spreading Communist sentiment in France, also did not achieve its purpose, as has been demonstrated by the powerful growth of the French Communist Party. Nor did the outright refusals and reductions in size of American loans to the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe succeed in forcing these countries to kowtow politically to the would-be world conquerors in Wall Street. This is not to say, of course, that American loans are not a potent weapon; but it does mean that these loans are not at all as decisive politically as the capitalists had hoped.

In a starving world, food, of course, can also be a powerful political weapon. The Wall Street imperialists figured that inasmuch as the United States controlled the world's greatest food reserves they could, with the schemes of such famine-juggling experts as Herbert Hoover, dictate economic and political terms to the war-devastated peoples.

Consequently, wide discrimination was made in the distribution of food by the American-controlled U.N.R.R.A. Naturally, this discrimination was directed against the militantly democratic peoples. The worst example was in the Communist-controlled areas of China. Although these regions contain some forty per cent of the Chinese people, they have received only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the U.N.R.R.A. supplies sent to China. Despite such discrimination, however, the bulk of the hungry nations of the world have refused to trade their liberties for food.

The world today does not present a picture that brings joy to the hearts of Wall Street millionaires, who had planned to make themselves quickly into that world's masters. While in the United Nations the Anglo-American bloc is usually able to command a majority, it can by no means enforce its wishes at will. The smaller countries, the colonial lands, and especially the Soviet Union, display a most disconcerting spirit of independence. Indeed, in the matter of Spain and the Indians in South Africa, the American and British delegates to the United Nations found themselves voting in a minority. They even raised dismal complaints that the Soviet Union, which was to have been ruthlessly put in its place as a second-class power by an all-controlling Anglo-American bloc, now finds itself, instead, with greatly strengthened prestige. It stands out as the main leader of the world's democratic and oppressed peoples.

The status of the Anglo-American bloc itself is also by no means satisfactory to the Wall Street imperialists. Many of them had hoped for the immediate realisation of an aggressive anti-Soviet military alliance of Great Britain and the United States, carrying along most other capitalist countries, on the model proposed by Winston Churchill. Or, at least, they wanted a political arrangement whereby Great Britain would tamely go along as a "junior partner" of the United States and do the bidding of Wall Street.

But, certainly, as yet, neither of these things has happened. The majority of the British people evidently do not relish the prospect of becoming a satellite and catspaw of the United States, while Wall Street slowly picks the Empire to pieces. Large numbers of British, including a big section of the trade unions and the Labour Party, look with increasing disfavour upon Foreign Secretary Bevin's reactionary pro-American, anti-Russian policy and are bringing heavy pressure against it. They do not want another war. What they do want is to develop more co-operative relations with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, British business men, ignoring American demands for international "free enterprise," are moving energetically to protect Empire markets

against vigorous American competition. These Anglo-American contradictions and antagonisms naturally reduce the effectiveness of the two-power bloc as a means for imperialist world control.

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe is also highly unsatisfactory to the Wall Street imperialists. For all their economic and political pressure, they have been unable to prevent the growth of democracy in these vital areas. Vigorous Communist Parties exist in all the countries, and the peoples everywhere are determined to set up far more democratic regimes than existed before the war. Several of the countries are obviously marching on to Socialism.

A major objective of Anglo-American diplomacy in Eastern Europe was to re-erect a ring of hostile, reactionary states along the western borders of the U.S.S.R., a repetition of the infamous *cordon sanitaire* of pre-war times. The type of State the imperialists had in mind for this purpose is illustrated by the ultra-reactionary regime they are maintaining in Greece with their money and bayonets. And the long fight they made to impose the semi-fascist "London Government" on the Polish people was a sample of their determined struggle generally to prevent the growth of democracy in Eastern Europe. The failure to re-establish the *cordon sanitaire* was a real defeat for imperialism in general. The States on the borders of the U.S.S.R., consequently, instead of being a stronghold of fascism as they were before the war, are now, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic, a major fortress of world democracy and Socialism. Similar attempts to organise an anti-Soviet bloc of Western European States have also failed.

But it is when one turns to the colonial and semi-colonial lands that there are to be found conditions that strike fear into the hearts of the imperialists. The oppressed peoples of the Near, Middle and Far East are on the march to national liberation. India, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, Burma, Korea, Egypt, Palestine, Syria—are all surging with vigorous independence movements. The more than a billion people of these vast areas are gradually breaking the chains of imperialist-capitalist slavery, and the British, French, Dutch, Belgian and American imperialists are frantically trying to "save the pieces."

American policy in China especially has also been anything but successful. While with the help of U.S. soldiers and marines and \$4,000,000 worth of munitions and food it has succeeded in buttressing the rotten Chiang Kai-Shek government and reducing it to the status of American puppet state, it has by no means achieved its major objective of defeating the vast Yenan people's liberation movement.

In Latin-America, Wall Street imperialist policy is also encountering unexpected difficulties. The peoples south of the Rio Grande by no means form the docile bloc of votes in the United Nations calculated on by the Wall Street manipulators. Like other colonial and semi-colonial nations, the peoples of Latin-America are sharply feeling the world-wide upsurge of democracy following the victorious anti-Hitler war. And the Wall Street imperialists are dismayed at their growing spirit of independence.

Obviously, Wall Street imperialism has not achieved the blitzkrieg world victory that it counted upon winning in the immediate post-war period. It has not halted the world trend to the left, and its central slogan of "free enterprise" is discredited on a world scale. Its drive for American world control has been definitely slowed down by the resistance of the democratic peoples who, after defeating the Hitler slavers, refuse to put on the yoke of Wall Street. Despite the aggressive policies of Anglo-American imperialism there has even been considerable progress made in the United Nations towards the establishment of a compromise peace.

But it would be unwise to conclude from all this that the imperialist danger, with its dread implications of economic chaos, fascism and war, has passed. On the contrary, it is still full of malignancy. The fact remains that the United States government is now controlled by Republican Tory reactionaries of the Hoover-Dewey-Vandenberg strip, while the fascist-like McCormicks, Hearsts, Pattersons and Brickers play a greatly increased role. These elements and their Southern poll-tax friends definitely have the imperialist perspective of making the Wall Street multi-millionaires the dictators of the world. And they are counting on still further increasing their political power by capturing the presidency in 1948. To further their imperialist ambitions they have at their disposal by far the biggest navy and air force in the world, the greatest supplies of available capital and food, and the largest industrial production. These imperialists consider an anti-Soviet war inevitable and they are relentlessly preparing to provoke and to wage it. Nor will this country's foreign policy cease to constitute the major danger to world peace until it is reshaped by the democratic masses of the United States.

The American people, especially the labour movement, must much more clearly learn the basic fact that the present foreign policy of our government is not a national policy. It is not a policy conceived in the interests of the whole American people; on the contrary, it is one primarily designed to advance the profits and power of the Wall Street magnates. Wall Street's imperialism is highly detrimental to the most

vital interests of the American people. The toiling masses of this country understand that the great capitalists are thoroughly greedy in their domestic policies, and they are waging increasing struggles against their exploiters. Nevertheless, they do not yet sufficiently grasp the facts that these same capitalists are also dictating American foreign policy and that they are just as profit-greedy in their foreign policies as they are in domestic policies. Many workers are still deceived by hypocritical talk about politics ending at our shorelines.

The great menace to world peace and democracy now lies in the activities of the Wall Street trusts and multi-millionaires. Hence the tremendous importance of defeating them and their Republican-Democratic political stooges during the legislative battles of the present Congress and especially in the elections of 1948. The American people are basically opposed to the trusts and to aggressive imperialism, and they will respond to a strong democratic, anti-imperialist leadership. But if the Wall Street imperialists are to be defeated at home and abroad, the organised labour movement especially must show the highest political understanding and united action of its entire history. The trade unions must bridge over their internal quarrels and jointly take up the fight against imperialist foreign policies and against reactionary legislation in the Eightieth Congress. They must spare no efforts in making all preparations to administer a real defeat to reaction in next year's elections. The outcome of our developing political struggle is of decisive world importance.

EASTERN AGRICULTURE AND BRITISH TRADE— I I

ARTHUR CLEGG

WE HAVE seen that the peasants, who form the vast bulk of the population of Eastern countries, suffer from a double exploitation. First, landlords take away by rent all surplus grain above the minimum necessary for subsistence; the minimum being defined as the amount required, not to maintain health, but merely to keep the peasant and his wife just alive until they can raise a son to till the land. Second, the peasant has to pay the additional levies imposed by imperialism, either in the form of taxes or in the form of high prices for the goods he buys and low prices for the goods he sells. The only Far Eastern peasants exempt from these additional imperialist levies before the war were those of Japan, for Japan itself was an imperialist country.

It is naturally extremely difficult to judge exactly the intensity of this additional exploitation, but the facts on declining standards of

living and declining consumption of cotton textiles per head clearly reveal its results. The increasing frequency of famines in China and India are another sign, as also the decline in China's irrigation system, due to heavy foreign exactions and interest payments, which unbalanced the Chinese budget in the 1890's and which, with civil war, have kept it unbalanced since.

One figure, however, is available. It is for the Philippines. In a recent Hearing (Hearing on S.1488) the U.S. Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs heard evidence that : "The income of the Filipino family of four averages only \$75 (£19) a year, about \$20 (£5) of which goes in taxes." Thus in the Philippines, after the landlord has deducted 50 per cent of crop as rent, taxes (direct and indirect) take over 25 per cent of the income remaining to the peasant. Yet even in this wretchedness, the Filipino peasants have a higher standard of living than those of most other Far Eastern countries.

The conditions so far described apply to Far Eastern countries, but of course the peasantry of these countries are not the only peasants who experience the double exploitation of feudal rent plus imperialist levies. An article on "The background of Iran's revolt" in *Communist Review* for October, 1946 set out the conditions of the peasants in that country, and they are not noticeably different in any other Middle Eastern area. The peasantry of Africa and of Latin America are also doubly exploited in this way. The result is that the people of all these countries have a standard of living which is qualitatively different from that of imperialist countries such as Britain or the United States. Thus, before the war, while Britain had a national income of £110 per head, the income per head in colonial and semi-colonial countries was everywhere less than a quarter of this :

Jamaica	£26
Palestine		£26
Turkey	£19
St. Vincent	£14
Syria, Egypt, Iraq	£10 to £13
China, India	£5

Since these figures include both rich and poor, they still over-estimate the standard of the average peasant family.

But the effects of imperialism are not limited to intensified exploitation. The repercussions of that intensification extend much further. The deterioration of Chinese irrigation and flood control due to the disorganisation of Chinese government revenues has been mentioned. A further effect is that where imperialism coerces the peasants to turn from grain crops to cash crops, such as tobacco and oilseeds (the

money rent paid in such cases is still on the percentage basis, being up to 70 or 80 per cent of the total proceeds of selling the cash crop) the whole balance of agriculture may be upset and the fertility of the soil reduced, thus leading to still greater poverty for the peasant. Mr. R. A. Pepperall, Chief Regional Officer of the Milk Marketing Board, who was sent to India in 1945 to investigate milk production, speaking to the Growmore Club at Fareham on his return, said (as reported in *The Times*, 8.1.46):

"One reason for the decline in the (Indian) dairy industry under British administration had been the practice of exporting from India large quantities of cotton seeds, linseed, ground nuts and other commodities . . . these exports had starved India's own stock and deprived her soil of its fertility."

Here again the impoverishment is cumulative. In such facts as this, and not in overpopulation, lies the root of Eastern poverty.

The effects of the war have been to increase this poverty still further. Huge areas of China have been devastated. India has been gripped by immense famines. Everywhere the prices of the manufactured goods he buys have risen enormously against the peasant, and attempts are being made to extend the grip of the imperialist monopolies by such measures as the "Project Boards" in Burma and the exclusive purchase agreements negotiated (at low prices) by the U.S. Commercial Company for oilseeds with the Philippines and the "Netherlands East Indies Government." Obviously the situation calls for immediate and radical action. What, then, can be done?

One method often advocated is that of improving methods of farming in these countries and improving the seeds used. This is urged in China by various Kuomintang spokesmen and has been tried in Japan for thirty years or more. When the landlord takes more than half of the crop grown the peasant has of course practically no incentive to improve his methods. Nevertheless in Japan, using various kinds of pressure on the peasants the rice yield per acre has been raised and before the war was nearly as high as the rice yield per acre in Italy. But of course the bulk of the extra rice went to the landlord and not to the peasant, and Japanese peasants remained in their sorry plight. By themselves such schemes only serve the interests of the landlords.

A second method is that of rent reduction. In China Sun Yat-sen advocated that, as a temporary measure, rent should be reduced to 30 per cent of the main harvest. Rent reduction was enforced as a war-time measure in the Communist-led liberated areas in China, and this is the only extensive use of the method to date in the Far East, though

it was also used by the anti-Japanese Filipino guerrillas. It does not solve the problem but merely eases it. But this method can also be used as a cover for restoring landlordism, as, for example, its present use by Chiang Kai-shek, who restores landlords in the districts he reconquers from the democratic areas of China under the slogan of "reducing rents to 30 per cent of crop."

A third method is to provide the tenant with credit to enable him to buy the land from the landlord. This is the method contained in the Agricultural Act passed by the Japanese Diet, with MacArthur's sanction, in September 1946, and the method which the American authorities in South Korea say they have adopted there. But the effectiveness of such measures depends upon the lowness of the rate of interest at which the credit is offered to the tenant, the price at which he has to buy, and the pressure put on the landlord to sell. In any case the result is that the peasant only becomes an owner through shouldering a heavy burden of debt. In addition to this disability, the Japanese Act only refers to large absentee landlords and even then in no way limits the size of an estate which can be worked with wage labour. All landlords are still allowed to keep seven and a half acres of land (enough for three tenants), they are to receive a high price for their land (some 3,000 yen per acre) and a State subsidy of nearly 1,000 yen per acre in addition. The actual operation of the law is in the hands of local committees on which landlords are equally represented with tenants. Even if the Act is strictly interpreted only 40 per cent of the total of landlords' land will be affected. Thus the whole Act can be described as an Act to preserve petty landlordism. In Korea, though it was announced that credits for peasant purchasers of land were available in the U.S. zone early in 1946, by the end of the year 65 per cent of cultivated land was still in the hands of a few Korean landlords and the joint Korean-American joint stock company set up to take over (after compensation) the land owned by Japanese landlords. Evidently this method of credits, in addition to its other disadvantages, is not very effective in actually transferring land to tenants.

The fourth solution is that of confiscating the landlords' land outright. The elected People's Committees which govern the Soviet zone of Korea have adopted this method. By the spring sowing of 1946 landlordism had disappeared there and over 2 million acres of land had been divided among some 700,000 former landless and poor peasants, with the result that none of the food and agriculture problems which curse the American zone are found in north Korea. This method has also been adopted in the democratic areas of Manchuria and by the decision of the elected village committees has been spread-

ing to all the democratic areas in China. Hence, in part, the fury of the Kuomintang banker-landlords against them. But the peasants of China have adopted the only method of solving the agrarian problem in the East, and of playing their part in enlarging world trade.

But it is not enough merely to welcome what Chinese peasants are doing. It is necessary for Britain to have a policy, for the question is vital to our future welfare as well as theirs. It is also inescapable.

First, in the Allied Council for Japan, in the Economic and Social Council of Uno, and its subordinate Food and Agricultural Organisation, questions of rent and landlordism have already been raised. Yet in the Allied Council for Japan, the British representative, MacMahon Ball, while favouring some agrarian reforms, refused his support to the proposal of the Soviet representative that all landlord's land should be confiscated, and on another occasion stated that "I feel it would be precipitous to advocate the abolition of tenancy." And in the Food and Agricultural Organisation, with Britain's approval, proposals for radical reform have been smothered under the discussions and proposals for such projects as the creation of buffer stocks of grains in "surplus" supply, projects which can only aid the big grain merchants.

Second, in British colonial policy, it is a constant question on the political side whether the British Government is to give special favours to landlords (rajahs, sultans, emirs, chiefs) in the shape of special positions in local assemblies, etc., as is proposed in the new Malayan Constitution, or whether it takes a democratic stand on universal suffrage and the abolition of special privileges; and, on the economic side, whether to assist the peasants by cheap credits and the encouragement of democratic buying and selling co-operatives and other measures leading up to the abolition of landlordism. Obviously every assistance must be given to the peasants and their co-operatives. The provision of cheap government credit to peasants and local industrialists is not only an excellent way of reducing the grip of the big imperialist banks, but ensures against the further growth of landlordism and, once landlordism is abolished, helps to check its recrudescence, while cheap credit to local industrialists stimulates industrialisation.

Third, since Britain's foreign trade is still almost entirely in the hands of the big monopolies, and this is especially true of Far Eastern trade, some method of reducing that hold and finally eliminating it must be found, along with methods of taking foreign lending entirely out of the hands of the present private banks and lending houses. A small start has been made in the setting up of the British Cotton Purchasing Board, but obviously it is necessary to extend such boards till they cover every major import and export and so break the

grip of such companies as Unilevers and other monopoly parasites.

Finally, the upsurge of national movements in the post-war period has led to the emergence of new republics in south-east Asia—the Republics of Indonesia and of Vietnam. They will be followed by others, and in the negotiation of trade and credit agreements with them there will be excellent opportunities of assisting their plans for industrialisation, thus bringing big orders for British machinery, and still further raising world living standards and export trade.

Today, however, it is no longer a matter of abstractly debating the measures which can be taken to improve the lot of Eastern peasants and therefore of British working people. Nor is it even a matter of mere propaganda for them. There is a movement of the people in all Eastern countries today, and in Africa tomorrow, which stands for the end of landlordism and the end of imperialism. The great question of politics is whether one welcomes that movement and seeks to aid and advance it, or the reverse. Each measure advocated must be judged by whether it aids or hinders this movement of national liberation. It is such things as the struggle of the World Federation of Trade Unions to assist the workers in the colonial and semi-colonial countries to build their own trade unions; the struggle against U.S. big business policies of backing Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Filipino reactionaries; and the struggle for the withdrawal of British troops from India and south-east Asia which are the essence of the struggle for a prosperous Britain. For only through such struggles can the hold of landlordism and imperialism be broken.

It is for British workers to realise how much they stand to gain, in terms of full employment and increased standards of living, from the end of imperialism and landlordism; and constantly and increasingly to throw their weight, the weight of the vast bulk of the British people, on the side of the Eastern peoples struggling to be free. This is not a matter of sentiment; for us ordinary people of Britain it is a matter of economic necessity. Colonial freedom is Britain's progress.

PROPOSED NEW WAGES STRUCTURE FOR THE MINING INDUSTRY

Now THAT the mining industry has been nationalised, it is important that an entirely new wages structure should be established, to eliminate the conflict which existed under private enterprise, with one of the most complicated wages structures in any industry. In my opinion the introduction of a new wages structure will be one of the basic features

in determining the success or failure of nationalisation. It is impossible to carry on a nationalised industry under the same conditions as existed under private enterprise and which were the root cause of so much friction in the past.

This is the reason why I consider it necessary to submit proposals which could form the basis of discussion amongst all mineworkers, so that this important question may be tackled without delay and thereby enable the first nationalised industry to succeed in this country.

In drafting proposals for a new wages structure, it will be necessary to discard the present wages structure which exists in any particular district. To endeavour to establish a new wages structure in relation to anything which exists in any particular district would immediately undermine the principle of a National Wages Structure. We have to make an entirely new approach to this question, leaving behind the traditions, customs and wide variations which existed in District Wages Agreements which led to so much conflict in the past.

Our approach should be to establish a completely new wages structure, keeping in mind that we shall have one unified industry, with one employer, as against a disorganised industry with 800 different coal company employers, such as prevailed in the past and was mainly responsible for the wide variations which existed in district versus district and pit versus pit.

The main principle of a new national wages structure should be to guarantee to every mineworker a decent standard of living, and no matter what part of the coalfield he works in or at what grade, he should be in a position to know what minimum daily wage he should be paid. The idea should be eliminated for all time that, because he works in a poor and difficult part of the coalfield, over which circumstances he has no control, his wages should be less than those of men in more favourable districts.

Illustration of the differentiation in wage rates prevailing in the industry can be obtained from a study of the *Statistical Digest* issued by the Ministry of Fuel and Power. The average wage for the whole of Britain in 1945 was 23s. 11d. per man-shift worked, including cash and kind. The rate in the twenty districts varied from 21s. 0.82d. per shift to 28s. 8.2d. per shift in the highest district.

This average wage, of course, includes the wages of all youths, and since youths' wages are much less than the average it is quite evident that the average paid to adults is slightly higher than that shown in the statistical digest.

It is also recognised that the majority of mineworkers are day wage men, and since the vast majority of day wage men earn less than £1

per shift (some of them as low as 13s. 6d., excluding the 2s. 8d. cost of living bonus), it will then be observed that the piece rate earnings are higher than the average wage as outlined in the statement of average wages paid in 1945.

I make this explanation because I think we will make a very serious mistake if we approach the question of a new wages structure on the grounds that the gap is too narrow between the day wage worker and the coalface worker, or vice versa. At least one could not convince a skilled mechanic, who is being paid 16s. 6d. per shift, that this is the true position, and what applies to a skilled mechanic could be applied to other grades as well.

In our approach to the question we should, therefore, begin on the premise that both day wage and piece rate workers in general have wages which are too low, and any new wages structure should take this into consideration. The need for reducing the number of grades is vital and important, and I would propose the following as a basis for discussion. The other and important question is the wages to be paid, and in my opinion the main task is to establish a daily minimum rate for each grade, less than which no workman could be paid, no matter in what district or pit he worked.

The question of piece rates is another important matter to be discussed and I submit an entirely new basis for consideration under a new wages structure. However, if we establish a reasonable daily flat rate for all grades, then we make the question of piece rates a much easier problem than we have experienced in the past, as wages were always on a low daily flat rate, even for piece rate workers at the coalface.

LIST OF GRADES AND SCALE OF WAGES :—

- No. 1 Grade :* Coal face workers, stone miners including face brushers, machinemen—Wage 30s.
- No. 2 Grade :* (Other face workers), prop and check drawers, timber cotters, packers, conveyer shifters. Wage—25s.
- No. 3 Grade :* Skilled mechanics, i.e., electricians, engineers, fitters, bricklayers. Wage—25s.
- No. 4 Grade :* Rope splicers, shaftsmen, head onsetters, repairers Wage—22s. 6d.
- No. 5 Grade :* General oncost, including haulage, enginemen, pumpers, etc. Wage—£1.

SURFACE ADULTS :—

- No. 1 Grade :* Skilled mechanics, i.e., electricians, engineers, fitters, bricklayers, winding enginemen, boiler firemen. blacksmiths, etc. Wage—23s. 6d.
- No. 2 Grade :* All other adult surface workers. Wage—£1.

It would be understood that all workmen would be available for all categories of work under the specified grade, except in the case of skilled mechanics.

One point would have to be made clear, to avoid any divisions in the miners' ranks. At present in certain districts, such as Nottingham and Derbyshire, we do know that piece rate workers (although not all of them) can earn as much as £2 10s. per shift. There are also day wage men in these districts who have over £1 per shift. If it were understood that the new wages structure would mean a reduction for any of these rich districts, then our new wages structure would fail in the Miners' Trade Union in the first place.

We also require to be on our guard against any question of the higher paid districts being reduced to the scale of the lower paid districts. This would be fatal to the industry, although the suggestion is frequently expressed in certain quarters. Our objective must be to raise the poorly paid districts to the level of the better paid districts, and with a nationalised industry, there is no reason why this should not be accomplished.

It will be necessary, therefore as a safeguard, to have a clause in any new wages structure to ensure that districts or pits having higher wages (either day wage or piece rate) shall continue to be paid at the higher rates.

With this understanding, I am quite sure that the above scales would provide a new wages structure and, above all, provide that security desired by all mineworkers.

The question of piece rates is still important in a nationalised industry, and particularly for production. To retain the old system of piece rates would mean a continuation of the old conflicts which existed within the industry.

Let us endeavour to place piece rates on an entirely new basis. All piece workers should be entitled to a percentage on the daily rate. Already this is in operation in the engineering industry; there is no reason why it should not be established in the mining industry. All piece rates should be subject to a minimum percentage of 50 per cent above day wage rates, this percentage to be recognised as a national principle and part of the national wages structure. This would eliminate much of the conflict in the past when discussing price lists, either on a sectional or pit basis. In my opinion it would lead to better relationship between management and men, as everyone knows that the fixing of price lists in the past has engendered bitter hatred between management and men.

The acceptance of this national principle would also eliminate the difference in piece rate earnings existing between adjacent collieries and districts because of geological differences entirely outside the control of the miners. It would also eliminate a long-standing grievance of the miners, that because a man is unfortunate enough to be working in a poor seam or coalfield he should be compelled to work for lower wages than those paid in a richer seam or coalfield. I am quite confident that such a system of piece rates would be welcomed by all mine-workers.

The foregoing scale of wages and piece rates is proposed on the understanding that we proceed on the basis of the miners being paid six shifts for five shifts worked. If this principle is not included, then the above scales would require a corresponding increase to make up for the loss of earnings if a five day week were in operation.

The question of youth wages must also be considered under the new wages structure. Already certain progress has been made in the establishment of a wage for age scale under the Porter Minimum. In certain districts the daily wage rate for youths is higher than that contained in the Porter Minimum and in my opinion we should have uniformity on this question. To obtain this, the highest wage paid in any district should become the rate for the whole of the coalfield.

The other main question in connection with youth wages is the age at which adult wages should be paid. In Scotland we have already established the principle that all war wage advances, of 6s. 2d. per shift, shall be paid at the age of 18 years, and if a youth does an adult job he is also entitled to be paid the adult basic rate. It should now be established, in a new wages structure, that all youths be paid the full adult rate at 18 years of age. This would be one of the greatest means of attracting youths to the industry, a factor which is of vital importance in determining the success of the coal mining industry in the future.

Also an important question is the guaranteed minimum weekly wage. It is known that the present guaranteed minimum weekly wage is £5 for underground workers and £4.10s. for surface workers, as awarded by Lord Porter's Tribunal on 22nd January, 1944.

The demand for coal is even greater to day, and it is recognised that increased manpower is a vital necessity to the industry. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable to suggest that the guaranteed minimum weekly wage under the new wages structure should be £6 for underground workers and £5 for surface workers.

It will be noted that I have not attempted to deal with the wages which should be paid to deputies and colliery clerks. This, in my

opinion, would have to be worked out with the appropriate trade unions catering for these classes of workmen.

I know that opinions on this important subject will be varied but this is a sincere effort to create discussion on one of the most complicated and difficult questions facing a nationalised industry.

If the article creates that interest and discussion which the subject warrants, then I am confident that the movement can become conscious of the need for the early introduction of a new wages structure which will lay the basis for a smooth working arrangement such as never existed under private enterprise, and will at the same time ensure good wages and security for the men who are responsible for producing the coal so essential to the reconstruction of a prosperous Britain.

THE COMMON SECONDARY SCHOOL

JOHN C. DANIELS, B.SC., DTH. P.T.

IN JULY, 1945, the Labour Government inherited the 1944 Education Act, part of which had been put into operation in April, 1945. This Act, the Butler Act, describes a new framework for the whole educational system of this country. Its main features centre around the provision of nursery schools, the provision of universal secondary education and the "further education" of adolescents and adults. It is with the second point, the provision of universal secondary education that we wish to deal.

It is necessary first of all to be clear on certain changes in terminology which the 1944 Act introduces, for here much confusion can and does arise. Before 1945, education was roughly divided into two main streams (1) Elementary—the free education provided by the State through the local authorities for all children between the ages of 5 and 14; (2) Secondary Education—education provided by various bodies, including local authorities, mostly with State financial aid directly or indirectly for about 20 per cent of all the children between 11 and 18 years old. To a proportion of these children, proclaimed by the scholarship examinations conducted by the local authority to be "specially gifted intellectually", this secondary education was free. For others, fees varying from about £6 per annum to well over a hundred pounds per annum were payable. Various off-shoots of this system, selective central schools, the preparatory schools, etc., merely served to reinforce the dominant pattern of the dual system—elementary and secondary education.

The terminology of the 1944 Act changes all this. All education

is divided into three parts (a) Primary Education—that education received by pupils under 12. (b) Secondary Education—full time education received by pupils between 11 and 18. (c) Further education—adult and adolescent part-time education, university and college education.

Secondary education covers three types of schools which are inherited from the old system—secondary grammar schools (formerly secondary schools); secondary technical schools (formerly junior technical schools) and secondary modern schools (formerly either modern or senior schools). Education in any of these types of schools, if maintained or aided by the local authority, is now free of charge. No fees have been paid since April, 1945. All entrants to the grammar and technical schools have been selected by "Scholarship" Examinations or whatever they are called in the locality. In certain other types of secondary school, called the "Direct Grant" grammar schools, however, fees are charged but as a condition of the subsidy which they get direct from the State, at least 25 per cent of its intake must be "scholarship" winners paying no fees. In other types called Independent Schools—including all "public" schools, fees are charged and no State grant is given. They are, however, inspected by the Ministry of Education. It will be recognised that one of the main weaknesses of the 1944 Act is the fact that it has allowed these two types of ruling-class supported schools to continue. Those who engage in campaigning for the full implementation of the 1944 Act will find that this loophole is the reactionaries' mainstay. However, whilst campaigning for the amendment of the Act on this point, much can be done within the existing framework.

It will now be seen that when the Act promises universal secondary education it does not mean that every child is promised a grammar school education. Nor is this either desirable or possible. Here we enter into the field of controversy on the future of secondary education.

It was stated above that the three types of secondary school were inherited from the old system. However, since the Act, the Ministry of Education has issued a pamphlet called *The Nation's Schools* (and other material since issued supplements its point of view) which professes that there are, conveniently enough, three types of child. These are the (1) Intellectually gifted type who will be able to profit by grammar school education and from which then the professional and higher clerical and administrative workers will be drawn; (2) the Practical type who are of second grade intelligence but very practically minded—capable of profiting from a technical school education and from which technical foremen, etc., will be recruited;

(3) the Modern [sic] type—"the hewers of wood and drawers of water" says *The Nation's Schools*. These, the Ministry pamphlet states, need a good general education as a background to their coming dreary life as toilers with a special background to help them improve the quality of their leisure activities. This classification into three types is at first plausible enough. But it must be plainly said that it is nonsense and that those who propagate the theory have no shred of real evidence to support it. Most leading educational psychologists have already rejected the theory as false or at least not proven. It must, however, be emphasised that the idea is plausible and acceptable to a large proportion of people. The theories of "typology" are deeply ingrained in popular philosophy and such a new and easy system of "types" is readily acceptable especially since it conforms so nicely to the existing tripartite school system. It is therefore essential at all times to be on guard against the introduction of such false notions into discussions and to head off the development of schemes based on them. Marxists will easily recognise in this "typology" a mirror image of the bourgeois conception of how industry and society is administered in capitalist society. Capitalist theorists, believing as they must in the unchangeable and eternal character of capitalist relations, see the types not as products of this particular system of social relationships but as fundamental characteristics of human nature. From the same source comes the error of Social Democracy in selecting the Boards for administering nationalised industries. This selection is based again on this same false "typology"—they feel they must use the best "administering brains" (Lord Hyndley, etc.,) who may at times be helped in some matters by the practical man ("technical" type). Another way of characterising this typology is to say that, believing as it does in the rigid and unchangeable nature of human personality, it does not believe in the capacities of the working class to govern and organise, and fails to see the possibility of so developing the positive features of an individual worker's abilities that, as Lenin said, eventually "every cook can be taught to run the State".

This leads us back directly to the educational field. For if men (and children therefore) are of these three types, in order to select pupils for the brand of education appropriate to them at 11 years of age, all that is needed is an efficient examination for labelling the types. Hence the "scholarship examination". Now the written examination is deeply ingrained in Britain. Most adults, whilst criticising certain features of scholarship examinations, for example, believe fundamentally in the ability of written examinations to prove something.

And they are probably right in so believing. But whether that "something" is that the examination can identify these so-called "types" is quite another matter. It is true that a written examination at 11 years can to some measurable extent forecast the future examination ability of a child. When we measure to what extent, we find that it does not exceed *in the best cases* an improvement on chance of more than 15 per cent. To build a system of education on tests as efficient as these is to ask for trouble. And of course, every grammar school teacher knows that he gets it. It has been reliably estimated that 65 per cent of the entrants to our grammar schools are misfits in such a school while as many as 25 per cent of the grammar school intake is being excluded by the examinations incorrectly.

The selection of pupils for technical school admission is even more uncertain and inaccurate. To select "the practically-minded" pupil of "fair intellectual ability" is a task at which any teacher or trained psychologist boggles. It just cannot be done. You will, of course, know the reason why—because these "types," anyway, have no real existence.

Finally, some authorities fall back on the "intelligence test". How many have accepted with relief this panacea? How many too have been disillusioned? The intelligence test can, they believe, grade children in "all-round mental efficiency". More than that, it can be shown that it can do more than the old written examination could ever do—viz., grade a group of children on two different occasions and get something like the same results each time. But as forecasts of all-round efficiency as grammar school pupils, intelligence tests are very disappointing. No wonder. Using an intelligence test result *in this way* presupposes that intelligence grows at equal speeds in all children. Because the average growth of ability to do "intelligence tests" is smooth and regular, it is assumed that growth of intelligence in each individual child is smooth and regular. The *average* child grows regularly in height and weight but any parent knows how there are spurts and then periods of stagnation followed by another spurt and so on. Nor do spurts and quiescent periods occur at identical ages in every child. So in intelligence. You can forecast mental or examination or practical efficiency only with difficulty because the average child at 11 might quite easily be brilliant at 14, or the brilliant one at 11 might be only average at 14. It must be recognised that a child's intelligence quotient is not static but variable. The most recent psychological research has exploded the myth that any one intelligence test result finally describes the past, present and future intellectual stature of a child.

So much for the efforts then of those whose answer to reorganising secondary education is the improvement in the efficiency of the selection examination at 11.

What then is the answer? *It is to rebuild the system of secondary education on what, is for this country, a new principle—the Common Secondary School.* This would mean that at the age of 11 all children in a given neighbourhood would be transferred from the primary school to the common secondary school. Children of all ranges of ability and social background would be educated in the one common secondary school. The consequences of such a reorganisation of the system would be far-reaching.

The social implications will immediately be obvious. Every child would be able to make his or her contribution to the fuller social life of the school and every child will begin to feel that his or her contribution is valuable and valued. Schools would become, therefore, real schools for democracy, for the essence of democratic society is that each individually is appreciably a part of society. This would begin the process of integrating the school as a society into the neighbourhood instead of remaining the mysterious 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. abode as many parents regard the present-day school. The common secondary school becomes the common property and concern of the neighbourhood. Parent-teacher co-operation grows into a unity of parent-teacher and pupil.

The academic implications of the common school are even more important in the immediate future. It is at the heart of the question of being able to utilise to the full all the available ability the country possesses—for on an adequate supply of trained, broad-visioned workers of all grades in the next few years, Britain's future depends. This is in part the long-termed solution to the man-power problem, and it is underlined by American experience. One of the reasons for American technical superiority is undoubtedly the vastly larger number of technically-minded workers produced by her common secondary school system. Britain produced Lord Rutherford, but America backed by many thousands of trained scientists finally crowned Rutherford's discovery by unleashing atomic energy.

Above we criticised the classification of children into three types. This, far from meaning that therefore all children are equal, means that there are as many "types" as there are children. Human beings are not equal. Marxism does not subscribe to the Rousseau doctrine of equality. Marxism teaches that it is the rigid stratification imposed by capitalist social relations which stunts the growth of individual differences. It contends that only under Socialism can individuals

develop their full potentialities for originality, can individuals fully make their own distinctive contribution to society.

The common school system would recognise this uniqueness of a child's abilities and would so arrange its inner-school organisation as best to develop each individual child. It would seek to implement the 1944 Act when it promises each child an education suitable to its "age, abilities, and aptitudes." *It is important, then, to recognise that a common school is not three types of school under one roof; it is not three streams, grammar, technical, and modern streams who happen to be able to belong to the same football team.* For this reason the term *multilateral school* (which many people use instead of common school) is to be discouraged since it suggests a continuation of the three-fold classification into types.

There are many stock objections raised. Would this mean a lowering of standards? Would it hold back the brilliant pupils? Would it so lower the standard of achievement of the senior pupils that the universities would be hampered? It would mean none of these things. It is increasingly being recognised that grammar school education is too narrow and specialised, and too hastily and superficially covers certain important branches of knowledge; is too "classical" and formal in its approach not only to Greek and Latin but to science and geography. It is, for example, seldom realised by non-teachers how circumscribed and formalised is the teaching of chemistry, physics, and biology in grammar schools. For the most part it bears as much relationship to the socially functional science of the outside world as does Greek or Latin itself. The mathematics of schools is concerned with the problems of Greek philosophy instead of the problems of the declining birth-rate and the re-planning of our cities.

The curriculum of the common secondary school, however, cannot be built around the preparation of pupils for the School Certificate Examination. Too long has the School Certificate Examination deformed secondary education and in the bargain deformed and constrained the content of education in the remainder of the school system—modern school, technical school and primary school alike. *Any fundamental advance in the secondary system will necessitate the abolition of the School Certificate.* A Ministry of Education Committee is considering the matter at the moment and every effort needs be made to help it to make up its mind in the right direction.

Progressive university teachers now recognise that too early specialisation in the grammar schools is bad for their students. They would much prefer to start to teach university matter themselves to students whose cultural background is wide and enlightened.

The common school, therefore, would need a new approach to each subject and a new curriculum. There is a common core of subjects now recognised by all schools, viz., English, history, geography, mathematics, science and foreign languages. A common course of studies by several classes of varying ability (studies not at equal levels but common subject matter) would be the starting point for a real diversity of specialist studies in subjects in which pupils show special aptitude and interest. Consequently, this would not mean the abolition of selection, but would ensure efficient selection by enabling selection and study guidance to operate throughout the whole of the secondary education stage. It would be possible for pupils to change their minds about this career or that career because no irreparable damage will have been done by too early specialisation. It would enable the "late-developers" to receive adequate and prompt attention and those who begin to fall off to be given guidance to prevent the appalling intellectual hurt inflicted on so many grammar school pupils today by the realisation that they cannot keep the pace.

Such a system, flexible beyond measure in comparison to the present system, would reduce wastage of ability to negligible proportions and would also produce a generation of capable, confident, socially-minded youngsters who would play a noble part in the coming Socialist transformation of our country.

Finally, the organisation of a common secondary school system can be accomplished within the framework of this Act. It cannot be done overnight but if education authorities take the decision that all new building and reorganisation done shall be in conformity with the principle of the common school, a big step will have been made. One or two authorities are favourably considering it. The West Riding have decided in favour. We have the responsibility of seeing that the vast majority of education committees take such a decision in the near future.

EARLY ENGLISH CHAMBER MUSIC

English Chamber Music. ERNST MEYER. (Lawrence & Wishart, 30s.)

DR. ERNST MEYER is an historical student and a lover of instrumental chamber music—that is, music for the fiddle family with or without a piano, or its precursor, the harpsichord. Dr. Meyer found refuge in England from Nazi oppression, and found also, to his surprise, that Early English music could bear comparison with the great schools of the Continent. So he has written a book to remind us of the musical beauties we possess in the Tudor and Caroline periods;

and he has related those beauties to the social conditions in which they were produced.

Ignoring for a moment his first chapter on The Medieval Background, the subsequent chapters afford the musician an opportunity of studying our instrumental music written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while the fact that the author continually refers to other contemporary forms of art, and to social conditions, gives his book a value absent from other books on the subject.

He points out that this early music was neglected from the time of the "invasion" of Handel to Victorian times. He pays just tribute to the work of Arnold Dolmetsch and Dr. Edmund Fellowes for their steady propaganda in favour of the revival of the music; and in fact, since the attention of younger musicians has been brought to the inheritance they possess, this music has had a greater influence upon our national musical life than the German tradition that prevailed from the time of Handel to the time of Wagner and Brahms.

Nationalism in the arts is important because it is not in opposition, is even favourable, to the conception of international organisation. We have an added interest in life as we look at the pictures and hear the music of other peoples. We enjoy the music of Russia the more because it contains idioms that are not to be found in the natural development of our own music; but no English musician wishes to imitate Russian idioms, because we have our own forms of expression. The neglect of those forms became serious from the time that the people of England were deprived of leisure and the means of their own culture—that is, from the time of the industrial revolution. The musicians of that time, more and more separated from the masses, more and more parasitical in their material lives and capacity for expression, lost touch with the original national music. So there followed a slavish imitation of the Italian and German idioms. It was, in the sphere of musical expression, the sort of tyranny that has happened when a conquering nation has denied to a defeated people the right to use its own language.

So it will be realised how important it is for us to recover our own musical tradition; and it is no mere coincidence that the will to recover that tradition during the last three or four decades has been associated with the revival of British folk music, and the revival of interest in the period treated in Dr. Meyer's book.

I have said that the value of this book is greatly increased because it associates music with actual life, a matter ignored by most musicographers with unsatisfactory results in the general understanding of the music; but it is just here that I would question one important

detail in the first chapter. The author gives credit to the Church for the great art of choral polyphony—the sort of music in which many people can sing at the same time, and yet sing different melodies. He describes that sort of music as “the reiterated assertion of the unchallenged stability of the Church and the worldly order of things.” Dr. Meyer has been misled, I think, because of his own special devotion to instrumental as distinct from vocal chamber music, for the earliest examples of polyphony were vocal and secular. What the Church did, as Dr. Meyer allows, was to put the multitudinous vocal style into shackles by trying to get rid of its rhythmic basis and most popular phraseology in what we call the major scale. He records the technical facts, but does not, apparently, realise their implications.

It was not without reason that the greatest church composers were obliged to trick their clerical employers by a clever subterfuge. Knud Jeppesen, the Danish musicologist, has shown how the Italian composer, Palestrina, made music rhythmic in spite of clerical authority. Jeppesen's study would equally apply to the music of Palestrina's English contemporary, Byrd. And it must not be forgotten that long before this period there existed many-melodied popular music. Superior musicians referred to their cultivated art as polyphony or many-sounds, and to the popular thing as heterophony, or the other sort. But it was in fact from that other sort that came the real life of music, for it had real tune in it and appealed to the emotions of men, and it had rhythm in it and set their legs going. And it seems almost certain that when the monk of Reading wrote down the popular round “Sumer is iumen in” he was, in fact, applying his cultivated skill in the technique of music to what already existed in cruder form. For we know that many of the monks came from the people and retained popular sympathies.

Many-melodied music was not, I submit, an expression of “Church stability” but of the popular will to enjoy in mass form. A truer expression of the Church was the Gregorian chant in unison—that is, free from all popular implications. That fact the Papacy itself has recognised as recently as 1923, when the reigning pope issued his musical instructions in “Motu Proprio.”

So I think that Dr. Meyer's first chapter needs some reconsideration; but that does not alter the value of the rest of the book, which should be on the shelves of all musicians and people interested in music as an expression of real life.

RUTLAND BOUGHTON.

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COMMUNIST REVIEW

APRIL
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

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THE PLANLESS PLANNERS

J. R. CAMPBELL

WHEN THE GOVERNMENT decided to issue its two White Papers, it had no idea that the serious situation which these papers revealed would be underlined by the fuel crisis.

The results of this coincidence have been both fortunate and unfortunate. Fortunate because people can no longer doubt the underlying seriousness of the situation; unfortunate because of the idea spread by the Tories and the U.S. Press that the situation is the product of eighteen months of Labour rule and not of the entire weakened position of British capitalism brought into the open by the war. It is not true, as the Americans and their Tory allies have suggested, that Britain's position has greatly deteriorated as a result of the first eighteen months of Labour Government. With all its crying weaknesses that Government has done infinitely better than the Tories would have done. Britain's economy is not in wreck and ruin. It is technically better equipped than that of many other European countries to overcome the post war crisis, given the ability of the Government to learn from experience and to provide the people with more resolute leadership.

Dealing with what has been accomplished, the *Economic Survey for 1947* states that "by the end of the year the rate of national output was probably not significantly below pre-war over the economy as a whole," and that capital re-equipment and maintenance in 1946 "was probably much the same as in a normal pre-war year."

If these assertions are even approximately true, there has been a much quicker recovery after the Second World War than there was after the first. Not only so but the people of Britain are in a much better position to face the future than they were in 1939.

In 1934, Sir John Orr conducted an investigation which showed that 1,100,000 families comprising 4,500,000 persons had an income of 10/- per head per week and 2,200,000 families comprising 9,000,000 persons had an income of between 10/- and 15/- per head per week. It is an absolute certainty that the first-mentioned group—who were living in conditions of destitution before the war—have had their conditions improved out of recognition in recent years and that the second group are living quite a lot better. And let us not forget that those two groups contain more than half of the children in the country.

It is right that the workers should insist on improved conditions;

and that the results of the further improvement in the country's economy shall be expressed in still better living standards. At the same time, they must never forget that many of them stand to lose a great deal of the ground that they have won in recent years, should the country fail to achieve complete economic recovery.

Why then the crisis? Because in view of the changed situation in Britain, "the pre-war rate of output over the economy as a whole" is hopelessly insufficient to enable the country to overcome its difficulties. We have three great objectives to accomplish, none of which was on the agenda of 1939.

First, we have got to solve our gigantic foreign trade problem. We have ceased to be a creditor country and can no longer expect to receive the same vast quantities of food and raw materials as payment for foreign investments. We have to send abroad vastly greater quantities of British goods, if we want to get the same quantities of food and raw materials as formerly. If we want to live better than before the war, we need also a much greater development of British agriculture. Now in order to achieve the export target of 75 per cent (in volume) above pre-war, we will need, the Government tells us in the White Paper on *Economic Considerations*, at least 500,000 more workers manufacturing for export. We will need at least 150,000 more workers to maintain agriculture at the present level when the prisoners leave.

Secondly, we need a vast programme of capital re-equipment. Even if we accept the Government estimate of a further 29,000 workers in metals and engineering as being sufficient (and it can only be if many of the workers now engaged in producing durable consumers' goods are transferred to producing capital goods) we still need further reinforcements of labour in other capital goods industries.

A further 150,000 is the minimum needed in the mining industry, 75,000 are needed in the building materials and equipment industry and 200,000 in building and civil engineering, if new factories are to go up alongside new schools and hospitals.

Then we will need more teachers, doctors, nurses and health workers, if the Government's social reform programme is to go through. In all we will need something in the neighbourhood of 1,250,000 new workers.

These are three tremendous tasks. To achieve them we will require not only this new gigantic labour force, but also a steadily rising level of output in industry, and a much more concerted effort than that of war-time.

Yet the Government insists on saddling the British people, quite unnecessarily, with the further tremendous task of maintaining

armed forces of over 1,400,000 men at present, which will decline only to 1,087,000 in the course of the next twelve months.

This is why our situation appears so hopeless. One and a quarter million new workers are required to carry through the Government programme and because of our huge military commitments, all that will be coming forward in the course of this year will be 228,000.

So long as this situation endures the Government's programme as put forward in 1945 will be nothing more than a fraudulent prospectus. For houses are not built, industries are not modernised by Acts of Parliament, but by labour and organisation. If there is no intention to provide the labour then the prospectus is as fraudulent as that of a company promoter whose capital assets exist only in his imagination.

The Labour Party as a body, and every individual member of it, has a clear duty to be honest with the British people. If it intends to pursue its grandiose military objectives, it must cut down its social objectives. To pretend that it can achieve both is to be guilty of barefaced political fraud.

To have sufficient labour is, however, only one prerequisite. It is equally necessary to ensure that the labour is used to achieve the three major objectives above outlined and is not frittered away on unessential purposes. This means the creation of planning machinery adequate to the problems that have to be solved.

That the Government believes that it has got the right planning machinery is evident from the affectionate description which it gives in the first pages of the *Economic Survey*.

Yet it has to admit that this machinery is inadequate. "The controls cannot by themselves bring about very rapid changes or make fine adjustments in the economic structure," it says. This, it argues, is inherent in "democratic" as opposed to "totalitarian" planning.

This is a specious alibi. The weakness of the planning machinery lies not only in inadequate staffing, but in a totally wrong conception of the problems to be solved in the whole period ahead. The planning machinery of the Government is devised to fight the problems of the 1930s and has little relation to the post-war world.

It is designed to meet a situation where the demand for labour is insufficient to employ all available hands. Through its planning machinery the Government is enabled to keep track of the trend of demand arising from private expenditure on consumer and capital goods, so that when that demand is insufficient, the Government can rush in and supplement it, thus creating sufficient demand to absorb the labour which would otherwise be in danger of being unemployed.

But demand today is not deficient but excessive, because people are spending not only currently earned rent, interest, profits and wages, but are drawing on business reserves accumulated in war-time, war savings, service gratuities, demobilisation leave pay, etc.

There is therefore a danger that even if much of the labour now rotting in the forces were available, it would be diverted away from the three principal objectives to less essential purposes by this pent-up demand.

This was a problem even in war-time. It was met (1) because the Government had a rough and ready plan, allocating labour and resources to the war and the civilian industries; (2) because it had the power to contract less essential industries and prevent them from competing for labour; and (3) because it had adequate means, including direction, to ensure that the labour went where it was most needed.

The war-time Government did not lay down a number of general objectives, and then invite "the attention of industry and the public to its plans." It had precise objectives and an adequate operational planning machinery to achieve them. Private interests were deprived of the power to create a demand which diverted essential labour from the war effort. Today they are in full possession of the power to divert essential labour from the peace effort, and the Government is confining itself to appeals to them not to exercise this power.

It has been truly said that the Government has planning machinery of the wrong kind, but not the vestige of a plan. In spite of vague talk about planning, it has yet to define how it proposes to reach its aims in terms of production. Obviously, if it is out to achieve a vast and varied programme of reconstruction, it has got to investigate what this means in the way of output. It must ensure that the various elements in its programme of reconstruction fit together harmoniously instead of getting in each other's way.

Right at the start it has got to be clear how much of the country's resources are going to be devoted to the production of goods for the people and how much on capital development—on the re-equipment and modernisation of industry, on new factories, on the development of the depressed areas, on houses and public buildings. Further it has got to decide how much of its production, both of capital and consumer goods, it will be necessary to export in order to acquire food and raw materials.

The implications of such a plan have got to be worked back from the industries providing the finished products, to the industries which produce the components and raw materials and to the transport system which conveys them from one point to another.

Because the Government has not worked out the proportions of such a plan, it has no standard to judge whether labour and resources are properly distributed; it does not know where bottlenecks are likely to arise and therefore cannot take proper steps to eliminate them. In such a situation, difficulties will continually accumulate and suddenly express themselves in unexpected breakdowns. The planners will then doubtless give us a lucid explanation of why the breakdowns have occurred, rather in the manner of the pre-war Tories, explaining where an economic blizzard hit them.

If the Government had been seriously concerned in planning to achieve its post-war objectives, its first preoccupation would have been the formulation of a capital equipment plan (including houses), and the organisation of the engineering and building industries, together with all the industries which supply them with materials. Right from the moment it assumed office, the best available experts, together with representatives of the employers and the unions, would have been brought together on such a plan. Even in the very early stages of its work the committee or commission engaged in drawing up such a plan would have called upon the Government to take interim action in certain directions, such as the expansion of supplies of mining and textile machinery. It would have stressed the danger of allowing too large a proportion of the engineering industry to be turned over to the production of durable consumer goods. It would early have been realised that one of the most essential features of post-war planning is the control of the engineering industry and that the war-time apparatus of the Ministry of Production should not have been dismantled, but should have been adapted to peace-time purposes. Yet with the Government nearing the end of its second year of office, the engineering industry is not yet controlled.

It is in this sphere that the complete inability of the Government to achieve its objectives on the basis of the manpower which it proposes to make available is most glaring. For its entire capital equipment programme in 1947 (48 per cent of which is building), it proposes to devote only 21 per cent more resources than were spent on similar objects in 1938. In other words, it does not propose to attempt any very serious programme of capital reconstruction at all. It is true that it proposes to devote twice as much to new capital reconstruction as before the war, but only by devoting one-third less to ordinary capital replacement.

It is of course necessary to control capital replacement so as to be able to concentrate on the large scale reorganisation of a selected group of essential industries. It is one thing, however, to prevent the demand for capital replacements from reaching a disproportionate

height, and is quite another thing to screw it down far below the pre-war level. When one remembers the neglect of capital replacement during the war, this decision of the Government can only be regarded as a harbinger of further shortages and breakdowns.

Surely as a minimum target for 1947 the country ought to be spending at least as much on capital replacement as before the war, while raising the construction of new capital by 25 per cent above the present target.

This would mean devoting 26 per cent of the national income to capital equipment and maintenance as compared with 16½ per cent before the war and 20 per cent in the present Government target. However, to attempt this with the labour now available would involve not only a cut in the production of durable consumer goods in engineering (which is desirable), but a cut in the consumption of more essential consumer goods, which would be intolerable.

In other words the present target of capital equipment and maintenance means that the Government's election programme cannot be carried through, for stepping up the target would mean an intolerable cut in consumer goods, unless more manpower were made available to all industry—capital goods and consumer goods alike.

So, until the Government produces a realistic capital equipment plan and backs it with adequate manpower, it had better cease pretending that its present hand-to-mouth bungling has any relation to planning.

Having got a concrete plan particularly in the sphere of capital re-equipment, the Government must take steps to ensure that labour is distributed in accordance with the purposes of the plan. It is childish to pretend that this can be secured automatically by the uncontrolled operations of the labour market, or that labour will distribute itself correctly if only the Government engages in the right kind of exhortation.

In a situation like the present, when purchasing power is in excess of available commodities, planning is endangered by two factors. The excessive purchasing power may lead to a rise in prices and ultimately to runaway inflation, and it may lead to the diversion of labour from essential to unessential work. The Government has always recognised the first danger—hence the continuance of price control and rationing. It has shown no real awareness of the second.

This is largely due to the fact that the second danger was not apparent during the war, when less essential occupations were contracted or closed down and there was direction of labour. It was then impossible to divert labour from essential to less essential purposes, because labour was tied to essential jobs.

Immediately the Government began to abolish the direction of labour, it should have faced the necessity of formulating an alternative policy which would ensure that labour went where it was most needed. Instead of which, the Essential Works Order was lifted and men were free to leave industry and become bookmakers' touts, pool clerks, canvassers or any of the unproductive occupations which consume labour. Employers engaged on low priority work were left free to compete with more essential industries for raw materials and for labour. Hence the present maldistribution of labour. This is not a passing situation which will disappear of itself. It must be removed by specific Government action.

There are four specific lines of policy which need to be developed. First, firms on less essential work should be contracted or closed down. This might be done in some cases by refusing supplies of raw materials and fuel, and in other cases, by direct prohibition. There is no sense in the Government supplying firms with material for carrying on less essential work, and then complaining that the workers are choosing to work there rather than on something more essential.

Secondly, the freedom of the worker to choose his job should not be treated as an absolute. If a building worker is not free to work on the building black market, or a distributive worker to work in the food black market, why should a worker be free to move from a productive industry into the betting industry? Freedom of choice should be maintained between one useful job and another, but there are certain occupations which should be denied further labour. This could be done if all workers were compelled to seek a job through the Labour Exchange.

Thirdly, the excessive purchasing power in the hands of employers, which is one of the causes of the present maldistribution of labour, should be cut off at its source. Of all the ludicrous suggestions made recently, the palm should be awarded to the Federation of British Industries which suggested that there should be a cut in employers' income tax, even if this might increase the prevailing inflationary danger.

On the contrary, what is wanted is to reduce the excessive purchasing power in the hands of the employers, which is leading to scrambles for capital equipment and raw materials, to hoarding of raw materials and spare parts, with all the consequent shortages. In this situation the Chancellor ought to aim at a Budget surplus by increasing the taxation on the higher income groups. He should introduce the new profits tax promised in two successive Budget speeches, an annual capital tax and such increases in death duties and standard rate of

income tax as will, together with a reduction in military expenditure, enable a budget surplus to be built up.

We are entitled to ask the Government to be consistent in its actions. It cannot go on with astronomical military expenditure, persisting budget deficits, and expect that the excess purchasing power so created will not express itself in ways which are harmful to its general objectives.

Lastly, the Government should stop hesitating as to the necessity of giving differential advantages to the workers in priority industries. If the T.U.C. is still wobbling on this question, the Government must face up to it, for on this issue the T.U.C. has not a leg to stand on. The great majority of the workers will prefer to see an efficient mining labour force made available by such methods rather than endure a recurrence of the shut-down.

Having decided on giving differential advantages to attract workers to the undermanned essential industries, the Government should ask the T.U.C., the working-class political parties and the co-operatives, to participate in a great recruiting campaign, to get them there. The working-class movement is ready to help it, but it can only do so when the Government's objectives are clear cut and positive. The planners must evolve a plan if they are to expect an adequate response from the people.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE YOUTH

JOHN GOLLAN

(Moving the Youth Resolution at the Nineteenth Congress of

It is quite natural that Congress, after its discussion on the serious economic position of Britain, should give its detailed consideration to the Youth problem. We cannot rest satisfied that we have laid down the correct solution of the country's ills until this is done.

Our resolution declares "that the entire future of Britain depends on solving the problems of the Nation's Youth" and demands that the Party must regard its duty in this connection as a "central responsibility." This is no rhetorical flourish but a statement of deadly seriousness. If we can find the correct line and method of work to win Britain's Youth for Socialism, half the problems of the Labour movement and the Party will be solved.

Many of the problems confronting us so acutely today have their origin in the years of neglect and exploitation of the nation's young

people by Toryism and big business between the two wars and the relative indifference of the Labour movement in facing up to its responsibilities in this direction.

You know the facts—continued crisis and depression in Britain's main industries destroyed the faith of our young workers in their future—a contributory factor to the manpower shortage today. Our young people were regarded as a source of cheap labour and super-exploitation and flung upon the scrap heap on reaching adult age. Education finished at 14 and our young workers were crowded into blind alley jobs, the distributive trades and parasitic employment.

The war brought an enhanced value to youth labour. Its bargaining position improved because of shortage—limited wage and social advances were won. However, the war years solved none of the problems and have indeed intensified many of them.

In 1936 I wrote in *Youth in British Industry*:

"We are now in the twilight of Britain's industrial skill, nine out of every ten of her youth are unskilled or semi-skilled. The workshop of the world could make anything for anybody, but now, caught in its own contradictions, it has not been able to guarantee that the skill of the old generation will be handed down to the young. . . . Now, as never before, the problem of Youth labour has come to the fore . . . all the forces have matured and have been intensified and the next ten years will see the combined expression of all the forces at work. The position is critical and grave."

The ten years have passed—what is the position?

First—The actual and potential youth labour as a proportion of the adult labour force is declining. From 20 millions of population under the age of 24 in 1911, we have dropped to 17 millions in 1946. The number of youth entrants to insurance dropped by 174,000 or 14 per cent between 1938 and 1946. In 1938 the number of young workers aged 18-24 was 7.4 millions, in 1946 it was 6.5, and statistical forecasts say the number will be 5.2 millions in 1965.

Second—Within this general decline there has taken place a concentration of youth labour in the Midlands and London, accentuating the general shortage in centres of heavy industry in Scotland, Wales, Lancashire and the North of England.

Third—In general the industries with the acute manpower shortage such as coal mining, bricks and tiles, textiles and clothing, are the industries which youth labour is entering in decreasing numbers. Comparing 1946 with 1938, youth entrants to coalmining declined by 61.5 per cent—a fact to be remembered when discussing the fuel

crisis; to textiles by 45 per cent; to bricks and tiles by 54 per cent. Other industries with less youth labour now than before the war are clothing, footwear, paper, laundries and distribution. As against this, youth entrants increased in engineering, aircraft, building, electrical wiring and contracting, metal manufacture and national and local Government service. These movements above all are the result of the war, but it should be noted, shipbuilding and building still have too few young workers.

It should be remembered, further, that the raising of the school leaving age to 15 will mean 370,000 boys and girls less for industry in the next twelve months, although this will adjust itself in the twelve months period which follows.

Already the reactionaries, monopolists and the Tories, responsible for this ghastly state of affairs, are raising a howl that the school leaving age should not be raised. It was on a similar pretext, after the First World War, that this great social reform was jettisoned then.

Nothing could be more disastrous than for the Government to give in to these demands. The mechanisation and modernisation of British industry is the way forward, and for this we will require more talented, skilled and educated young people. Raising of the school age, continued day education and county colleges, free and unfettered access to the universities—all these will be milestones in our industrial recovery, as important as any machines.

We don't rely on the good intentions of the Government, we have got to fight, and first and foremost the Trade Unions must be the shock troops in the battle. Above all, it will be necessary to win specially attractive conditions for young miners if the new young life-blood is to be attracted to this key industry. Already the miners, the engineers and the builders' unions have conducted important campaigns and won valuable concessions. The T.U.C. and the entire movement should be rallied in a gigantic effort to win the main youth demands in the next two years.

Above all, it is the duty of the Party to lead this fight. There has not been a single issue before the common people these last few years upon which our Party has not played a leading role. From this Congress we must campaign as only our Party can, to win the fight for the full life for our country's Youth. We must work in such a way as we stand out as Youth's champion, fighting for its rights and heritage.

Youth has always been a turbulent fighting force, progressive if given proper leadership and inspiration, but, as Germany has shown, strongly susceptible to demagogic reaction. In the days before the war the brilliantly conducted youth strikes in engineering, which

laid the basis for a change in that industry, the mass youth movement against Fascism and war and the movement for Spain, the young heroes who flocked to the International Brigade, and the great youth unity movement, showed the fighting calibre and progressive aims of our young men and women. Our universities were transformed, the mass of the student body rallied to the progressive cause.

In the war, Youth's experience has been profound. The under-18s in the Youth Service Schemes showed not only a willingness for service to win the war, but a keenness for discussion which went far outside the official bounds of the scheme. They did their bit in the factories, shipyards and mines. They formed the backbone of the R.A.F. and the commandos. In Europe, Malaya and Burma they saw the great onward sweep of the peoples, they met the resistance movements and they saw fascism as it really was. They saw the real poverty of India and the Empire. All this left a lasting impression.

The young people of today are more than ever determined to win a fit place in society. They not only want economic security and better conditions, but peace to enjoy the years lost in war. Above all, they will be to the forefront of our fight for peace as none have more to lose in war than they. They want sport, hiking and access to the country. They want to dance and live. They want to read, write and express themselves. They don't want to be read sermons, they want to be given a chance to live.

This determination was seen above all in the General Election, where the swing of the youth to Labour was a decisive factor in the election victory. There has been a development of the Labour League of Youth, though this has been spasmodic, of the Co-operative Youth Movement and of Youth membership in the trade unions.

At the same time everything is not straightforward. There is a widespread feeling among many sections that this country is finished and that they should seek their fortune in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. There has been a tremendous growth of young Tory activity. The old discredited Tory Party is making a supreme effort to capture the youth. Young Tories like Peter Thorneycroft produce new demagogic creeds. They organise debates and lectures and proclaim a new conservatism. They skilfully exploit every weakness of the Government, and today claim 50,000 members. What is at stake is the 3 million youth votes which will be decisive for the 1950 General Election.

As against this the growth of the political Youth Labour movement is small and uneven. No encouragement is given from Transport House, and the last Labour Party Conference turned down the Labour League of Youth. This is a reflection of the traditional fear

of the youth, inherent in Social Democracy. The Labour chiefs are afraid of a fighting youth, afraid it will get too far in the struggle for Socialism, afraid of the urge for unity always present in youth's ranks and its detestation of compromise. The continued "disciplining" of the Labour League of Youth before the war and the splitting of the Student Labour Federation is a vivid remembrance in the minds of Labour leaders today. The Government makes no bold appeal to youth to be the fighting vanguard for the country's reconstruction and for Socialism.

But all political youth movements are in the minority. The field is still held by the bourgeois youth movement, the Scouts, the Guides and the Cubs, themselves largely the product of Labour's indifference to youth. Even they, however, with their traditional "no politics" line shielding an objective political role of acceptance of the existing capitalist state of things, have been greatly affected by the war. Fierce discussions take place within their ranks; Youth Parliaments and Forums are the order of the day. There is continual searching and seeking. A broad unity of youth is developing in the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the basis for a million strong national movement for peace, democracy and social advance, expressing above all the intense international feeling of youth.

What is needed today above all is .

First That the Government grants Youth's demands, and on that basis the problems of Youth Labour and entry into industry be solved, and we thereby show that this country really has a future.

Second That the Labour Government makes a bold appeal to the Youth to be the vanguard in the great drive for nationalisation and Socialist reconstruction against the Tories.

Third On this basis to ensure that the three million strong youth vote will be cast for the working class in the next General Election.

Fourth For the working-class youth movement to strive to unite the widest sections of the British Youth movement around the World Federation of Democratic Youth.

In general our Party's task is clear in all this. It is to make our campaigning on Youth demands a central feature of our work, to raise all the issues in the trade unions, the local authorities, Parliament and every section of the Labour Movement; to assist youth unity in every way; and to build up and develop our youth movement, the Young Communist League and its newspaper—*Challenge*.

One cannot consider all these problems without at once realising the leading part in all of them which must be played by the Young Communist League.

Here I would like to pay public tribute on your behalf to the

Young Communist League, its leadership and its work. If our youth before the war stood firm against Fascism, no small part of the credit for this belongs to the Y.C.L. The Youth strikes, the Youth Pilgrimage, the International Brigade, the unification of the Youth; in all of this it was the work of the League which was decisive. Under great difficulties and with depleted ranks it rallied youth for assistance to the war effort. Its members volunteered for the pits, conducted work on the land, organised shock brigades in the factories. In the army, air force and navy the League members played a general part. If ever a political party can be proud of its Youth movement, it is the Communist Party.

But do we always appreciate our League? I don't think so, because if we did we would not have a position where our Young Communist League membership is only 1,500 against the Party's 40,000. This must be ended once and for all, and the Y.C.L. transformed into a mass youth organisation. A decisive change is long overdue and this is what the resolution sets out to achieve.

The first matter is to clear up misconceptions about the role and character of the League and its relations to the Party, something which has been hindering the development of the League for years. In view of changing circumstances at different times, various tactical proposals have been made for the League development. We won't detail these here, there is not the time. One such idea was that of developing a mass United Socialist Youth movement. The political situation is such that there is not the immediate perspective before us, irrespective of how correct it was in the past or any probable developments which might occur in the future. The big thing for this Congress, is to arrive at a clear-cut decision with no ifs and buts, that the vital need is to build a mass Young Communist League during this year.

Because of wrong conceptions there has grown up over past years a virtual isolation between the Party and the League. The independence of the League has been distorted with the effect that the vast majority of Party organisations washed their hands of the Y.C.L. When Lenin spoke about the independence of the Youth Leaguers he certainly never meant this.

We therefore stress as basic principles :

First, the Y.C.L. is the youth organisation of the Communist Party, and the major responsibility for its organisation and guidance is that of the Party, locally, on a District level and nationally. This means a decisive change for the vast majority of Party organisations, and Congress will insist they operate their responsibility.

Secondly, in addition to all our campaigning and fighting on Youth

issues, it is now the duty of each Party organisation to give consistent attention to building up the membership of the League, assisting in the educational work, and allocating Party comrades to work with the League organisations.

Thirdly, every Party organisation must receive regular Youth reports on the development of the League and the Youth movement, assist in the political formulation of demands, and assist the League to develop mass movements of the Youth around these demands.

If every Party organisation operated these decisions immediately a rapid change could take place in the membership and activity of the League—it could rise to 5,000 in a few months.

Such decisions in no way interfere with the independence of the Y.C.L. as a youth organisation. The Y.C.L. has its own Congress, leadership, paper and organisation. On the contrary, the greatest care must be taken to avoid a bureaucratic approach. We must work in such a way as to encourage the greatest initiative of our young comrades. At the risk of misinterpretation I would say: let our Party comrades help above all in organisational matters of the League and friendly political guidance, so that the Young League cadres can pitch into great colourful campaigns. Most youth would rather storm heaven than organise a weekly meeting.

We want the League to organise educational work, cultural activities, sport and drama. However, if we can make a point, above all we want it to be a fighting campaigning organisation on youth's demands and the general struggle for Socialism. Not to campaign in a Party sense, but great colourful youth drives with youth methods. Don't worry if there is not day-to-day consistent campaigning. Youth does not work that way. Let the campaigning go in waves in accordance with conditions and possibilities.

Two final points. We must restore the idea of the Y.C.L. as a reservoir for the Party. Already it has given us some of our best cadres—Rust, Wainwright, Mick Bennett, Alex Massie and many others. Let this be a systematic function of our relationship. Let Party parents now understand also, that the liberal idea that it doesn't matter if the son or daughter joins the League or the Boy Scouts, won't do any longer. We don't want them to use any big stick, but we definitely want them consciously to encourage their children to join the League.

In conclusion let us recognise that there never was a political party which advanced without the Youth, the most heroic, self-sacrificing section of the population. The battle for Socialism in Britain depends on the Party winning the Youth, building a mass Y.C.L. That—no less—is the issue before the Party.

BRITISH ROAD TO SOCIALISM

KITTY CORNFORTH

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS in various countries have brought home the fact that there is no set formula for the road to Socialism and that different countries are going in the direction of Socialism in different ways according to their special circumstances. The purpose of this article is to raise for consideration some aspects of our road to Socialism here in Britain; in particular the way in which the working-class movement, by taking the lead in solving the problems that face our country now, by taking the lead in saving Britain from disaster, can make decisive advances along our British road to Socialism.

As Marxists we see the question of *power* as a decisive one for the achievement of Socialism. And one of the most important differences between the Marxist and the reformist idea of the road to Socialism concerns the question of the State as an organ of power. In so far as reformists believe that the State apparatus—the armed forces, police, civil service, etc.,—is a means of maintaining law and order standing above classes, they see the key to power in a parliamentary majority, and fail to reckon with the real power of the capitalist class embodied in the State machine. But Marxism has shown that the State is not neutral in relation to classes, but is a means of maintaining the domination of a ruling class, with the whole of its apparatus adapted for this purpose. Marx therefore said that the working class could not simply lay hold of the existing State apparatus and use it for its own purposes, but that the first step on the road to Socialism must be to smash the capitalist State machine and replace it by something altogether different, a new State which would be the proletariat organised as the ruling class.

How is this step to be taken? How is the capitalist State machine to be smashed and what is to be put in its place?

No abstract plan of campaign was ever put forward by Marx or Lenin in answer to these questions, but at each stage their theory was based on the actual experience of the working-class struggle—in 1848, in the Paris Commune of 1871, in the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

The experience of the past, in particular the experience of the Soviet Union, was that the power of the capitalist State had to be broken by a violent revolution led by the working class and that it had to be replaced by a totally new State, with the Soviets, the organisation developed by the people in the course of the revolution,

as its machinery of government, and its organ of force the armed people, the basis of the new army and police force.

Lenin more than once said that the exact forms of the transition to Socialism must depend on the actual conditions of the struggle; and in Britain we have not been near enough to the decisive struggle for power to be able to discuss exactly how it would develop, but when, in the past, we have envisaged our road to Socialism in Britain, it has seemed probable that when the class struggle developed to the stage of a struggle for power, it would take a violent form. And whatever the degree of violence of the struggle for power, it has been envisaged as a struggle *against* the old State machine, leading to its replacement by something altogether new, in particular the replacement of parliament by new organs of government, such as Workers' Councils, which would have been built up in the struggle.

But now it is necessary for us to study this question afresh. Today the struggle for Socialism is taking place in new conditions and in new forms. The united working class, led by the Communist Party, is acting as the decisive force in more than one country. The balance of class forces over the whole world has changed; and our own ruling class is facing unprecedented difficulties in maintaining its system of exploitation and imperial power. In this situation we cannot be content simply to repeat the lessons of the past. We need to study, in the light of Marxist theory, what is to be learned from the new developments.

The Communist Parties of the new democracies envisage a new road to Socialism. It is not intended to discuss their experiences here, except to stress one point: that while Comrade Bienkowski, in his speech at our 19th Congress, could describe the perspective for Poland as "a peaceful and evolutionary advance towards Socialism," this road must be distinguished from the conception of a gradual, peaceful evolution towards Socialism put forward by reformism. Reformists, in so far as they refuse to recognise the State as an organ of class power, talk about the road to Socialism while they refrain from attacking the main bases of capitalist power in the State apparatus, leaving it unchanged, with the ruling class and their agents in all the key positions. But in the new democracies the main bases of capitalist power in the State *have* been attacked. Power has been taken from the ruling clique of the capitalist class, the five to ten per cent; and the vast majority of people, the 90 per cent, have become or are becoming the decisive factor in the State. If a new road to Socialism lies open, it is because capitalist power has been undermined and is in process of being broken in a new way. Therefore the experience of the new democracies, while it gives no grounds

for slurring over the basic differences between the Marxist and the reformist conceptions of the road to Socialism, nevertheless shows that in the present historical stage new ways are open to breaking capitalist power, and there are new possibilities of building working-class unity for this purpose.

In Britain, Labour's victory in the general election and the policy of the Labour Government, though they have weakened the position of capitalism, have not yet struck at the roots of capitalist power. In the economic sphere, Labour's full programme would nationalise only 20 per cent of industry, and the proportion so far nationalised is much less: even in nationalised industry, control is not decisively removed from the capitalist class. Our state apparatus remains, in essentials, untouched as a basis of capitalist power. The leadership of the Services and the police, the upper ranks of the civil, diplomatic and colonial services, and their methods of work, are unchanged.

Hence, unlike the new democracies, we still face the question of how State power is to be taken out of the hands of the capitalist class. And this question must be discussed in the light of the struggle that is actually developing now.

Our country now faces crisis. A new basis has to be found for our whole national economy, or we face disaster. Our capitalists and reactionaries can offer no solution to our problems. The only way out they can find is to sell out to Wall Street as a means of preserving their own privileges. The only policy which can save Britain now is one which strikes at capitalist interests; and the working class is the class on which the whole future of our country depends.

In this situation, the Communist Party is fighting for a re-constituted Labour Government which will end the policy of surrender to capitalist interests. We are fighting for an Economic Plan for Britain, which will subordinate the interests of monopoly capitalism to the interests of the nation; for a more effective control over economic life by the Labour Government, backed by new forms of participation in control by the working-class movement from the factories up; for a restriction of the rent, interest and profit of the capitalist class, and an increase in the share of the national income going to the masses of the people; for a man-power policy that will bring our men into industry, out of the armed forces; and for the radical change in foreign policy that will make this possible. We are fighting for a new attitude to the Soviet Union, the new democracies and the colonial peoples, and an end to the efforts to bolster up the old system of imperialism by an alliance with American reaction.

We are fighting for this policy as a matter of urgency for the

British people, since the alternative is for Britain to sink into dependence on America, with an immediate prospect of economic crisis and a growing menace of war.

We need to see this immediate fight as a new stage in our advance to Socialism. The British people face a position where they must either advance in the face of capitalist opposition or go backwards in surrender to capitalism; and the path forward for Britain now involves a struggle to take from monopoly capitalism a considerable measure of its *state* as well as its *economic* power. We are fighting for the Labour Government to take this path; and on our side, making for a change in Labour's policy, are the growing militancy of the workers, the increase in dissatisfaction in the Labour movement, and above all, the march of events themselves, which are bringing home to the people the need for decisive action. And we should realise that the policy we are fighting for now raises the issues of class power in a totally new way.

To carry through a changed policy will raise the question of changes in our State apparatus. To carry through a Plan for Britain, which really subordinates the interests of the monopoly capitalists to those of the nation, demands big changes in the civil service and the apparatus of control. New forces have to be brought forward, both to make and to carry through such a plan; and new forms of democratic organisation have to be developed from the factories up, to enable the working class to participate effectively both in planning and in carrying through the plan. Such a development would represent a big change in our State apparatus, a change which would take away a measure of the real control now exercised by monopoly capitalism, transferring it to the organised working class. A real change in foreign policy demands great changes in the personnel and methods of work of the diplomatic and colonial services. The fight for international co-operation and peace demands that those who aim at a military alliance with the U.S.A. directed against the U.S.S.R. as potential enemy should be removed from control over our armed forces.

Thus the path of advance for Britain is a path of sharp class struggle against monopoly capitalism, and the need to break the hold of reaction on our State apparatus must arise in the course of our battle to solve the immediate problems facing the British people. Today the fight for production is not something separate from the struggle for power. The point of production is still the focus of the class struggle—but in a new way. In so far as the organised working class of Britain can take the lead in solving the problems that now face us, new forms of democratic organisation will be needed, and

will be created, which represent accessions of power to the working people. Moreover, in proportion as the capitalists feel their vital interests challenged, they will make use of their hold on the State apparatus to attack and sabotage the policy of the Government. In this way the need to remove the reactionaries from their key positions will become more and more obviously a matter of immediate practical concern for the whole people. Thus to carry through our policy in the face of capitalist opposition it will be necessary to fight for the transformation of our State, by a purge of *our* quislings and traitors, by a thorough-going democratisation and by the building up of new forms of democratic organisation as part of the State apparatus.

Thus the battle to solve the new problems which face the British people leads in more than one way to the fight to break the hold of monopoly capitalism on the State machine, and in this way there does open out a new perspective of the British road to Socialism. It is a different road from that of 1917. But it is a road of class struggle, sharply distinguished from the reformist dream of a gradual, peaceful transition to Socialism by its recognition of the need to strike at the roots of capitalist power by breaking the hold of capitalism on the State machine. What is new about this perspective is not so much that it is peaceful but that it recognises the possibility of smashing the capitalist State machine in a new way, here in Britain, with the struggle to end capitalist power arising directly out of the struggle of the British people to solve their immediate problems. This road would lead to the possibility of making the transition to Socialism without replacing parliament by something altogether different. Power of the working class and all the people who do useful work could be exercised through a new use of parliament and a purged and democratised State apparatus, backed by new forms of democratic, popular organisation.

What makes such a new perspective possible? Amongst all that is new, two factors appear of special importance. First; the greatly weakened position of the British capitalist class. Faced with American economic domination and imperialist expansion, and the revolt of the colonial peoples, they are unable to maintain their system of imperialist exploitation in the old way. In their efforts to preserve their old privileges and class interests at any cost, they are prepared to betray the vital interests of their country, and to jeopardise its independence, by an economic, political and military alliance with America. This policy of the British ruling class makes it possible to expose them as traitors and reveal their true face to the British people, just as the true face of reaction has been revealed to the people of the new democracies. In this way they can be isolated and the majority of the

people won to support a policy that strikes at the roots of their power.

And secondly, the increased strength of the progressive forces of the world, of the Soviet Union and the new democracies, of the colonial peoples, and the working class and progressive movement of every country, all of whom would be allies of the British people in their fight against the forces of imperialism and reaction. This means, not only that the power of world, and in particular American, reaction to bolster up our own reactionaries at home and intervene on their behalf is restricted, but also that we have powerful allies to look to outside our own country, once we take the democratic road; other countries and peoples seeking a democratic road forward, ready for mutual assistance in building world trade and world peace.

Thus we can hold out the perspective of a new road to Socialism in Britain; and our fight now for the future of the British people, our fight to change the policy of the Labour Government, is the fight to go along this road.

FICTITIOUS CAPITAL

AS THE DATE of the Labour Government's second Budget draws near, it is useful to look again at some aspects of Labour's taxation policy.

In the election programme not much was said about taxation. The declaration of policy, *Let Us Face the Future*, contained only a brief reference to the need for "taxation which bears less heavily on the lower income groups." Yet in the general aims set out—a high and rising standard of living, security for all, and the rest—changes in the distribution of the national income were clearly involved. To achieve such changes, taxation—the direct use of the State apparatus in the allocation of money resources—is a necessary instrument.

In a Socialist country, where the whole value of national production belongs to the State, the allocation can be made at the source: budgeting can provide for necessary national expenditure, including new capital required for socially-owned industry, before the total amount of individual incomes, in the form of wages and salaries, pensions and allowances, is arrived at. Taxes, therefore, are of a different and much more limited character.

In Britain, where the overwhelming majority of the values produced are subject to the claims of private ownership, taxation is the principal means of raising revenue to meet all forms of national expenditure. It can also be a highly effective means of providing an incentive to

production, and improving the distribution of wealth between the classes. A Labour Government has to consider this last aspect of taxation policy—so familiar to the absolute monarch or the Indian prince—from the standpoint of which class interests are to be advanced.

For the financial year 1946-47, the chief groups of public expenditure which had to be provided for were estimated as follows: Defence and Supply Departments (£1,666 million); Civil and Revenue Departments, including social services and subsidies (£1,652 million); interest and management of the National Debt (£400 million); other Consolidated Fund services (£78 million). In other words, out of a total of £3,886 million, nearly £500 million was required for interest on the National Debt—more than the whole amount that was to be spent on national insurance, pensions and allowances, and education grants put together.

What is the National Debt, which now stands at about £24,000 million? What is its place in the national economy? From one standpoint, of course, it represents "gilt-edged securities"—capital invested at a certain steady rate of interest. Holders of Government stock have a claim to receive each year a part of the country's total income as a return on their investment. But from the standpoint of the national balance sheet, what assets offset this colossal liability? Marx wrote:

"The State has to pay to its creditors annually a certain amount of interest for the money loaned from them. In this case the creditor cannot call on the State to give up the principal. He can merely sell his claim, his title of ownership. The capital itself has been consumed, spent by the State. *It does not exist any longer*" (*Capital*, Vol. III, page 546.)

Because the National Debt does not represent real capital, in the sense of means of production, it is obvious that it has no part in the process of production, and that whatever interest is paid on it is simply an additional charge on the income from the country's productive resources. From time to time this has been recognised by the Labour movement. For example, the Bournemouth Labour Party Conference in 1940 adopted a statement on Labour's Home Policy, which included this point and proposed a way of dealing with it:

"To grapple with *the inert mass of war debt*, an annual capital tax during the war, and a bold capital levy afterwards, are indispensable."

The idea of a levy on capital to pay off the National Debt—the taking over by the State of one set of claims to rent, interest or profit, in order to set them off against claims to interest on the debt—is not new. In one of his ironical pamphlets on Ireland, written more than two hundred years ago, Jonathan Swift devised a "Proposal to pay off the debt of the nation without taxing the subject." He suggested that the

State should take over half the capital value of the lands from which "their Graces and Lordships, the Archbishops and Bishops of this kingdom" drew their revenues. The grounds on which Swift argued for his scheme are peculiarly appropriate today:

"The debts contracted some years past, for the service and safety of the nation, are grown so great, that *under our present distressed condition, by the want of trade, the great remittances to pay absentees, regiments serving abroad*, and many other drains of money, well enough known and felt, the kingdom seems altogether unable to discharge them by the common methods of payment"

Today the "many drains of money" include a new set of claims, arising from the compensation to ex-owners of nationalised industry, which are as unreal from the standpoint of productive capacity as the National Debt itself. On the terms at present laid down, they represent a perpetual claim to interest on a certain fictitious capitalised value, by people who take no part whatever in producing the real values of coal, electricity or transport.

"Interest-bearing capital generally is the mother of all crazy forms," Marx said; and in another part of the same chapter.

"In all countries of capitalist production, there exists an enormous quantity of so called interest-bearing capital, or moneyed capital, in this form. And accumulation of money-capital signifies to a large extent nothing else but an accumulation of such claims on production, an accumulation of the market price, the illusory capital-value, of these claims" (*Capital*, Vol. III, page 551.)

What should be the attitude of a Labour Government to the "crazy form" of the National Debt, now reaching the monstrous total of some £24,000 million of interest-bearing capital?

In an appendix to Beveridge's *Full Employment*, it is argued that the amount of the debt makes no difference; that it does not diminish total real income, and that if everyone puts into national savings a constant proportion of his income, and interest is paid out of a tax proportionate to income, there is no transfer at all of income as between different members of society. With rising productivity and stable prices, the argument continues, the Government could go on adding to the debt at the rate of £250 million a year, without increasing the proportion of the interest burden to the national income.

For a Labour Government, however, one principal aim of taxation policy must be to ensure (1) that *there shall be a transfer of income* as between different members of society—a transfer from the rich to the "lower income groups"—and (2) that the proportion of national income spent in interest on the debt *shall not remain at the present level*.

How can this be done? To answer this question, it is necessary first to look at the present chief sources of revenue. Who pays taxes? In what proportion is national revenue taken from different sections of society?

For 1946-7 estimated revenue amounted to £3,161 million, of which £1,686 million came from direct taxation, and £1,232 million from indirect taxation, the balance of £243 million being made up of sales of surplus war stores, etc.

Before the war, according to figures given by Barna, out of a total of £1,160 million raised by taxation (local and national), £610 million was paid by people with incomes of less than £500 a year. Allowing for increases in indirect taxation as well as for changes in income tax, it is probable that the proportion has not greatly altered. In the year 1942, the proportion taken in income tax from people with incomes between £250 and £500 had increased from three per cent in 1938 to 14½ per cent of the total income of this group, according to figures of direct taxation of personal incomes given in the White Paper on the *War Effort of the United Kingdom*.

In regard to the ownership of capital, including holdings in the National Debt, again no exact figures are available. On the basis of pre-war estimates, it appeared that two-thirds of total private property was made up of holdings of more than £5,000. Of the National Debt itself, in the period between the wars, it was found that one-third was held by the rich individually, and over half by banks, insurance companies and other concerns. Of the remaining 12 per cent, the Post Office and other Government funds held a large proportion, and individual small savings represented only a very small part. Although national savings campaigns will have increased the *amount* of small savings, it is quite certain that the immense bulk of the National Debt is still held by the rich, either individually or through company investments, and that existing taxation of the rich, in so far as it goes to pay interest on the Debt, is simply taking money out of one pocket to put it back into the other.

How, then, can this totally unproductive burden be reduced at the expense of the class that can best afford to pay?

There are three possible ways: by lowering the rate of interest; by reducing the (capital) amount of the Debt by a levy on capital; by increasing the proportion of interest and/or repayment that is taken from the rich.

The average rate of interest is now about 1.8 per cent, compared with 2.5 per cent before the war. Further reductions in the rate of interest are certainly desirable, but even at a lower rate a heavy burden on taxation remains.

When proposals for the second method, a levy on capital, were put forward by Labour spokesmen between the wars, and an Inquiry Committee (the Colwyn Committee) examined the whole scheme, it was found that, even at the rates of taxation then existing, a capital levy would result in a considerable loss in income tax, surtax and death duties. An estimate showed that a levy on properties above £5,000, on a graduated scale rising from five per cent to 55 per cent, would raise a total of £2,500 million to be paid off the Debt. This would result in reducing interest by £125 million a year, but there would be a loss of £77 million in other taxes; the net saving would be only £48 million.

At the present rates of income tax and surtax, even if the scale of a levy on capital were increased up to 75 per cent of the biggest properties, the actual saving would be still smaller. About three-quarters of the total gross saving of interest on the Debt would be counterbalanced by losses in other taxation. The immediate gain, therefore, from so vast a measure of expropriation, would be comparatively small.

But if, instead of a "once for all" levy on capital, the method of an annual capital tax were introduced, it would be possible to make an effective reduction in the burden of interest, with a much smaller loss from other taxes on the rich. A capital tax would take contributions from gains not touched by income tax—for example, gains from house property sold at increased prices, or from the sale of shares. It could be adjusted from time to time to meet changing national needs, but it would be a tax on capital, and would not depend on whether in a particular year a profit had been made on that capital.

On a rough estimate of present capital holdings, a yearly capital tax (from which all properties of less than £10,000 would be exempt), starting at 0.5 per cent on holdings between £10,000 and £25,000, and going up to five per cent on property of more than half a million, would give a net yield, after allowing for losses in income tax and surtax, of about £300 million in the first year. By this means, three-fifths of the amount required to pay interest on the "fictitious capital" of the National Debt would be taken from the richest property-owning groups, and the total amount of wealth that could remain in the hands of any individual would be effectively limited.

The Blackpool T.U.C. in 1945 approved a statement on Fiscal Policy, which showed that a capital tax would not open the way to further evasion of death duties, and would "therefore be of great importance in securing a more equitable distribution of property."

Whatever proposals are to be made with regard to the long-promised tax on profits, the Government cannot afford to ignore the views of the Labour movement, which have been so clearly stated, on the need for a tax on capital.

NATIONALISED RAILWAYS AND COAL

A. GEORGE

WHAT GREAT changes are to result from the nationalisation of the railways? Will it improve the "transit and distribution" of domestic coal? Reference was made by the 1919 Coal Commission to the need for economies to be effected in coal "production," also "coal in transit" and "coal in distribution." The nationalisation of coal will effect economies by breaking down the former capitalist ownership of mines, but like the nationalisation of railways leaves intact the aspects of domestic coal in "transit" and "distribution."

One looks forward to a number of changes taking place upon the railways consequent upon nationalisation. First and foremost, thousands of vehicles "privately owned" will belong to State railways. Secondly, the whole of the passenger services can be electrified with the great advantage of safety devices. Electric "track circuits," "signal locking" apparatus, "motor cut-outs," passing signals at danger mechanism, and so on. Thousands of vehicles—privately owned vehicles—are not suitable for fast freight services, due to being fitted with grease axle boxes. The need now is for all oil axle boxes.

A further improvement one can expect is that passenger stock will be standardised, will not, as now, cease its "circuit" usefulness at joint stations, as, for instance, L.M.S. Leeds-Bristol services will be extended. Many other terminal point stations could be cited where an extension of services would be possible, as, for instance, Gloucester and Worcester. Loose-shackled freight and mineral trains, one hopes, will be replaced in time by automatic couplings, and all trains should have the "automatic continuous brake" operated by the driver on the engine and, in case of danger, by the guard. Freight and mineral services between what are now four companies will be extended; instead of, as now, exchange points between railway companies being bottle-necks, because of the "demarcation point" and the need of "railway clearing house" officials to take particulars of vehicles respecting loads and their routes in order that each company will get its pound of flesh—its margin of carriage.

State railways may, again, institute better conditions, better wages, the five-day week. Industrial health services. Full-time doctors and clinics at loco sheds and other busy points. The need is also great for hot water baths at loco sheds for cleaners and boiler workers. Mess rooms, again, need to be brought up to a par with outside industry. Consultation at all levels should be a feature of the new conditions.

Also appropriate sections of the Factory Acts should be made applicable to the railways.

One of the greatest changes that took place at the commencement of the war was the creation of the "wagon pool." All vehicles, with certain exceptions, were operated by the railway companies irrespective of ownership. For this temporary control all owners were paid the sum of 3/6d. per day wagon hire. Firms owning some thousands of vehicles—mainly coal carrying—would under this arrangement net a considerable sum. Up till the date of nationalisation, these vehicles continue to operate under the wagon pool arrangement.

Formerly the practice operating upon the railways of Britain was that the thousands of vehicles belonging to the collieries, coal agents, dealers, factors and wagon-hire firms had to be shunted and marshalled as empty wagons at the owners' behest and sent to the collieries. This resulted in a false railway economy—in thousands of miles being wasted by the "passage as trains" of these vehicles. Equally thousands of hours more wasted in marshalling and shunting of these directed vehicles. These vehicles have now lost their "individual directed" characteristic, they have become "uniform." A vehicle can now be sent anywhere and in accordance with the "natural play and stress of railway operations." A train-shunting operation that formerly took 40-60 minutes can now be performed in some ten minutes, owing to the uniformity of vehicles in their capacity as "empty vehicles."

This "common user" characteristic constituted a revolution in railway economy. And yet still the railways are chaotic and congested, cluttered up with the special private interest of some thousands of private owners of loads of domestic coal. All shunting and marshalling of coal and freight vehicles has a relationship to the "destination indicated upon the wagon label and the ownership." Why should the railways be congested year after year because of the special profit and interests of some several thousand agents, factors, and so on, of domestic coal? By a reorganisation of domestic coal in distribution one can effect from the point of view of the railways a revolution in transit. It would eliminate useless "ant-like shunting" at sidings and shunting and marshalling of trains of coal. This revolution would eliminate over a third of shunting on the railways, and in effect would cause a "shrinkage" of traffic requiring siding accommodation.

One hears of collieries congested, lack of empty wagons, no room to shunt vehicles owing to congestion. Trains of domestic coal wait for hours on goods and slow lines behind each other for their turn to be shunted at principal marshalling points. Some trains take several days (through traffic) to do the journey from the North to the West. Train crews may be on duty 12 to 18 hours at one stretch. Nationalisation of

the railways or of the mines will not in itself alter this tremendous annual congestion. Something vital has to be removed that acts as a stranglehold upon railway economy. And that boa-constrictor is the "direction and control" of domestic coal by private enterprise. The solution to congestion upon the railways is State ownership in transit and actual distribution—from pit to cellar.

It should be obvious that if the State, instead of selling domestic coal to agents, factors and dealers, were to set up their own distributing apparatus, a revolution could be effected in railway shunting and marshalling operations. Much dead wood would be cut away. Fewer distributing agents would mean that trains could be wholly composed of loads of coal for a particular distributing area authority. Useless shunting, as is the position now, on behalf of the directed and privately owned loads of coal would cease.

The suggestion here offered is that regional distributing authorities for domestic coal distribution should be set up. These authorities to approximate the areas now covered by the existing railway "traffic controls" (railway control areas, it is to be noted, cover roughly some 50-70 miles in extent). By this new form of organisation the railway system would need only to accommodate sidings and running lines to some 50 or less authorities or owners, instead of the thousands of different owners as is now the case.

Again, the link between the mines and the railways—nationalisation measures have now made it possible for the actual distribution of household coal to be undertaken by the goods departments of State railways, having as their basis the type of structure cited above. Further, State railways distributing domestic coal could reorganise their shunting coal wharves by the introduction of mechanisation—the use of hoppers to load bags of coal, etc., making for a quick turn-round of wagons.

The Sankey Coal Commission sat in 1919. Much was revealed by the inquiry. The only fundamental recommended by the Commission, and which has been adopted, is nationalisation. We still have (it is assumed) some 27,000 agents, factors, dealers, etc., handling the nation's coal—which in some cases the commission described as a "three- and four-tier system" of handling from pit to cellar. The inquiry also revealed that of the 27,000 cited above, only some 1,500 to 2,000 have actual railway toll accounts or direct accounts with collieries. Reference was also made to the £500,000 annual profits made by the London distributors. One wonders what are the profits today, not only respecting London but of the entire country. Again, what a relief to the housewife if these profits were ploughed back in lower prices or, on the other hand, to improve distribution or the conditions of the rank and file of the industry.

THE CULTURAL FRONT

MAO TSE-TUNG

(Part of an address to a meeting of Communist Party members on the role of literature and art in the Chinese revolutionary movement)

SINCE OUR ART is created for workers, peasants, soldiers, cadres and sympathisers, there arises the problem of how to understand these people and how to approach them.

In this respect, what have you artists and writers done in the past? I say that you are not familiar with these people—your audience—and you do not understand them. You are heroes without a battlefield. You are not familiar with anything—with the characters you depict, with the situations you describe, or the people for whom you work.

First of all, you do not understand the language. You use the language of intellectuals and they use the language of common people.

I have often noted that many of our comrades are fond of speaking about the popularisation of art, but what is "popularisation"? It means that the ideas and emotions of our cultural workers should be merged with the ideas and emotions of workers, peasants and soldiers. In order to weld this unity, we must start by learning the language of the people. If we cannot understand even the language of the masses, how can we talk about the creation of literature and art?

When I describe you as "heroes without a battlefield," I mean that the masses of the people will not be able to appreciate your set of principles. The more you demonstrate your qualifications as an accomplished writer or artist, the more you parade as a hero, the more you try to sell your ideas to the people, the more emphatically will the people reject your work. If you want the masses to understand you and if you want to forge yourself into one piece with the masses, you must resolve to pass through a long and even painful process of tempering.

Here I will tell you my own experience in changing my feelings toward the people. When I was in school, I picked up the habits of students. I felt awkward about doing any manual labour. For instance, I was embarrassed when I carried my own luggage on a bamboo pole in the presence of students who could not bear the weight of anything across their shoulders and who could not carry anything in their hands. At the time, I felt that the cleanest people in the world were the intellectuals. Workers, peasants and soldiers—they were always dirty people. So I was willing to borrow the clothes of intellectuals, as I considered them clean. I would not borrow clothes from workers, peasants or soldiers; I thought they would be dirty.

After the revolution, I lived together with workers, peasants and soldiers. Gradually I came to know them, and they also began to know me. At this time, and only at this time, could I fundamentally change the feelings of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie that I had acquired in bourgeois schools. After this, in comparing unreformed intellectuals with workers, peasants and soldiers, I felt that such intellectuals had many unclean places not only in their minds but also on their bodies. The cleanest people in the world were the workers and peasants. Even though their hands might be black and their legs plastered with cow dung, they were still cleaner than the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. This is what I mean by a change of feeling—a change from one class to another.

Our cultural workers who come from intellectual backgrounds must make a change in their thoughts and feelings. They must experience this transmutation before the masses will welcome their productions. Without such changes, such remouldings, artists and writers can do nothing well and their ideas will not penetrate among the people.

The problem of self-education. By this term, I mean the problem of learning Marxism-Leninism and of conducting research studies of society. Anyone who wants to be a revolutionary writer, especially one who wants to become a Communist Party writer, must acquire the common sense of Marx-Lenin philosophy. At present, however, many of our comrades lack the most fundamental Marx-Leninist concept that the objective decides the subjective, that therefore objective conditions of the class struggle determine our thoughts and emotions. But many of our comrades reverse this principle. They say that love is the motivating power behind every development. As far as love is concerned, in a class society there is only love of class or class-love. But many comrades are maintaining that love is beyond all class distinctions; they deal in terms of so-called “above-class” love, abstract love, abstract freedom, abstract truth, abstract human nature, etc. This reveals how deeply our comrades have been influenced by the bourgeoisie. Now we must root out this influence and embrace Marxism-Leninism with open minds.

It is right that all cultural workers should study the ways of creative production, but Marxism-Leninism is a subject that all revolutionary workers must learn, and workers in the field of literature and art cannot be exceptions. In addition, you artists should study society—that is, the various classes of society; the inter-relations between them, the conditions of individuals within each class, their faces and their minds. Only through an understanding of these things can our literature and art be given full meaning and correct orientation.

“... what syllabuses can I use for classes?”

asked the conscientious Tutor

And the Education Secretary, from his considerable experience, was able to point to some very valuable material for use at all levels.

“First,” he said, “there’s one of the year’s best-sellers amongst syllabuses—*The Aims of the Communist Party*. You’ve probably heard of it. It’s the first of an introductory series on Marxism. The lessons are headed ‘Our Communist Aim’: ‘Socialism’, and ‘The Communist Party and Labour’s Programme’, and there are questions at the end of each to stimulate discussion. It’s a threepenny.”

“Good,” said the Conscientious Tutor. “I’m glad you reminded me. It’s just the thing for new members and sympathisers—and some of the older members who need something of a refresher. But I’ve another problem. I want something simple but good for an elementary political economy class. You know how difficult that subject can be. Any others?”

“Certainly,” flashed back the Education Secretary. “Tie the companion syllabus—*Capitalist Society*, No. 2 in the series, also 3d. It gives the elements of political economy under headings ‘Capitalist Exploitation’, ‘Capitalism, Crisis and Unemployment’, ‘Capitalism and War’, and ‘The Development of Capitalist Society’.”

“Well, that’s really fine,” said the Conscientious Tutor, making a note to get in touch with his Literature Secretary that

evening. *But the Education Secretary had a little more to say.*

“I think,” he went on, “you should also make use of *Essentials of Communist Theory*. That’s R. W. Robson’s great little syllabus, which has been widely used. Maybe it’s most suitable for comrades who’ve already had basic education—but a good tutor like you could probably take any kind of class on it. And it’s worth noting that it has done a good job with the tricky business of briefly explaining some important political terms.”

“But don’t put your notebook away yet,” he continued. “Just add these four Lawrence and Wishart titles, which no tutor should be without—one, *Britain’s Wealth*, 9d; two, *The Problems of Full Employment*, by Winternitz, 1/-; three, *Britain’s Labour Movement*, 6d; finally, a *Study Guide to Morton’s People’s History of England*.”

“And here’s something new, to help you make your classes live by illustrating basic and abstract theory with topical illustrations—the Report of the Party’s 19th Congress. There are two volumes at 6d. each time—Part I, Harry Pollitt’s speech, *Britain’s Problems Can Be Solved*, which is the Marxist way out of Britain’s present troubles; Part II, *The Resolutions Passed at Congress*.”

All the above may be obtained through Communist Party Branch Literature Secretaries, from progressive bookshops, or direct from Central Books, Ltd., 2-4 Parton Street, London, W.C.1

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THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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Bound copies of the ten issues—March to December, 1946—are available at a cost of 10s. 6d. Orders should be sent to Central Books Ltd., 2 Parton Street, London, W.C.1

THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL STRUGGLE

HARRY POLLITT

A SITUATION WITHOUT PARALLEL in the history of the British Labour movement is developing as a consequence of the Government's policy. When on the debate on the National Service Bill the *Daily Herald* thought fit to feature as a headline " 242 Labour M.P.s voted for the Government " it unconsciously showed the extent of the deep-rooted cleavage which has developed in the movement, one which will only be overcome by a decisive reversal of the Government's policy. At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party, we said:

" The right-wing Labour leaders who at present dominate the Labour Government . . . have to face the fact that the new spirit in the Labour movement is on the upgrade. This growing movement will refuse to be turned into channels that result in capitulation to capitalism. . . . But it will achieve what changes it wants in policy and leadership "

Recent events have fully justified this statement.

It is now recognised that the results of the General Election represented a fundamental step forward in the political development of the British working class. The growing movement against the Government's policy among the trade unions, the shop stewards, the Co-operative movement and the Labour M.P.s is, in fact, part of this process, which commenced with the decisive defeat of the Tory Party at the General Election—the fight of the British people for a Socialist policy at home and abroad. This movement is now at a new and important stage which, with correct leadership and unity, can bring about the reorganisation of the Government, and an overall policy to save Britain.

Most of the illusions fostered by Labour's electoral victory have gone—never to return, despite the efforts of Labour ministers to persuade the movement that with this victory everything was now plain sailing and that there would be a triumphant easy march to Socialism.

The June, 1946, Bournemouth Conference of the Labour Party was dominated by this self-deception. The repeated speeches from the platform, each more complacent than the other, fed this sentiment. Even there, however, the criticism of the Government's foreign policy was growing and found expression in Laski's presidential address and resolutions from D.L.P.s defeated or withdrawn only after an hour and a quarter speech from Bevin.

It was argued that while the Government's foreign policy was bad, its home policy was good.

Thus Laski could claim in the same presidential address that the Labour Government's record in internal politics "has been unsurpassed in any single year of any other Government in our history." It was the period of the first nationalisation Bills and the repeal of the Trade Disputes Act, and in his speech to the Conference Attlee made the most of his opportunity, at the same time dwelling at length on the "wonderful and orderly absorption into industry" during the year and the "remarkable expansion of our export trade," and so on. This was nothing, however, compared with Morrison's speech on the economic situation, which contrived to skate over the grave problems, obvious even then, his single reference to coal being "lack of fuel, again, may be even more of a handicap to us (in 1947) as reconversion gets into its stride." A resolution from Nelson and Colne Labour Party congratulating the Government and expressing pride in its achievements was passed unanimously; that on Communist affiliation was overwhelmingly defeated.

Only the Communist Party at the time really assessed the Bournemouth Conference, our National Executive statement claiming:

"The Bournemouth Conference did not seriously discuss these grave questions. Nevertheless, they must be discussed, for on their solution depends the success of the workers' demands. The lack of an overall economic plan to meet Britain's serious position was covered over by Morrison's complacent panegyric on reconversion."

The Communist Party ceaselessly pointed out that a progressive home policy was impossible on the basis of a reactionary policy abroad. The connection between home and foreign affairs was made startlingly clear in the freeze-up in February, 1947.

The four months between the Bournemouth Conference and the Brighton T.U.C. brought a rapid development of understanding of the real problems within the movement. This Congress was remarkable for the open opposition to Government policy shown by the votes of the big unions, despite the anti-Communist intervention of the Prime Minister. Two and a half million votes were cast for the E.T.U. resolution condemning the foreign policy; the resolution demanding the break with Franco was carried by 4,534,000 votes to 1,391,000, and a resolution against the Anders' Poles obtained 2,416,000 votes. On home affairs considerable concern was shown by Congress on the 40-hour week, a national wages policy, the development areas, the nationalisation of the iron and steel industry, and

participation of the workers in control of the nationalised industries.

It was this strong display of the industrial movement, coupled with the further development of events, which brought the opposition among the M.P.s to a head. For some time concern had been expressed among the more far-sighted M.P.s on various aspects of the Government's policy. The increasing tie-up with America and the economic and political dependence it was bringing, the increasing estrangement with the Soviet Union, all deepened this concern; and, above all, the revelations of the serious economic position displayed in the White Papers focused attention on the issue which brought home and foreign affairs together—manpower. The combination of the fuel crisis, the shut-down of the factories and the Truman declaration all underlined the need for action. Things have moved swiftly since the beginning of the Parliamentary session in November, when 86 M.P.s supported the amendment to the King's Speech, tabled by Crossman and Michael Foot, calling for a change in foreign policy. Between then and Easter of this year, apart from critical speeches and questions, amendments have included:

To the King's Speech, signed by 86 M.P.s.

To the Polish Resettlement Bill, signed by 21 M.P.s.

To the Northern Ireland Bill, signed by 32 M.P.s.

To the National Service Bill, signed by 68 M.P.s.

To the Prime Minister's Defence Motion, signed by 20 M.P.s.

By far the most important motion was that on the National Service Bill, which, as is well known, went to a division. On this division 73 Labour M.P.s voted against the Government and it is calculated some 50 abstained, in spite of a three-line whip. The amendment, while supported by the traditional pacifist elements in the movement, was actually based on the political opposition to the foreign policy, particularly in view of the grave manpower shortage evident as a result of that policy. It should also be noted that many of the consistent critics of the Government voted for the Government on this occasion, including G. H. C. Bing, Mrs. B. A. Castle, R. H. S. Crossman, Harold Davies, Tom Driberg, Michael Foot, Leslie Hale, B. W. Levy, S. Swinger and Lyle Wilkes.

An analysis of the voting records on these issues will show that if we take the M.P.s who have actually tabled motions or amendments against the Government policy, or voted against or abstained, a minimum of 130 M.P.s have been involved in the various "revolts" against the Government. There is a total of 391 Labour M.P.s in Parliament of which 70 to 80 are Ministers or Parliamentary Private Secretaries. So it will be seen that one-third of the rank-and-file

Labour M.P.s have been involved in these movements in one way or another. *This is an event without parallel in Parliamentary history and cannot fail to have profound repercussions in the future, because it so strikingly reflects the feelings of the workers in the factories and the constituencies.*

The rising surge of revolt against a policy which is daily proved more bankrupt has been given fresh impetus by the proceedings of the Easter trade union and co-operative conferences. Outstanding has been the determined opposition to the Truman policy on Greece and Turkey. The Conference of the Co-operative Party, in the teeth of opposition from the Executive, condemned the Truman policy by an overwhelming majority as "a menace to world peace and a negation of democratic principles." It was also overwhelmingly condemned by the powerful united union of the distributive workers. A general resolution on foreign policy was only narrowly defeated at the latter conference, as was likewise a resolution at the Co-operative Party Conference, calling for a substantial reduction in armaments' expenditure as a step towards total disarmament. But equally noteworthy was the extension of the criticism to the big issues of the home front. Both the Clerks and the Distributive Workers Conferences called for an overall economic plan, and the nationalisation of the steel industry, the distributive workers being quite specific in their demand calling on the Government to end the policy of compromise with big business.

All this has cleared the decks for the Labour Party Conference to be held at Whitsun. Here there is a complete contrast with the atmosphere and spirit of Bournemouth. In all the 430 resolutions before the Conference, it is impossible to find one general congratulation of the Government, and confidence in its policy—a fact which is in itself a striking condemnation of the situation. The biggest issue in the Conference will be manpower, on which 41 resolutions have been tabled, headed by those of the Mineworkers and the Constructional Engineers Union. A whole series of resolutions, headed by one from the A.S.L.E. and F., deal with the relationship of manpower with foreign policy; others deal with a great variety of points which show deep-seated anxiety on the whole situation. Twenty-one resolutions survey the field of general foreign policy, and of these 18 are condemnatory. Seven resolutions, headed by one from the A.E.U., call for a trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. A mass of resolutions deal with problems of the home front, including ten calling for increased workers' representation in the nationalised industries, five demanding a wages' policy and control of profits, seven the decisive speed-up of negotiating machinery; and there are various resolutions on housing,

rent restriction, rising rates, Local Government reform and national insurance. Forty-three resolutions express dissatisfaction in one form or another with Government publicity and propaganda, and call on the Government to take the workers into its confidence.

Here then is a position unprecedented in the movement. The Government's policy is disastrous and is running into increasing difficulties, and encountering more and more opposition from all the best elements in the movement. This opposition is already widespread in the factories, pits, and the main trade unions, with the T.U.C. proceeding to call a special conference of Executives to consider the economic crisis, with an extending revolt among Labour back-benchers in Parliament, with the great Co-operative movement almost equally divided in policy. A critical stage has been reached where the unity of all in the Labour movement opposed to the present composition of the Government and its policy can achieve the necessary changes that can solve the present crisis.

Such a lead can come from the Whitsun Conference of the Labour Party, a lead which can transform the situation and rally the country. For this is no internal question of the movement; it is indicative of the position in the country and in the world. The two lines in the movement are a reflection of the basic conflict today between the democratic and progressive forces on the one hand, and the forces of reaction being rallied by Truman and Wall Street, the Tories in Britain and De Gaulle in France. The rising forces of opposition to the right-wing policy of the Labour leadership are the forces which can rescue Britain and defeat the Tory campaign, now open and obvious. As the Labour right-wing depends more and more on the Tory vote for pushing its reactionary policy through Parliament, Tory demands will rise as the price of its support. The blatant nature of these demands—abandonment of nationalisation, abandonment of food subsidies, cutting of wages, and controls, along with an insistent demand for a new coalition—was seen in the debate on the economic situation. More and more in the foreign field, the Government will tie up with the reactionary Truman line.

The British people have remained solid throughout. They defeated the Tory attempt to stampede the country on bread rationing, they responded with initiative and enthusiasm on the fuel crisis. They have remained firm in every by-election and in the recent local elections. They are determined to get the general line of policy they voted for at the General Election. The developing movement in the unions, the Co-operatives, and among the Labour M.P.s against the Government's policy represents these solid, politically-stable British masses, the real heart of the movement.

It is now the historic moment for this opposition to extend, arise to new heights and endeavours, marshal its united strength, and force through the changes in the Government's policy and changes in its composition to ensure a new policy.

The Labour Party Conference can give the lead if the union representatives, the Divisional Labour Party delegates, and the M.P.s carry into that conference the spirit and the fight.

But so far the opposition is dispersed, while the right-wing is consolidated. There is urgent need for the Union District Committees and Executives and D.L.P.s to rally behind the back-benchers, show them they have their support, and in turn approach the M.P.s to voice their demands in Parliament. Above all, it is necessary for the Union Executives to demand that the Trade Union M.P.s play a greater role than ever in shaping the policy in Parliament and fighting at Westminster for the necessary change in policy. Too long have the unions been content to pay the election and Parliamentary expenses of their representatives without insisting on them fighting for the policy of their unions inside the Labour Party and Parliament. The shop stewards in the factories can play a decisive part in rallying the mass movement of the industrial workers for this fight.

The other side of this struggle must be that of the T.U.C. General Council playing a leading role in the handling and direction of the economic situation, to which its position entitles it.

Never had a Government such a chance as the Labour Government in the political capital it has to draw upon. The class consciousness of the working class, their eagerness to plan and work, their readiness to sacrifice, and their firm determination to resist all the attacks of the Tory Party, are worthy of a better kind of Government—one that has their complete confidence; one in which the supporters of American imperialism have been dismissed; one in which stronger, more capable, younger men and women, who come from the heart of the movement—know it inside out—have their chance to show the world that Britain and its people will never be down and out, and that we can rapidly overcome our immediate problems, and, in accordance with British conditions and traditions, proceed along the road to Socialism.

Finally, increased responsibility rests on our own Communist Party. We have played a big part in bringing about these developments by our mass activity and campaigning. The next six months will demand from us still greater effort—inspiring, co-ordinating, and directing the movement. We shall fulfil this responsibility with honour, as we have done in the past. We are now entering the decisive stage of the struggle. The people will respond without fail to the lead.

SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE

GEORGE MATTHEWS

AN ARTICLE ON "CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE" in the March, 1946, issue of *Communist Review* described the main characteristics of agriculture under capitalism. These may be summarised as follows:

The development of agriculture lags behind that of industry. Capitalism intensifies and sharpens the contradiction between industry and agriculture, and deepens the opposition between town and country.

Private ownership of land, giving rise to absolute rent, acts as a barrier to the free investment of capital in agriculture, and so holds back the full use of machinery and new techniques.

The technical backwardness of agriculture is further accentuated by the existence of large numbers of small producers, exploited by capitalism, lacking resources and capital, and unable to attain the same degree of efficiency as the large capitalist farmers.

The exploitation of agriculture by the capitalist towns is still more intensified by monopoly pressure from big business, by high prices for what the farmer buys and low prices for what he sells, by the grip of the banks and finance corporations, and by the operations of unnecessary middlemen.

Added to this, in Britain the historical development of capitalism as a whole has resulted during this century in the capitalist State carrying through a policy of restriction in agriculture.

As a result of these and other factors the level of wages paid in agriculture is below that of industry as a whole, and capitalism, having driven the workers from the countryside into the towns, is now faced with a manpower shortage in agriculture.

It is these contradictions of capitalism which explain why in capitalist agriculture mechanisation has not proceeded in the same way or to the same extent as in industry, and why capitalism in agriculture is found at the stage nearer to hand production than in large-scale machine industry.

Yet while intensifying the antagonism between town and country, capitalism at the same time, by its development of industry, creates the conditions for abolishing this antagonism. In Marx's words:

"Capitalist production completely tears asunder the old bond of union which held together agriculture and manufacture in their infancy. But at the same time it creates the material conditions for a higher synthesis in the future, viz., the union of agriculture and industry on the basis

of the more perfected forms they have each acquired during their temporary separation." (*Capital*, Vol. I, p. 513, Allen and Unwin Ed.)

The solving of this basic contradiction of capitalism can only take place with the ending of capitalism and the establishment of a new Socialist society

The development of agriculture in the Soviet Union is a remarkable demonstration of this, and shows what enormous strides are possible when capitalist class rule is ended. The extreme backwardness of Tsarist agriculture is well known. It makes the giant strides taken by Soviet agriculture even more extraordinary. In the words of Dr. E. M. Crowther, of Rothamsted Experimental Station. "The Soviet Union has effected in 20 years changes which were spread over a matter of 500 years in Britain"

The November, 1917, Revolution completely changed the relations between town and country. The working class looked on the peasantry not as an object of exploitation, but as a partner in building the new society. On the second day after the revolution, the Soviet Government's Decree on the Land ended private ownership of land for ever. The land was nationalised, and the peasants not only retained the land they already possessed, but received from the Government more than 375,000,000 acres belonging to the former landowners, as well as the Crown lands. They were freed from the payment of rent to the landlords to the amount of nearly £50 million per annum.

The nationalisation of the land, by abolishing absolute rent, removed one of the biggest obstacles to the full development of agriculture. From the first days of its existence the Soviet Government understood the vital importance of revolutionising agricultural technique. In his report to the Eighth Congress of Soviets in 1920 Lenin called attention to the need to replace small-scale production in agriculture by modern large-scale production

Stalin drove home the same point eight years later

"It follows that we cannot build Socialism in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development on the grounds that the countryside will 'automatically' follow the lead of the towns. The existence of Socialist industry in the towns is the principal factor in the Socialist transformation of the countryside. But this does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. If the Socialist towns are to take the peasant countryside in tow, and lead it all the way, it is essential, as Lenin says, 'to place the economy of the country, *including agriculture*, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production'." (*Leninism*, p. 233.)

The policy of concentrating on the development of heavy industry was based on this understanding of the need to transform agriculture's technical basis.

Stalin repeatedly stressed that Soviet power could not for any length of time be based on two different foundations—the foundation of large-scale, concentrated Socialist industry, and the foundation of the most scattered and backward small-commodity peasant production. Agriculture had to be rebuilt on a Socialist foundation, peasant labour transformed into a form of industrial labour, the exploiting kulaks liquidated, and new scientific techniques introduced. To achieve these aims the industrialisation of the country was necessary, so as to provide agriculture with the immense quantities of tractors and agricultural machinery needed.

But the supply of machines was not enough. The whole social and economic structure of the countryside had to be changed before new machines and new techniques could be utilised. Soviet agriculture had to be changed from a small-peasant economy to large-scale economy. Thus, following its historic decision to begin the industrialisation of the country with the development of heavy industry, the Soviet Government launched its second great campaign—for the collectivisation of agriculture.

The success of the policy of collectivisation in the late 1920s and early 1930s was, in Stalin's words, "the most important and decisive of all our achievements in recent years." It solved at one stroke three of the most important questions of Socialist construction: the liquidation of the largest exploiting class, the kulaks, the turning of the most numerous class in the Soviet Union, the working peasantry, away from the past of small peasant economy to the new Socialist path; and it secured a Socialist foundation for the most backward section of the national economy, agriculture.

The establishment of the collective farms, by ending the previous dismemberment of agriculture, and making possible the concentration of labour and means of production, opened the way to the full-scale mechanisation of agriculture. Socialist agriculture is raised to the status of large-scale industry by the supply of immense numbers of tractors and other machines produced by Socialist industry.

The great progress made in this direction by the Soviet Union can be judged by figures given in an article in the *Bolshevik* (May, 1946).

In 1928, on the eve of the great turning point in the policy of collectivisation, there were 26,700 tractors in agriculture; in 1940 there were 523,000. The number of tractors had increased by nearly 20 times in 12 years. In 1929 the supply of home-produced tractors was still behind the supply of imported tractors, but by 1932 the out-

put of the Stalingrad and Kharkov tractor works was sufficient to meet the needs of agriculture. Not only the quantity, but the quality of the tractors was improved: powerful caterpillars and special tractors for ploughing were produced in increasing quantities.

The full use of the increased supply of tractors was given a great impetus by the organisation of the machine and tractor stations during the years of the Five Year Plans. Prior to the first Five Year Plan tractors were distributed among individual collective farms—a method which resulted in their inefficient utilisation. Thus in 1929, of the collective farms using tractors, 85 per cent only had one each, 14.6 per cent had from one to five tractors, and only 0.4 per cent had more than five tractors.

The development of machine and tractor stations, supplying groups of collective farms with their power requirements, resulted in much better use of the available tractors and machines. But the role of the machine tractor stations was much more than that of mere suppliers of machines. They were political organising centres, playing an important part in strengthening the collectives, in the Socialist education of the collective farmworkers, and in the planning of agriculture. The machine tractor station is a form of organisation combining the help and leadership of the Soviet Government with the activity and initiative of the collective farmworkers.

The results of this mechanisation of agriculture are shown by the fact that in 1940 mechanical "prime movers" (including not only tractors, but steam and oil engines) comprised 71.2 per cent of all the power resources of agriculture. In the machine tractor stations and collective farms they constituted 69 per cent, and in the State farms 90 per cent—i.e., approximating to industry.

In Socialist agriculture there is a further development in mechanisation. Machines become more and more complex and varied, and not only are machines known in capitalist countries put to full use (e.g., the 182,000 combines used in the Soviet Union in 1940), but completely new machines are developed. Machines such as flax-pulling and flax-threshing machines and flax combines have appeared, and many other cultivators and sowing implements are outstanding in size and design as compared with those of other countries.

Agricultural operations can be divided into four categories: the pre-sowing operations (ploughing, harrowing, etc.); the sowing; the care of the plants after sowing (weeding, etc.); and harvesting. The operations mechanised to the greatest extent are pre-sowing and sowing. In 1940 pre-sowing was mechanised to the extent of 66.6 per cent in the case of spring corn, and 82.1 per cent in the case of winter corn (in 1928 this stood at 1 per cent). The mechanisation of sowing in

1940 reached 52.4 per cent for spring corn, and 53.4 per cent in the case of winter corn. In many grain-growing regions the mechanisation of these processes is almost 100 per cent complete.

Almost equally great advances have been recorded in mechanised harvesting. By 1940 combines harvested 42.6 per cent of the wheat. Even more outstanding was the fact that 77.6 per cent of the beet acreage was harvested mechanically.

One most important result of these developments in harvesting was the step taken towards ending seasonal work in agriculture, which arises mainly from the low degree of mechanisation in harvesting operations. Seasonal work in agriculture has developed with capitalism, but is not an inevitable feature of agriculture.

Marx pointed out that the difference between "the time of production" and the "working time" is especially apparent in agriculture, and wrote of Russia:

"In some of the northern regions of that country agricultural labour is possible only during 130 to 150 days per year. It may be imagined what would be the losses of Russia, if 50 out of its 65 million of European inhabitants would remain unemployed during six or eight months of the winter, when all field work must stop. Apart from the 200,000 farmers who work in the 10,500 factories of Russia, local house industries have everywhere developed in the villages. . . . We see here that the divergence of the period of production from the working period, the latter being but a part of the former, forms the natural basis for the combination of agriculture with an agricultural side industry." (*Capital*, Vol. II, p. 275, Kerr Ed.)

The development of capitalism destroys this domestic production in the villages, and creates on the one hand a surplus population, and on the other a shortage of hands in the busy season, and so produces seasonalism in agriculture.

Socialism, step by step, does away with this seasonalism. The development of a planned agriculture and the abolition of narrow specialisation make it possible to fill in the slack periods by work in other departments of agriculture—live stock raising, the processing of agricultural products, etc. The increase in mechanisation and in the productivity of labour, and the changes in technique that follow (e.g., autumn ploughing) also make possible a better distribution of labour, for "the circumstances which augment the product of the individual working day, such as co-operation, division of labour, employment of machinery, shorten at the same time the working period of the connected acts of production." (Marx, *Capital*, Vol. II, p. 267.)

Consequently there is a marked decrease in seasonalism in agricultural labour, and it is brought nearer, so far as continuity of work is concerned, to industrial labour.

The least mechanised of the four stages of work in agriculture is that between sowing and harvesting. Here also, however, successes have been recorded, in the development of tractors for row-crop work, hoeing and ridging, etc.

Though big advances such as those mentioned have taken place, it is, of course, recognised that much remains to be done, and that further mechanisation to ensure an increase in the productivity of labour is still the most urgent task before agriculture. While the main processes in grain cultivation and sugar-beet harvesting have been mechanised, less progress has been made with regard to other crops, fruit growing and live stock raising. During the Five Year Plans many types of machines were produced for some of these sections of agriculture, such as machines for cotton sowing, potato digging, for cultivating berries, for market-garden work, vegetable sowing, etc. But in general what has been achieved in these directions represents only a beginning. The aim is to achieve the mechanisation of all the basic operations in all sections, and so completely reconstruct the whole of agricultural economy on a machine system.

Of course, the production of machines is only one part of the task of transforming agriculture into a form of industrial production. As well as machines, large numbers of qualified organisers, mechanics and technicians are needed. There has been a very big increase in the number of such "industrial workers in the countryside" as a result of collectivisation and mechanisation. In 1940 the "cadres" in mechanised agriculture consisted of over 3,000,000 people—mechanics, tractor drivers, combine operators, technicians, etc. masters of the new technique did not appear out of air, but came as a result of the planned work of the Party and the Government. During the Five Year Plans, 103,000 people passed out from technical colleges, and 229,000 from special institutions for training specialists. The Commissariat for Agriculture trained 142,000 agronomists, 72,000 zoologists, 40,000 veterinary surgeons, and 78,500 engineers and technicians. But these numbers were not sufficient to keep pace with the needs. Consequently special shortened courses were instituted, and during the three years of war alone 1,800,000 workers passed

or technically educated people, rising to the same level as the advanced workers in industry in their development, their knowledge of technique, their culture and discipline.

"The machine worker in the collective village excels both the peasant working in the field in an antiquated way, and also the industrial worker under capitalism, whose capabilities are only partially developed, and whose further development, both mental and physical, is retarded. In the collective village there have grown up people who have mastered through experience the management of communal property. Only large-scale Socialist economy could produce such a new type of worker." (*Bolshevik*, May, 1946.)

Accompanying the transformation in the technique and organisation of agricultural production have gone enormous changes in the social and cultural aspects of country life, leading to the bridging of the gap between town and country.

"The old type of village, with the church in the most prominent place, with the best houses—those of the police officer, the priest and the kulak—in the foreground, and the dilapidated huts of the peasants in the background, is beginning to disappear. Its place is being taken by the new type of village, with its public buildings, clubs, radio, cinemas, schools, libraries and crèches; with its tractors, harvester combines, threshing machines and automobiles. The former important personages of the village, the kulak exploiter, the blood-sucking usurer, the profiteering merchant, the 'little-father' police officer, have disappeared. Now, the prominent personages of the village are the leading workers in the collective farms and State farms, in the schools and clubs; the chief tractor and combine drivers, the team leaders in field work and live stock raising, and the best men and women shock workers on the collective farms." (Stalin in 1934, *Leninism*, p. 507.)

What future lies before Soviet agriculture? The collective-farm system not only proved itself during the years of peace: it played a decisive part in achieving victory over fascism in the war. Deprived of the important food-producing areas of the Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban, Soviet agriculture, nevertheless, provided the bulk of the food required for the army and the people.

But the war inflicted great damage on Soviet agriculture. The level of mechanisation has been lowered, for industry during the war had to be switched to the production of tanks, planes and guns, instead of tractors and machines for agriculture. Much of the pre-war machinery is badly worn. And the terrible damage done to the invaded areas will take some time to make up. The Nazis destroyed or sent to Germany 137,000 tractors, 49,000 combines, and more than 5,000,000 cultivators, planting and harvesting machines.

Stalin has set the Soviet people the aim of speedily reaching and

surpassing the pre-war level of food production, of strengthening the collective farms; increasing the sown area and increasing the harvest. And to achieve this aim great efforts are being made to re-establish and still further increase the mechanisation of agricultural production. The new Five Year Plan allows for twice the expenditure on agricultural machinery provided by the second Five Year Plan. During the next five years more tractors will be supplied than during the first two Five Year Plans, taken together. Nine hundred and fifty new machine tractor stations will be established, the motor-repair factories will be increased to 210 and the tractor-repair factories to 510.

By the end of the Five Year Plan it is proposed to mechanise agricultural work to the following extent: ploughing up to 90 per cent; grain sowing not less than 70 per cent; grain harvesting by combine to 55 per cent; steam and tractor ploughing to 90 per cent.

The Five Year Plan sets the following targets for the production of agricultural machinery by 1950: Tractors, 112,000; tractor ploughs, 110,000; cultivators 82,300; sowing machines 83,300; threshing machines 18,300. To assist in achieving these targets a new Ministry has been created—the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery Production.

The Plan also provides for improvements in the quality of the machines—the modernisation of existing types and the construction of new types. For example, for use with combine harvesters, a mechanised grain transporter, and a cleaner, sorter and drier is planned, as well as a machine to collect straw and glean the grain left in the field. Steps are being taken to improve scientific research so as to develop mechanisation in other directions—for example, the production of new beet-harvesting machines, cotton-picking machines, improvements to the combines for harvesting sunflower seed, flax and mustard seed, new machines for cultivating and harvesting vegetable crops and orchards, and machines to assist in live stock farming (e.g., in the preparation of fodder).

Electrification assumes an important place in the Five Year Plan. Engels long ago pointed out that the use of electricity could become the most powerful lever for the ending of the antagonism between town and village, and Lenin stressed its importance later with his slogan "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." Even during the war many Party organisations took active steps to develop electrification. For example, in the Sverdlov Region hundreds of collective farms and machine tractor stations were electrified in 1945, by the construction of simple grids of small and medium power. In the Molotov Region river and mill dams, etc., are used for supplying electricity. Now the new Five Year Plan provides for further widespread electrification of collective and State

farms and machine tractor stations. For this purpose the mass construction of small electric grids of 1,000,000 kilowatts will be embarked upon, and the rural consumers will also be linked with the network of regional, factory and city power stations. By the end of the Five Year Plan it is estimated that agriculture will use 3,500,000,000 kilowatt hours.

Repair and servicing of machines will be provided for by the training of 145,000 tractor drivers, 10,000 members of tractor brigades, 30,000 combine drivers and 37,000 assistants to them, 4,000 mechanics, 35,000 chauffeurs, 21,000 repair workers—altogether about 300,000 industrial workers in agriculture.

This article has dealt mainly with mechanisation in agriculture, with the “industrialisation of agricultural labour,” and has not touched on the great advances in other directions—in crop breeding, live stock breeding, artificial insemination, the use of fertilisers, new rotations of crops, etc. But enough has been said to show the perspectives before Soviet agriculture—perspectives of further striking advance, increased mechanisation, the fullest use of new scientific methods, the raising of the productivity of labour and of the soil, and the improvement in the standard of living of the collective farmers. In the words of the *Bolshevik*:

“The new Five Year Plan confirmed by the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. opens for agriculture wide perspectives of further development. In the new Five Year Plan a further step forward will be taken in the transformation of agricultural labour into a special form of industrial labour and therefore in the liquidation of the antagonism between town and village.”

PRINCIPLES OF HIGHER EDUCATION

JOAN PEEL

THE REFORM OF HIGHER EDUCATION has become an important economic question. Pressure is being brought to bear on a system already considerably affected by the war and now grappling with acute post-war problems. Questions of university policy have been brought from the dimness of study and debate in an academic senate into the clear light of day and the hurly-burly of the changing political and economic scene. Blinking and dazzled in the unaccustomed glare, hustled into action by outside forces, the directors of our system of higher education are searching for a new equilibrium.

These heart-searchings are new in university circles. And new also is the readiness to acknowledge and accept the social functions and social relations of education. But the search for a new synthesis and direction is still largely an academic occupation. There is a tendency to regret the supremacy of science, to regard the training of thousands of additional professional workers as essentially degrading the university from its true function of pursuing knowledge, and to believe that any form of economic pressure or planning must hamper essential freedoms. Proposals for new forms of "general education," for humanising scientific and technical education, for introducing arts' students to scientific method, counteract this or that undesirable trend rather than making a new and positive approach based on objective realities and needs. While the science faculties go ahead with a relatively clear idea of their function, the arts' faculties epitomise this indecision and are at a loss.

"Arts' Faculties . . . must somehow make their studies . . . relevant to the society of the present time, so that they can perpetuate what is valuable in tradition, not so much to preserve it against attack as to re-create it in the context of today. . . . To anyone who looks below the surface the arts are sick for all their Alexandrian activities, because they are not carrying out their humanising work. They are trying to defend old values, struggling along under the weight of those 'inert ideas' . . . relevant to a civilisation, an ambience of culture, a structure of society, that have disappeared. They are retiring into fastnesses which may be impregnable, but in which they will die." (Prof. Bonamy Dobrée. *Political Quarterly*, 1944.)

How can higher education be brought to life and into relation with social needs and aspirations? Only by full recognition of the trends and necessities of the present age. A glance at the developments in the field of scientific knowledge shows that the universities are not battling in a void with the problems of integration. In advanced research specialisation in the old sense is already beginning to disappear. The original splitting up of the sciences into innumerable different subjects, necessary for their original development, has been succeeded by a tendency to fusion on a higher plane. Chemistry now uses physical terms of description and physical methods of investigation; biology draws many of its basic ideas from recent developments in physics and chemistry. The natural sciences are themselves becoming more interdependent and the life sciences are passing from the stage of analysis, description and classification to that of experiment and application. Because of the great extent and detail of every branch the problems of revising curricula and courses are

very real, but they are mainly practical problems. The clear need in teaching is to bring studies up to date, and subject them to constant revision (instead of leaving a time lag of up to a century between laboratory and lecture hall), to combine learning closely with active research, and to relate each science to the industries and activities it affects.

Science itself is neither an amoral subject nor an abstract searcher for truth. Our age is dominated by the achievements, methods and conceptions of science. It is the significant agent of change in the modern world, introducing new knowledge, raising new problems, welding theory and practice in the search for their solution, and applying the result of research to practical ends. Its fundamental urge is to form a unified and coherent world picture in which all phenomena have their proper place. But it is essentially democratic in approach. It has solved the problems of freedom and authority by basing its world views on the results of the co-operative efforts of thousands of researchers, while leaving it open to any individual of whatever race or class to insist upon modification if he can. The student trained to understand the social relations and uses of his science in theory and practice is being introduced to the most significant aspect of twentieth-century culture, which has integral links with every other aspect.

What are the humanities of today? An arts professor, taking social realities as his guide, has outlined a scaffolding about which the arts faculties should be built if they are make men and women aware of the vital currents of thought and feeling of the time.

"(1) The physical structure of the world he lives in; physics and astronomy; (2) what kind of animal he is, what made him what he is and what the conditions of his survival are; biology; (3) what has happened to the human race in the past, that is, the large movements; history; (4) by what ideas and organisations the human race lives; anthropology, psychology, and sociology; (5) the ideas concerning what it is all about (the basis of values), religion and philosophy; (6) human achievements in literature, music and the plastic arts. . . . Instead of these humanities being virtually ignored or vaguely touched upon in the course of pursuing other studies, they should form the core; and the present subjects—even history in its usual specialised form—become the subsidiaries . . . The only subject now represented in the Arts' Faculties (sometimes shared with the faculty of science) which begins to approach this idea is geography. . . . It is human ecology rather than geography, embodying the physical nature of the world, recent history, religions, anthropology, and sociology in the form of economics." (Prof. Dobrée, *loc. cit.*)

Not only do the boundaries between different arts' subjects begin to disappear, but also the rift between science and humanities. Social trends are imposing a synthesis. In the complex world of today every human and social activity involves many influences and factors which can only be fully investigated and explained by use of a variety of methods of approach. But we are living at a stage of civilisation when man is becoming capable of conscious knowledge of the springs of human conduct, of conscious control of his own destiny in an increasingly man-made world. This unity is achieved by the relation of all branches of study to their human origins and human purpose, their social uses and social effects. In the process the arts overlap into the sciences, and the sciences into the arts; ideas appear as human events corresponding to human needs, proper emphasis is placed on the social effects of knowledge applied in practice, and similarities and common ground become the core. "Human achievements in literature" can embody ideas and strivings common to humanity as opposed to "Eng. Lit.," which accentuates formalistic differences and linguistic intricacies.

It also becomes clear that the emergence of the social sciences—those studies which have grown up in the no-man's-land between science and the humanities and are concerned with social and political forms—is a typical and significant feature of our age. Their relatively slow progress illustrates the frustration resulting from inadequate access to a field of investigation and application where advance has been slow; current conflicts cloud issues and any theory leading to action may be regarded as politically tendentious. A university concerned to further knowledge must make it a first task to raise the status and extend the scope of the social sciences. What is needed to raise them from an analytical and descriptive to an experimental and applied science is "a coherent and unified picture of human society in which the different disciplines of economic, psychological and anthropological analysis and the reconstruction of history by the methods of scholarship and archæology find a natural place." (*The Social Function of Science*, Bernal.)

The problems of balance and direction in education can only be solved by such reference to social practice. To the Marxist, knowledge is not detached and formal; it is the content of social consciousness. Human consciousness is not a mere individual possession, it is a social formation, arising and developing on the basis of human activity in the sphere of social labour. Understanding of the evidence of consciousness, of immediate or transmitted experience, requires interpretation of motive and purpose, not merely formal understanding of the text. This interpretation can only be made in the light of practice.

"The coincidence of . . . changing circumstances and of human activity can only be conceived and rationally understood as revolutionising practice." (*Theses on Feuerbach*, iii.)

In this light knowledge appears as provisional and progressive instead of absolute, in the context of a world of changing processes as opposed to a static world of ready-made facts and things. The student introduced to human achievements and human means of solving human problems has his own place and responsibility made clear. Human faculties are formed in the course of active work and study. Behaviour does not depend one-sidedly on character; there is a two-way continuous interdependence between traits of character and motives. Concrete acts and experiences fully understood react upon the man himself; he acquires virtues by practising them. More active methods of teaching and learning, linked with research, stress the advancing of knowledge rather than the acquiring of facts and make the pivotal position of the learner and active worker clear—in scientific discovery and application as much as in æsthetic appreciation and creation. Such changes could herald education of the whole man, knowledgeable, forward-looking and emotionally balanced, consciously master of his own experience, of the social implications of this knowledge and of the obligation to apply it to fulfil social and individual needs.

This is something very different from an artificially-imposed "synthesis" or a superimposed humanism. Those who insist that science is not enough, that the arts alone can give spiritual guidance, are in the toils of the idealist philosophy which isolates consciousness from the concrete activities of man and detaches its objective social content from the motives of human behaviour. It is precisely this isolation which produces the theoretical sterility which is the bane of education under capitalism, mirroring more or less indirectly the actual sterility of life.

Those who wish to make an amorphous group of social studies a core or link are frequently not so much concerned to induce a full understanding of the social attributes of knowledge as to create an illusion of unity through co-ordination by obscuring basic conflicts. They seek to foster a social neutrality, a detached clinical approach which can inoculate against class-consciousness and produce the malleable servant of the State.

Those who emphasise that education is a product of present circumstances, and that a new education can only arise in changed circumstances, forget that circumstances are changed by men, and that changing education can be an important contribution to a totally changed situation. The key problem of our time is the establishment

of human control over human actions, of social control of social evolution. The means to the solution of this problem lie to hand—in science and the working-class movement. Higher education must bring the two together.

A Communist policy for higher education must, therefore, be concerned not only with opening up the way to the universities and colleges of higher education, but also with introducing a radically new conception of their task. It must show what are the implications, already half-accepted, but not consciously, of all the changes modern needs impose; it must draw the inferences from facts and trends which cannot be refuted. It must emphasise that the cultural unity which begins to emerge when knowledge is consciously related to its true end—the transformation of the world and re-making of man—can only be developed in so far as man's efforts are actively directed to solving human problems in accordance with human needs. Cultural unity cannot be achieved on the plane of knowledge alone; it will only be achieved on the plane of social action.

There has always been a close and demonstrable interaction between the development of knowledge and of technique and social forms. But it has been neither conscious nor efficient. Today it can be both, and one of the strategic planning points is higher education. The pursuit of knowledge and the development of technique and social action can no longer be regarded as mutually antagonistic. Every activity of our age demonstrates their inseparable connection and the mortal dangers inherent in their separation. Knowledge must maintain a fertilising and controlling contact with technique and social action in every sphere if it is itself to advance and humanity's problems are to be solved. The significant figure of our time is the experimental scientist who, working indifferently with hand and brain, bridges in his own person the gulf between scholar and artisan. In an increasing number of occupations a similar balance will become necessary. Modern industry demands an ever-narrowing gap between theory and its application. Modern warfare has pointed the moral by sending the research scientist on operations.

What does this new orientation imply? The university no longer appears as a cultural leader in its own right, pursuing knowledge and culture in isolation according to convictions of its own and guarding them from the contamination of worldly events. Nor does it appear merely as a reflector of social trends and supplier of social needs. It becomes at once both a centre of inspiration and the servant of society, providing new knowledge which raises new problems and perspectives, transmitting knowledge to solve current problems and consolidate progress, challenging and aiding the people to use knowledge and

science to remove the hindrances to human and social development and so to enlarge human capacities for achievement.

As such it becomes a cultural centre of society, drawing its recruits from every sphere, and despatching them to every occupation. As the mere spiritual home of an *élite* it can only atrophy. It neither grudgingly accepts the task of training professional workers as a sideline to its main end of research nor becomes a mere teaching school concerned with narrow vocational ends. It welcomes the duty of training the professional advisers of the people for their work as embodying the essential link whereby knowledge may be widely disseminated and used, and so new stimulus provided for its advance. Today this work demands expert and expanding knowledge, individual self-knowledge and active participation in social life in the light of a full understanding of social trends and aims. All higher education must therefore aim to foster a high standard of scholarship, a balanced development of individual abilities and personal culture, the capacity and desire actively to apply and advance specialist knowledge for common purposes and to the common good.

This aim implicitly includes a research attitude at every level. But it is the supreme task of the university to undertake the highest forms of organised research extending the boundaries of human knowledge and to introduce the conscious planning and direction of effort now possible in this field as in every other. It has also the privilege and opportunity to initiate corporate forms of research which, by bringing different departments into relation for a specified common aim, further cultural unity in action within the university while advancing social progress without.

By its recognition of the necessities of the present age, by its realisation that the future of knowledge and science is indissolubly linked with solution of the major social and economic problems confronting human society, the university will find the freedom it seeks to further knowledge and advance the cause of humanity.

SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR SCOTLAND

W. LAUHLAN

A CLASSIC MARXIST DEFINITION of a Nation is given by Stalin in *Marxism and the National Question*. "A nation," he says, "is an historically-evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up in a community of culture."

It is clear from the above definition that Scotland is a nation. It is an historically-evolved, stable community. From the sixth century onwards there has always been a Scottish people, and from the end

of the tenth century the territory of Scotland has been practically the same as today.

The Scottish people have a common language and common economic life. In Scotland the social and economic developments differ from those of England. Scotland remained practically untouched by Roman influences; and its Celtic customs, though influenced by Irish, remained free from Mediterranean influences. The beginning of the eleventh century marks the emergence of Scotland as a nation by the amalgamation of territories, regions and principalities into a single whole.

Until James VI of Scotland became James I of England in 1603, Scotland was a completely independent nation. Scotland had developed her own constitutional system of Parliament, of King, Barons and Burghers, and legal jurisprudence. For over five centuries in bitter warfare against a more powerful opponent she held her own and won independence and liberty at Bannockburn in 1314. The "drift south" began when James VI went to London in 1603, and continued with the Treaty of Union in 1707.

The majority of the Scottish people were opposed to the Treaty of Union. The Convention of Royal Burghs voted against it, and popular demonstrations of opposition took place in the principal towns and cities. While the Treaty set out that in all time coming there would be neither Scotland nor England but Great Britain, it could not break down the historical past of nearly a thousand years' struggle between the two nations. The drift south continued, and, despite the growth of entanglements, the two countries remained apart.

As capitalism developed into imperialism, the decline of British industry as a whole was especially marked in Scotland, where, owing to the predominance of heavy industry, all the features and aspects of decline were accentuated. The struggle between the dominating English monopoly capitalism and the Scottish people sharpened. The growth of the demand for Scottish control of Scottish affairs resulted in 1885 in the passing of the Bill providing for a Secretary of State and a separate Scottish Department and a day in Parliament to discuss Scottish estimates. The Scottish national question again became an integral part of Scottish politics.

Previous to the First World War the Labour Party in Scotland, the I.L.P. and the Scottish Trades Union Congress passed periodical resolutions, and a Nationalist movement, of varying proportions, always existed. But it is in the period of post-war decline of monopoly capitalism that the Nationalist movement grows more and more as the national problem remains unsolved.

In 1924 a Convention representing M.P.s, town councils, county

councils, parish councils, education authorities, some trade unions and the Scottish Home Rule Association, the Scottish National Movement, and other national bodies met in Glasgow and set up a committee to draft a Bill. After two years the Convention met again and endorsed the terms of a Bill which was brought before the House in the spring of 1927. It was talked out in its second reading. This was the ninth occasion in eight years on which the question came before the House—the twenty-first since 1889.

Today there is widespread and growing interest in the affairs of Scotland. It is most sharply expressed around the issues of Scotland's economic and social future, its pressing problems of housing and health—so much worse than England's—anxiety about the future of the heavy industries, the demand for new, light, alternative industries, the plans and demands of the various local authorities.

Because of these, Scotland's national question arises afresh. The total inadequacy of existing Government machinery to deal with the huge and pressing problems becomes more apparent. The very act of the British Parliament in giving a Scottish Secretary, Scottish Office and Administrative Department is in itself an admission that Scotland requires separate treatment.

Scotland's problems cannot be dealt with fundamentally without a Scottish Planning Commission and a Scottish Government. The resolution adopted by the Scottish District Congress of the Communist Party in September, 1943, stated clearly:

“We require not only a National Planning Committee for Scotland to plan our post-war reconstruction, but complete self-government for Scotland. We demand the establishment of a Parliament for Scotland on the basis of equal and democratic election by the electors in the burgh and rural areas, which would have the administration of all Scottish affairs and deal with Scottish aspects of social and industrial legislation.”

Whilst taking our stand on this basic position we believe that the movement for self-government can be rallied and consolidated if it sees before it not only the objective of a Scottish Parliament, but certain immediate, clear and practical steps that could set the country firmly and speedily on the road to complete self-government.

Four such proposals are being worked out by the Communist Party in Scotland at the present time. They were explained for the first time at the Scottish Assembly held in Glasgow on March 22 of this year to advance the cause of self-government, and created a very deep and favourable impression. It is our belief that Scotland's ability to

deal with her problems could be increased by:

(1) The creation of an Under-Secretary of State for Industry and a Scottish Department for Industry which would take over all functions of the Board of Trade in Scotland; be fully responsible for the development, location, and control of Scotland's industry; prepare an annual finance, raw materials (production and consumption) and output budget; encourage Scotland's trade. It would be independent of the Board of Trade, but would work in close liaison with it.

(2) An Under-Secretary for Labour and a Scottish Labour Department which would take over all existing functions of the Ministry of Labour in Scotland; be responsible for the control, training and allocation of Scottish labour, and administer National Service arrangements on behalf of the Ministry of Labour.

(3) A Scottish "Cabinet" to be created, responsible for Scottish administration, and consisting of the Secretary of State, the two new Under-Secretaries, the two existing Under-Secretaries who are responsible for housing, agriculture and fisheries, and the Scottish representatives of the Ministry of Supply; fuel and power; transport; admiralty, etc

(4) The Physical Planning Committee should be transformed into a Scottish National Planning Commission responsible for developing a long-term as well as short-term plans for Scotland, co-ordinating all existing regional plans, making its proposals to the Scottish "Cabinet" for endorsement. Besides representatives from the Scottish and British Government Departments, the Planning Commission should include representatives of the employers, trade unions, major local authorities, North of Scotland Hydro-electric Board and the like.

At the same time as we put forward these interim measures for legislative and administrative devolution we recognise the need for attention and speedy action to deal with Scotland's economic problems if a repetition of pre-war conditions is to be avoided.

The changeover in Scottish industry following the conclusion of the war witnessed a decline in the numbers employed in the basic industries, and an increase in the number employed in the consumption-goods industries. The aircraft industry virtually disappeared from Scotland, and today we have almost 90,000 registered unemployed in the country.

This colossal waste of manpower and exceedingly rich resources is due to negligence of the past and its continuance into the present stage. In face of the acute economic difficulties confronting Britain today the demand, proper and urgent, is being made for an overall economic plan. No British plan can secure full utilisation of Scotland's exceedingly rich resources unless there is a national plan for Scotland

which takes full account of its special problems. Big and quick decisions are needed, but there is as yet no sign of a Scottish national plan. Rapid action is necessary if crisis is to be avoided.

It is imperative that industry be directed to Scotland. Speedy development of the nationalised coal resources is essential. Scottish steel capacity must be expanded, and a long-term programme announced for shipbuilding and engineering. We need to get a planned increase in the number of trading estates and new factories to employ at least 150,000 people by the end of next year at the latest. For balanced industrial development rapid decisions are needed on the Forth Road Bridge, Mid-Scotland Ship Canal, the Clyde Estuary Report, and the main road and rail developments. Speedy expansion of our building forces is vital to build the half-million new houses, the health centres, the schools, roads and industrial projects clamouring for attention.

To operate successfully and carry through such a programme, to ensure that Scotland will not become a distressed area once again, we need the right to run our own affairs.

SWANSONG OF LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY

WITHIN EIGHTEEN MONTHS of the end of the war two big-scale books of philosophy were published in England—Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* and K. R. Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. The message of both is remarkably alike.

Russell sets the tone in the second page of his introductory chapter --

"Science tells us what we can know, but what we can know is little. . . . Theology, on the other hand, induces a dogmatic belief that we have knowledge where, in fact, we have ignorance. . . . To teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralysed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it."

Reviewing the whole history of Western philosophy from the year 600 B.C. to the present, Russell sees in it two main tendencies. "Philosophers have been divided into those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them." The former have always tried to introduce "certainty" in the form of dogmatic systems, the latter have been critical of such dogmatism.

Each side "is partly right and partly wrong." Society always faces two opposite dangers—"ossification through too much discipline and

reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution . . . through the growth of individualism and personal independence that makes co-operation impossible." Society has oscillated from one of these extremes to the other. But, says Russell:

"The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless oscillation. The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community. Whether this attempt can succeed only the future can determine." (p. 20.)

Too much "certainty," thinks Russell, is a danger and an illusion. And in his later chapters he associates this danger with what he calls "the sense of the collective power of human communities" (p. 855). This, he says, is "cosmic impiety" (p. 856). It leads to "an intoxication of power" which "I am persuaded . . . is the greatest danger of our time." On page 755 he speaks of "a new belief in power: first, the power of man in his conflicts with nature, and then the power of rulers as against the human beings whose beliefs and aspirations they seek to control by scientific propaganda, especially education." He concludes that: "To formulate any satisfactory modern ethic of human relationships it will be essential to recognise the necessary limitations of men's power over the non-human environment, and the desirable limitations of their power over each other" (p. 756).

Against whom in modern philosophy is this preaching directed? It is directed against Hegel and against Nietzsche, against Henri Bergson and against the American pragmatists. But it is obvious that the chief offender, in Russell's eyes, is Marxism. Though "rationalistic" and "in intention scientific and empirical," Marxism is, nevertheless, "committed in practice to power politics, and to the doctrine of a master class, though not of a master race." This means "war and dictatorship, and insistence upon ideological orthodoxy" (p. 818).

As against the endeavour scientifically to understand the world so as to control it and to plan human society on rational lines, Russell propounds in the end his own liberal "Philosophy of Logical Analysis." Those who adopt this philosophy, he says, "confess frankly that the human intellect is unable to find conclusive answers to many questions of profound importance to mankind." They renounce all larger views, and tackle problems in isolation, one by one and piecemeal, beginning, says Russell, with the problem of "what is number"—a problem

which, we may agree, is both interesting and harmless. And then

"the habit of careful veracity acquired in the practice of this philosophical method can be extended to the whole sphere of human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of fanaticism with an increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual understanding. In abandoning a part of its dogmatic pretensions, philosophy does not cease to suggest and inspire a way of life." (p. 864.)

In Russell's pages one senses something of the melancholy of an old man whose world is crumbling about him and who has very little faith in the future. Liberal philosophy finds a more ardent and forceful champion in the newcomer, Dr. K. R. Popper. In Popper's volumes Russell's vague and general suspicion of any broad philosophical outlook is made precise, and the enemy is named—"Historicism."

"Historicism" is defined as the attempt "to understand the laws of historical development" and "to predict future developments" (Vol. I, p. 6). Such an outlook, says Popper, is an evil. Like Russell, he thinks it is always associated with people intoxicated with power, who want to impose upon their fellow men the straitjacket of a totalitarian social system.

In Popper's first volume he writes at length about Plato, as a typical exponent of "historicism." In the second volume he leaps over the centuries to Hegel. Here he becomes almost incoherent with indignation, for Hegel was nothing but a "clown," who produced his whole philosophy because he was in the pay of the Prussian Government. Then comes the third representative of "historicism"—Marx.

Popper begins by acknowledging Marx's "humanitarianism" and "honest attempt to apply a rational scientific method to the most urgent problems of social life." But Marx went wrong in trying to work out historical laws and make historical generalisations and "prophecies"—i.e., in expounding Marxism. Marx's "prophecies" have not come off, because in some capitalist countries working people have a higher standard of life than in Marx's own days, and the world Socialist revolution has not taken place. Worse, Marx's doctrines lead his followers to try to set up dictatorships, and they also have the deplorable effect of scaring the capitalists into setting up fascist dictatorships of their own. Marx was, moreover, a fatalist. For if, as he teaches, the State is an organ of the ruling class, then all that it does is predetermined by the interests of that class, and it is useless to try to influence it by independent political action. Thus "politics are impotent." (Vol. II, p. 111.)

It will be seen from this that there is nothing new in Popper's

criticisms of Marx. In general, Popper maintains that all "historicist" philosophies, from Plato to Marx, are directly or indirectly defending and propagating what he calls "the closed society." This, he says, is "the magical or tribal or collectivist society"—the society in which the part is subordinated to the whole, the individual to the State. The struggle for progress, he thinks, is the struggle to break the bonds of the closed society with its "historicist" ideology, and to achieve "the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society." (Vol. I, p. 152.)

Our task, according to Popper, is to defend and to build the "open society." This involves what he calls "social engineering." It might be thought that "social engineers" should know something of "the laws of historical development." But this, says Popper, is precisely what they must not know. They must not inquire, as the "historicist" does, into the "nature" or "essence" of social institutions, but must approach every institution "piecemeal" in order to consider what can be done to make it a little better or to use it for some desirable purpose. Any other approach leads to tendencies to dictatorship and to the betrayal of the ideals of the "open society."

The essence of the "open society" is that each individual is free to make "personal decisions." Yet Popper admits that there must be some degree of what he calls "interventionism,"—i.e., social regulation of what people may or may not do, and particularly economic "interventionism." "It is undoubtedly the greatest danger of interventionism," he says, "that it leads to an increase of State power and bureaucracy." But he hopes that "once the danger is faced squarely, it should be possible to master it"—provided all "interventionism" is both "democratic" and "piecemeal" (Vol. II, p. 181).

The end of Popper's book is curiously like the beginning of Russell's. "We need hope. . . . But we do *not* need more, and we must not be given more. We do not need certainty. . . . We must learn to do things as well as we can, and to look out for our mistakes" (Vol. II, p. 266). The essential evil of "historicism" is that "it is out to find the Path on which mankind is destined to walk . . . the meaning of history." But "history has no meaning" (Vol. II, p. 256).

So what is it that both Popper and Russell, in their different ways, have to tell us? It is that we must "live without certainty," though we are permitted to "hope"; that "history has no meaning"; that we must beware of the dangerous "sense of the collective power of human communities," whether this is power over our own destinies or over external nature; that any broad philosophical outlook that helps us to "understand the laws of historical development" is at all costs to be avoided; that we must combat all radical aims of transforming society

as likely to lead to dictatorship; that we must approach everything "piecemeal" and "learn to do things as well as we can." This is the message which liberal philosophy has for us today.

I shall briefly consider some of the main points of this message, and where it leads in practice.

(1) These philosophers have a horror of "certainty." For them it means dogmatism, the imposition of an "ideology," intolerance, the methods of the Holy Inquisition. And so, they say, we must learn to live without it.

Of course, we must learn to live without irrational dogmas. But does that mean that we must not seek a scientifically-based knowledge of the universe around us and of the laws of development of human society? When Marxists speak of the "laws of historical development," they do not claim for these laws the sort of "certainty" which Roman Catholics, for example, claim for the infallible utterances of the Pope. They claim for them the sort of certainty which belongs to any well-tested scientific generalisations. There is no generalisation which may not be modified in the light of further experience. But if we want to manage our affairs successfully we must do so in the light of a scientific view of human life and of social development.

It is just such a view that Marxism is working out on the basis of the experience of the modern working-class movement. But the liberal philosophers reject it. Their warnings against the evils of "certainty," expressed as a rejection of all irrational dogmatism in the name of science, are in reality the rejection of the application of a scientific point of view to human affairs.

(2) These philosophers are afraid of "power." To believe that by the advance of technique and knowledge we can attain anything but the most limited control over natural forces is, says Russell, "cosmic impiety." Being an agnostic, he does not say that the extension of scientific technique is an offence against God, but he does suggest that it may be an insult to the "cosmos." Just like the most illiberal of dogmatic theologians, Russell would have us believe that man is a miserable worm, who must be humble and learn to know his place.

But, worst of all, in the eyes of these philosophers, is "power" in the management of social affairs. They just cannot distinguish between the minority dictatorship of a particular group and the democratic organisation of social affairs in the interests of the whole people. When it comes to the organisation of a planned society, then they are full of fears and warnings. Let there be a certain amount of "interventionism," Popper agrees, but, please, as little as possible. Just like Winston Churchill, these philosophers can only visualise a planned society as a "police State," complete with "gestapo."

(3) And, finally, they want to approach everything "piecemeal." There are two sides to this "piecemeal" approach. In the sphere of general theory, it means refusing to adopt any sort of broad, guiding conception, although this is always the method of science. This means that their theoretical activity becomes extraordinarily abstract and remote from life, and that they spend their time in endless hair-splitting arguments about isolated "problems." In their hands philosophy becomes something entirely removed from the interests of the common man—as can be easily verified by reading the philosophical works of the exponents of what Russell calls "logical analysis."

In social practice the "piecemeal" approach, which Russell and Popper admire, means something with which we are very familiar—timidity in handling critical situations, tinkering with problems, refusing to take decisive measures and capitulating before reaction—in fact, just "doing things as well as we can" without guiding principles.

We agree with Russell and Popper that it is desirable to tackle each problem we have to face carefully and objectively, critically and without dogmatism. But that does not mean that our method should be "piecemeal." On the contrary, we need a general scientific conception of "the laws of historical development" in order that problems can be properly related together, that what is essential in each case can be grasped and we can work in a planned way with an aim in view.

The "piecemeal" approach without scientific principle is, in fact, extremely apt not to lead to objectivity at all; where guiding principle is lacking, prejudice, and usually class prejudice, silently takes its place. This was illustrated by Russell's recent broadcasts. His "habit of careful veracity" led him to denounce the U.S.S.R., to condemn all the new democracies as outcrops of tyranny, and to extol the American monopoly of the atomic bomb.

Popper's ideal is an "open society," in which men are free from both political and economic oppression and from the spiritual oppression of dogma. We share this ideal. But to realise it demands that liberalism, in both thought and action, must be superseded. We must know our aim, be guided by scientific principle and knowledge of the laws of historical development, live in the certainty of the triumph of the people's cause. Liberal philosophy, in fact, if not in intention, betrays its own ideals.

COMMUNIST REVIEW

JUNE
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

JOHN GOLLAN

TOO LOOSE TALK ABOUT AN ANGLO-AMERICAN BLOC might give a distorted picture of Anglo-American relationships today and of probable lines of development of future policy. With 60 per cent of the productive capacity of the capitalist world, the United States is the undisputed capitalist world power, aiming not only to take over the positions of Japan and Germany, but to become the controller of Europe and increasingly to gain economic supremacy in the Dominions and the Empire at the expense of Britain. The fact that the public direction of America's campaign is against the U.S.S.R. in no way changes the likelihood that Britain is being sorted out for the kill.

It is on the crucial issue of world trade that Anglo-American differences are sharpest and threaten to break out into open conflict, particularly on the so-called dollar question. While Europe is suffering from a crisis of under-production caused by the economic dislocation and ravages of the Second World War, the United States, with production in 1947 88 per cent above the 1935 average, is heading rapidly to a crisis of over-production. As internal needs meet saturation point, the issue of the American export trade is put with redoubled sharpness.

The slogans of the new American trade drive are well known: Multilateral trade, freely-convertible currencies, etc., in keeping with the U.S.A.'s production advantages and Wall Street's drive against the new democracies and State regulation of trade which has developed in practically every European country. The financial negotiations for the Anglo-American Loan Agreement were used to force concessions from the British Government to fit in with these aims. The purpose of the £937,500,000 credit was clearly stated to be "to assist the Government of the United Kingdom to assume the obligations of multilateral trade." The main concessions were the understanding and agreement that sterling would become freely convertible by July 15, 1947; that in the event of import restrictions being imposed by the British Government, the principle of non-discrimination would be applied, and that the outstanding £3,500 million sterling balances should be convertible over a period, with negotiations for cancellation of a certain proportion. Alongside the actual terms of the loan, the British Government was required to give support to the American-sponsored international trade organisation and the World Trade Charter, and consider reduction or elimination of the system of Empire

Preferences. The American concession to multilateral trade was to be reduction in U.S. tariffs.

William Clayton, of the Department of Commerce at the House of Representative Hearings, on March 26 declared that the main aim of the International Trade Organisation and Charter from the American point of view was to disrupt the State control of foreign trade, as this was "not the sort of climate in which our type of foreign trade, carried on by private business men, can expand and prosper"; and he argued that Wall Street must use its position of economic strength immediately. He pointed out the value of the American import trade to the rest of the world and that the tariff system controlled access to this market. "Therefore our tariff is our bargaining stock." Larger foreign markets for the enormous surpluses now being produced in America were essential. "That is what we are going to Geneva for," he concluded, "to bargain for a chance for American private enterprise to continue and to benefit American economy through expanded foreign trade."

Bilateral negotiations between the administration and the Republican Party in preparation for the Geneva Trade Conference resulted in the so-called "Vandenberg" Tariff, with the American negotiators at Geneva given formal power to reduce tariffs by as much as 50 per cent and the Tariff Commission ready to determine if such concessions threatened serious injury to domestic producers, and the American Government pledged to invoke the clause by which the American producer can secure the withdrawal of any reduction which seemed likely to make him meet the test of competitive costs. Commenting on this position, *The Economist* (15.3.47) declared that this arrangement "is no less pernicious than any earlier schedule approved by congressional lobbies and is the worst possible introduction to the Geneva talks next month."

The Times (17.3.47) in an editorial headed "The American Giant" plaintively complains, and doubts whether the Republican Party "can show the same willingness to co-operate on the economic side of foreign policy as it has shown on the political side," and goes on to state: "But the possibility of tariff concessions being banned if they lead to larger imports, which surely should be their purpose, is too menacing to be disregarded. Such a provision would introduce something very much like a veto in economic affairs as the price of American participation."

Only the first skirmishes have taken place at Geneva, but these are significant enough. Cripps dealt at length with Britain's special trade arrangements and economic connections with the Commonwealth countries on which the economic vitality of the United Kingdom

depended. The Conference, he claimed, would have to reconcile the two facts—this special arrangement “more delicately balanced than some seem to realise, judging from the suggestions for its ‘direction’ into new channels at short notice,” and the need for development and change in the interests of progress. The essential thing for the Conference to succeed, in his view, was that America should import more goods from Britain and the rest of Europe, and in reference to the creditor position of the U.S.A. declared: “It is the hope of all that the United States, by maintaining and satisfying a demand for the products of the rest of the world, would make it possible for us to join in this great new project,” the clear implication being unless this was done there wouldn’t be any great new project or reduction of Empire preferences.

The Economist (29.3.47), in reviewing the opening stages of the Conference, demanded that the British delegates seek a major amendment of the draft Charter, “something in the nature of an escape clause for countries in Britain’s present difficult position” so long as the balance of payments crisis lasts, in order that there be some exemption from the “full rigour of the principle of non-discrimination.”

One of the main aims of the U.S. drive is to capture the British Empire trade, and this is the main reason for the attack on the Empire preferences. The American penetration of the British Empire markets before the Second World War is well known, and today the U.S. Press is full of statements regarding the trade drive to the Empire.

The Far East-American Council of Commerce and Industry has just added a new division to the organisation to help develop trade with India. During 1946, 181 million dollars’ worth of U.S. merchandise was exported to India, nearly four times as much as before the Second World War. The President of the Council stated in an interview that the main exports’ effort will be concentrated on capital goods. The *New York Herald-Tribune* (April 11) remarked that “India’s weakened political ties with Britain, lessening of exchange controls within the sterling bloc, and increased Indian preference for American goods, are the principal factors expected to bring increased United States-India trade.”

Britain’s capacity to take counter action against the American drive is limited by her economic and manpower crisis and acute balance of payments problem. While the world is gasping out for goods, Britain, in the grip of under-production, has great difficulties in supplying the goods and on many items the goods for export are sorely needed for the re-equipment and modernisation of British industry. The volume of exports in 1946 was roughly equal to that of 1938, although greater in value. The official target for 1947 is 140 per cent of the 1938

volume, which means a 40 per cent increase on the level of 1946. While 42 per cent of Britain's imports come from the Western hemisphere, however, only 14 per cent of our exports go there, and the drain on dollars is greater than the total trade deficit of £350 millions. Only 4 per cent of our exports went to America and almost another 4 per cent to Canada; whereas 88 per cent of our exports went to the "soft-currency" areas.

U.S. exports in 1946 exceeded imports by 8,150 million dollars compared with an annual average in 1937 to 1939 of 548 millions. The December issue of the *Federal Reserve Bulletin* suggests the 1947 figure will be 5½ billions and allowing for various unilateral transfers, etc., arrives at a final excess of exports of 3½ billions, which can be financed by drafts upon the British line of credit, by the Export Import Bank, and the two Bretton Woods Agencies. Bulking large in these considerations is gold and dollar resources of 19 billions held by foreign countries in 1946 (of which some 2½ billion was held in Britain at that time). This very optimistic estimate does not answer the question of what is to happen in the future when there are little or no unilateral transfers, and dollar holdings are down to working balances. Is the U.S. likely to purchase foreign goods or services or lend to the tune of 7.8 billions a year? *The Economist* (8.3.47), trying to answer this question, stated that while there would be a growing bill in the United States for raw materials and that tourist traffic would increase, "it will take years before these trends will add many billions to the present imports." Lending will also continue, but it would not, *The Economist* concluded, reach anything like the 7.8 billion level, apart from the fact that lending leads to the contra payment for interest.

On this the present position is roughly as follows. The January *Bulletin of the Department of Commerce* calculates that an overall outside total of 10.4 billion dollars has been lent. Excluding the operations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, debt charges will rise from 164 million in 1950 to 366 million in 1952. Other British estimates have put the total as high as 400 to 450 millions in the 1950s. With the U.S. contributions of roughly six billions to the bank and the fund added to existing loans, debt charges will be substantially above one billion. When this is put side by side with the consistent American refusal to allow substantial quantities of British and other goods to enter the U.S.A., it is clear that the position will increasingly sharpen. It should be noted also that Canada, Britain's second chief creditor, is also faced with an acute dollar problem, the net deficit in 1946 being 263 million.

The Observer (20.4.47) devoted an editorial to the U.S. lending

policy and the problem of repayment. Even if the U.S. were prepared to take imports, the writer declared, the volume of goods is not there, and the conclusion was drawn that the U.S. "must be ready to give some of it away."

But President Truman and Wall Street are not pursuing this policy in order to act as Santa Claus. Both in the Far East and in Europe American policy has a major object—the elimination of Britain's remaining power.

There can be no question that the U.S.A. has sought to utilise the defeat of Japan enormously to strengthen her strategic position in the Far East—not only in Japan, but also in China—while the older imperialisms, particularly Britain, faced with rising movements of national independence, have not been able to maintain their pre-war positions.

The period since VJ Day has seen McArthur and U.S. big business digging in in Japan. Raw cotton from the U.S.A. has restarted the Japanese textile industry. It has been estimated that in 1946 the U.S. supplied almost all Japanese imports and bought 70 per cent of her exports. There has been a steady stream of American businessmen to Japan since it was announced that the Zaibatsu concerns were to be dissolved, and Americans are buying into the Japanese business concerns. The whole idea is clearly one of American-backed Japanese industry driving to capture the Asiatic markets, assisting the United States in ousting competitors, in the first place, Great Britain. British banks in Japan are still not opened and the demand for equal access to Japanese trade is still not met.

U.S. political policy in Japan, with the Mikado and Japanese Government intact, has evoked repeated protests from other members of the Far Eastern Council, and, while the results of the recent Japanese elections were received with great satisfaction by McArthur, *The Times* (29.4.47) wrote that "the readiness of the electorate to be content with minor changes is perhaps disquieting."

McArthur recently demanded an early Peace Treaty and declared that Japan could not pay reparations; that the armed forces must be withdrawn and the Allied control replaced by "mild controls" by the United Nations. To make trade successful and to allow Japan to buy the three million tons of food required, he argued that trade must be taken out of the hands of the Allied control "bottleneck," and put into the hands of private traders, and once on her feet Japan could "repay to the United States her present indebtedness of 200 million dollars and all the dollars she could borrow in future."

Simultaneously with U.S. policy in Japan, the drive has been made to establish U.S. strategic and economic control in China. Four

thousand million dollars of goods have been given by the U.S. Government to Chiang in order to wage civil war; the training of the Kuomintang Army has been placed entirely in the hands of American instructors, with U.S. equipment being used throughout. A U.S. naval base is being completed at Tsing Tao. The Chinese-American Commercial Agreement, signed in November, 1946, not only makes China an American colony, but is equally designed completely to exclude Britain from the Chinese market. This treaty forbids China to discriminate against United States' goods by tariffs, quota restrictions, exchange controls, etc.; binds China to support U.S. ideas on general world trade; gives U.S. big business most-favoured-nation's rights in China for mining and internal and coastal shipping; and allows American trusts full freedom to operate throughout the whole territory of China, with United States nationals possessing the same rights as Chinese nationals. It is perhaps this background of American domination which has been the reason for the consistent editorial plea for compromise in China advanced by *The Times*, and the hope that a more democratic China in the long run would be more in British interests than the present set-up.

While the immediate reasons for the Truman speech were the increasing difficulties of British policy in Greece and the general crisis position of Britain, the new American policy will bring an enormous accession of U.S. strategic strength in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

It was preceded by the two agreements concerning the oil resources of the Middle East reached by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey on December 26, 1946. Twenty-four hours after the Truman speech the Standard Oil Company and Socony Vacuum announced that they would finance the £30 million Trans-Arabian pipeline linking the oil of the Persian Gulf with the Eastern Mediterranean.

An immediate effect of the Truman policy, while part of the drive against the U.S.S.R., is to strengthen enormously American strategic positions in the Middle East *vis-à-vis* Britain's "life-lines of the Empire." It is noteworthy that in the House and Senate hearings this point was stressed by Robert Patterson, Secretary for War.

Economically the aim of the agreement is to obtain complete American domination in Greece. Half of the 300 million dollar loan to Greece is intended for civil use. In the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives (March 24) William Clayton made perfectly clear that the loan would be administered by an American Civil Mission, and all expenditure would be subject to the control of that mission. The far-reaching nature of the control

envisaged was seen in Clayton's statement that "sound policies" would be demanded on "fiscal matters; a modern tax structure; strict husbanding and control of foreign exchange earnings of the Greek people; conservation of remaining gold resources; a restriction of unessential imports; and the expansion of Greek exports."

Alongside this, business penetration is proceeding apace. American Airways has acquired the majority of shares in the Greek Internal Airways Corporation, and it is reported that a Greek Parliamentary Commission has approved legislation for the concession of Kirki lead mines in Thrace to an American mining corporation.

The Truman speech was timed to coincide with the Moscow Conference, and subsequent developments showed that Marshall's main purpose at the Conference was to launch an attack on the agreements previously recorded at Potsdam and Crimea. On the main issues the American line was endorsed and supported by Bevin.

The Anglo-American zonal fusion solved no British problems. On the contrary, because denazification is held up, with the Junker elements in control, incompetence rampant, and with no support among the people, production in the British zone is in a parlous state. With a net loss of £38 millions in 1946 and with the financial agreement on fusion still further increasing the dollar problem for Britain, difficulties have multiplied. A partition line creates difficulties for German social democracy, Britain's main political support, while the policy of political division and German administration in the various "Landers," pursued by both America and Britain, makes the creation of a unified German administration for the West difficult.

It is noteworthy that Bevin's first step on his return from the conference was to ratify the Anglo-Polish financial agreement after a friendly discussion with the Polish Prime Minister; this was followed by the announcement that broad agreement had been reached on an Anglo-Polish Trade Treaty.

While not immediately necessary for the U.S.A., a European settlement and economic recovery and European trade is vital for Britain. Without doubt this was also connected with the discussions on the revision and strengthening of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty which took place simultaneously with the main Moscow Conference, and the resumption of the Anglo-Soviet trade talks. It was precisely the Truman speech and subsequent developments in American policy, with the support given to them by Britain, which created the difficulties on the revision of the treaty in the sense that genuine Soviet-British friendship with all that it implies and an Anglo-American bloc policy are incompatible. A strengthened Anglo-Soviet Treaty is vital for Britain's security and would be a cornerstone of a real democratic

Europe. There can be no question that the successful conclusion of these negotiations could speed an Anglo-Russian trade agreement, which is already under discussion, and could be of immense importance for the economic recovery of Britain.

America could not pursue the aggressive Truman line without the full compliance and support of Britain, but each additional step in this policy at the same time strengthens the U.S. at the expense of Britain and weakens her association with her real allies in Europe. It is this hard fact which has caused increasingly wider sections of the Labour, trade union and progressive movements to realise where the policy is leading to, while the Tory reactionaries, in the spirit of Churchill's Fulton speech, have been the most ardent supporters of the American bloc.

At the same time many bourgeois circles have for some time been seriously disturbed about the trend of events. In consistent editorials over the latter half of 1946, *The Times* pointed out that a correct British foreign policy demanded simultaneous and equal agreement of Britain both with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

A leading article on January 1 on this theme dealt with Britain's acute problems and touched on the difficulties of Soviet-British relations. The difficulties "of a different order" with America were then discussed. These were the need for special trading agreements of Britain with the European countries, including the U.S.S.R., as against American free trade. The result, it was claimed, if Britain fell in line with "extremes expressions" of American wishes,

"could not ultimately be other than to prejudice beyond repair British relations with not only the Soviet Union, but with the greater part of Europe; and upon these relations with Europe, as with the Commonwealth, Britain's economic wellbeing, and even her political security, will vitally depend. Co-operation with the United States must be an axiom of British policy. But the assumption that unreserved co-operation with the United States is by itself an adequate substitute for an independent policy cannot be supported, quite apart from the partisan and prejudiced considerations which have lately been advanced in this connection. Great Britain's interests are so many-sided and her present economic position so precarious that it is unlikely that any single formula, or any single alliance, will provide a key to the right path."

The case could hardly be better put.

In repeated interviews, Stalin has shown that the Soviet Union with its great resources is willing and eager to co-operate with both

Britain and the U.S.A. in the solution of the problems of world peace and economic recovery. The interview given to Stassen was an offer to the American people of what could be done if the Truman line was abandoned, just as the statement made to Marshall was a clear warning that the Truman line would fail, although negotiation and compromise could solve the problems and secure an economically integrated and democratically united Germany essential for rapid European recovery.

It should be clear from all the evidence that an Anglo-American bloc of equal partners is an impossibility. Contradictions and developments are too acute and can only result in increasing British subservience to American domination. Such domination can only enormously sharpen existing acute economic tensions, deepen the crisis of capitalism, and betray genuine British interests. There can be no road other than disaster in the attempt to re-establish the old positions of British imperialism. Neither the power to do this, nor the opportunity, are any longer there, and it is this attempt which exacerbates every aspect of the economic crisis in Britain and increases every strain on British manpower.

The only possible policy open to us is genuine Three Power co-operation, with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. In Britain there is the unique opportunity to strike a blow for this line by increasing resistance to American "anti-Communist" policy and economic pressure, the cornerstone of which would be the successful conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations. This in itself could create a fundamental turn in the world situation, strengthen the hands of the progressive forces in the U.S.A., rally every country feeling the dollar pressure, and lay the basis for a new world settlement and the solution of Britain's problems.

ENGLAND'S DEMOCRATIC ARMY

CHRISTOPHER HILL

THREE HUNDRED YEARS AGO England had a democratic army, really democratic, so democratic that it would give our Whitehall brass-hats the creeps if anything like it existed today. This army produced ideas about politics which are still of interest today. The object of the present article is to recall the way in which this army was organised and the ideas which it produced.

It was in the middle of the English bourgeois revolution, in which

political power was transferred from the feudal landed class, with its representatives the King, the Bishops and the Peers, to the new bourgeoisie in town and country, represented especially in the House of Commons and the City of London. By 1647 the civil war against Charles I and the cavaliers had been won; two years later the King himself was to be brought to the block as "a traitor to the good people of this nation."

But winning the war had not been easy. The bourgeoisie had the longer purse; but the cavaliers were at first the better fighters. The fox-hunting, swashbuckling gentry of the outlying regions of England, with their armed retainers and dependent tenantry, were accustomed to fighting: the citizens of London and the yeomen farmers of the home counties were not. Moreover, they were organised in local militias which hated serving outside their own county. To beat the cavaliers new organisational methods were called for, and a cause to fight for: Parliament could win only by appealing to the people.

It was an East Anglian country gentleman who discovered the importance of morale. On the field of battle after a parliamentary defeat, Oliver Cromwell observed to his cousin, John Hampden: "Your troopers are most of them old decayed serving men and tapsters and such kind of fellows; and *their* troopers are gentlemen's sons . . . You must get men of a spirit . . . that is likely to go on as far as gentlemen will go, or else I am sure you will be beaten still." Cromwell got down to class realities: in his own troop, he said, "I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for and loves what he knows, than that which you call a gentleman and is nothing else."

Many people on the Parliamentary side were frightened of arming the people, of proclaiming that the war was being fought for democratic principles; some indeed were not quite sure that they wanted to win too decisively. A tussle was needed with these reactionaries before Cromwell's ideas were adopted. But finally all were ejected from their commands who owed their position merely to social rank; and the New Model Army was created.

It was very new indeed. It was a national army, paid centrally, with a unified command and under the general direction of Parliament. It was an army of the career open to the talents. Once the lords were purged from their commands, able men from any walk of life were able to come to the top. The cavaliers jeered bitterly at the "cobblers, draymen and brewers" who officered the New Model Army. As in the higher command peers were replaced by commoners who really wanted to beat the enemy, so down through all ranks efforts were made to enrol volunteers who felt that the cause mattered. Complete freedom of discussion was allowed for the rank and file of

this army. The Rev. Richard Baxter, a conservative-minded army chaplain, was horrified at their goings on:

"I found a new face of things which I never dreamed of. I heard the plotting heads very hot upon that which intimated their intention to subvert both Church and State. . . . I perceived that they took the king for a tyrant and an enemy, and really intended absolutely to master him or to ruin him . . . They said: 'What were the lords of England but William the Conqueror's colonels, or the barons but his majors, or the knights but his captains?' . . . My life among them was a daily contending with seducers."

But though uncomfortable for chaplains, this atmosphere of free discussion must have been intoxicating for the soldiers. For centuries the English people had been kept illiterate, spoon-fed by a single State Church which persecuted "heretics." Now they were able freely to think for themselves, to discuss problems with their fellows; soon they would try to translate their thoughts into action. Because the Church had so long monopolised education, and the Bible was the only book easily accessible, men still tended to talk politics in religious language: orthodox historians speak of "religious toleration" in Cromwell's army, and of the whole bourgeois revolution, as a "Puritan Revolution." But it was far more than that. Men learn quickly in revolutions; we can see from Baxter's pained observations that the soldiers were no longer satisfied with pie in the sky: they wanted it in this world, too. Baxter shows the mix-up of politics and religion when he writes: "the thing contrived was an heretical democracy." Democracy was indeed a heresy for the ruling class and its propagandists.

Sixty years earlier a Secretary of State had dismissed the larger half of the population in the following words: "Day labourers, poor husbandmen, yea, merchants or retailers which have no free land, copy-holders and all artificers . . . have no voice nor authority in our commonwealth, and no account is made of them, but only to be ruled." That was still true in 1640. The gentlemen and merchants sitting in the House of Commons had no wish to see this changed now that *their* interests had been secured by victory over the king and the cavaliers. But here is what the men who had done the fighting thought, expressed in the dignified language of one of the New Model Army's manifestos:

"We were not a mere mercenary army, hired to serve any arbitrary power of a State, but called forth and conjured, by the several Declarations of Parliament, to the defence of our own and the people's just rights and liberties. We, by their invitation, took up arms in judgment and conscience, to preserve the nation from tyranny and oppression and,

therefore, were obliged to insist upon our rights and freedoms as commoners."

This then was the situation by the spring of 1647. The war had been won; Charles I was a prisoner, his supporters defeated and disarmed; Parliament decided it was time to get rid of these soldiers who seemed to have the extraordinary idea that they had won the war for themselves. Parliament coolly proposed to disband the army, paying some, but not all, of its arrears of wages. Some regiments were to be given the option of volunteering for a disagreeable campaign in Ireland, to suppress the revolt of the Irish people against the dictatorship of alien British landlords. Of the reforms and liberties so lavishly promised when the army was being recruited there was no word.

But this was a politically mature army. The rank and file of the cavalry sent a deputation "to know whether the officers . . . would effectually fall upon some petition in their behalfs"; if not they would act for themselves. A vast spontaneous organisation sprang up, first among the cavalry, then all through the army. Each troop or company elected delegates and then chose two or more from their own number, known as agitators, to represent the whole regiment. These drew up a petition to Parliament and then remained as a standing committee.

The movement was not at first directed against the officers, who shared the troops' interest in being paid: the agitators were anxious only lest they should sell out to Parliament. ("And therefore, brave commanders, the Lord put a spirit of courage into your hearts, that you may stand fast . . . Is it not better to die like men than to be enslaved and hanged like dogs? . . . We have been quiet and peaceable in obeying all orders and commands, yet now we have a just cause to tell you, if we be not relieved in these our grievances, we shall be forced to that which we pray God to divert.") Already political demands were being put forward "beyond the proper concerns of soldiers" about which the officers were uneasy. But for the moment they had to accept the movement. "We knew no better way to prevent such discontents from being blown up into any mutinous distemper," they said later in their defence. For the moment the army was united and the agitators were leading it.

By the end of April the regimental representatives were meeting regularly; committees and sub-committees were set up without authority from the officers, and despite their opposition. In one meeting in May "every foot soldier gave 4d. apiece towards defraying the charges," which argues a considerable degree of organisation; and 4d. was half a day's pay. The soldiers attended meetings with red ribbons tied on their left arm, to show "that we will defend the equity of our petition with our blood."

On May 15 and 16 there was a meeting between officers and representatives from the regiments; observers from nearly every troop and company also attended. All reported that the army would neither disband nor go to Ireland until its grievances were attended to: one or two colonels who tried to describe their regiments as more docile were at once corrected by their subalterns, fortified by the presence of the soldiers' delegates. Some junior officers were clearly working with the rank and file, notably Cornet Joyce, of whom more shortly.

After the meeting a report was drawn up for Parliament, signed by Fairfax, Cromwell and the other generals, saying that the army was solid in its demands: unity of the rank and file had forced the officers into line. Having thus won over Fairfax's army, the agitators sent three of their number to General Poyntz's army up in the north, generally regarded as a politically backward force. Poyntz wanted to arrest the emissaries, but dared not. They organised discussion meetings and petitions, and within just over six weeks Poyntz was arrested by agitators elected by his own troops. The northern army joined hands with Fairfax's. Odd regiments and companies in garrison towns "received orders from the agitators," upon which they expelled their officers and marched to join their fellows. Other emissaries were sent to London and other parts of the country to expound the soldiers' cause: manifestos of support began to come in from all sides.

The soldiers' delegates were now in virtual command of all the land forces in England. Hostile officers were beaten out of quarters on the agitators' initiative; and the general could do nothing about it. Fairfax was asked to order a general rendezvous; otherwise "we . . . shall be necessitated . . . to do such things ourselves." Fairfax's Council of War stated its conviction that the agitators could be as good as their word; so a rendezvous was ordered for June 5.

Two days before this the agitators had taken the offensive. Cornet Joyce had been sent to Oxford with 500 horse to seize an ammunition dump. On the way they swung aside to Holmby House, where Charles I was held as Parliament's prisoner, drove away the colonel commanding the garrison (with the help of his own troops) and seized the king. He was taken away as a hostage. Historians dispute whether Cromwell was told in advance what the agitators were going to do; but the point is that whether told or not he could not have prevented it. Joyce was, in fact, acting *against* the generals, who were rightly suspected of negotiating with the King behind the army's back. Joyce was acting as the emissary of the army, not of its generals. When Charles I asked to see his commission he pointed to the 5,000 grim troopers lined up around the King.

At the rendezvous on June 5, at the agitators' demand, a General

Council of the Army was set up, composed of the generals plus two officers and two other ranks "to be chosen from each regiment." Henceforth this Army Council (the Russian for it would be Army Soviet) was in effective command. At the instance of the agitators the army began to move on London, where Parliament still refused to compromise. In August, the city was occupied and many of the reactionary M.P.s fled before they could be purged as the soldiers' delegates demanded.

But by now the generals were anxious to call a halt. They were now in power themselves and had got all they wanted. They "discouraged the agitators from meddling with matters which did not concern them" and began to pack the Army Council by introducing *all* the officers. Some agitators were bought off by promotion. A bourgeois historian sums up with a naïve assumption that all's fair that saves the ruling class: "To organise the army while weakening the power of the agitators by bringing them into close contact with the officers, and at the same time to obtain from the soldiers themselves authority for the pursuance of a policy of moderation, was a service worthy of Cromwell's intervention."

In October, five cavalry regiments, dissatisfied with their agitators, recalled them and replaced them by new delegates closer to the feelings of those whom they represented, thus anticipating a procedure provided for in the Soviet constitution. The new agitators put forward more definite political and economic demands—for manhood suffrage (excluding those who had collaborated with the enemy), new Parliaments every two years, and a series of economic and legal reforms to the advantage of the small man. By November 4 the representatives of 16 regiments had declared their adherence to the new proposals. A pamphlet on October 29 told the soldiers: "Ye can create new officers. Necessity knows no law."

The last meeting of the Army Council began at Putney on October 28. The agitators were supported by two civilians, Wildman and Petty, to stress their solidarity with the people of London. The question in debate was the government of England. "We have had a great war for power," said Wildman. The army had seized power from Charles I and the cavaliers. How was it to be used?

The generals argued for "continuity." They wanted the framework of the State to be altered as little as possible. Themselves mostly landowners and business men, they wished to take over the old State machine, to adapt it to their class needs, rather than decisively to transform it. The agitators and City Levellers with a clear vision of the realities of political power, saw that the rank-and-file soldiers and the common people would get nothing out of their victory over

the old order unless there were far more decisive changes. A London Leveller a year earlier had proclaimed this: "Whatever our forefathers were, or whatever they did or suffered or were enforced to yield unto, we are the men of the present age, and ought to be absolutely free from all kinds of exorbitancies, molestations or arbitrary power." The Levellers wanted to emphasize that there had been a revolutionary break, to refound the State on a more democratic basis, to proclaim and protect the rights of all citizens: not merely to let power pass from one group of exploiters to another.

"I would fain know what all the soldiers have fought for all this while," asked Colonel Rainborough, the only field officer to support the agitators; "he hath fought to enslave himself, to give power to men of riches, men of estates." "Our very laws were made by our conquerors," said Wildman: now that the old ruling class had been defeated the laws must be changed to suit the needs of the people. "The poorest he that is in England," said Rainborough, "hath a life to live as the greatest he, and therefore . . . every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government." "That's the undeniable maxim of government," added Wildman, "that all government is in the free consent of the people."

These were revolutionary ideas in the seventeenth century. What had the generals to say in reply? Democracy, they thought, would lead to calling in question the sacred principle of private property. "If the master and servant shall be equal electors," said Colonel Rich simply, "... it may happen that the majority may by law . . . destroy property." So there must be no democracy. "In a general sense," said Ireton, "liberty cannot be provided for if property be preserved." And, of course, he was for property. This has been the fundamental dilemma of bourgeois democracy ever since: the more truly democratic it becomes, the greater the likelihood that the foundations of bourgeois rule will be challenged.

Once the issue between property and the people had been posed as clearly as that, the generals did not stop at talking. A few days later at another rendezvous Cromwell picked out one of the leaders of the rank and file and had him shot. Eighteen months later there was a final flare-up, and Cromwell was heard banging the Council table and shouting: "You have no other way to deal with these men but to break them in pieces. . . . If you do not break them they will break you." They were broken. Six years later Oliver told a gratified House of Commons: "It is some satisfaction, if a common-wealth . . . must needs suffer, it should rather suffer from rich men than from poor men." It has been suffering ever since.

In the seventeenth century, Leveller democracy could be broken in pieces. The capitalist system was only just beginning to develop, and had centuries of progressive constructive work before it. Because capitalism was undeveloped, so too was the working class. The rank and file of the New Model Army was composed of peasants and small craftsmen: there was none of the solidarity which the factory system forges in the proletariat. The agitators and the Levellers dreamed of a democracy of small producers because there was as yet no class which could challenge the existence of capitalism as a system; there were only isolated figures in seventeenth-century England who dreamed of a society based on communal ownership of production, on Socialism. For that, economic conditions were not ripe.

But if the agitators could not then put forward a constructive alternative, they already saw what was wrong with capitalism: its denial of the rights of common individuals, its assertion of the superiority of property rights. The Leveller leaders had a tremendous confidence that they were speaking for the people who should come after them: "Posterity we doubt not shall reap the benefit of our endeavours, whatever shall become of us." They saw, too, that united action by ordinary people was the way to overthrow the evils of capitalism. "If writings be true," said Rainborough, "there hath been many scufflings between the honest men of England and those that have tyrannised over them . . . if the people find" that the laws are not "suitable to free men as they are, I know no reason should deter men . . . from endeavouring by all means to gain anything that might be of more advantage to them than that government under which they live."

NEW WAGES STRUCTURE FOR MINING

LEW MILES

CONSEQUENT UPON THE NATIONALISATION OF THE MINES a new wages structure became inevitable. It is important that this wages structure be as free as possible from any future source of friction, and that it should also be a model demonstrating that State enterprise is superior to the old anarchic ownership.

In a new wage agreement the following factors need to be carefully considered:

- (1) The need to make nationalisation a success, by raising productivity, increasing the flow of entrants into mining, and providing

the miner with a wage compatible with his new status and responsibility in British society.

(2) That improvements and changes in the technical state of the industry are certain.

(3) The attitude of miners towards certain matters of principle—piecework, bonus, incentive, etc.

(4) The need to take advantage of the overhaul of wage payments to produce the *simplest* possible agreement

Although Abe Moffat lays great stress on the majority—the day-wage workers—in the industry, the minority—the pieceworkers—are equally important. The one can be the bottleneck for the other, so day-wage rates and piecework rates are equally urgent. Both need those new or added incentives for maximum output.

Basic rates must be substantial. The £6 minimum (for five-day week, and exclusive of cost-of-living bonus) is not exorbitant; it is a modest but satisfactory demand. This minimum is necessary for surface and underground lower grade.

The trend in mining is for more mechanised methods to be used in the different phases of work. Whilst most of the old skills have been kept, new skills are increasing. The fitters and electricians are becoming more numerous. In mining, as in engineering, one does see clear-cut classifications appearing—the craftsmen, the skilled and semi-skilled. This will become more and more clear. Our new structure should follow this trend, and this is the opportunity for all coalfields to adopt such a classification, scrapping the different grades in the several coalfields, and substituting a practical grading for both underground and surface.

Indeed, in South Wales (1937 Conciliation Agreement) only four grades existed in place of more before 1937.

The rates for these three grades should be: craftsmen, £7 10s.; skilled, £6 15s.; semi-skilled, £6. These rates will mean varying increases upon the minimum now existing. For instance, under the Porter minimum (excluding cost of living) these rates would mean an increase of £3 os. 8d. for the craftsman (not on piecework) and £1 16s. 8d. for the semi-skilled. Moffat's proposals would be the same increase for the lower grade, but £4 10s. 8d. increase for the highest grade.

The number of grades Moffat proposes, and some of the scales, are out of proportion. The classifying of who should and who should not be in the respective grades is bound to give some trouble, but if this could be done in the union areas, or on a regional level, then much trouble would be avoided. There would be no confusion over the use of names, e.g., repairer, whose function varies in different

coalfields. Secondly, proper consideration will be given to the technical level of the industry in a given coalfield.

Other things need to be stressed. That Grade A or the craftsman's grade is not the minimum exclusively for the coal getter. As has been intimated such workers as the repairer (in South Wales), and the leading fitters and electricians, should be given this highest rate.

The case for adult rates at 18 years of age was well put by Moffat. This means that rates need to be fixed for youth between 15 years (the youngest) and 18 years. The rates could be £3 per week at 15 years with 10s. increases each six months, until 18 when the rate will be £6 (or according to grade). Pieceworkers who have lads working with them, and for whom they are financially responsible, need to be guaranteed adequate payments, in order to compensate for increases in youth earnings.

In regard to piece rates it should be obvious that piecework payments should extend and not contract. Day-wage men have always seen the unfairness of their handling all the coal from the coal getter, and even though the pieceworker will receive 50 per cent over his basic wage, the day-wage worker's wage will be the same as normally. It is possible and necessary, when greater productive efforts are required, to give the maximum personal (at times group) incentives. Many workers, hitherto on day work, can be put on piecework. This applies to even pit-bottom personnel, and some on the surface. For instance, repairers, rippers, all traffic men, cutter men, flitters, packers, timber drawers, those unloading timber in trucks, etc., can be put on piecework, as well as the coal getter. The three rates mentioned earlier will be their bedrock.

Of course, this will leave a minority outside the influence of improved incentive, e.g., electricians, pumpsmen, onsetters, etc. These should be drawn into a bonus system whereby they would receive a certain increase according to the weekly (or daily) increase in the pit output, over a certain agreed output. In this way everyone will know that there is something extra for him, too.

There can be no fixed proportion between piecework earnings and day-wage rates. Individual (and collective) effort varies. Skill varies, too. Price lists need to be so itemised as to give the pieceworker a reasonable opportunity of earning 75 per cent over his basic rate. But this must not be the limit. If one fixes a limit on piecework, one also fixes a limit on production. There must be a careful examination of existing price lists, and new price lists produced, which show that due regard is paid to abnormal conditions.

Piece-rate lists for coal getters or colliers will need to be completely different from those existing today. Uniformity, opportunity and

satisfaction are essential. Thousands of existing lists will have to be scrapped. The old barriers of the 800 different coal owners must not be reflected in the new lists, which must offer like wages to those producing like amounts under like conditions. The principle of equality for effort must be implemented. (At the same time preserving any better rate that a given coalfield may have over the new rates.)

Such price lists will take some time to fix, but there is a wealth of information in the union, colliery and N.C.B. offices on the basis of which proposals could be made in a few months, which could outline payments for given amounts in similar seams (under approximate geological conditions). Maybe it would be necessary to draw up 30 to 50 different price lists. This will be a wonderful achievement over the four per colliery that exists now.

In their final form price lists may be simplified further by translating the detailed price for specific items into overall prices, either on the per yard forward of travel, or on the ton.

In those coalfields where the percentage of mechanisation is still very low, and where some time will elapse before radical changes are made, it will be necessary to have new price lists for the workers cutting and filling by the old methods.

This is the approach, I believe, that we should be making to the problem of wages in the industry. We should be staking good claims, but not Utopian claims.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE NAVY

MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN IN RECENT YEARS of "people's armies," of the interrelated problems of democracy and discipline in military forces, and of the relationship between armies and the society which has produced them.

Marxists in particular have devoted much attention to these problems, and even before the Second World War such a valuable study as Lewis Clive's *People's Army* was published. The special and somewhat different questions associated with naval forces have, however, received remarkably scant attention from progressive writers. We have heard much of "people's armies," little of "people's navies." Yet to an island nation such as our own, whose whole history is intimately bound up with the sea, and the very physical existence of

whose inhabitants depends upon sea power, the Navy is inevitably of even more moment than the Army.

In certain important respects the social composition of navies differs from that of armies, and in order to understand these differences it is necessary to trace the social development of the sea forces, both as regards the officers and the lower deck.

The Army, as a specialised body of men, was preceded by the universal tribal levy of gentile society, but the Navy had no such precursor, for the development of the ship took place at a period when gentile society was breaking down and classes evolving. Moreover, navies by their nature did not lend themselves to a gentile organisation, for they required mariners—men with a specialist skill. The creation of the British Navy coincided with the development of a specialised warrior class on land. The Danish invasions had demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the old popular levy or *fyrð*. Alfred the Great, therefore, not only fostered the class of “*thegns*” or professional warriors, but built the first English fleet, and, since seamanship had not been developed by the Anglo-Saxons, he was obliged to man his ships with foreign mercenaries—Frisians.

In the fleets of antiquity a distinct naval profession can scarcely be said to have existed. Ship’s companies were divided into quite separate categories—the soldiers or marines who did the fighting, the mariners who sailed and navigated the ship, and the (usually servile) oarsmen who provided its main motive power. Naval battles largely resembled land battles afloat, and there was no synthesis between the sailor and fighter. This triune division remained the fundamental pattern in the Mediterranean world till the battle of Lepanto, and the admirals, from Themistocles to Don Juan of Austria, were merely generals temporarily afloat, or, as the latter was styled: “*Capitan General del mar*.” In Northern Europe, however, a different practice was developed, which was exemplified *par excellence* by Alfred’s Viking opponents. Here there was no slave economy and the warrior and the rower were one. The English Navy was based originally upon the Norse model, but as the Middle Ages progressed it was shaped by influences both from Northern and Southern Europe. The oars, which were not suited to the stormy seas of Britain, disappeared, and the Royal Navy of the feudal period had not a triple but a double division into soldiers and seamen. Since sailing ships did not use the ram, battles such as Sluys resembled land warfare even more than those of the Mediterranean, and the fleets and individual ships were officered by knights and nobles. The master shipman and his mate merely had the function of sailing the ship to the scene of battle. The thoroughly feudal character of this organisation needs no emphasis,

although it was the bourgeoisie (especially that of the Cinque Ports) which was obliged to furnish all the ships, except for a few royally-owned "Ships of the Tower."

The rise of a true naval profession was due to the maritime revolution which went with the Renaissance and the opening up of the ocean routes. The spotlight of naval history shifted from the Mediterranean to the rougher waters of the Atlantic.

Up till this time the traditions of Mediterranean galley fighting had dominated the tactics even of the sailing ships, but now the latter began to develop their own manner of warfare. The introduction of naval ordnance turned the warship from a fighting platform into a floating battery. Gunnery was now so intimately connected with seamanship that the fighting could no longer be left to soldiers. Moreover, the development of the science of navigation added to the skill requisite in a seaman officer and gave him a correspondingly higher status. Since military officers were of the old feudal caste, while sailors were not, and were closely associated and often identical with the rising bourgeoisie, the revolution in shipbuilding and naval tactics was an important aspect of the breakdown of the feudal social order to make way for capitalism. The new naval tactics were first developed by the Dutch bourgeois in revolt against the feudal power of Spain, and by the English privateers who challenged the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly of the exploitation of the great discoveries.

The social character of these privateers needs some elucidation. At first privateering was carried on by members of the gentry, like the Tremaynes, Horseys and Cobhams, as a means of acquiring bourgeois wealth, for money had taken the place of land as the standard of affluence, and so money-making adventures superseded the land-grabbing enterprises of the feudal age. The bourgeois proper only took a hand in the game with Drake's voyage to Nombre de Dios after the defeat of Hawkins' attempt to open up peaceful commerce with the Spanish colonies. But whether waged by merchants or by squires this unofficial war was essentially bourgeois in character. The privateering influence soon made itself felt in the National Navy. John Hawkins was placed in charge of naval construction and created a fleet designed for the new form of warfare. When the marauding merged into open war with Spain, the privateer captains (Drake, Frobisher, Fenner, etc) were given commissions in the Royal Navy, and the officers and men trained in their school formed the backbone of the fleet that defeated the Armada.

It should be remembered that in personnel there was no rigid distinction between the Navy and the mercantile marine. The Queen's ships were normally laid up "in ordinary," and when commissioned

for active service were manned by seamen conscripted by Bills of impressment. The maritime revolution meant virtually that the Tudor Navy had been transferred not only from the soldier to the sailor, but from feudal to bourgeois control. The soldier now formed the less important section of the ship's company, the guns being worked by seamen. It is true that it was still *de rigueur* for the captain and the lieutenant of a warship to be "gentlemen" and not necessarily essential for them to be sailors. But in Elizabethan society seamen of bourgeois, or even lower origin (like Drake) could pay their way into the ranks of the gentry with Spanish gold. The feudal tradition, however, was not entirely broken, for the supreme command in 1588 was given not to Drake, but to Lord Howard of Effingham, a great noble whose father had been Lord High Admiral before him, while other nobles, like Lord Sheffield and Lord Thomas Howard, also had commands. The defeat of the Armada was the triumph of the new order over the old, bankrupt feudal organisation which was still maintained in the Spanish fleet. The greatest weakness of the Elizabethan system was the absence of any regular system of recruitment for officers and men, but the consequences of this did not become fully apparent until the next century.

The seventeenth century saw the passing of the heyday of the Elizabethan privateer, and the rise of the great chartered companies, notably the East India Company. These two factors made it increasingly difficult for the seaman to rise socially. He was becoming proletarianised, and the bourgeoisie were ceasing to sail their own ships as the Hawkinses had done. The effect of these changes on the Navy was seen particularly in the character of the officers. The gentle or bourgeois privateer captains were replaced by two widely-differing groups—the rough "tarpaulins"—seamen promoted from the lower deck, like Sir Christopher Myngs and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, or commissioned from the merchant service like John Benbow, and the "gentleman officers" appointed by Court influence, and who included such shining lights of Restoration literature and licence as Dorset, Rochester and Wycherley, and whose incompetence was largely responsible for such fiascos as the Four Days Battle. Pepys gives us an enlightening glimpse of the attitude of the latter group towards the former. "He says that he heard Captain Digby (my Lord of Bristol's son, a young fellow that never was but one year, if that, in the fleet) say that he did hope that he should not see a tarpaulin have the command of a ship within this twelve months."

The English revolution brought about a drastic purge of the "gentlemen" (to the great improvement of the fleet's efficiency) and high-ranking officers of the New Model Army (Blake, Deane, Monk) were

appointed "generals at sea," in which capacity they showed remarkable adaptability, but the "gentlemen" came back with Charles II. It was in his reign, however, that there appeared the germ of a truly professional system of training officers. Certain boys of good family were sent to sea as King's letter boys—a cumbrous designation soon superseded by "midshipmen." Thus was achieved a definite synthesis between the "gentlemen" and the mariners. In the seventeenth century service in the navy had been a mere episode in a "gentleman's" life, in the eighteenth century it was a career, and in the days of Smollett and Marryat the professional officer who had entered the service at twelve or thirteen had supplanted both "tarpaulin" and court favourite. The rigours and isolation of the sea life were still such that it was mostly from the lower and poorer strata of the ruling class that officers were drawn—Hawke's father was a lawyer, Nelson's a clergyman.

It is dangerous to generalise about eighteenth-century naval officers. The life seems to have had widely different effects upon different temperaments. There was the much-publicised sadistic type, such as Bligh and Colpoys. On the other hand there were many officers of humanity and culture—Nelson, Hawke and Cook were ever solicitous for their men's welfare, and Marryat carried on vigorous propaganda for better conditions (Nelson even went so far as to express his sympathy with the Spithead mutineers of 1797). The lonely, austere life, begun at such an early and impressionable age, seems to have tended to produce extremes of character, to say nothing of strongly-marked individualities like Captain Pilfold, Shelley's friend and disciple, and Lord Dundonald, the *enfant terrible* of the Navy, advocate of Parliamentary reform, and successively commander of the infant fleets of three small nations struggling for independence. The Navy never became "fashionable" in the sense that guards and cavalry regiments were. Unlike the army officer, the naval officer was never an aristocratic amateur, but always a professional. The combination of professionalism and isolation explains why naval officers played such a comparatively small part in politics; as a rule they were content (like Nelson) to follow the prevailing political trend of their class without thinking much about it.

The eighteenth century produced the professional naval officer, but not the professional naval rating. Men were recruited not for a term of years, but for a single commission, and the Navy's finest seamen were still drawn (mostly against their will) from the Merchant Navy and the fishing (and smuggling) fleets. The popular legend that our wooden walls were manned by the scum of the jails does not bear examination. Crews were, it is true, "made up" with convicts who

were rated as "landsmen," but the working of a complex sailing ship demanded skilled seamen. It was still possible, though exceptional, for ratings to rise by merit to the quarterdeck, as James Cook did, and the expansion necessitated by the frequent wars of that period increased the number of such promotions.

The Royal Marines had been founded by Charles II as part of the new standing army. They replaced the soldiers hitherto carried and their role was to prevent mutiny. (Charles II could scarcely have forgotten the part played by the Navy in the English revolution.) Their role as musketeers in action was obviously an afterthought, for their original weapon was the pike. This policy of *divide et impera* bore fruit in the refusal of the marines to mutiny in 1797.

The profound changes that took place in the social composition of the Navy in the nineteenth century were brought about by the industrial revolution. Its transformation of the warship made the professional naval rating essential. The modern steam and armoured ship developed along quite different lines from the merchant steamer, and to work and fight her long training and a high degree of specialisation were requisite. Moreover, a mechanised Navy required a considerable proportion of skilled artisans. This new professional and specialised Naval personnel was drawn largely from the industrial proletariat. The engineer officers were at first on much the same standing as the tarpaulins of old. Class prejudice relegated them to a mess of their own, apart from the wardroom. Eventually, however, the engineers attained a similar status to the executive branch by a similar process to that which had synthesised the "gentleman" and the "mariner."

But long before this the Royal Navy had been conquered by the public-school system. Lads were no longer sent direct to sea as midshipmen, but to H.M.S. *Britannia* at Dartmouth, the water-borne predecessor of the present Royal Naval College. Steam and other innovations made life afloat more tolerable and less isolated, and thus more attractive to the sons of the rich. The high fees payable at Dartmouth made the quarterdeck more exclusive, and the type of training given in that establishment caused the supersession of the picturesque individualism of the eighteenth-century officer by a standard public-school type. These changes have brought about an increase of snobbery and probably widened the gulf between officers and ratings. It is perhaps not too much to say that officers of today have less understanding of their subordinates' needs and problems than had the better type of eighteenth-century officer. As for the chances of a lower-deck rating attaining high rank in the service, they have become infinitesimal.

The vast expansion necessitated by total war gave the Royal Navy

Volunteer Reserve a new importance. The regular officers were supplemented by the amateurs of the "wavy navy," who had been obliged to serve for a term on the lower deck, and such officers played a large part in the Second World War.

The Government has now announced "reforms" in the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth "to afford the opportunity of becoming a naval officer to boys of all classes." But only a thorough overhaul of the whole system can make the British Navy democratic.

THE TEACHING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

JOHN EAST

THE TEACHING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY at the universities has been sharply criticised by Marxists on the ground that—with certain exceptions, it is true—it ignores the Marxist approach, or mentions it only to "refute" it, and in the main is nothing more than a study of abstract "theories" about the most superficial aspects of economic life. But also in bourgeois circles there is increasing dissatisfaction with what is taught on this subject. The most recent manifestation was an article in *The Economist* (1.4.47) which pointed out that.

"First-year courses at the universities consist mainly of a treatment of the theory of value on 'classical' lines, following the Marshallian tradition, plus some analysis and description of the monetary system and the study of a period of recent economic history. . . . But technical institutions appear to have reacted against the aridity and other-worldliness of the conventional introductory economics course by introducing courses in 'commerce.' These concentrate mainly on the routine of commercial life and straightforward description of economic institutions. Neither approach to economic institutions is at all satisfactory. . . ."

A considerable correspondence in succeeding weeks agreed generally with this thesis, without throwing any fresh light on the subject.

The same problem is causing concern in America, as can be seen from articles in the *American Economic Review* of June and December, 1946. One writer, in revolt against the abstract and unreal nature of modern theory, advocates the use, in its place, of "broad historical-sociological pictures." Another, recognising both the necessity of theory and the limitations of modern economic theories, gets as far as advocating for an introductory course that "negatively, it must refrain from describing the present economy as what it is not—a self-regulating system."

The retreat from an unrealistic theorising began many years ago, and slashing attacks on academic economics have become increasingly common of recent years, as, for example, Barbara Wooton's *Lament for Economics*. Moreover, useful statistical and institutional studies have been produced with much greater frequency. Economists are realising more and more that, above all for students, their work must deal with a real world becoming increasingly complex and disordered.

The Economist articles drew attention to two recent books by eminent economists which attempt to resolve this dilemma, the separation between theory and practice in the teaching of economics: *The Social Framework*, by Professor Hicks, and *Income*, by Professor Pigou. Both start from the national income, its definition, size, and how it is arrived at. They deal with the factors of production in realistic terms. Thus labour is described by reference to the trend of population and the make-up of the working population; while capital is described and discussed by reference to its physical composition, magnitude, ownership, etc. Distribution is dealt with on national income lines, and problems of expenditure, both public and private, are discussed factually. In view of the claims made for this "new approach" it is worth examining, as typical, Professor Pigou's book, since it goes further than the other in its attempt to bring together theory and practice.

Income is in seven chapters, of which the first is a largely formal discussion of problems of definition and measurement of the national income along lines familiar to students of the Annual Budget White Papers. The following chapters deal with the factors affecting the size of the national output in real terms, both internal (technique, capital equipment, etc.) and external (foreign trade); the allocation of resources; the role of the Government in production; fluctuations in economic activity; and the distribution of private incomes.

Professor Pigou has an engaging style, and at first sight appears to have banished from the classroom the aridities of the "marginal utility" economists. In his chapter on the internal influences affecting the size of the national output, everything proceeds simply and smoothly, and looks like perfect common sense. The argument proceeds from the three factors of production, land, labour and capital, dealt with not as abstractions or algebraic symbols, but concretely as natural resources—human beings with differing skills, inborn or acquired, and mechanical equipment, buildings, etc. There is a discussion on the advantages of division of labour and specialisation, while the importance of science and the development of technique is suitably stressed. Yet nowhere in the chapter is there the slightest hint of the class division in capitalist society. In fact, the economic

system is as much an "eternal category" as in the world of Jevons or Marshall. The "propensity to truck, barter or exchange" is trotted out. Competition is treated as the norm, and monopoly as an aberration, dealt with in an aside. Capital is no more than machine tools and factories, and not the relationship between a small class owning those tools and factories and a large class owning nothing but their ability to work. It is true that the facts as to the ownership of capital are revealed later in the book, but the significance of these factors, if any, escapes the author. It follows, of course, that since the class division in society is not sufficiently important to be worth mentioning, the most vital factor in the explanation of the size and distribution of the national income is entirely absent.

So far, then, apart from the manner of expression, there is little advance on the traditional textbook. The next chapter, on the external influences affecting the size of the national income, is a little better, as the discussion is carried on with the aid of up-to-date factual and statistical material. But here again, although there is reference to the fact that while before the Second World War more than a quarter of Britain's imports were obtained free, as interest on overseas investments, these imports must now be paid for by additional exports, there is no explanation of how and why Britain could live partly on others and now cannot do so. There is no explanation, in fact, of the mechanics of monopoly capitalism and imperialism, and of the consequent distortion and degeneration of Britain's economic system. Still less is there any discussion of the real problem facing Britain in the sphere of foreign trade, how to free ourselves from dependence on the dollar, to import from and export to Eastern Europe, and to raise the standard of living and thus increase the purchasing power of the colonial territories. Once more, there is little advance on the pure "free-trade" theory of the traditional textbook, with its natural corollary, the multilateral system, which is the perfect background for American imperialism.

The next chapter, after setting out the facts about the allocation of the working population and economic resources among industries and occupations, poses the question:

"By what influences and in what manner is it brought about that the working population of a country is allocated among different occupations in the way in which at any time it is allocated; and how are the differences between the ways in which it is allocated at different times accounted for?" (p. 55.)

The answer runs in terms of our old friends the marginal theory of value and the law of supply and demand. Once again Professor Pigou avoids in an engaging manner the abstractions of the textbook.

There is none of Jevons' algebra, or Marshall's geometry, or the "indifference curves" still found necessary by Dr. Benham in his introductory textbook *Economics* in use in the first year at most universities. Summing up the influences on the supply side, Pigou writes.

"Men of similar inborn quality . . . tend so to allocate themselves among occupations that nobody would gain by shifting out of the occupation where he is into another one. This entails that net advantages—roughly the rates of pay—tend to be similar in different occupations for kinds of work that require equally expensive training; and where the work of one occupation needs more training than that of another, to be higher in the former in a degree more or less corresponding to the extra cost of training there." (p. 62.)

So that is the reason why David Jones from the Rhondda Valley becomes a miner rather than a city stockbroker! And why Jane Robinson works in a Burnley weaving shed and cannot ride in the Row each morning! Once more we are back in a classless society, and all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. But let us be fair to the Professor—he says: "These tendencies only work themselves out very imperfectly and sometimes very slowly." David and Jane may yet get there!

The analysis on the demand side is equally trite, equally blind to the realities of a class society. It is enough, perhaps, to quote from the passage on the determination of women's wages a real gem: "Apart from friction, traditional prejudice and so on, equal pay for equal work tends—we must emphasise, tends—to be established." (pp. 68-9). Evidently the Royal Commission was wasting its time.

The next chapter, on the role of Government in production, requires little comment. The treatment is along familiar lines and somewhat cursory. To do Professor Pigou justice, he has always been a benevolent advocate of certain types of State intervention, in the spheres of the public utilities, for example. But his basic assumptions are the same as those of most of the older members of his fraternity. Capitalism is capitalism, and by and large, you should leave it alone. Consequently Socialism is something outside his ken and the product of an oriental dictatorship. But what is really missing from this chapter is a realistic discussion on economic controls and economic planning. Public utility economics and the "trust-busting" approach to monopoly are not of great interest today and it is significant that the younger economists, even in the academic field, are pursuing more realistically the role of Government in economic life.

Professor Pigou next turns to the problem of industrial fluctuations. Nowadays no textbook is regarded as complete without a chapter on

this subject, and this, at least, may be counted as advance towards realism. But the treatment here is very superficial. There is no marked preference for any particular theory or explanation. We are told that there is something wrong with the monetary system; businessmen are given to exaggerated swings of optimism and pessimism; and the rate at which inventions appear or are exploited varies. It is true that in 1945, when the book was written, shortage of demand seemed remote, while professional economists notoriously suffer from short memories. Nevertheless, no explanation of economic fluctuations which ignores the basic capitalist contradiction between the drive to expand production and restricted consuming power (whatever the terminology used) can hope to be realistic.

Perhaps Professor Pigou's answer is to be found in the passage where he says: "At the present time people are much more interested in practical schemes for improving the employment situation than in the diagnosis of causes." (p. 94.) Such is no doubt the case. But the proper diagnosis must come before the cure. The cure which Professor Pigou finds most attractive lies in the stabilisation policy advocated in the Coalition Government's White Paper on Employment Policy. After a warning against placing exaggerated hopes in the Beveridge approach (which he identifies with expanded monetary outlay), he goes on:

"If, as experience shows to be likely, upward tendencies in the demand for labour call into play associated upward tendencies in money rates of wages, the benefit to employment might well turn out to be a good deal less than was expected. Wage earners might, in effect, choose better money wage rates instead of better employment. Up to a point they might enjoy something of both. But beyond a point it is impossible for them to get both except at the risk of bringing into play a spiral of monetary inflation so rapid as to threaten serious social evils." (p. 99.)

At the end of the vicious circle—the vicious spiral! So much for the new realism. After a display of vulgar eclecticism we end up with the old recipe, that wages must not be raised.

The last chapter, on the distribution of private incomes, for all its comparative wealth of statistical illustration, follows the familiar lines of the "marginal productivity" theory, which says very little more than that if a factor of production were paid less than its worth in any given occupation, it would either move elsewhere or get more (and vice versa); the implication being that the distribution of incomes is generally just. Professor Pigou takes note of modern trends towards greater equality, and has two significant observations to make. The first, in discussing these trends, is: "This reaction against the older views is, no doubt, justified. It may, how-

ever, be carried too far." (p. 116.) The second is "that consumption in terms of actual stuff is distributed less unevenly than money expenditure on consumption." (p. 117.)

Income, therefore, emerges from scrutiny as nothing new, but the old story in new garb. But it would be wrong to impute to Professor Pigou any sinister motives. On the contrary, he is a liberal-minded economist who in the practical field has performed much valuable service. The plain truth is that he is rooted in the standard bourgeois theoretical approach and that along this path there is no solution. It is something to recognise the divergence between theory and practice, but much more is necessary.

This dilemma does not exist for Marxism. The practical problems of the real world are necessarily always its subject matter. It uses a theory which, because it is drawn from the basic realities, is both profound and true, to solve those problems. Nowhere more than in the field of practical economy does it illustrate the truth of its own dictum, the unity of theory and practice.

Of recent years, the influence of Marxism on some non-Marxist political economists has had its effect in the field of statistical studies relating to the standard of living, the distribution of income, industry and economic planning. Moreover the trend of a school of modern economists, that associated with the name of the late Lord Keynes, has been in the direction of conclusions in certain fields not dissimilar from those of Marx.

Marxists must take note of these trends. Moreover, they can claim no monopoly of truth. They cannot claim to have said the last word on any aspect of political economy and there is infinite scope for further application and development of Marxist theory. But it is with the aid of the approach of Marxist political economy that the economic systems in the world today are to be explained, changed, or developed. It follows, therefore, that there must be real development in both the quantity and quality of the teaching of Marxist political economy.

The dilemma of bourgeois economics, the growing recognition of its divorce of theory from practice, and the knowledge that Marxism alone can resolve the dilemma, represents a challenge to Marxist political economists. Never has there been so great a need for them, and never has there been such an opportunity. Now is the time for greater attendance at the schools, for more study groups and classes, for more and better syllabuses and teaching material. Above all, there is need for more study of the works of Marx and the great Marxists themselves.

COMMUNIST REVIEW

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POLITICAL ASPECTS OF PLANNING

J. PAUL

THE INADEQUACY of the Government's economic plans is causing widespread alarm in the Labour movement. It is felt that the lack of efficient planning jeopardises the whole programme for which the Labour Government was elected, and, moreover, threatens the country with a general economic crisis, the gravity of which was forecast by this year's coal crisis.

Many constructive criticisms and proposals for planning have already come from the Labour movement. The question of planning is, however, not only a technical question, nor even first and foremost a technical question. For the apparent technical difficulties and obstacles are chiefly the expression of political problems. An obvious instance of this is the problem of manpower: the shortage of labour for the essential industries is not primarily caused by technical shortcomings of planning, but by political factors such as the foreign policy of the Government which prevents rapid demobilisation.

The present crisis and the plans to overcome it have many other political aspects.

First of all, the present crisis is by no means simply an expression of *technical* difficulties which present themselves in the field of production, of foreign trade, etc. Statistics tell us that already national production has substantially reached the pre-war level and that exports now exceed the pre-war level. Profit, rent and interest (after deduction of taxes) have gone up from less than £1,700 millions in 1938 to over £2,400 millions in 1946. From the technical point of view there is no reason for alarm over our capitalist economy. But for the great majority of the British people the question is not one of simply restoring "normal" production and profits. The problem is not to "recover" the state of affairs which moribund capitalism had reached before the Second World War—a state of affairs characterised by anarchy of production, low wages and unemployment, where 37 per cent of the whole national income went into the pockets of a minority in the form of profit, rent and interest. In such a state of affairs, crises themselves are a normal, inevitable and accepted feature.

The question of planning to overcome the present crisis, therefore, cannot be solved apart from the political question, which is this: is the aim simply to "recover" pre-war economy, an economy directed and controlled by the profit motive of the capitalist class, or is the objective an economy planned for, and put at the service of, the people?

In Britain today a decisive struggle is taking place between those who want to return to the old profit motive and those who want to advance to a new, people's economy. The capitalist class, and especially its leading section, monopoly capitalists, have shown themselves unable to solve any of the great problems, economic, political or cultural with which the people are confronted. Having lost their prestige and much of the political and economic power, they are fighting bitterly to thwart constructive planning and restore the rule of free enterprise, where the incentive of production, and the aim of production, is their own profit. To this end they do not hesitate to sell Britain out to American reaction.

The working class, on the other hand, together with a large section of the people, have pronounced themselves overwhelmingly against the return to the pre-war economy. They have elected a Labour Government with a clear mandate to take decisive steps towards a new Socialist economy, towards an economy which will be planned for the present and the future benefit of the people. But although some steps in that direction have been achieved, for instance, the nationalisation of the coal mines, no decisive blows have yet been struck at the bitterest enemies of that new economy, who are still in virtual control of the overwhelming part of our economic system.

Such is the situation: but it is a situation which cannot last. In the words of the last Party Congress resolution:

"The basic choice opens out more and more clearly before the British people. Either to go forward along the path of radical, social and economic reorganisation, breaking the power of monopoly and building up planned economy . . . or to sink to dependence on American monopolist reaction, surrender to the monopolies at home, succumb to economic crisis and depression. . . "

This alternative must be constantly borne in mind when considering the question of planning. It is not a question of just planning; the question is: Planning for which alternative? For planning *can* be a means of "recovering" the old capitalist economy by attempting to reconcile those contradictions within capitalism which hold up its development. Planning *can* help the monopoly capitalists to concentrate more production, wealth and power in their hands and to eliminate the competition of the small producers. Planning *can* help the capitalists by securing for them credits, manpower, raw materials, etc., or by guaranteeing them a minimum of profits. This is the kind of planning the Tories are fighting for under the cover of elaborate technical and economic arguments and theories. If, through their

pressure on the Government, they cause it to adopt this kind of planning, then not only will the crisis not be solved, but all hope for a better future for the people will be destroyed.

On the other hand, planning can be carried out with the aim not of restoring the old, but of *creating* a new economy, an economy adapted to the present transition stage of advance towards Socialism, and laying the foundations for further advances by the people. But this kind of planning cannot be achieved without a political struggle against the reactionary forces, without fighting to take out of their hands the political influence and the economic control which enables them to obstruct the new economic plans and to prevent their realisation.

Take, for instance, exports. To plan for a greater volume of exports is not in itself planning for a new economy, nor, indeed, planning for the solution of the crisis. Everything depends on what is exported and what use is made of the exports.

Increased exports can have very different aims and effects. There is, for instance, the aim of the capitalists, and, above all, of the trusts and finance capital to build up again their overseas investments. The annual income (mainly of finance capital) from overseas investments shrank from £175 million in 1938 to £60 million in 1946. Finance capital is eager to recover these sources of parasitic income which constitute an essential factor in the profits and political power of the trusts, but which are no benefit to the people. Thus increased exports can be used for building up the profits and power of monopoly capital, instead of building up an economy for the people.

Exports can also be used to pay for imports. But, again, all depends on *what* is exported and what imported in exchange. If, for example, machinery much needed for our own industry is exported to pay for the import of films, tobacco or nylon stockings, it is clear that this does not help us to get the new economy which the people need. Here again, if the decision is left to the initiative of the capitalists, we shall get those exports and imports which yield the highest profit, not those which are the most essential for our economy.

Similarly it is not sufficient to demand an increase of production output (as the Government does) without being clear on the question of what must be produced first, and how this production will be controlled and made use of. We know, for instance, that there is a great reluctance on the part of the big engineering industries to produce mining machinery. This reluctance may have economic reasons: that the production of mining machinery is less profitable (at least for the immediate future) than the production of machinery for exports. But it has also political reasons: that the coal industry has

been nationalised and the enemies of nationalisation have no reason to help this nationalised industry to be too successful. If, therefore, we leave it to the capitalists to decide what is to be produced we shall not get the mining machinery and many other things which our country needs so desperately. We shall, above all, never get the vast capital re-equipment of industry essential for any serious production plan, as long as planning remains subservient to the profit interests of the capitalists and finance capital. No "sensible" capitalist will invest capital in British industry at a moment when he feels that a crisis is certain to come very soon; when he has to face the possibility of nationalisation; and when he has more profitable prospects of investing overseas.

To get the export policy and the production policy corresponding to the needs of the present situation, it is not sufficient to have general plans or technical discussions of plans. We must achieve a greater *control* over the plans and their execution *by the people*, and, above all, by the working class and its organisations. This greater popular control will only be secured in the face of bitter opposition from the capitalists, and, above all, from the monopoly and finance capitalists who are the enemies of real planning and of a new economy. They will not give up their control any more willingly than their profits. The outcome—and it is a vital outcome for the country's and the people's future—will depend upon political struggle.

The great positive factor for the working class in this struggle is the Labour Government. Without it the decisive initial steps towards the new economy cannot be carried out in the present political situation. The successful carrying out of nationalisation of the basic industries, correct allocation on a national level of credits, exports, raw material, and manpower, etc., depend on the existence of the Labour Government. The people, and especially the working class, fully realise this simple truth. They showed this, for instance, during this year's coal crisis when they solidly supported the Government and rejected with the greatest firmness and indignation all Tory manoeuvres for a coalition government.

The existence of the Labour Government alone, however, is no guarantee for the successful advance towards the new, planned economy. The Labour Government is nothing more than the concrete political expression of the present situation. It is not a government brought about by a decisive victory of the working class over vested interests. It simply represents the willingness of the working class to achieve this victory. The victory itself has yet to be won.

Experience has already clearly shown that the same is true of the Government's actions: they are determined by the relative strength

of the political forces in the country. The five-day week of the miners was won by the political determination and struggle of the miners: it was not the result of Government initiative.

This is only one of many instances which show that the policy of the Government is a reflection of the political forces acting on the Government from outside. The increasing pressure which has been brought upon the Government by trade unions, the Co-operatives, and other working-class organisations, as well as by different groups of M.P.s, has already achieved important results and the growing militancy of the people will no doubt continue to express itself in this way. The importance of this growing movement can hardly be overrated.

It is, however, not enough to press the Government and to force it to adjust its planning policy to the needs of the people. The best plans of the Government will be of little value if they are not put into effect with the co-operation of the working people. The measures taken by the Government during the coal crisis would have remained paper resolutions without the hard work and sacrifices of the miners and without the co-operation of the population in the fuel-saving campaign.

For the Labour movement there are two essential courses of action to carry forward the struggle for planning. One is to act through its organisations, M.P.s, etc., to support the Government in all its steps towards real planning for the people, to press it forward in that direction, and to fight for a greater participation of working-class representatives in the planning machinery. The other is to act on the spot, in the factories, pits, and fields for the material support of every progressive policy of the Government, for the execution of the plans in a way which will save the country from the crisis and lay the foundations for a better economy. In both the workers have a predominant role to play.

The activity in the factories will gain in importance with the development of the struggle. The Tories are in a minority in Parliament, but they are still in a majority as directors, managers and engineers in production. What they lose to the Government in Parliament they will try to make up for in the factories. Already the most reactionary Tories threaten to sabotage the Government's production plans. These threats are a warning of the fierceness of the coming struggle for planning. It will be a political struggle, and it will be decided in the factories, in the pits, and in the fields.

It is in this light that the main tasks of the working-class movement must be seen. The struggle for Factory Committees, for Joint Production Committees, is a vital step towards gaining more control

over production, without which no plan can ultimately be carried out and without which the direct sabotage of reactionary employers cannot be exposed. Hundred per cent trade unionism, T.U. recognition, Shop Stewards, better negotiating machinery, better working conditions and wages are vital steps towards drawing the workers, especially those in the essential industries, into this struggle for the greater production involved in the new economy.

Finally, a vital factor in successful planning is the political education of the workers. Only if we can convince the masses of the importance of the struggle, not only for their own present and future, but, indeed, for the present and future of the nation, only if we can convince them of their responsibility in that struggle, only if we can make them understand the respective roles of the Government, of the Tories, and of themselves in that struggle, can we be sure that they will solve the present problems and prepare for the future they have chosen with such determination during the Second World War and in the elections.

BRITAIN'S ROAD

THE ARTICLE IN THE APRIL *Communist Review* by Kitty Cornforth takes up a subject of vital importance. But I believe it is necessary to go more closely into the question of how the change is to be brought about.

I work in H.M. Dockyard. This State business hits me in the neck every hour of the day. There is not a single iota of change in the official attitude of the higher ups as compared with before the war. To me we are all just a section of the half-million that the debates in Parliament have been about. The whole conception of an Admiralty Yard must be altered. As I see it, it should and must (as the oldest nationalised industry) become the shock troops or commando force of the Government's industrial economy programme. As far as is practical (machinery, shops, etc.) it should be the basis for baling the Government out where it is short of a particular set of machinery, such as coal-mining equipment or agricultural machinery. Later on, electrical generating machinery; as the coal situation improves, coal-carrying ships; railway stock and machinery. This is the horizon in front of us.

But before this can be gone into, the State is the stumbling block. The brasses at Mount Wise, Bath and Whitehall fear and oppose all forms of production beyond that just necessary to keep the present complement of the yards and keep within naval estimates. The idea

is to keep the men inside off the dole and, incidentally, to ensure no disrating among the high-ups. But not to make the yard a maximum-producing yard. Ah no!—that would be taking some industry out of the hands of private firms. Consequently inside the walls the battle for production is not a reality. It is something going on in Russia or Timbuctoo, but not in Plymouth.

It would be useful to go into the question of how this state of things can be changed.

JACK SYMONS

Jack Symons is right in saying that the State arsenals and dockyards should and must become the commando force of the Government's industrial programme. In these works (1) there is the best basis for Joint Production Committees and general co-operation between workers and management, because the private-profit interest is excluded; (2) there is the best basis for quick switchovers to the most urgently-needed requirements, as there is no need to "nurse" existing markets in order not to lose them for the future; (3) there is the best basis for controlling raw materials supplied, and also the use of the product when completed, so that it does not lose itself in some form of black market. These are only a few of the special advantages of the arsenals and dockyards for the purpose of helping forward a national production plan.

But how can this be brought about? The chief obstacles to be overcome are (1) the fear, on the part of the Government, and the political unwillingness, on the part of many officials, of using the arsenals and dockyards in competition with privately-owned concerns; (2) the continued absence of a national plan which could guide the allocation of orders to arsenals and dockyards; (3) the inertia of both workers and managements, who are content to jog along in the old ruts and wait for new instructions from the higher-ups—who don't send these new instructions for reasons (1) and (2).

If this is true, then the way to overcome the obstacles is, for the workers to drop inertia and show initiative. First, to campaign for the maximum allocation of Government work to its own yards. Secondly, shop stewards—including office staff representatives—should consider what the plant available could produce that is more needed than what is now being produced. Through the Joint Production Committee, and through other trade union channels, they should press managements, brass hats, and the Government to give them this job. The campaign should be carried out with all forms of publicity, at meetings, in the Press, deputations to M.P.s and others, in such a way as to mobilise public opinion behind the demand. This is the

principal way of overcoming obstacles and "shaking up" these bits of the old State machine. Rosyth Dockyard, for example, has already had partial success in such a campaign.

Of course, the working-class movement outside the arsenals and dockyards also has a job to do. The general political drive for a production plan, and for a firmer class policy from the Government, will play an important part in bringing about a change. But the main drive on the proper use of the arsenals and dockyards must come from the workers directly concerned.

Where is this initiative to come from? Obviously, from the Communist Party members. They should be the first to see what needs to be done and to put forward proposals, and help to win support for them. In doing this they will know that they are not merely helping to solve a particular problem of production, but also making inroads into the existing capitalist influence in the State machine.

JOINT PRODUCTION COMMITTEES IN FRANCE

DEREK KARTUN

THE JOINT PRODUCTION COMMITTEES in Britain sprang directly from the initiative of the organised workers themselves. The idea was first put forward at a national conference convened by the Engineering and Allied Trades Shop Stewards National Council. This historic meeting took place on October 19, 1941, in London, and the driving force behind the decision to press for a share in the management of industry was the desire to increase production in order to win the Second World War. Shortly afterwards the Ministry of Supply concluded the first agreements with the unions for the formation of J.P.C.s in the Royal Ordnance Factories. Within a short while most of the major concerns had J.P.C.s, which were functioning with varying degrees of success.

Since the end of the Second World War these Committees have fallen into a fairly general state of disrepair. Many have ceased to exist; some operate only spasmodically; others try to work under very hostile conditions. The time has come to examine the role of the J.P.C.s in the period of reconstruction in Britain, to determine how they can serve the movement, to decide—if they have such a role—how best they can be revitalised. A useful contribution to this study is afforded by a glance at the history and present development of the Joint Production Committees in France. It is the purpose of this

article to look at their progress and to indicate the role they are considered to have in the development of French democracy by the French Trade Union movement.

As in Britain, the French J.P.C.s struck root deep down in the popular movement. On March 15, 1944, while France was still occupied by the Germans, the National Council of Resistance—representing overwhelmingly the working class who had fought the Nazis—elaborated a programme aimed at developing democracy in France after liberation. A point in this programme was:

“The right of access for all workers possessing the necessary qualifications to all matters relating to management and administration within each factory, and the participation of the workers in the management of the firm's economy”

On May 22 of the same year Fernand Grenier, Communist Air Minister in the Provisional Government in Algiers, ordered the formation of “mixed production committees” in all Air Ministry establishments outside France.

These were the first formal beginnings of the J.P.C.s in France, but the real impetus for their organisation on a wide scale could not come until the liberation of the country. When it did come it was the workers themselves who took the matter in hand without waiting for further action from the government. In factory after factory throughout France, committees were set up whose aim it was to get the plants into operation again after the disorganisation of the liberation. Meanwhile, on December 23, 1944, the C.G.T. (the French T.U.C.) had called for widespread organisation of J.P.C.s in industry.

An outstanding example of how the workers got moving is afforded by the Berliet commercial vehicle works. The owners had fled, and after liberation the 7,746 workers found themselves with no management, a heavily-bombed plant, and equipment which was thoroughly out of date. A Committee was formed, production restarted, orders negotiated, and lorries began to roll off the lines. Berliet vehicles are now being produced 20 per cent cheaper than their most efficient competitors. The example of Berliet and others was taken up with enthusiasm, and very soon there were between 40,000 and 50,000 J.P.C.s in France.

Acknowledging a *fait accompli* the Consultative Assembly and the Provisional Government of General de Gaulle proceeded to give the existing Committees a legal basis. But in spite of lively opposition from the Communists in the government, a law was adopted which curtailed the Committees' powers in line with insistent demands from

the employers' organisations. This took place in February, 1945, and in spite of constant protests by the C.G.T. and the Communists it was not until May 16, 1946, that a law was finally introduced which laid down a clear basis for the work of the J.P.C.s and fully acknowledged their scope and social significance. The main responsibility for the law belongs to Ambroise Croizat, Communist Minister of Labour. It was one of the very first results of the resignation of General de Gaulle from the leadership of the government.

The new law laid down that the J.P.C.s should be "compulsorily consulted on matters concerning the organisation, management, and general conduct of the enterprise." It allowed for the establishment of special sub-committees to examine particular problems and permitted the co-option of experts and technicians who were not full members of the main committee. Each J.P.C. was to establish an output committee and a committee on productivity (this reflected the need for energetic measures to deal with France's backward technical equipment and methods). The law made inroads upon the privileges—so far considered sacred—of managerial function. The most jealously-guarded sphere of all—that of costing and sale price—was thrown open to investigation by the J.P.C.s. On this issue the manufacturers fought, and continue to fight, with the greatest of vigour, for they have understood that here the workers have got their foot into a door which leads directly to the very citadel of the capitalist system—the fixing of prices and rates of profit.

A vitally important aspect of this part of the J.P.C.'s work is the control of prices. It was recognised by the French workers that the enforcement of price controls by bureaucratic methods had no chance of succeeding in the special conditions which have arisen in France since the liberation. It is only at the point of production and sale, in the factory itself, that any effective control of costs and prices can be maintained. Quite apart from infringements of price controls, manufacturers in France have deliberately increased such items as personal expenses and payments to subsidiary companies in order to get round the regulations. Only the J.P.C.s can deal effectively with these manœuvres, and though the difficulties put in their way have usually been too great for them, in many cases they have been able to intervene effectively. As it is, the law makes provision for this type of control, and with the constant development of French democracy it will become increasingly possible and increasingly necessary for these functions of the J.P.C.s to be thoroughly fulfilled.

Further, it is recognised that the ruling class in France has every interest in preventing an increase in production in French industry. It is in conditions of instability and dissatisfaction arising out of

shortages and high prices that General de Gaulle has the best chance of coming to power and destroying the unions and the Communist Party. It is also true that French monopoly capital, like monopoly everywhere, is frequently anxious to suppress new technological discoveries. Here, in the interests of the nation as a whole, the J.P.C.s have an important role to play through their productivity sub-committees. They also have the job of watching for illegal stocks of goods which might be diverted to the black market and thus have the effect of forcing prices up.

The Communist Party recognised the importance of the J.P.C.s in the key political question of the day—the control of inflation. On February 13 the Political Bureau stated:

" We consider that in the development of the campaign for lowering prices the J.P.C. can be and should be of decisive importance in supporting the efforts of the Government. . . . We call upon those members of the Party who are members of J.P.C.s to make every effort inside the Committees in this direction "

It is, in fact, only the French Communist Party and the C.G.T. who have shown any understanding of the role of the committees and have kept up the pressure for their universal application; though it must be said that the employers have also understood very clearly the menace afforded by the J.P.C.s to their privileges. Constant efforts have been made to get the 1946 law withdrawn, and meanwhile every conceivable obstacle is put in the way of its successful operation.

There is one further direction in which the work of the committees has quite outstanding political importance. Croizat's law provides that they shall be supplied with all information which normally goes to shareholders. They are also entitled to examine balance sheets, auditors' reports and profit and loss accounts. Their task in the financial field is to keep watch on the distribution of profits. Now in France there are some five million small shareholders—mainly peasants and members of the lower middle class. Time after time in the chaotic history of French capitalism large numbers of these small savers have been fleeced of their savings in bankruptcies, swindles, and crashes of every kind. Now, however, the J.P.C.s are able to have some say in the financial affairs of their companies. They will, in fact, be defending the interests of the small savers—the people who are constantly told by reaction that their interests do not coincide at any point with those of the workers. The great political importance of this unity between industrial workers and other social groups can readily be seen. This aspect of the law has led the President of the Employers Federa-

tion to demand repeatedly that new legislation be introduced which would withdraw these powers.

From the point of view of the French workers, the J.P.C.s make a valuable contribution to the task of limiting the power of the great monopolies. They represent a very real and important step along the road to Socialism. This, of course, has been understood equally well by reaction, and accounts in the last analysis for the implacable hostility of the ruling class to the committees.

The attitude of the Communist Party and the C.G.T. is best summed up in a statement of Benoit Franchon, C.G.T. General Secretary:

"I believe that the members of the Joint Production Committees should not forget that we are living in a capitalist society within which there exist divergent interests. They are the representatives in the Committees of the working class and the nation. If they lose sight of this fact they are bound to make mistakes. Naturally, there are some who would like to revive the Vichy corporate state. They are people who are always waxing indignant about collaboration. They even talk happily about revolution. Yet if one touches the least of their class privileges, if one mentions nationalisation, they roar like wounded lions.

"The true character of the J.P.C.s was best defined by the Employers' Association when they protested vigorously because the Committees' powers were being slightly increased. The employers showed in this way that they did not look upon the J.P.C.s as organs of class collaboration, but as an unavoidable accident in a particular political situation, the consequences of which they were trying to reduce, while maintaining the hope of getting rid of them for good. And it is true. The J.P.C.s are a conquest of the working class which does not abolish the privileges of the capitalists but which can limit their effects."

TEXTILE MACHINERY IN AN ECONOMIC PLAN

E. FROW

AN IMPORTANT ASPECT of a Labour Government's national economic plan must be priority for supplies of new machinery to modernise Britain's basic industries. The textile industry, in common with other sections of British economic life, is in a state of protracted crisis. From being the producer of the chief British export, it has travelled the path of decline until today only 60 per cent of home demand is being met. In 1912, 622,000 workers were employed in the cotton

industry, and 8,050 million square yards of cloth produced. In 1946 the figures were 212,000 workers and less than 2,000 million square yards of cloth produced.

For years during the depression a policy of the destruction of surplus plant was pursued. Between 1924 and 1935, 260,000 looms were destroyed, about 350,000 being in actual use in 1935, compared with 800,000 in 1914. In the spinning section, where one ring spindle is reckoned as the equivalent of $1\frac{1}{2}$ mule spindles, the number of "mule equivalent" was 63 million in 1914. As a result of deliberate destruction, twentieth-century Luddites brought the total down to 41 million in 1938.

Today the shortage of labour is the most acute problem. The incredible backwardness of the cotton industry tends to repel and not attract more workers. The "status quo" attitude of large sections of the employers does nothing to help to solve the problem. This backward technique has to be seen to be believed. Some machines still in use in the industry are 80 years old, and the majority of machines are 30 or 40 years old. Most mills are old-established small units, and the employers maintain their traditional conservative outlook.

In the spinning section of the industry about three-quarters of the total spindles are mule spindles, yet the ring frame occupies a smaller floor space, requires less motive power, and produces one half more yarn than a similar number of mule spindles. Mills using mule spindles work on the low-draft system. In countries where ring spinning predominates, high-draft spinning has been adopted on a wide scale, eliminating intermediate processes, and thus increasing productivity.

In the weaving section less than 5 per cent of the looms are automatic, yet automatic looms make possible an increase in the number of looms per weaver without speed-up or sweating, and output per weaver can be trebled.

Finally, high-speed winding and beaming is confined to less than 1 per cent of the total spindles. The Barber-Colman system, in use in the U.S.A., has been estimated as being four times as productive as the slow-speed machines still in use in Lancashire.

The main requirements are, therefore: (1) ring spinning and the high-draft system; (2) automatic looms; (3) high-speed winding and beaming.

The facts have been made quite clear by the Government in the Working Party Report and the Platt Mission Report, and have been stressed time and again by the cotton trade unions and the Lancashire and Cheshire District of the Communist Party. Yet more decisive steps need to be taken.

The textile machinery industry reproduces the characteristic features of the textile industry. It comprises 500 firms in Lancashire, of which only 80 employ more than 100 workers. Eight large firms, employing 17,000 workers, are in a combine—the Textile Machinery Makers Ltd., including Platt Bros., Howard & Bulloughs, Prince & Smith, Stells Ltd., Dobson & Barlows, and Tweedale & Smalley. This combine has virtually a monopoly in the production of spinning machinery, over 80 per cent of which was exported before the Second World War, and a large percentage of the remainder went to sections of the industry other than cotton spinning. The needs of the export market and the slump in 1930 to 1933 led to the formation of this combine. Concentration on export by the combine has not resulted in the necessary advance in efficiency in the firms concerned. It is true that steps are being taken for reorganisation, developing research, mechanisation of foundries, and the introduction of jigs and tools to increase efficiency, but the result at the moment is higher profits rather than the production of cheaper machinery to the cotton industry. The Cotton Working Party Report cites the fact that carding engines could be bought in 1933 for £100, but that today, with hardly any alteration in design, the price is £363.

Further, the number of small firms engaged on the manufacture, repair and modification of obsolete machinery mainly used in Lancashire has grown out of all proportion. Yet the capacity of the industry is totally inadequate to meet present requirements.

In the industry at present the foundry is a bottleneck, due to the acute shortage of labour; the shortage of other classes of skilled men and scientific and technical personnel is also very serious.

The Cotton Working Party Report lays down a re-equipment programme to replace 9,000,000 mule spindles by 3,000,000 ring spindles, and modernise 8,000,000 of the existing ring spindles, at a cost of £38,000,000. On the weaving side it proposes to replace 200,000 Lancashire looms with 120,000 automatic looms, at a cost of £29,000,000.

The P.E.P. Report gives a similar figure, and estimates that machinery to the value of £70,000,000 to £80,000,000 is needed immediately, but stresses the fact that the Board of Trade have earmarked 70 per cent of textile machinery production for export.

To the machinery required at home we must add the value and importance of textile machinery for export. A considerable demand comes from India, Argentine, Brazil, and numerous other countries. The chief exporting countries are the U.S.A., Switzerland and Great Britain. It seems certain that Japan will now receive every assistance from America to produce and export textile machinery. Following

the recent visit of the Indian trade delegation to this country, India has already effected a liaison with the combine—the Textile Machinery Makers Ltd.—for the purpose of developing her textile machine industry. Yet, if demands could be met, British machinery is preferred, as U.S.A. and Swiss machinery is more expensive.

The present policy of the Government is to offer inducements to cotton firms to combine in groupings large enough to produce by modern methods. They have begun on the spinning side of the industry, which is the main bottleneck, with a proposal for groups of not less than 500,000 spindles, and on this basis a State grant of 25 per cent for all new machinery will be given. In common with all other industries, there is also a 20 per cent relief in taxation for all new machinery installed.

Out of 280 businesses on the spinning side of the industry, only 23 have more than 200,000 spindles. Of these six combines would immediately qualify, without any action on their part, for the Government grant.

This policy of dangling a carrot before the donkey is not producing the best results, and much firmer and far more decisive measures by the Government are necessary in the framework of a National Economic Plan, which will indicate priorities in machine production for the six main industries, including textiles. The fact has to be faced that, without a tremendous expansion of the textile machinery industry, the full needs for new machinery cannot be met.

The automatic loom mainly produced and used in Lancashire is the Northrop. As a result of extensions in hand this company expect to produce 6,000 automatic looms by June, 1948. Two thousand of these are for export; 1,000 for fibres other than cotton and rayon, i.e., principally woollen. This leaves 3,000 automatic looms for Lancashire in the next year, a totally inadequate figure.

Contrast this production figure with the programme laid down in the Working Party Report to replace during the next few years 200,000 Lancashire looms with 120,000 automatic looms working double day shifts. Three thousand Northrop looms a year would result in 120,000 in 40 years. Yet innumerable wartime engineering factories in Lancashire are derelict. An exception is the case of the ex-Ford Plant at Barton, part of which is being reconverted for producing textile machinery. This factory was a Government shadow factory during the Second World War, producing Rolls Royce Merlin engines, and employing 17,000 workers at the peak period, including 9,000 women.

Despite the initial scepticism of Rolls Royce engineers the Ford

High-precision Engine, on mass-production lines, achieved staggering output figures. After the Second World War the shop stewards agitated for the factory to be converted to peace-time production, but the plant was closed down and most of the machinery sold.

Platt Bros. have now taken up part of this factory and are producing carding engines, to be followed shortly by draw frames. One thousand machine tools are in use, and 1,200 workers employed; this will reach 6,000 to 8,000 workers when full production is reached.

At Accrington, Courtaulds have taken over the Bristol Aero Factory for producing rayon spinning machinery, and 1,200 workers are employed. Here also the best use of this factory would have been for the full production of textile machinery.

In general, these developments are only tinkering with the problem. It is clear that the combines by themselves will not take decisive measures to increase production. Continuous research to bring designs up to date is needed while the planned production of modern machinery is going ahead. The lessons of American developments could have been applied 20 years ago. For example, the Northrop automatic loom was an innovation when first produced, but has since stood still; yet other countries have gone ahead with improved designs. Over 10 years ago Platt Bros., at their Hartford works, produced a Japanese-designed "Tayoda" modern automatic loom, which has never found its way into Lancashire mills. In Switzerland continuous experiments and developments have been conducted by Sulzer Bros. on what is described as a revolutionary automatic loom. It embodies such features as high-production per machine, reduced re-winding and equipment cost, and small space and power requirements.

The first requirement is for expanded production of existing types of machinery. The Northrop must be taken as the basis for automatic looms. Experience gained during the Second World War years must be utilised to the full, using both large and small firms. This means a strong, central control of the production of machinery, and decentralised production of parts, on the basis of the aircraft construction technique. This could only be done by Government intervention and direction.

One means would be for the Government to order machines in bulk, and at a set price. This machinery should then be directed to the most efficient cotton firms. Where the most efficient firms are small firms, the machinery could be let out on loan instead of being sold outright. Numerous well-equipped, modern engineering factories in Lancashire, such as Vickers Armstrongs, Manchester; Napiers, Liverpool; the Beech Hill Royal Ordnance Factory, Wigan,

could be opened up and geared into this programme. The skilled labour is there in abundance.

During the Second World War, under the compelling needs of the national emergency, production of guns, aero engines and all the paraphernalia of war was rapidly got under way on mass-production lines. We need to meet the present crisis in the same spirit. This time, the standard of living, the very future of the British working class is at stake. The trade unions must demand and fight to realise the opening of a number of factories in Lancashire, that at the moment are derelict, to produce textile machinery. Such factories, under Government control, working on up-to-date designed machines and on mass-production lines, with real Joint Production Committees, could show what can be done rapidly to re-equip the Lancashire cotton industry, and let this great industrial county play its full part in winning Britain's economic salvation.

EXTENSION OF CO-OPERATIVE TRADE IN THE SOVIET UNION

V. BERNARD

ON NOVEMBER 9, 1946, the Soviet Council of Ministers issued a decree "on the extension of Co-operative trade in towns and villages in food and industrial goods, and on raising the production by Co-operative enterprises of food and goods in general demand." This decree marks a new stage in the development of Soviet trade. The reasons for it and the aims which it was hoped to achieve through the new decree were dealt with in a lecture by N. Sidorov which was printed in *Planned Economy* and on which this article is based.

In the period before November of last year, it had become increasingly clear that a very great development of trading turnover and of trading points was necessary, both from the standpoint of collecting agricultural products for sale in the towns and with a view to bringing about a reduction of the prices now ruling in the free markets. In the development of Co-operation in the previous years, the Consumers' Co-operatives had in the main stopped buying activities in the countryside and seen their role only as distributors of goods obtained from Government industry. On the other hand, Industrial Co-operation hardly used the Consumers' Co-operatives as the outlet for their products and, therefore, lost touch with the consumers. There was a very poor development of trade between the town and the village. The surpluses left in the hands of the collective farms and individual peasants, after the fulfilment of their obligations

to the Government and the setting aside of seed, were, as a rule, not bought and sold through Co-operative channels, but rather on the free market. Another aspect of the situation was that the Co-operative Movement did not function as a means of collecting local raw material and the products of local industry. There was, in general, no competition between State trade in the towns and the Co-operatives, and to that extent the whole purchase and sale of goods was slowed down.

The aims, therefore, of the new decree are as follows. In the first place, the extension of Co-operative trade in the towns is expected to lead to the drawing in of new resources from the countryside, as well as an increase in the production of articles in general demand. The Consumers' Co-operatives are to open up more shops and stores in the towns, as well as in the villages, and to set up productive undertakings for the processing of agricultural products and the manufacture of clothes, shoes and similar goods.

The point of competition with State trading enterprises is stressed; it is hoped that this competition will lead to improved service for the consumers, guaranteeing improvement in the quality and variety of goods and the steady lowering of the costs of distribution. In connection with this step, insistence is laid on the need to develop active democratic control by the members of all trading organisations in such a way that the consumers will be able to judge the work of the shops and stores in providing them with efficient service.

Does this extension of Co-operative trade mean a reduction in State trade? On the contrary. According to the 1947 plans, the State trade turnover will increase 27 per cent compared with last year; while the retail trade turnover of Consumers' Co-operative Societies in 1947 will be 41 per cent more than last year. It is a question of the rapid development of the network of sales points in order to handle a rapidly increasing volume of production, and in this both the State trading network and the Co-operative network have their part to play.

In his report to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U. in January, 1934, Stalin pointed out that rapid economic progress required not only production but:

"fully developed trade between town and country, between the various districts and regions of the country, between the various branches of the national economy. The country must be covered with a vast network of wholesale distribution bases, shops and stores. There must be a ceaseless flow of goods through these bases, shops and stores from the producer to the consumer. The State trading system, the co-operative trading system, the local industries, the collective farms, and the individual peasants must be drawn into this work. This is what we

call fully developed *Soviet trade*, trade *without* capitalists, trade *without* profiteers." (*Problems of Leninism*, p. 511)

At the moment, the principal step forward has to be taken by the Co-operative Movement. The decree authorises the Co-operatives to buy the surplus products of the collective farms and individual peasants at prices formed on the market, but the selling prices are not to be higher than those fixed for the State commercial trade. The retail prices of goods in wide demand produced in the enterprises, either of Consumers' Co-operative Societies or of Industrial Co-operatives, are to be fixed by the Co-operative Unions within each province or district, but again are not to be higher than the corresponding State commercial prices.

A special point is made that the prices laid down for the Co-operative turnover are different in certain respects from ordinary market prices, inasmuch as their upper limit is set by the State commercial prices for similar goods, and thus they come under the final control of the Soviet Government. In this way, the Co-operative prices will constantly have a downward tendency under the influence of the State commercial prices; and on the other hand, the Co-operative prices will in turn have a constant influence on prices in the free market, so that there will be a general lowering of prices. (Press reports indicate that prices have already fallen considerably.)

When the decree was issued, it was explained that the buying by Co-operative organisations of the surplus in the hands of the collective farms and individual peasants would, in fact, be on a large-scale basis and that, therefore, the collective farms and individual peasants would be more inclined to deal with the Co-operatives than to attempt to sell their products piecemeal on the free market. It was also felt that Co-operative enquiries and offers would lead both to the discovery of products which, in fact, were not coming on to the market, and to the collective farms and individual peasants definitely planning to meet the Co-operative needs instead of producing without any clear idea of where their surplus would be sold. It should be mentioned also that one of the difficulties of the free-market position in recent years has been that prices are much higher in the country round big industrial centres than they are at more distant points. Through the Co-operative organisation of buying and selling, it is expected that the difference in prices will be rapidly narrowed and that very soon a single price will be established for surplus products all over the country.

Out of the total collected from the collective farms and peasants, and also from the goods produced by the Co-operative enterprises, one-fifth will be sold to the Ministry of Trade for use through the

State trading organisations; the price paid for these will be the price of purchase, plus the cost of processing or manufacture, with an additional percentage to cover overhead expenses. The remaining 80 per cent will be sold through Co-operative organisations, as described above. A large number of new selling points—stores and shops—will be established both in the towns and in the villages. It is expected that the number of these new establishments in the towns set up during the course of 1947 will exceed 12,000. One of the difficulties for Co-operative stores in the Soviet Union in the past has been the short supply of goods and the absence of stocks, with the result that customers are often unable to satisfy their needs in the Co-operative shops. The point is made that through the purchase by the District Co-operative Unions for the supply of shops, it should be possible to establish sufficient stocks to maintain constant supplies for sale to the consumers, with a steadily increasing variety.

At the same time, the opening of shops in the towns must be accompanied by the extension of the network of shops in the villages. This is particularly important, because it is not only a question of bringing the agricultural products to the towns, but also of taking industrial products to the villages, so that the whole turnover of goods is enlarged and better conditions of production reflect themselves at once in more goods being available all over the country.

The village Co-operative shops are described as the very basis of the Co-operative network, in direct contact with the customer. Their job must be not only to sell goods, but also to buy from the peasants and the collective farms. In the long run the turnover of the whole Co-operative trading network depends on the activity and initiative of the village Consumers' Societies.

An especially interesting point is the call to the Co-operatives to build up their own resources for the development which is now being encouraged. This means that they must everywhere extend the number of shareholders and the resources obtained both from shares and the trade itself. In order to do this, they must do everything possible to reduce the costs of distribution, which is also a necessary part of the general movement for the reduction of prices. The Government will give them especially favourable conditions by modifications in taxes, including the tax on turnover. The Co-operatives will also receive special advantages in transport, which is of exceptional importance for the trade between the towns and villages. In connection with transport, a large number of lorries will also be placed at the direct disposal of the Co-operatives.

The weeks following the publication of the decree saw already the opening up of large numbers of shops by the Consumers' Co-operatives,

and numbers of new Co-operative factories are also being built for the production of goods in general demand. One of the interesting items in the list of new establishments to be opened is restaurants and cafes. It appears that some of the Co-operative stores which will be opened in the towns will be run by Co-operative Unions—for example, 19 stores are to be opened in Moscow in 1947 by Centrosoyus (the Central Union of Co-operatives), and others by the wholesale Co-operative Unions of the Ukraine, Georgia, and other Republics. But in addition to these, the Moscow Union of Consumers' Societies will be responsible for opening 200 new shops on its own resources.

The whole development of Co-operative trade in the present period is extremely interesting as showing the fluidity of organisation in the Soviet Union. The huge increase of production which has already begun and which will be even greater in the coming years requires an enormous extension of the distributive network, including both the collection of products and their sale to the people. The problem is not solved in any bureaucratic fashion, but by drawing in the Co-operative channels alongside those already established by the State, and thus increasing the whole volume of turnover and making a rising standard of living immediately follow the extension of production. Owing to the development of the free market during the Second World War period of shortage, with very high prices and difficulties in obtaining supplies, what is necessary at the moment is an alternative channel to this rather than any attempt to stamp it out by direct measures, which would not only be extremely difficult, but would not help towards the growth of a real Socialist outlook. Through the Co-operatives, the sale of what are at present individual or collective group surpluses can be brought within the Socialist framework, and this method, if it functions well, can rapidly displace the kind of free trade in which prices are arbitrary and high and which does not meet the needs of the people.

THE MECHANICS OF MONOPOLY

D. H.

OVERSIMPLIFIED MECHANICAL NOTIONS about monopoly have become all too common. It is far too widely accepted that a monopolistic industry is one where a single firm or group of firms has control over the total supply, which is restricted so that the price may be raised. This general notion tends to be encouraged by bourgeois economists, who contrast the "ideal" of free competition with the "evil" of monopoly as a single organisation restricting output to raise price. The con-

clusion, whether explicitly drawn, or left implicit, is that steps should be taken to return as rapidly as possible to the "ideal" of free competition.

While no one denies the role of monopoly as a means to restriction and price raising, there is much more to it than this, and the best antidote to oversimplification is to study the manysidedness of monopoly from practical examples. In this article, a particularly notorious British monopoly, the cement industry, is examined with the aid of data set out in *Cement Costs*. (Report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Works. H.M.S.O.)

Not all the Report is relevant to the present examination, but it is worth while pausing to examine the general nature. There were three members of the Committee: a city lawyer, a city accountant, and a merchant banker, with no representative even remotely connected with the Labour movement. At the same time the terms of reference appear to have deliberately restricted the enquiry to questions of financial structure and price, with questions of efficiency excluded. In other words, whether intentionally or not, the Committee by its very nature and constitution was a whitewashing committee. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Committee attempts to deny that the industry is a monopoly, states that it does not consider profits have been excessive, and that it considers that the Cement Makers Federation, embracing 100 per cent of the industry, have not "abused their position." Equally, it is not surprising that there is no suggestion of any sort as to how the output of cement can be increased and its price reduced.

Bearing in mind how strongly the dice were loaded in favour of the industry, it is all the more interesting that the Committee have been compelled to throw a good deal of light on the unambiguously monopolistic nature of the industry and the inner workings of this monopoly.

In the first place, there is ample proof in the Report itself that the industry is as complete and tight a monopoly as is ever likely to be found. In this respect the body of the Report is at variance with the finding that there are nine independent financial groups. Thus it is shown that the Federation is all-embracing; that it operates a minimum price and quota scheme; that there has never been in practice, whatever the position may be in theory, any change in the allocation of quotas from one group to another; by implication, that a number of inefficient works have been deliberately kept in operation (unfortunately no details are given, but it is known that the costs of the least efficient works are roughly twice those of the most efficient, and that each financial group owns both efficient and inefficient

works). It is also shown that there is no competition by variation in quality or sales service, and insignificant competition from imports; that apart altogether from the higher capital costs involved:

"any outside interest which set about erecting a new cement works in this country would be faced with a situation that prospective customers, who were also dependent on the existing industry for their supplies, would (unless the new manufacturers joined the Federation) be faced with the difficulty that by accepting supplies from the new manufacturer they would lose whatever rebates they were entitled to under the rebate scheme. This is indeed a very strong bar to the establishing of new businesses."

The reference to the nine independent financial groups is thoroughly specious, since the two largest firms control 80 per cent of the gross output. Moreover, these two, Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (Blue Circle) and Tunnel, are themselves united by an exchange of shares and by their joint interest in the Alpha Cement Company.

No doubt whatever remains that the industry is under complete monopoly control. Now the familiar defence of monopoly by capitalists and their hired scribes is that nevertheless output increases, quality improves, and that prices do not necessarily increase unduly. Such a defence is, of course, made by the cement industry, and by the Committee; and it is perfectly true that, in the period before the Second World War, the output of cement increased, quality improved, and prices rose very little.

The proof of the pudding, however, lies in the eating, and the effect of the Federation—of, in fact, the complete monopolisation of the industry—is perfectly clear.

The finding of the committee that profits are not excessive in relation to capital employed is astonishing, to say the least of it. Three years' results only, 1938 and two war years, have been examined. In the first there was a general recession of economic activity, and in the two others, Government price control, which has had some effect, was in operation. The Committee evidently belong to the school of thought which regards dividend records as misleading, but the connection between the establishment of the Federation in 1934 and the record of some of the principal companies when unfettered can hardly be fortuitous. A.P.C.M., for example, paid dividends rising from 7 per cent in 1933 and 10 per cent in 1934, to 22½ per cent in 1937. Eastwood's raised their dividends from 3 per cent in 1933 and 7½ per cent in 1934, to 16 per cent in 1937.

It would also have been illuminating, and surely within the Committee's terms of reference, to give some account of how the industry has evidently financed expansion out of its profits, over and above what it declared in dividends. The complete data about the profitability of the industry are unfortunately still not available. But the rate of surplus value has always been very high. According to Census of Production data, the output per man has increased from about 275 tons in 1907 to about 850 tons in 1935. During the same period real wages rose no more than 25 per cent. Comparable price data for the whole period are not available, but from 1924 to 1935, nearly half of the period, and the years when productivity was increasing at the highest rate, the fall in price was no more than 33 per cent. Taken together, these figures throw a clear enough light on the profitability of the industry.

Some reference has already been made to the evidence in the Report of the many different ways by means of which monopoly power is exercised. The all-embracing federation with a centralised constitution and strong powers, the minimum price and rigid quota scheme and the failure to substitute competition in sales service or quality-for-price competition, as is the case with weaker monopolies, are all familiar devices.

What is less common, at least in its completeness and the means by which it is achieved, is the complete ban on new entrants to the industry. It is, of course, familiar that there is a natural bar to entry in an industry where capital costs are high, partly because it is not easy to raise large amounts of capital, and partly because a new entrant, if it is to compete at all, must operate on such a scale that the large addition to the total supply of the commodity reduces all prices in the industry to an unprofitable level. But, as has been shown, the cement industry has another, and much more potent weapon, namely the loyalty rebates to customers who deal exclusively with members of the Federation. These rebates are considerable, and it is clear that, except in the limited case of local customers who could transfer entirely to the new works, large potential customers who required cement in a number of different places could not afford to buy cement in the particular locality near the new works, however cheap it was, since the benefit would be more than offset by the lost rebates in all the other localities.

The Committee devote some time to explaining and vindicating the compromise delivered price system, under which consumers distant from cement works pay only part of the heavy transport costs involved; on the other hand, consumers near cement works (and especially efficient works) get some, but not the whole, benefit of their location,

but no benefit from the efficiency of local works. The monopolist always tends to favour a form of delivered prices, since the uniformity, or tendency to uniformity, of the price facilitates price fixing. At the same time, by "dumping" in distant markets, potential competition from new works can be eliminated.

The system of differential rebates, which is also passed as satisfactory, is, in essence, also a monopolistic instrument. The loyalty rebate, already discussed, is obviously such, but any system of discriminating prices, which is what is involved in differential rebates, can obviously be exercised only by a monopolist and is a means of increasing profits.

Probably unwittingly, therefore, the Committee have performed a real service by providing a number of useful facts for those who care to seek. Facts have their own logic and the logic of the development of the cement industry is clear. As Lenin put it:

"competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialisation of production. In particular, the process of technical invention and improvement becomes socialised. This is no longer the old type of free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with each other, and producing for an unknown market. Concentration has reached the point at which it is possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw materials . . . of a country . . . An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets is also made, and the combines divide them up amongst themselves by agreement. Skilled labour is monopolised, the best engineers are engaged, the means of transport are captured. . . Capitalism in its imperialist stage arrives at the threshold of the most complete socialisation of production. In spite of themselves, the capitalists are dragged, as it were, into a new social order, a transitional social order from complete free competition to complete socialisation. Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognised free competition remains, but the yoke of a few monopolies on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable." (*Imperialism*, pp. 54-56.)

How closely this relates to the cement industry is obvious. The cement industry has been monopolised not in the social interest, but in the interests of its owners. These interests have been very well served. At the same time, in the backward field of the building material industry, the cement industry stands out as relatively efficient, while the ground has been prepared for the next step. It is

both useless and wrong to call for the re-creation of competition in the cement industry, as do so many reactionary and liberal critics, just as they did in Lenin's time. "Reactionary, petty-bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism dream of going back to 'free,' 'peaceful,' and 'honest' competition." (*Imperialism*, p. 58.) That is impossible.

QUACK REMEDIES FOR A SICK WORLD

Science, Liberty and Peace. Aldous Huxley (Chatto and Windus, 3s. 6d.).

THE PUBLISHERS' BLURB tells the credulous reader that this book is "an exciting and powerful plea for the humanistic application of scientific knowledge," with "closely-reasoned argument" and "brilliant analysis." Well, publishers have to sell their books; and, anyway, after reading the manuscript, they may well have felt a little confused as to what the book was about. For it is a typical example of the confusionism which, under the cloak of progressive ideas, undermines everything really progressive that is taking place in the world and leaves the unwary reader a helpless prey for reaction.

Huxley starts with the encouraging statement that science and technology have made notable advances; but that "so has the centralisation of political and economic power, so have oligarchy and despotism." In whose hands? Ah, that's none of the reader's business; to answer that question would interfere with the "brilliant analysis" and "closely-reasoned argument" that follows. So it is easy for the author to bring in his next phrase—"political bosses who control the various national States with unprecedentedly efficient instruments of coercion." It is science that has contributed "toward the centralisation of power in the hands of a small ruling minority"; science and technology have equipped these political bosses with "the tank, the flame-thrower, and the bomber," which "have made nonsense of the old techniques of popular revolt." Nowadays "no weapons available to the masses of the people can compete with those in the arsenals controlled by the ruling minority."

Fortunately for humanity at large, the people of Yugoslavia, for example, were not aware of this "closely-reasoned argument." Or to put it another way, they were able to make a little scientific and technological progress themselves in the art of partisan warfare, and so made hay of Huxley's "scientific" conclusion that "in any armed conflict, the side which has the tanks, planes, and flame-throwers

cannot fail to defeat the side which is armed at the very best only with small arms and hand grenades." It is the same in China today. Chiang Kai-shek's armies are equipped with all the best that United States science and technology can supply (except, it is true, the atom bomb); yet they are being defeated *in armed conflict*, in defiance of the great truths which Huxley's "brilliant analysis" has discovered.

However, Huxley, with his sensitive mind, is sorry for the poor people, who, on his analysis, have no hope from "popular revolt" against the "political bosses." "Is there any way out," he asks, "of the unfavourable situation in which, thanks to applied science, the masses now find themselves?" Fortunately he knows of one, and gives it willingly to the masses, plus his book, for 3s. 6d. It is non-violent direct action, Gandhi's *satyagraha*. Would it succeed? Well, Huxley says, maybe it wouldn't; but the result would be no worse than if the intolerable oppression had been resisted unavailingly by force, and—here Huxley obligingly takes us onto a higher plane than mere science—

"psychologically and morally, it would in all probability be very much better—better for those participating in the *satyagraha*, and better in the eyes of spectators and of those who merely heard of the achievement at secondhand"

And, of course, Huxley is particularly concerned with the psychological and moral feelings of "spectators" and "those who merely hear at secondhand" of the class struggle. It is what Engels, in his account of Duhring's lamentations about the use of force, calls "this parson's mode of thought—lifeless, insipid, and impotent"; a mode of thought which, while using the watchword of liberty, has nothing in common with the real fight for liberty that real men and women, not spectators and not secondhand auditors, have fought against fascism and are still fighting against the fascist remnants of today.

However, *satyagraha* is not the only remedy for the social disease of "political bosses"; Huxley has three bags full of remedies, which he dispenses page by page. "The rotary press and, more recently, the radio have contributed greatly to the concentration of political and economic power." The remedy? "Meanwhile there is no remedy for the evil except personal self-denial"—stop reading newspapers and listening to the radio.

But applied science, according to Huxley, in addition to supplying the ruling oligarchy with more effective instruments of coercion and persuasion, has other charges in its crime sheet. It has introduced "methods of large-scale mass-production and mass-distribution";

secondly, it has created "an economic and social insecurity which drives all those concerned, owners and managers no less than workers, to seek the assistance of the national State."

Take first the large-scale crime Huxley accuses inventors and technicians of having—

"paid more attention to the problem of equipping large concerns with the expensive machinery of mass production and mass distribution than to that of providing individuals or co-operating groups with cheap and simple, but effective, means of production for their own subsistence and for the needs of a local market."

That's just too bad of them. Instead of helping you and me, gentle reader, to grow our own food, make our own clothes, build our own houses, print our own books, make our own cars, railways, and *Queen Elizabeths*, those scientists have equipped large concerns with expensive machinery which has enormously reduced the total human labour expended, immensely increased the sum of use-values available to humanity, and opened the way to a truly human existence.

The remedy for this truly appalling state of things? According to Huxley, it is in the hands of the scientists themselves: "If inventors and technicians so chose, they could just as well apply the results of pure science for the purpose of increasing the economic self-sufficiency and consequently the political independence of small owners, working either on their own or in co-operative groups, concerned not with mass-distribution, but with subsistence and the supply of a local market."

Yes, it's as simple as that. If this "were henceforward to become the acknowledged purpose guiding the labours of inventors and engineers," and their efforts were "seconded by appropriate legislation," this would stop the further concentration of power and lead to "a progressive decentralisation of population, of accessibility of land, of ownership of the means of production, of political and economic power."

Stupid of Marx not to think of that, wasn't it? But what exactly is the society we are offered, if only "inventors and technicians so chose?" A society of small owners. No doubt Huxley's conception of it is not exactly the same as the society which gave rise to capitalism. Nevertheless, it is precisely the small owner, the "petty-bourgeois," who always and everywhere is a forcing bed for accumulation and large-scale capitalism. Economic laws will not cease to operate, even if "inventors and technicians so chose." Huxley's slogan, if not "Back to Methuselah," is at least "Back to Early Capitalism," back

to the whole long struggle on which we in Britain have spent some three hundred years.

What is particularly enlightening is his phrase that the efforts of the inventors and technicians must be "seconded by appropriate legislation." Evidently a new variety of trust-busting legislation; but who is supposed to pass it, and, above all, who is supposed to enforce it? Is it not precisely the small owner who is at the mercy of the trusts?

Among the more comic passages in Huxley's book is his account of slumps: "Mass unemployment and periodical slumps have a variety of interlocking causes—meteorological, financial, and psychological causes, as well as those connected with science and technology." Not a word about social production and private appropriation, about capitalism; why bring that up? His remedy is the mixture as before—small-scale production for the local market.

This decentralisation is also Huxley's remedy for war. Again, of course, war has nothing to do with capitalism or imperialism; it is the result of "the collective mentality of nations," which "is that of a delinquent boy of fourteen, at once cunning and childish, malevolent and silly, maniacally egotistical, touchy, and acquisitive, and at the same time ludicrously boastful and vain." On the basis of this "brilliant analysis," he conjures up a "nationalistic boy gangster" who is "in every Foreign Office" and at some moment finds "the temptation to press those buttons" (which start war) irresistible.

It is all very popular, and very, very cheap. But at the same time it is the sort of stuff that serves to weaken the confidence of the people in themselves and in their struggle for Socialism. The enemy presented is not a class, but abstract "political bosses"—already a condemnation of political activity. Under cover of this, centralisation under "a few private capitalists and their managers" or under "the one public capitalist, the State" are treated as the same—"So far as liberty is concerned, there is little to choose between the two types of boss." Trade unions curb the employers, but trade unions, too, are "subject to gigantism and centralisation," and so "the masses of unionised workers find themselves dependent upon, and subordinated to, two governing oligarchies—that of the bosses and that of the union leaders." Progress is a myth, "based upon the wishful dream that one can get something for nothing." Talk about the future is deceptive: "the one thing we all know about the future is that we are completely ignorant of what is going to happen."

So Aldous Huxley, like Koestler and the rest of them, preach ignorance as against science, reaction as against progress, passivity as against action to change the world. They reflect in all their "brilliant

analysis " and " closely-reasoned argument " only the helpless confusion and despair of the petty-bourgeois who sees the world which produced him melting away, and is afraid to jump to the " brave new world " which the working class is creating. But the outlook which they represent, the muddle and mystification which they dispense with such lavish pens, must not be ignored. It is dangerous, poisonous stuff, serving the interests of the most reactionary sections in their fight against the people.

EMILE BURNS

COMMUNIST REVIEW

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THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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PARLIAMENT AND THE LABOUR PROGRAMME

PHIL. PIRATIN, M.P.

WHEN LABOUR WAS RETURNED with a majority in 1945, the new Government was pledged to introduce measures that would in some degree change the face of our society—the beginnings of a planned economy, nationalisation of the basic industries, and changed social relations and standards. To carry out this progressive task, the Labour Government took over a Parliamentary and administrative machine which was part and parcel of a capitalist, retrogressive society.

What were the Government's problems in relation to the Parliamentary machine, if the Labour Party programme, on which the election was fought, was to be carried out during this Parliament? It was necessary to introduce new State controls of industry, to expand and adjust the existing controls imposed on the country during the years of war. It was necessary to harness the support of the people who had just won a victory over Fascism abroad, and over Conservatism at home. Speed was, therefore, all important. The longer the delay in getting these new features working, the more difficult would be the economic position, the less the keenness and enthusiasm of the working class; and time would be given to the capitalists to recover and to counter-attack by taking advantage of the post-war difficulties and creating demoralisation.

As for the administration, to a large degree the Government machine had been geared to the war effort. Much of it could have been adjusted to the needs of peacetime reconstruction. In actuality, Government controls of production were withdrawn, Government factories were disposed of to private enterprise, and the possibilities of planning economy, developing from wartime arrangements, were lost.

The problem can be seen more clearly if considered alongside the Government's programme. There are three main aspects of the Government's policy, social, economic, and international. The last has little bearing on the subject of this article.

Undoubtedly a fair amount of legislation has been passed by Parliament in relation to the social needs of the people. Such measures as National Insurance, National Health, Industrial Insurance, passed last year, are expected, in general, to come into operation in 1948. The Education Act of 1944 serves as a typical example of cumber-

some administrative machinery, and its implementation is proceeding at a snail's pace. The adjustment of the schooling system is hardly noticeable, and in some cases no attempt has yet been made to effect it. The raising of the school-leaving age, due to have taken place in April, 1946, was postponed until April this year. The extension of the school-leaving age to 16, foreshadowed in the Act to take place three years after the extension to 15 (i.e., 1950), is most unlikely to take place, to judge by the Minister of Education's answers on this question.

The weakest aspect, however, is the economic programme. The special difficulties here were to be anticipated. On the one hand we were dealing with problems that had never yet been faced in this country, and on the other hand, whereas the Conservatives themselves had to give some measure of support to social legislation, they were absolutely opposed to any attempt by the Government to introduce any plan and control in the country's economy. On July 8, Mr. Herbert Morrison, in the Debate on "Imports," admitted the inability of the Government to make any headway in planning during the first two years of its existence. There are, no doubt, more profound reasons to explain this, but not least is the fact that the Labour Government conceived, and, I believe, still conceives, the possibility of using the capitalist Parliamentary procedure and administrative machine for purposes which were never dreamt of by those who for centuries developed our Parliamentary forms.

With regard to the nationalisation of industry, the Government set itself to nationalise coal, transport, steel, electricity, and gas, during this Parliament. It is to be assumed that its objective has reference to the actual nationalisation, and not merely the passing of a nationalisation Act of Parliament. It will, therefore, be necessary for all of these to be passed into Law, at the latest during the 1947-48 Session. To date the coal industry has been nationalised, as from January 1 this year. Transport (in a restricted form) and Electricity Nationalisation Bills have passed through the House of Commons. These are shortly expected back from the House of Lords, somewhat mutilated. Steel and gas, it is reported, are due for legislation next year. It may be possible, therefore, for a Government apologist to claim that Labour's programme is being, to a substantial degree, implemented. Unfortunately this is not the case. The reconstruction of our industries called for emergency measures and emergency powers. Above all, we required an economic plan. It would have been far easier for the Government to have achieved this had it had a closer, and in basic industries, direct control of production and supplies. To this end—revolutionary as it may sound to the British Parliamentary

conception—it would have been to the nation's benefit to have nationalised the basic industries within the course of the first week of the Labour Government. Such things have been done in other countries. In January, 1946, the bulk of Poland's industries were nationalised by Act of Parliament in two days.

The purpose of this article, however, is not to discuss Labour's programme, but the effect of Parliamentary procedure on the carrying through of that programme. Is the Parliamentary machine adequate to the demands which are made upon it—demands not only of a modern kind, but those of a Labour and progressive Government?

The Government can claim that 84 Acts of Parliament received the Royal Assent during the Session 1945-46. During the present Session, still not completed, 49 Bills have been introduced, of which 28 have received the Royal Assent, and 21 have gone to the House of Lords. At the end of the 1945-46 Session, Labour spokesmen boasted that more legislation had been passed than in any previous Session in history. Apart from the fact that many of the Acts were minor undisputed ones, credit must be given for this achievement, while at the same time everyone recognises that the existing Parliamentary machine was being strained beyond capacity, the staff could not keep up with the pace, the drafting of the Bills was often shoddy, Members of Parliament were overworked, and Ministers fell ill.

The Government recognised that the Parliamentary machine was not suitable. Early on in the new Parliament, in August, 1945, a Select Committee was appointed "to consider the procedure in the public business of this House, and to report what alteration, if any, is desirable for the more efficient despatch of such business."

Its report in November, 1946, referring to the previous Select Committee on procedure (1931-32), says:

"The problem facing that Committee was how to adapt procedure to the growing pressure of business, a problem, which as they recognised, was by no means new and presents itself 'in almost every elected assembly in all countries where modern views as to the powers and duties of the State are finding expression, and where the social, industrial, commercial and economic questions of our time are demanding Parliamentary attention and solution.' The problem facing your Committee is fundamentally the same—in the course of the intervening 15 years it has only become more acute."

This general statement of the seriousness of the problem had no bearing on the Committee's conclusions, which were affected by other factors. In its view:

"... there is not at the present time any strong or widespread desire for changes in the character of the Parliamentary institution. . . . The danger to Parliamentary Government in this country, at the present time, is less likely to arise from lack of confidence in it, than from the overwhelming burden which the growth of Parliamentary activity places upon it. . . . It is therefore a matter for constant vigilance to ensure that the machinery is continuously adapted and strengthened to bear the new burdens put upon it. It is from this point of view that your Committee approach their task."

The final recommendations were unimportant and ineffective, as was to be expected from the attitude taken. The only change worth notice which has taken place during the past year has been the extension of the number of Standing Committees to which Parliamentary Bills are referred, thus saving the time of the House as a whole. It is unlikely that any further adjustments will be made.

Newspaper readers are told how Parliament sat until 2 or 3 a.m., or sometimes through the night. Many have wondered is this really necessary, and can the M.P.s really apply themselves intelligently to the problems of State in the early hours of the morning? The answer to both questions is "No." Most serious, however, is the effect on individual M.P.s. The physical effects would be obvious to all. But the political and mental effects are not unimportant. Many M.P.s of the young and energetic type, who entered Parliament two years ago, feel frustrated, and an occasional contribution to some debate cannot overcome this feeling. Especially is this so on the part of sincere Labour Members who were active during the Second World War and feel the contrast of their present inactivity.

To offer a solution to these problems is not simple. A very tempting short-cut would be to do away completely with the present Constitution (not least the House of Lords) and curtail the debating procedure. But I am trying to present this problem as it must appear to any active member of the Labour Party.

A significant factor is the time involved. Parliament sits about 35 weeks in the year. The various divisions of the matter discussed, and the proportion of time spent on each, are (in percentages):

Government Legislation	50
Control of Policy and Administration	36.8
Control of Finance	10
Private Members' time	3.2

To study these figures more minutely is of value and would obviously show cases where duplication takes place, and time could be saved. For example, there is undoubtedly duplication in connec-

tion with the proceedings on the Budget Resolutions, and the Finance Bill. It may be suggested that there is a theoretical difference. But on reading the speeches it will be seen that there is hardly any difference at all in the Debates on these two items. But there are wider questions which occur to one on glancing at these figures.

Does Parliament call for longer Sessions, and for more time to be spent on Parliamentary work by M.P.s? Should more time be allotted for legislation at the expense of opportunities for debating policy and administration, or vice versa? Should more time be provided for private Members? What scope should the Labour Government give to "His Majesty's Opposition"? Granted the rights of the opposition and of the minority parties to criticise and debate, how far should the Government allow this "democratic" right to interfere with, or obstruct, Government legislation in the true democratic interests of the public? Can, and should, our legislative procedure (i.e., procedure dealing with Parliamentary Bills) be curtailed? Should Parliament deal with the details of legislation, or leave it to Committees of Parliament, and/or the administrative personnel?

Irrespective of the specific answers to these questions and to others that may occur to the reader, I believe that there are three main points with which Parliament and the Government need to be concerned.

(1) The speed-up of legislation. The main factor here is not merely a saving of M.P.s' time, but rather a public need for the speedy implementation of so much in Labour's programme which has yet to be fulfilled.

(2) Adequate opportunities to be provided for debating current political and administrative problems. This would have the effect of bringing the Government nearer to the back-bencher; of providing opportunities for the Opposition (and others) to criticise and to seek information; and to give more scope to the private Member, which is so necessary.

(3) M.P.s must be given opportunities in Parliament and in the administration so that their abilities and experience are properly used in the interests of the public.

So far as I know there is no Parliament in the world which spends so much time in Parliamentary discussion. The Russian Supreme Soviet meets three times a year, for a few days on each occasion. The Swedish Parliament (which example may be more acceptable to some sections of the Labour Party) meets about five months in the year; for the remainder, the individual M.P.s (except Ministers) return to their normal occupations, which, by law, must be kept open for them.

Mr. Morrison has stated that, in general, Members of Parliament should continue their normal occupations and not become professional politicians, adding that their contributions in debate would be more representative of all aspects of public life. But for the best part of the year the Standing and other Committees, involving 300 M.P.s, meet in the mornings. The House of Commons meets in the afternoon and evening, and often late into the night. It is evident that only professional and businessmen can continue their normal occupations, and even then partly at the expense of Parliamentary time. A reduced Session, however, could see a Parliament composed of representatives such as Mr. Morrison describes.

The most difficult problem is how to speed up the passing of legislation. This is difficult only because the official attitude has been to confine itself to the present procedure. But the present procedure is something which has grown up over centuries. It must be understood that all changes and adjustments (such as those made in the seventeenth century) were made to serve capitalism. In some cases it has been incorporated in the Parliamentary Standing Orders: in other cases it continues as "ancient usage." However attractive to some, and impressive to transatlantic visitors, our old customs and procedure may be, they do not conform with the times and are a hindrance to progress. A century ago not more than one or two Bills would pass through Parliament in a Session. They would be discussed on the floor of the House, and, the period being what it was, at length and in classic style. There are some today who yearn for that period and who ape the style. We who are concerned with legislation and regard Parliamentary procedure *only* as a means of achieving public good cannot put the cart before the horse.

I submit, hesitatingly, my own opinion for the solution. I believe that it is essential for Parliament as a whole to discuss the principles of the proposed legislation. But the details can be left almost entirely to Committees representative of the House of Commons. At present, after these Committees have discussed the details, Parliament still spends several days rediscussing them, very often achieving nothing more than dotting i's and crossing t's.

The House of Lords is an obstruction to progressive legislation. In its present composition it cannot be otherwise. If the Government carries out what it has occasionally threatened, that it would recommend the appointment of several hundred Labour Peers, so drastic would such action be that it might as well do away altogether with the Lords as a legislative assembly.

There is one feature in our legislative procedure that I would seriously recommend. The Government should take steps to

encourage public discussion while legislation is being prepared and

The great importance of this is that the legislation which is now being passed is of a constructive character, involving the participation of the public, and particularly of the working class. As time passes, the Civil Service and Local Government Service will not number two million, but will, in the broad sense, include the whole nation. It stands to reason that as the nation owns more and more of the country and its wealth, it, the nation, must be concerned with the country's management and must participate in it.

The simplest example is the nationalisation of the coal mines. In all the circumstances the miners are doing a good job—certainly a job which they would never have done within a Conservative, non-nationalised industry. But the weakest element in the Nationalisation of the Coal Mines Act, and in the operation of it, is the Pit Consultative Committee. Not only are the miners given limited responsibility, but the constructive approach to this responsibility has not yet been adequately inspired. In Czechoslovakia and in Poland the passing of the legislation on nationalised coal mines may have been hurried, and badly drafted, and the details not worked out. But the main problem—the digging of coal—is being tackled in a way we can envy.

If the Government made a turn in this direction of involving the public, it would help to turn the balance heavily against the capitalist view expressed by the Conservative Party in the House of Commons. It would also be the best way of answering Conservative criticisms about Government legislation—its curtailment of speech, etc. Above all, it would mean that we enter into a new period in the conception of the British Parliament, bringing Parliament closer to the people, and bringing nearer to operation the "Government of the People, by the People, and for the People."

THE USE OF OUR CULTURAL HERITAGE

R. F. WILLETTS

IN THE LAST CHAPTER of his pamphlet *Marxism and Poetry*, George Thomson discusses the future of culture in general, and of poetry in particular. His argument, briefly stated, is that this future will be radically different from the cultural renaissance in the U.S.S.R. in one important respect: in Britain, Socialist culture will have no pre-capitalist reservoir to fall back upon for inspiration and vitality. To quote his own words: "In Western Europe, apart from a few

isolated pockets, pre-capitalist culture has perished, and so we cannot look for a renaissance of the same type. The only poetry in Western Europe is bourgeois poetry. But it is the finest in the world. It is a magnificent heritage. But it is not being used. The first crying need is that this treasury should be thrown open to the people."

He returns to the same point more urgently shortly afterwards: "This then is the first need—to rescue our bourgeois heritage from the bourgeoisie, to take it over, reinterpret it, adapt it to our needs, renew its vitality by making it thoroughly our own."

So far as I am aware, George Thomson's argument has not been seriously challenged. Such reviews of his pamphlet as I have read, British and American, have been generally favourable. I therefore assume that his fellow Marxists are in general agreement with his theoretical analysis and practical conclusions. It is time that responsible Communists in cultural organisations paid more serious attention to these practical conclusions.

In the cultural sphere, as in other spheres of national life, Marxists have a decisive role to play. In country after country, of recent years, the old order has crumbled, and the forces of the organised working class have assumed a major responsibility in guiding the destinies of their peoples. In our own country the process of change is less spectacular, but nonetheless continuous. The sponsors of the old order sense their failure of nerve. Culturally, this failure reveals itself in expressions of pessimism concerning man's ability to shape his environment as the many would wish it to be, rationally organised, peaceful, prosperous, and just. Under new guises, old cults of irrationalism are promoted, and the power of the human consciousness is doubted or betrayed. One result is that bourgeois interpretation of the bourgeois classics, the greatest of which were revolutionary in their day, becomes formalistic and lifeless.

We should be unwise to exaggerate the influence of these swansongs. At the same time we ought not to overlook their constant repetition in the Press, radio, theatre, and circulating libraries: wherever, in fact, the means exist to provoke thought or excite emotion, wherever the will of the people can be lulled to acquiescence or steeled to hopeful resolution. The transition to Socialism in this country can be made easier by recognising this fact and by taking appropriate action. We must come forward as the rightful heirs of the cultural heritage of the past, and likewise stake our claims in the future. It is no easy matter: yet we can at least begin to decide how it should begin to be done.

Let us consider first of all the role of those cultural organisations closely connected with the Labour movement and mainly concerned

with the presentation of music and drama, and more particularly drama, since it is more extensively developed over the country as a whole. Broadly speaking, the role of such organisations may be said to be twofold: first, to present the bourgeois masterpieces of the past, reinterpreting, where the bourgeois misinterpret them; secondly, to promote the creation of contemporary work by artists and writers closely associated with the Socialist movement. These tasks are complementary in the light of George Thomson's analysis. In the past we have tended falsely to pose the second aim as being the only one worth considering. This is why so much of the discussion as to what constitutes "proletarian art" has been so barren.

In this connection, the remarks made by David Wilson in a recent article (*Modern Quarterly Miscellany* No. 1) are capable of a wider application: "... in recent years there has been a good deal of discussion about the probable emergence of a proletarian literature as a thing to be expected in our time. What is meant by this has never been agreed upon by those who argue about it. The label has been attached indiscriminately to literature written by workers, or written about workers, or addressed specifically to the working class. Surely all this is beside the point. If there is to be a proletarian literature, it can be so only by virtue of whether life is seen from a new point of view, a point of view growing out of the emergence of the working class in society, not as a dependent and subsidiary thing, but as a living and independent force."

This new point of view has to be all-embracing, equally concerned with the reinterpretation of the old and the creation of the new. We ought to recognise that, just as the bourgeois epoch has transformed the economic and political basis of society in the course of its development, so the artists of this epoch, who emerged as the bourgeoisie advanced to the leadership of the progressive forces of mankind, often expressed the latent contradictions inherent in the society which they saw coming to birth. It was no mere love of refinement that prompted Marx to pay such close attention to Shakespeare—or for that matter to re-read annually the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus.

Because Karl Marx read Aeschylus it doesn't follow that all good Communists should learn ancient Greek. But it is reasonable to suggest that the opportunities should be created to allow Communists and the working class, of which they are the vanguard, to derive inspiration, as Marx did, from the national poet whose works Marx read in what was to him a foreign language. Our Elizabethan ancestors enjoyed Shakespeare's plays when they were first produced: so do our Soviet contemporaries in translation. It is announced from time to time in the Party Press that Shakespeare is popular on the

Soviet stage: the announcement rarely seems to stir our conscience.

In theory, no one would deny that we should endeavour to present the people with the cultural heritage of the past as a help to the creation of contemporary work. But in practice several reasons are adduced for concentrating on the second task and ignoring or postponing the first, instead of acknowledging their essential unity. It is said that such and such a group isn't yet technically efficient enough to attempt a classic; that the language of the Elizabethans presents too many difficulties for a working-class audience; that our immediate aim is to promote class-consciousness by handling contemporary themes, and so on.

These objections take no account of the fact that many of the best productions of the classics are, in fact, amateur productions; that there is much to be said for training your personnel on something first-rate to begin with; that generations of workers managed to become familiar with the authorised version of the Bible, though the language of that book is as difficult as Shakespeare; that class-consciousness can often be aroused by indirect means, as it apparently was by Lorca's poetry and plays in Spain; that the result of too narrow a definition of class-consciousness may be the presentation of contemporary class-conscious themes by the class-conscious to the class-conscious—which doesn't help much.

In short, we have a right to expect that cultural organisations associated with the Labour movement should be prepared to include classical as well as contemporary productions, reinterpreting them and adapting them to present requirements. This has been done successfully, for example, by the Birmingham Clarion Singers, over the past ten years. They consist of working-class amateurs. Their repertoire includes traditional British workers' and peasants' songs; Soviet songs; Bach's "Peasant Cantata"; Mozart's "Marriage of Figaro"; Purcell's "Dido and Aeneas." They have played and sung in concert halls, in factories, at street corners, on bombed sites, at meetings. Their conviction is that the music of the past can play its part in arousing enthusiasm for the future. They refuse to classify their audience before it assembles as lowbrow or highbrow. Quite rightly, however, they are prepared to combine the more simple with the more difficult. In their limited sphere they are proving that the workers can dominate the managerial functions of art.

Many workers are habitual filmgoers. Our cultural organisations might well consider the presentation of films together with their music or plays. This would broaden their appeal, and at the same time enable the workers to see what can be done with the film when

it is not dominated by the most vulgar of commercial motives. Outside London, only the members of provincial film societies ordinarily have a chance of seeing the better Continental or Russian films. Many of our best British documentary films have similarly been seen by too few people. Projectors and films of this type are not difficult to hire; nor are they too expensive.

Cultural organisations apart, the trade unions, and the Trades Councils, nationally and locally, could play an important part in these developments. To our shame, we have no national theatre. With a Labour Government in power the trade unions could mobilise an enormous public opinion in a campaign for such a project. Many of our large cities are pitifully equipped with cultural facilities within the reach of a working-class income. Campaigns led by Trades Councils for the establishment of civic theatres would have public opinion again on their side, and the enthusiastic support of film societies, amateur repertory companies, Co-operative Guilds, and such-like.

A great demand for enlightenment exists, as our brief wartime renaissance indicated. We must point the way to its satisfaction.

RAILWAY EFFICIENCY

FRANK MOORE

TO UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT PROBLEMS of railway efficiency one has to be aware of the position in the industry during the period of rampant economy and the economic crisis of 1929 to 1931. The economy cuts did not stop at manpower, wages, and conditions, a factor in the present understaffing of the industry, but extended to removing what appeared in the eyes of the railway management anything that was superfluous. Timber, glass, and buildings were removed, all of which has had its subsequent effect upon the efficiency and working conditions of the staff and the comfort of the public.

Apart from the cut in manpower this period brought about unprecedented redundancy and with it the migration of hundreds of young men with their families over the greater part of England, Scotland, and Wales. One can see the memories which many in the industry have had to fight, with the knowledge that today many of their employers who tolerated and supported such chaos and inhumanity are still the management of the railways.

Recently a description was coined in relation to railway operation—it was, that there was “remote control” exercised from the H.Q.s of the main-line companies, and passed down to divisional centres, and from there to the numerous depots. It is this kind of managerial

function that makes participation in practical railway work differ from factories or other undertakings.

The practical worker who, from years of experience, can and does often make helpful suggestions, finds that his immediate head, or the head of the department to which he may make the suggestion, cannot act upon it because his hands are tied by higher officialdom. This is glaring in the case of the operation and movement of trains. Train crews see many moves that would lead to the more efficient movement of traffic, but because of the above and the additional fact that those employed in the telephone control offices are not recruited from the ranks of practical men, such suggestions are rarely put into operation.

An immediate remedy for this would be greater worker participation at all levels of management, with an indication that managements would act upon the suggestions made by the men's accredited representatives. There has just taken place a series of meetings, on an area basis, of the men's representatives from a number of grades and officials of the companies, but despite the fact that these meetings arose from the M.O.T. in an endeavour to overcome difficulties which became very clear during the past winter, there is no guarantee that the findings of these meetings will be acted upon.

In an industry such as the railways with its separate departments for locomotive power, marshalling and movement of freight and passenger traffic, and the numerous sides of maintenance of rolling stock and the permanent way, there is no opportunity of all sections meeting together to discuss the all-in problems. Instead of such co-operation we see watertight compartments, each dealing with one particular section of work, apart from some liaison at top level. Hence you get the position that only the keenest trade unionist who attends his branch meetings, or takes the trouble to study the problems, is aware of the difficulties which other grades are working under, both in relation to wages and conditions and the problems of day-to-day work.

The fact that railways have few modern methods of dealing with work shows a serious state of affairs. Few marshalling yards are electrically lit, and this is also true of goods sheds and motive power depots. Welfare in the form of washing facilities, cloak-room accommodation, etc., are practically non-existent, whilst messrooms and canteens are most primitive.

The methods of carrying out maintenance repairs are ancient, whether it be for locomotive, rolling stock, or the permanent way, and are such that operations are carried out by sheer human exertion. There is little appreciation of the use of electric or other methods of

power-operated tools and equipment. Power-driven drills, grinders, and lifting apparatus are almost unknown, and depots are considered lucky that can call upon some type of cutting or welding machinery, or other appropriate mechanical device suitable for a particular job.

This is the situation that exists when in almost any machine-tool shop pieces of machinery can be purchased, which, if installed, would reduce hard, physical hours of labour. The position of supplies of spare parts for renewals is very bad, and on some sections of the system such parts may be sent hundreds of miles from depot to depot in order to put another locomotive into service.

The basic shortage of locomotive power is shown in a recent publication, *The Locomotive Building Industry*, Report No. 264, published by P.E.P. The supply and repair of existing locomotives is the subject of most bitter complaint of driver and fireman, and those concerned with repairs.

The P.E.P. report states that in 1944, 20,016 main-line steam locomotives were in use and that: "Between 1921 and 1938 the annual renewal rate averaged 2.1 per cent of the total number in use. It would appear, therefore, that, assuming very few locomotives built or purchased since 1921 have been destroyed, slightly more than 50 per cent of the railway companies' fleet are 25 years old or more."

Between 1929 and 1938 the railway companies' new construction averaged 311 locomotives per annum at the cost of £1,280,000. Repairs and partial renewals averaged £8,830,000. This was in sharp contrast to the private builder, the bulk of whose orders consisted of new construction. The domestic demand for main-line locomotives in the years 1929 to 1938 was as follows:

Year	Railway Workshops	Contractors	No.	Total Value £000's
1929 ...	412	129	541	2.157
1930 ..	321	183	504	2.084
1931 ...	293	85	378	1.507
1932 ..	263	6	269	913
1933 ...	219	1	220	962
1934 ...	288	103	391	1.818
1935 .	371	195	566	2.557
1936 ..	366	245	581	2.906
1937 ...	288	277	566	2.052
1938 ...	316	—	316	1.479
Totals	3,137	1,224	4,332	18,435

The actual rate of renewal tended to fluctuate in the periods of depression and prosperity. In 1925-29 it averaged 2.6 per cent, and in 1935-38, 2.7 per cent. To maintain the 2.1 per cent replacement figure on the number of locomotives in use in 1944 would need 435 new locomotives a year. On the basis of the prosperous periods quoted above, 540 locomotives would be required each year. Both figures, however, make no allowance for the shortage of new locomotives during the war years.

In this connection the position is that the railway companies built 1,432 locomotives in their workshops during the Second World War, or an annual rate of 229, representing less than 58 per cent of estimated capacity. The private builders' production in 1938-42 averaged 220 a year, but during the next three years production rose to an annual average which is still only about 80 per cent of estimated full capacity. The annual production all told, according to the *Monthly Statistical Digest*, Table 58, was 1940, 282; 1941, 244; 1942, 360; 1943, 795; 1944, 1,070; and 1945, 786.

The railway companies (*British Railways in the Future*) have stated that 2,800 locomotives must be built during the next five years to maintain normal building programmes and to overtake arrears which have accumulated since 1939. These arrears are estimated by P.E.P. to be 1,235 locomotives. On this basis, this would leave only 1,565 locomotives to maintain the normal building programme, or 313 per year, which is about a quarter less than the average yearly rate of replacement since the amalgamation in 1921. *It will be seen, therefore, that the railway companies' figures are a bare minimum.*

As it is, however, this represents an annual total of 560, and of course takes no account of the export of locomotives. Here is the position of annual production and export, according to the *Monthly Statistical Digest*, covering main-line locomotives:

	Production	Export	Domestic Use
1935 ...	738	141	597
1945 ..	786	139	647
1946 ..	726	358	368
1947 (estd.)	558	222	336

The estimate for 1947 is based on the figures for January and February only.

It is quite possible, of course, that production in 1947 will step up, but from this brief survey it is clear:

- (a) That the 1946 rate of locomotives available for domestic use is hopelessly inadequate and does not come anywhere near the

minimum requirements stipulated by the railway companies.

- (b) That in view of this position a completely disproportionate number of locomotives is being exported.
- (c) That this situation, unless quickly improved, can still further impair the position of the railways on the eve of nationalisation.

The urgency of the present situation demands immediate Government action to increase locomotive production; and, pending this increase, locomotive exports should be prohibited.

A twin evil with the shortage of locomotives, which means a curtailment of trains, is the inadequacy of many sections of the line to cope with trains. There are, for example, main lines that are only double-tracked, which necessitates the shunting into loop lines and sidings of slower-moving traffic to make way for the passenger services and express goods going in the same direction.

Sidings of termini are not sufficient to handle the incoming traffic which requires re-marshalling to other parts of the country. Sidings are built in the centre or on the outskirts of cities, with no by-pass lines to obviate the necessity of running over the busy inner city lines. These factors are largely responsible for the bottlenecks which arose during the bad weather, and other temporary hold-ups.

That there is a need for the re-planning of British railways is obvious to the practical rail worker, and it is to nationalisation that he looks for a speedier approach to the problem. In the meantime all grades, given the opportunity to offer more of their wealth of practical experience in the management of the industry, now and under nationalisation, would do much to ensure that recent examples of rail inefficiency would not be so manifest.

The final vital issue is that wages and conditions of the workers should be improved so that they are in keeping with their responsibilities. They should take into account the abnormal hours of work, and for large sections of the staff the liability to be available for work on every day in the week, with all the anti-social effects that has upon family and personal liberty.

THE TRUSTS' HOLD ON AMERICA

BEHIND THE OFFENSIVE OF AMERICAN foreign policy against the progressive countries of the world, and behind the offensive in America itself against the Labour and progressive movements, is the drive of the great trusts, the most reactionary section of American capitalism, to complete their domination of the U.S.A. and to extend

it over the whole world. The Second World War not only removed their chief rivals, the German trusts. It enormously increased their power and their hold upon America.

The increase of productive capacity in the United States during the Second World War put into the hands of the largest 250 non-financial corporations productive resources equal to the whole productive output of the United States in 1939. "It is clear that during the Second World War these large corporations (each employing over 1,000 employees) have come to dominate not only American manufacturing, but the entire economy as a whole," concludes the U.S. Smaller War Plant Corporation's Report on Economic Concentration in World War II. It is estimated that these big firms accounted for 44 per cent of the total employment in the U.S.A., and 55 per cent of the total payroll in 1943. In manufacturing industry alone, the big firms employed 64 per cent of the employees in 1945. In 1944, 2,947 firms employing more than 1,000 employees accounted for 52 per cent of all the employees in manufacturing industry, while 344 firms employing more than 10,000 employees accounted for 30 per cent of the workers (or five million out of a total of 16.7 million). In 1939, 967 firms employing more than 1,000 employed 4.2 million out of 10.8 million employees; and 49 firms employing more than 10,000 employed 1.4 million.

Government assistance enabled the trusts to increase their hold on America. Thus while U.S. Government contracts were awarded to 18,539 firms (out of a total of over 200,000) from 1941 until September, 1944, 67 per cent of the value of the contracts were awarded to 100 corporations. The average contract awarded was just under \$10 millions, but the smallest received by the hundred corporations was \$232 millions. These same firms acquired control of 51 per cent of all the privately-financed manufacturing facilities built in the U.S.A. during the Second World War, and 75 per cent of the Government-financed.

What this means in terms of physical plant and capacity to produce can best be quoted from the report of the Smaller War Plants Corporation. "The nation's manufacturing facilities in existence in 1939 had cost about 40 billion dollars to build. To this capacity was added by June, 1945, about 26 billion dollars of new plant and equipment."

The technical efficiency and quality of this new plant was of the highest order:

"Not only was the expansion programme of tremendous proportions, but in addition, the quality of the new plants and equipment was

generally very high. . . . Most of the plants contain the best materials. . . . The new plants usually have the most modern factory layouts, lightings, power installations, etc. . . . The quality of the new equipment is, if anything, even better than that of the plants. In 1940 there were in place 827,000 machine tools of various ages, degrees of repair, and suitability for the job they were performing. Almost 75 per cent of these were more than ten years old, and a large proportion was over 30 years old. During the last five years 747,000 new machine tools have been built and put into operation. These new tools are generally bigger, faster, hold to finer tolerances, and turn out a larger volume of work than the average pre-war tool. Most of them are designed for the use of tungsten carbide cutting tools which have brought about a great increase in both machine and worker output. . . ."

It is not just that the trusts have been re-tooled, with generous assistance from the U.S. Government. These tools, by their nature and distribution, increased the peace-time potential of the firms getting them. On this point the report says:

"A study conducted by the War Production Board . . . showed that 74 per cent of the wartime outlay for manufacturing facilities—public and private—went for facilities to make the same product which the operator produced before the war. . . . In the second place, the bulk of the machine tools and items of plant equipment built during the war years are either general-purpose types or special-purpose types designed for operations that are required in peacetime as in wartime. . . ."

Thus, for example, the electric furnace capacity of the U.S. steel industry increased from 1,614,000 tons in 1938 to 6,248,000 tons in 1945. Of this, 1,715,000 tons' capacity (or 27.5 per cent) belonged in 1945 to the Republic Steel Corporation, third in size to the Morgan-controlled U.S. Steel Corporation and Bethlehem Steel. In 1938 Republic had only 8.9 per cent of the electric furnace capacity.

The trusts were not only favoured in the distribution of contracts and machine tools. They received favoured treatment in the allocation of raw materials, which greatly strengthened their position. Thus from the allocations of strategically important raw materials to 30,130 manufacturing establishments the plants of the largest 25 using companies were allocated 30 per cent of carbon steel for 750 plants; 40 per cent of alloy steel for 664 plants; 37 per cent of stainless steel for 508 plants; 58 per cent of aluminium for 447 plants; 66 per cent of copper for 506 plants; 51 per cent of copper-base alloys for 567 plants.

In the allocation of contracts for industrial research, the 50 largest corporations receiving contracts got 62 per cent, while the 10 largest received 37 per cent of the contracts. Before the Second World War 13 firms had controlled one-third of the industrial research personnel in the U.S.A., and 140 companies had employed two-thirds. During the Second World War 68 corporations received two-thirds of the war industrial research contracts.

The expansion of physical capacity had its reflection in the financial position of the trusts. In the production of basic iron and steel the 19 largest corporations acquired a capitalisation 25 per cent greater than that of the whole industry in 1939. Seventy corporations fabricating metal products (including motor cars and trucks) increased their capital to 25 per cent more than the whole capitalisation of the industry in 1939. Fifteen non-ferrous metal corporations have 60 per cent more capital than the 1939 capitalisation of the industry. Five aircraft companies have a capitalisation 11 times as great as the whole pre-war American aircraft industry. Two hundred and twenty-one corporations making iron and steel products have double the pre-war capitalisation of their industry, and now control fifty per cent of the present level. Five shipbuilding corporations have nearly three times the capitalisation of the pre-war industry; and 15 have four times.

Naturally, markets have become more important than ever before to the American trusts. It is estimated that they must now operate at 90 per cent of capacity in order to make a profit, as against 80 per cent pre-war. The magazine *Business Week* says that the "break-even" point is now much higher; while the President of Bethlehem Steel says: "Just let a few points fall away from present operating rates and see what happens." Before the Second World War only 2½ per cent of American production was exported. The most important lines were agricultural produce and processed foods. The motor-car makers, for example, were most interested among the great manufacturing corporations, and they exported less than 15 per cent of their annual production. In 1947, the radio industry, for example, has plans to export four million radio sets, from a production that at its peak in 1946 was running at a rate of 16 million sets a year, but is now operating at only 75 per cent of that. Its agents abroad already report that the South American market is glutted with radios.

As the trusts increasingly turn to exports with the rapid saturation of the American home market, the international battle in the world market is going to become fiercer. The American trusts are preparing the ground to their own advantage in every way available to them. Through their hold on the U.S. administration, especially of the

State Department, they are pushing the foreign policy with which we are only too familiar, seeking in every way to increase international dependence on the dollar, and to open every market to American goods on the most favoured terms. The way for this was being prepared even during the Second World War, when, for example, the anti-cartel prosecutions of the American trusts had the effect of releasing them from their cartel arrangements with German and British big business. "The government anti-cartel policies," writes James S. Allen in his book *World Monopoly and Peace*, "were fully in accordance with the high objectives of big business. The result of these policies, whatever their origin or motivation, was to further the expansionist drive of American monopoly-capitalism." Thus the anti-cartel trials, which had no effect on the internal position of the trusts, had the effect of clearing the decks for a full-scale invasion of all foreign markets by American business, unhampered by any pre-war agreements with their German or British competitors.

Another factor is driving the trusts to more aggressive activity in the foreign field, besides the need for markets to keep up their profitability. It is the question of raw materials, and control of raw material supplies. Fear of exhaustion of domestic reserves has always been one excuse for the aggressiveness of U.S. oil companies in search of foreign concessions. A similar situation is driving the copper trusts, the aluminium trust, and great steel trusts to take more interest abroad. The House of Morgan, with its great interests in the motor-car, steel, copper, and chemical industries, has now added incentives for intervention in foreign affairs, apart from its already huge banking, insurance, and electric power and telecommunications interests.

U.S. business has been using up native American resources at a phenomenal and wasteful rate. Just as the economics of American lumbering and farming led to mining of the soil and destruction of its natural fertility, so American mining methods have resulted in ruthless exploitation of existing reserves for the sake of immediate profit. Now the heads of the trusts are worrying over the early exhaustion at present levels of technique, of reserves of bauxite, lead and zinc, oil, copper, and high-grade iron ore. All of these, on the basis of known reserves and present consumption rates, will be exhausted inside twenty years; the non-ferrous metals inside ten. This is leading to feverish activity in two directions. Field staffs and geologists are stepping up surveys to find new fields and ore beds. Research staffs are working out processes to use lower-grade ores and raw-material supplies. Thus U.S. scientists are working on pilot-plant methods of extracting aluminium from china clay, and iron from magnetic taconite.

But while this work is going on, the trusts are reaching out to get control of foreign supplies. Already the U.S. aluminium industry is largely dependent on foreign, especially South American, supplies of bauxite. The copper trusts have long been deeply interested in Mexican and Andean mines. Now they are muscling in on the formerly British monopoly in Africa. The activities of the oil trusts in Arabia, Iran, and North China are too well-known to require further comment. The steel trusts are now entering the field. Until the Second World War, the Mesabi Range in Minnesota satisfied their needs for high-grade ore. Their interest in Canadian, Labrador, and South American iron ores was long range, if not academic. It is now much more close and real. The interests associated with the Republic Steel Corporation (the so-called Cleveland interest group, one of the big five trust groupings) have already acquired Canadian iron ore, taking the bulk of the output of the Steep Rock development, which was given high priority and financial assistance by the Canadian Government as a war measure to develop Canadian iron and steel production (itself largely in the hands of subsidiaries of the American trusts). Long-range plans of the U.S. steel industry are considering what will be necessary to re-orient the industry on South American, Canadian, and Labrador supplies. Labrador ores, for example, require development of the St. Lawrence waterways, at present held up by Canadian opposition. The fate of Newfoundland, too, has a bearing on the problem.

It is obvious from the above that it is not for nothing that the trusts have taken a firmer hold on the U.S. administration. In the early days of the Roosevelt regime, the Du Pont family led the opposition to F.D.R. within the Democratic Party, and sponsored the notorious Liberty League to oppose the New Deal policies. The Du Ponts never broke with the Democratic Party. It was undoubtedly their wing that led the fight against Wallace for Vice-President, and promoted the Missouri stooge who now occupies the American Presidency. And the Du Pont trust did very well out of the Second World War. Apart from the expansion of its original chemical and explosives interests, its General Motors Corporation received the greatest total of contracts from the U.S. Government, nearly 8 per cent of the total, and more than twice as much as the next nearest recipient. The trust itself was given the \$500 million contract to develop and manufacture plutonium for the atom bomb. The House of Morgan has friends and associates in many branches of the U.S. administration. The railway king and banker Harriman succeeded Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, while he himself was succeeded as Ambassador to Britain by the head of a Morgan-controlled insurance

company. The American Ambassador to the Vatican, and Chairman of the State Department's Committee on Post-war Foreign Economic Policy, is Myron Taylor, a director of the Morgan U.S. Steel Corporation. A new appointee to the State Department, to succeed Dean Acheson, is Robt. A. Lovett, whose father was associated with the Harriman railroad empire, and who himself received his training in the banking firm of Brown Bros. Harriman.

Although the largest 200 corporations in the U.S. utterly dominate its economy, effective control is even more narrow. The interests of the 60 most wealthy families penetrate every aspect of American business, education, and social institutions. Even narrower than that is the control exercised by the interests of the House of Morgan, the Du Pont, Rockefeller, and Mellon families, and the "Cleveland group." And just as the power behind the rise of Hitler in Germany was the Stinnes Trust, the Krupps family, and the chemical and electrical trusts, so in the U.S.A. the well-spring of the drive to reaction is the big five.

The trusts control the sources of information of the American people. Through their hold on the universities by their endowments and foundations (Carnegie, Rockefeller, Guggenheim, Mellon, etc.), they exercise an all-pervasive influence on the intellectual atmosphere and the direction of research. Their interests in the newspaper and publishing field give them control over the important organs of public opinion. Thus the House of Morgan controls the powerful Time-Life Inc., has interests in *Collier's Weekly* and the *American Magazine*, and is closely connected with the *New York Herald-Tribune*. Through the Phelps-Dodge Corporation it controls the leading newspapers of Arizona. Through the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation it exerts a wide influence on the Press and public opinion.

"The Bell System (of the American Telephone and Telegraph) has spent large sums on advertising, propaganda, and other public relations activities. Its annual advertising budget, in the years from 1927 to 1935, fluctuated between 4,372,000 dollars and 7,477,000 dollars. In several cases it is said to have purchased space for the purpose of influencing the editorial policy of the journals which it employed. Contracts for printing telephone directories are said to have been let to high bidders for political reasons. Between 1925 and 1934, the Bell companies and Western Electric spent nearly 5,000,000 dollars on membership dues and contributions to business, professional, scientific, social, and athletic clubs. The associated companies have sought the friendship of local bankers; in 1935 they had money on deposit in 26 per cent of all the

banks in the United States. The system has financed lecturers, subsidised the publication of books, and produced motion pictures in an effort to cultivate good will." (*Competition and Monopoly in American Industry*: U.S. Senate Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, p. 85.)

Both directly through the big radio companies, and indirectly through the influence of their advertising contracts, the trusts control American broadcasting. Their advertising interests give them the power to exert terrific pressure on newspapers and the radio. The Du Pont interests, for example, control six to seven full pages of advertisements in a 200-page issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*.

The trusts control most of the sources of information about America that are available to the British people. But how deeply-rooted is suspicion of the trusts and their aims can be gauged in part from the hysterical lengths to which their propaganda must go in order to mask them. And how widespread is the opposition to them is reflected in the extreme measures to which they are being driven to ensure their political control of the United States.

THE GREAT BASIC QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY

Science Versus Idealism. (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 12s. 6d.)

AS ITS TITLE INDICATES, Maurice Cornforth's book is a contribution to what Engels described, more than fifty years ago, as "the great basic question of all philosophy . . . that concerning the relation of thinking and being," which splits the philosophers into the two camps of idealism and materialism. More specifically it is a Marxist critique of a school of contemporary writers who, while dismissing most previous philosophy as meaningless "metaphysics," claim to be the exponents of a radically new and scientific philosophy, Logical Positivism.

Unfortunately for the general reader, to whom clearly the book as a whole is addressed, these philosophers have found it necessary to invent a "radically new" kind of language in order to express their ideas; a farrago of pidgin English and symbolical formulae which, as Cornforth says, makes any examination of their philosophy "an involved and difficult process." When Wittgenstein, for example, one of their most venerated spokesmen, solemnly asserts that: "What solipsism means is quite correct, only it cannot be said," one is prepared to accept his further dictum: "He who understands

me . . . must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it" (p. 159), but one cannot help wondering whether one's journey would be really necessary. Or again, it is difficult to believe that Carnap, the most recent exponent of Logical Positivism, has established a useful criterion for distinguishing "statements from pseudo-statements in philosophy" by elaborating a "formal mode" of language in contrast to the commonsense or "material mode." For in order to translate the statement that: "A thing is a complex of atoms" from the material mode into the formal mode, which alone ensures "absolute safety," one is reduced to asserting that: "Every sentence in which a thing-designation occurs is equipollent to a sentence in which space-time co-ordinates and certain descriptive functors (of physics) occur," (pp. 174-5).

But though these examples of logical positivist writing—and they can be multiplied indefinitely—may at first sight appear to be ample justification for dismissing them out of hand, Marxists cannot afford to do so. For when Bertrand Russell, whom Cornforth declares (not quite correctly, I would have thought) to be "the principal founder" of their views, set out to substitute "piecemeal, detailed, and verifiable results for large untested generalities, recommended only by a certain appeal to the imagination" (p. 98), he was, in fact, voicing "the protest of science and commonsense against the belated disciples of German idealism" (p. 99), who for fifty years or more had been the official academic spokesmen of philosophy in England. And it is a weakness of Cornforth's book that he does not develop this point more fully. Had he done so, and, in doing so, brought out more clearly the nature of the contribution to philosophical thought that they were attempting, however misguidedly and ineffectively, to make, the full social and political significance of his own painstaking and annihilating critique of them would have been more apparent.

This, however, is one of the real difficulties that confronts the Marxist polemicist in every field; a difficulty that arises from the ignorant neglect of Marxist methodology by its opponents. When, for instance, Keynes in *The General Theory, Etc.*, (1936) initiated the "revolution" in modern bourgeois economics, he attributed the signal failure of orthodox economics "for purposes of scientific prediction" to the fact that "professional economists, after Malthus, were apparently unmoved by the lack of correspondence between the results of their theory and the facts of observation." In effect, he was only repeating what Marx had already asserted some sixty years earlier of Ricardo's successors, that: "In place of disinterested enquirers, there were hired prizefighters; in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetic." But

though Keynes criticised his predecessors for being unscientific, he was not prepared to press his criticism to its logical conclusion. Had he done so, he would have been obliged to face the fact that the point at which capitalist economists ceased to be scientific was precisely the point at which, rather than face the social or class issues involved, they abandoned the materialist basis of political economy. As a result, not only is his critique superficial, but, by taking over the fantastic pseudo-scientific conceptual paraphernalia of the economists he was condemning, he made it more difficult for Marxists either to assimilate what is of positive value in his critique or to get to grips with what is false.

The Logical Positivists confront Cornforth with an analogous difficulty. Because in their critique of idealism they burke the fundamental question of "the relation of thinking and being," and instead attempt to restrict philosophy at first to logical analysis, and later, in the work of Carnap, to the analysis of language, they oblige their critics either to condemn them out of hand as ideological reactionaries, or to follow them into the morass of "speech-thinking" and "linguistic forms." By doing the latter, Cornforth has done a very real service to Marxism. It has enabled him to show beyond question that "despite its 'scientific' and even 'materialistic' pretensions [Logical Positivism] is only a variant of the old Berkeleyan pure empiricism" (p. 226); or in other words is only the most recent, fashionable hide-out of idealism. This was a necessary job, and my only criticism of this part of the book is that it does not more clearly show *why* it was necessary.

This polemic with the logical positivists takes up less than half the book, however. The first hundred pages provide a summary, but extremely stimulating, review of the growing impact of the natural sciences on bourgeois philosophy in Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. This will be of the greatest help to all students of Marxism, especially Chapters 3 and 4 which discuss the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume. Here the issue between idealism and materialism is clearly posed as it first emerged in its modern form; and is shown to hinge on conflicting theories of knowledge, a conflict which can only be resolved by dialectical materialism. These two Chapters, together with Chapter 6, which is a critique of pure empiricism, serve as an admirable introduction not only to Cornforth's criticism of Logical Positivism, but also to Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio Criticism*.

Less satisfactory are Chapter 5, which attempts to deal with Kant and the nineteenth-century agnostics in a dozen pages, and suffers

from compression; and Chapter 2, which devotes only six pages to the problems, crucial for a Marxist study, of the social roots of materialism and of the interrelations of science, religion, and philosophy. Much could be said for making this the opening chapter of the book; and more for revising and expanding it. It is surely not sound Marxism to speak of the capitalists having "first established their right . . . to expand their capital and activities *within feudal society*" "in the course of a long series of *revolutions*" (p. 35). While to assert that materialist philosophy "*absolutely smashed* the old scholastic forms of thought" (p. 34), or that "the rise of the capitalists . . . led to the *triumph* of science over church authority" (p. 36) is certainly much too sweeping an account of the impact of science on religion in the seventeenth century.

One other weakness in this first part of the book, all the more serious because it could so easily have been remedied, is the almost complete absence of dates. Apart from the convenience to the general reader of knowing when Bacon and Hobbes and Locke were writing, it is of considerable significance for the more specialised student to be aware of the actual date of publication of the various works by Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap; and it is misleading to find Kant and Mach lumped together in the same chapter with nothing to indicate that they are separated by a century crowded with scientific achievement.

These criticisms are superficial, however, in comparison with the very real value of the whole of this first part as an introduction to the study of philosophy. But it is the final chapter, one of the longest in the book, in which Cornforth introduces "some considerations about the foundations, methods, and meaning of science," that I personally found to be the most stimulating. Here, it seems to me, though as yet somewhat tentatively, he opens up new fields of philosophical inquiry by relating the problems of philosophy to the tremendous advances that are being made in the natural sciences in our own time. And by so doing he rescues philosophy from the private asylums to which the bourgeois philosophers are condemning it and shows how it can be used by ordinary men and women in the struggle of progress against reaction. Reading this chapter I realised more clearly what Engels meant when he said: "It is from the history of nature and of human society that the laws of dialectic are abstracted. For they are nothing else but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development." (*Dialectics of Nature*, p. 26.) There is, however, one statement I would dissent from: that "the historian can perform no experiments" (p. 243). For, in the sense that all Marxists are necessarily historians,

they are today performing no less an experiment than building a new world. And to this purpose Cornforth's book contributes a solid and useful brick.

DOUGLAS GARMAN

A PLANNER EXPLAINS

Central Planning and Control in War and Peace.

Sir Oliver Franks. 2s. 6d.

THE EXPERIENCE OF BRITAIN'S WAR ECONOMY, the advent of a Labour Government pledged to planning, and a heavy increase in understanding by the mass of the people of what is going on in the Soviet Union and now in Eastern Europe, have all naturally provoked a powerful and continuous counterblast against planning from the Right and from all the circles concerned to preserve and defend capitalism. Mingling with this, however, one or two new notes can now be detected. The recent Tory economic programme, for example, is at pains to stress its agreement with much of the Labour Government's programme, and especially to stress the need for planning. Now three lectures delivered earlier in the year to the London School of Economics by Sir Oliver Franks have appeared in book form.

Sir Oliver Franks is a professor of philosophy and provost of Queen's College, Oxford. But the interest of his lectures lies in the fact that during the Second World War, and for a year after, he occupied various key positions in, and was eventually permanent head of, the Ministry of Supply, the key economic department. His views are, therefore, based on first-hand experience, and what is more may be regarded as reflecting the views of the highest official circles. They are, therefore, worth examination.

Before proceeding, however, it is important to avoid the confusion which bedevils much of the discussion about economic planning, by getting clear what is the nature of the economic system it is proposed to plan.

Although attempts are made from many different quarters to obscure this single fact, the British economic system is capitalist. This means, basically, three things: that the means of production—i.e., factories, land, machinery, raw materials, are owned by a small and definite class in society; that the mass of the people are wage labourers—i.e., that they own no capital in the sense of means of production and have nothing to sell but their labour power or ability to work; and that production is carried on for private profit by a

great many producers operating independently of one another. A given piece of production takes place when, and only when, the individual producer, or capitalist, can see a profit. This is the real significance of the profit motive, and profit in this sense is obviously fundamentally different from anything that is described as "profit" earned by the wage worker, operating, for example, on piecework. Confusion between profit in the two senses generally follows from the use of the term at all in the second sense; its use in this sense is generally, of course, by those whose aim is to create confusion.

Under Socialism, the means of production are not privately but socially owned and are, therefore, at the disposal of the State. It follows first that profit (or any other income from property ownership) cannot exist, and second, that production takes place or not at the initiative, in the last analysis, of the State. Consequently an economic plan is not only possible, but essential.

The foregoing brief analysis shows that central economic planning has an entirely different significance under Socialism and under capitalism. In the former case, it is the determinant of all production, or at least all production is determined within its framework. In the latter case, except to the extent that the State owns an industry, whether or not production takes place is dependent on private entrepreneurs who take their decisions in the light of the profit motive. Consequently the State can, through an economic plan, affect only indirectly these decisions, and control only indirectly the use of economic resources. But it cannot take the actual decisions themselves.

It is of vital importance to make these distinctions, but this does not in any way mean that an economic plan is not vitally important in capitalist Britain today, just as it was vitally important in war.

Sir Oliver Franks, unfortunately, seems to be unaware of these distinctions. There is no mention of the term "capitalism" or, indeed, evidence of awareness of its characteristics. He devotes his first lecture to an examination of the essentials of wartime planning and control, taking as an illustration the planning of raw-material supplies. He describes the three bodies responsible, the Combined Raw Materials Board in Washington, and the Shipping and Materials Committees in London, and how they operated. The procedure was very simple. An estimate was prepared of supplies available, shipping, or a particular raw material, as the case may have been, in a future period. Representatives of the various claimants for supplies attended the Committee; for example, when the Materials Committee were allocating copper representatives of the Service Supply Departments and, on behalf of essential civilian needs, the Board of Trade would appear. The Committee would allocate supplies in relation to

demands made by those present, who, subject on rare occasions to appeals to Ministers, would feel bound by decisions finally taken after full discussion.

After the planning came control, as Sir Oliver Franks correctly stresses. This he considers under two heads. The first he calls the verification of fact, by means of returns and statistical forms. The second he describes as measures to ensure enactment, either by agreement or by compulsion, such as the licensing of distribution, the control of acquisition and stocks by public purchase, and in the last resort the wholesale planning of and participating in production.

So far there can be no disagreement, except to note one significant fact, that Government purchase, and, indeed, the overwhelming importance of the Government as the market for so large a proportion of everything produced, is dealt with almost casually as if merely something important, but no more important than many other things.

Sir Oliver concludes his first lecture with the reasons why he believes that whatever the form of Government, central planning must continue. He stresses continually that: "From the point of view from which I am speaking the issue between private ownership and public ownership is of secondary importance" (p. 19). His first reason is the need for military security. "Politically the world is still composed of sovereign national States" (p. 20). Secondly, there is the fear by governments of large-scale unemployment. Thirdly, there is the general condition of the world: "... This is the world in which the United Kingdom will find itself, a hard world for developing and maintaining a large export trade" (p. 22).

Planning and control to serve the military needs of a still powerful imperialism; to save the Government from the wrath of a people who are liable to be unemployed, and to push exports in a fiercely competitive world against rival imperialisms! How similar this programme is to that of another imperialism which believed in "planning and control" and which found itself in difficulties in 1933.

In his second lecture, Sir Oliver deals with planning in peace-time. He begins with a somewhat tedious discussion about how planning and control are normal characteristics of all reasonable practical activity and cites the planning of her activities by the housewife, or the planning of business activities by a Board of Directors. He would have been saved a lot of time and penetrated further into the heart of the subject if he had read the succinct passage written by Engels more than half a century earlier:

"The contradiction between socialised production and capitalistic appropriation now presents itself as an antagonism between the

organisation of production in the individual workshop and the anarchy of production in society generally." (*Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, p. 59.)

The argument then proceeds along a somewhat turgid course, during which some of the more obvious objections to planning are disposed of; in which it is stressed that all large bureaucratic organisations tend to become woolly, inert, and rigid, but that such organisations are not found only in Government departments; and finally that the eqds of peacetime are more varied and complex than those of war. Such a conclusion is, indeed, obvious, but no attempt is made to find out what these ends are. Yet they are not far to seek. The British people voted unmistakably in 1945 for peace and the independence of their country, for the re-equipment of industry, for a higher standard of life, including more food, houses, clothes, and schools. Such ends are attainable, given first a plan, and second unity and determination on the part of the people in the face of their enemies. But obviously there can be scant hope of a plan if the objectives of a plan are wrapped in semi-philosophic mystification.

Sir Oliver next deals with the problems of the relation between Government and business. He says, quite correctly: "The organisation required by central planning and control in peace has no chance of success if it is composed of masters and servants, of men acting with authority and men acting under authority" (p. 39). Yet the significance which he attaches to this statement and that which the working class would attach are soon shown to be widely different.

In the first place he considers that there must not be too much authority exercised by the Government on businessmen. In fact, as the extremely shrunken section on "control" in this lecture shows, he thinks there must be far fewer statistical returns, while for compulsion must be substituted agreement, "the long way round of democratic procedure." In the second place the method of voluntary discussion, of "two-way traffic," applies to the relationship between Government and business, and is not intended to apply to the workers. Indeed, the only reference to their existence is when, in order to lessen the burden on the Civil Service, the setting up of groups of industrialists is advocated, which, Sir Oliver suggests patronisingly, "would be strengthened if an academic economist and a trade unionist were also included" (p. 55).

This last refinement, along with a number of others, comes in the third and last lecture. But enough has been said to indicate the general thesis. There can, of course be no doubt of the overwhelming importance and urgency of an economic plan for Britain now. At the

same time, it is vitally important to be on guard against many self-styled "planners," especially those who claim to be non-political, and who regard capitalism as merely a term of abuse.

JOHN EAST

LOOKING AHEAD

By HARRY POLLITT

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COMMUNIST REVIEW

SEPTEMBER
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

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THE CRISIS

The speeches of Ministers in the Commons debate, and still more the Prime Minister's broadcast, show that the Labour Government, as at present constituted, is quite unable to overcome the very real difficulties facing our country. The crisis is a crisis of policy. The first "sacrifice" required is that the Government be compelled to sacrifice the policy that has brought us to this pass, and the men directly responsible for it. The second "sacrifice" is to throw overboard the illusion of a dollar remedy, and with it the half-hearted, futile measures that postpone but do not overcome our difficulties.

Once the ground is cleared in this way, Britain can save herself, in association with the countries of the Empire and the democratic world. The policy to achieve this, and the case for it, is set out in Harry Pollitt's new book, LOOKING AHEAD. This has come out at just the right moment. Our fight is a fight for this policy, with and through the Labour movement. Our victory will be all the speedier the more we study the book and the more widely we sell it.

EMILE BURNS

A TRADE UNION GENERAL STAFF

THE HISTORY OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT reflects the struggle of the working class in every phase of industrial development. It is a fascinating story of working-class resourcefulness in an ever-changing industrial structure, requiring new combinations of forces to meet the higher forms of capital concentration as capitalism in Britain progressed from small-scale enterprise to the great monopolies of the present day. The strength and mobility of the trade unions fluctuated, but the hard core of working-class determination remained steadfast in success and defeat, making advances when conditions were favourable and retreating only in face of overwhelming odds, to remobilise for the next phase of the struggle. Steeled in the struggles of a century and a half the trade union movement has grown in stature and become a political force of supreme importance in the period in which we live.

Direct action was the main weapon in the arsenal of the workers. The right to strike for a fair share in the products of their labour and against increased exploitation by an arrogant, profit-seeking capitalist class is a heritage which can never be relinquished under a capitalist system of production. But the struggles took other "political" forms

in which the working class sought to challenge the privileges of the ruling class in the legislative and administrative institutions of capitalist society. It was out of these struggles that the Labour Party was born and in less than half a century has become the Party in power. Trade union membership and organisation are the basis on which the Labour Party has developed and the trade unions cannot escape responsibility for a disappointing political leadership organically inseparable from the capitalist interests it was built up to challenge.

Even today, when the hopes and aspirations of the trade union and Labour movement for a Labour Government in power have been realised, this organic combination of the leaders with the forces of reaction is expressed all too clearly in the foreign policy of the Government and in its all-too-friendly consideration for the exponents of capitalist "free enterprise." To combat this policy and to revivify the enthusiasm of the Socialist pioneers who gave their all in the building of the Labour Party is a job of work to be done by the more far-seeing in the Labour movement, and especially by the Communist Party.

The adaptability of the working class to changing conditions requiring new methods of struggle has already been remarked on, and this quality would be evidenced to a greater degree at the present time if it were given a fuller opportunity to express itself. Defence of existing living standards and the struggle for higher and better standards and conditions is even more an obligation of the unions than in years gone by. But new conditions require new methods, and to rely on the traditional methods of struggle is to ignore the new relationship of which the return of a Labour Government to power is symptomatic. It also ignores the real character of the crisis, the solution of which is of no less interest to the unions than it is to the Government, since the improvement of living standards is conditional on a solution of the crisis and the means by which it is accomplished.

Improved living standards require that the relationship of wages to profits is adjusted in favour of wages, but it requires a great deal more. Britain's crisis is a crisis of shortages—shortage of consumer and capital goods—shortage of production capacity whereby the goods can be produced for home consumption and for export, so that the goods which our own industries are unable to provide may be obtained from abroad; and shortage of manpower in our basic industries. To increase production is, therefore, an obvious necessity, but it must be regulated to maintain a balance in a regulated economy. The struggle for improved living standards is a struggle for higher wages and increased production, and in such a situation the trade unions must find the means to accomplish both.

Reduced to a simple formula, our whole future depends on the

initiative and energy of working people, plus a plan. There is no distinction between manual, technical, scientific, or administrative workers in this formula. All are equally necessary in finding a solution to Britain's problem of rescuing the basic industries from the decrepit condition into which capitalist mismanagement, aggravated by the ravages of war, allowed them to lapse, and of giving to existing social forms of production a new social purpose, and to the people a new Socialist way of life. An economic plan in Britain that will give full scope to working-class initiative will get the responses that a poster appeal to "Work or Want" will never get.

It is now six months since the second of the Government White Papers on Britain's crisis outlined the general requirements for a planned development of our industrial resources, and planning is still without form, yet Britain's crisis grows daily more grave. Labour's programme for full employment and social security is in danger of misfiring unless there is a speedy mobilisation of Britain's people within the framework of a plan which will enthuse the workers in every sphere of industry. A mere appeal to work harder will not ring a bell. Years of propaganda that boom and slump are inevitable within capitalist society have taken deep root in the minds of the working people, and it will take more than mere words to convince them that the Labour Government can or will succeed in solving the contradictions which cause periodic unemployment. Until planning ceases to be a subject for talk only, and assumes practical form, scepticism will continue to be a brake on production.

Scepticism is not removed by the activities of Working Parties, the setting up of Advisory Committees in engineering and other industries, or even by the establishment of the Planning Board—none of them having any attachment with the workers on the machine, the bench, or the foundry floor. Some feeling exists that there are too many national bodies without any authority, and of which very little is known by the workpeople immediately concerned with their activities. A National Planning Board or Industrial Advisory Committee cannot impress the workers unless there is co-ordination at the top, and with some parallel organisation at all levels of industry, bringing the workpeople themselves into active co-partnership in the preparation and conduct of a plan. All the national advisory bodies set up can give useful service and probably do. They may fit into the framework of a planning organisation, but any planning body must have authority to prepare a plan and give directives for carrying it out, without restraints from vested interests only concerned with the profit return and not with the social purpose of production in a planned economy.

Planning does not, of course, merely consist of preparing production

targets and issuing directives for their fulfilment. Production targets there must be, based on a full assessment of how existing resources are to be used so that economic recovery may be assured. Such assurance will only accompany a balanced production of the capital and consumption goods on the basis of well-defined priorities. For this a balanced distribution of the labour force is of supreme importance, which means finding a solution to the problem of the undermanned industries.

A great deal has been written and spoken about incentive to attract labour into the undermanned industries, but there has never yet been a clearly-defined wage policy by the trade union movement such as would give reality to the declaration of Ministers and trade union executives on this question. Most of the unions immediately interested in these industries have formulated and pressed for wage claims. Some of the unions have given serious and constructive attention, as in the case of the Miners and the Foundry Unions, to the question of improved conditions and amenities and better health facilities, so as to make the industries concerned more attractive. Objection is expressed to a defined wage policy by the Labour Government on the grounds that it would interfere with the normal practice of collective bargaining and destroy the trade unions. But the Government has defined its policy on equal pay (a policy which is at variance with the declared views of the Labour Party itself and of the T.U.C.), and must in the normal course of events define a wage policy for the nationalised industries. No one expects any serious consequences to the unions interested in the nationalised industries, or that there will be less interest in the trade unions concerned. A wage policy must have some relationship to the national economy and to the needs of the workers in industry as a whole. In other words a National Wage Policy is required so as to obtain a balanced production which will give a general all-round increase of production with emphasis on given priorities, so that an all-round improvement of living standards may be realised. To fully man the mines, foundries, and other undermanned basic industries is, therefore, a matter of primary importance. Short of direction of labour, which under conditions when labour is still a "commodity" would defeat its purpose, the obvious and only practical solution is a clearly-defined wages policy that affords an inducement both to retain the present labour force and to attract new entrants. There are broader aspects of the problem which can only be solved by placing restrictions on the socially-undesirable occupations, and on some of the luxury trades, and by reducing the armed forces to proportions in keeping with a real Socialist foreign policy.

Wage considerations are very much influenced by inter-union

rivalries, the fruits of an outdated trade union structure with inevitable inter-union conflict from overlapping of membership and with each union jealous of any relative advantages obtained in respect of wage standards or working conditions. Gone also are the days when the British trade unions could obtain for their members relatively favourable conditions in ratio to the working class in the less advanced capitalist countries. Such advantages were won when British capitalism was largely maintained on the tribute from its Colonial Empire. This situation is now very radically changed and Britain must in future depend on its own resources if economic stability is to be assured. In these circumstances relative advantages in a wage return must be in favour of workers in the undermanned basic industries, on whom so much depends for a solution to Britain's crisis.

A wage policy guided by the Government and related to the needs of the nation is unlikely to materialise until the question is first resolved by the trade unions. The Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions has decided to make application for a "New Wage Structure," but at the time of writing the exact form of the proposed new structure is not known, except that basic improvements are asked for, including consolidation of the national bonus into basic rates. No attention is given in this presentation to the problem of the undermanned industries, nor is it a problem which any one union or group of unions in allied trades can fully resolve. Unless there is agreement in the National Councils of the trade unions, confirmed by the T.U.C. itself, whereby authority is given to the General Council of the T.U.C. to work out a national wages policy corresponding to national needs in consultation with the Labour Government, a dangerous delay in obtaining a balanced distribution of the labour force is bound to result.

The new relationship of the trade unions to the Government brings new responsibilities and new tasks. Problems of production, manpower, wages, profits, are all inter-related and expressed concretely in the need for an overall plan. If the trade unions are to take their full share in planning and to represent the real interests of their members there must be an end to all those variances of policy which divide the movement in face of the greatest crisis that has ever menaced the British working class.

Out of the struggles following the First World War came the demand for a General Staff to co-ordinate trade union policy and promote unity in face of the capitalist onslaught on working-class standards. In this post-war period following the Second World War new problems and new tasks demand even closer unity and even greater co-ordination of trade union effort and policy. New struggles

demand new weapons, and a part-time General Staff meeting at intervals, each member having a multitude of other commitments much too onerous and diversified, is no longer adequate. If the trade union movement is to take its full part in building the foundations of a planned economy which alone can ensure victory over the forces of reaction, there must be a General Staff fully equipped and given authority to direct the movement on a policy democratically decided by the organised workers.

How a full-time General Staff is to be appointed is not easy to decide, yet the need is great, and all obstacles to such a development must be overcome. A full-time administrative sub-committee of the T.U.C. General Council, composed of experienced leaders of the affiliated unions who will give their undivided attention to the job, could be elected by the Annual Congress. Every important industry must be directly represented on the General Council itself, much more effectively than the present distribution of places permits. Each member of the full-time sub-committee must in turn be directly responsible for a group of industries so that every industry is constantly under review and its particular problems are examined in relation to the general problems of reconstruction for a planned economy. Only by some such reorganisation of the General Staff will it be possible for the trade union movement to take its full part in the economic, social and political life of the nation, and to represent the interests of the membership in such a manner as will ensure a real revival of working-class initiative and enthusiasm in the task of building a new life in which full employment and social security will become a reality.

Proposals for vesting more authority in the General Council of the T.U.C. will meet with opposition for probably varied reasons. In some unions arguments will be used against relinquishing executive powers to a centralised authority and creating a bureaucracy with a remote control. Certainly the danger of bureaucracy has to be guarded against, and more democracy is not only required in the General Council of the trade union movement, but also in some of the individual unions. These are problems which can be resolved if there is the will to strengthen the movement for the supreme effort in building a planned economy.

Every trade, craft, or industry has particular problems of its own requiring specialised trade union service from an executive administration having intimate knowledge of its technique and practice. When dealing with the broader and more general questions, which are now so much a part of trade union effort and responsibility, it is necessary to pool this knowledge and experience in the general interest; but it is equally necessary that the leadership should not be immersed

in the sectional problems and administration of individual unions.

Trade union rivalry is an obstacle to unity and goodwill, stifling the initiative of working people and sowing dissension at every level of trade union activity. When it intrudes into the deliberations of the General Staff of the movement it is an even more serious obstacle to unity since it prevents progress in formulating a policy for the general advancement of working-class interests on which unity can be assured. Yet in the final analysis no individual union can derive any ultimate gain to its members over its rivals by exploiting any particular circumstance favourable to itself. Failure to solve Britain's economic crisis will have equally disastrous consequences to the membership of all the unions. There is a greater danger to the working class from failure to cement trade union organisation and policy in relation to the basic problems of our time with a leadership freed from all restraints of individual union administration than can possibly occur from relinquishing its very doubtful advantage of individual union executive authority to a reconstituted General Staff of the movement on matters of general interest.

It cannot be repeated too often that this country is faced with the most serious economic crisis of its history, the solution of which, with a Labour Government in power, is the supreme test of the leadership of the trade union and Labour movement. The price of success will be exacting, but the price of failure is too terrible to contemplate. The deepening of the economic crisis is already reflected in a political crisis which is in reality a crisis of leadership, and the trade unions must share responsibility. If worse is to be averted the trade union movement must adjust itself to the situation. The General Staff of the movement must be capable of objective examination and decision on the pressing problems of industrial reorganisation viewed from the standpoint of general interest, otherwise a planned economy is impossible. The conclusion is inescapable, either the trade union movement accepts the logic of the present situation or it is doomed to ineptitude and futility.

If this presentation of the problem provokes argument and discussion and brings out suggestions for the improvement of the T.U.C. General Council it will have served its purpose. These are matters which should receive the deepest consideration of all, executive and rank-and-file members alike. Every suggestion for the strengthening of trade union leadership should be made welcome and examined from the standpoint of whether it will bring unity of purpose, co-ordinating the movement on a policy and programme for a planned development of our natural and industrial resources within the framework of an overall plan for the building of a Socialist Britain.

IS YOUR SOCIALISM REALLY NECESSARY?

THE SECOND EDITION OF A BOOK ON "democratic Socialism" might not seem to call for particular notice. The re-issue in a slightly revised form of Mr. Douglas Jay's *The Socialist Case* is, however, of considerable significance. Mr. Jay is not only a Member of Parliament and prominent in the Fabian hierarchy. For a year before his election at North Battersea he was economic adviser to the Prime Minister, who contributes a foreword to his book; while for the greater part of the Second World War he occupied a senior position as a temporary Civil Servant in the Board of Trade. These last two experiences have given him, he claims, the opportunity of testing out the theories he evolved as an academic economist before the Second World War.

Part I of Mr. Jay's book brings out fairly clearly the basic facts of poverty, inequality, and insecurity in capitalist Britain and continues with a semi-philosophical disquisition on utilities, needs, satisfaction, choice, etc., on which no time need be wasted. Part II was about the capitalist system in the first edition, but is now about something called "*laissez-faire*". It is along lines made familiar to students of "imperfect competition" theory. The argument proceeds to the conclusion that "the case against *laissez-faire*" depends on the combination of unequal and unearned incomes, inheritance, and the haphazard effects of the free-price scramble. Much of the argument is, indeed, very sound. It derives largely from Mrs. Barbara Wootton, one of the most progressive bourgeois economists, who has seen through many of the superficialities and sophistries of academic economics. But such economists, Mr. Jay included, do not more than hack vigorously at the leaves and the branches; their axes are not strong enough to tackle the trunk, still less the roots. Indeed, there is a strong suspicion that they are rotten, like this tree.

Part III is about the "trade cycle," its causes, and what to do about it. Here we are on familiar "Keynesian" grounds. In the first edition, the remedies lay in the sphere of "monetary policy." The same remedies are now rechristened "employment policy." The heterodoxy of yesterday becomes the orthodoxy of today.

Part IV deals with Socialist policy. (No doubt it will prove possible to eliminate the disagreeable adjective in the third edition.) What, then, does Mr. Jay mean by "Socialism"? To arrive at the answer to this question, it is first necessary to establish what he means by "capitalism." The word itself, as we have seen, is superseded. "It

now seems to me best to use the words '*laissez-faire*' rather than 'capitalism,' 'competition,' 'free enterprise,' the 'market economy,' or the 'price system'" (p. xiii). Having defined modern capitalism to his satisfaction, Mr. Jay, as we have already noted, does describe quite correctly many of its evil consequences and his discussion, for example, of how competition inevitably turns to monopoly (pp. 106-8) is admirable. Much more important in Mr. Jay's eyes, however, are the existence of unearned incomes and, still more, inherited incomes.

"Inheritance is at once the chief cause of inequality and of the resulting poverty, and the most indefensible of all the trappings of *laissez-faire* capitalism. The payment of inherited incomes is not socially justifiable, *because the recipients make no real effort of sacrifice in return* (our italics). . . . The central aim, at any rate, of Socialists must be the abolition of all inherited incomes rather than all large incomes or all incomes that can be called profit" (pp. 193-94)

At this point Mr. Jay's argument is not altogether clear, but he appears to believe first in "waiting" and in the "effort and sacrifices" involved in not consuming in order to create capital; second, that these functions can be taken over by the State; and third, that "risk bearing" is properly a function, not of the State, but of the private individual. On the other hand, as the italicised passage just quoted shows, it is the inheritors and the recipients of unearned incomes who make no efforts and sacrifices; presumably, therefore, other recipients of profit incomes do.

Despite the confusion, made still worse by the discussion of the supposed Marxist view on these questions (pp. 118-19), the general thesis is clear. Exploitation of wage labour by the capitalist is both defensible and necessary. Certain types of profit incomes are morally indefensible. Therefore, let us abolish inheritance and redistribute incomes by taxation. Mr. Jay's error is a simple one: accumulation is an integral part of the capitalist system. Moreover, it has been the historic rôle of capitalist accumulation to develop enormously the forces of production and thus pave the way for Socialism. Nevertheless, capitalists accumulate not because they are either possessed of a social conscience or are perverse, or because they cannot consume, or because, noble fellows, they make a great "sacrifice" and "wait." They accumulate because they have to in order to cheapen production and keep going in the race for profits. But Mr. Jay is guilty of more than an intellectual error. He also unfortunately adds his weight to those who inveigh against the financiers and protect the "enter-

prising" or "productive" capitalists, in order to divert attention from the real nature of the capitalist system.

In the light of Mr. Jay's characterisation (it can only be called a "characterisation," since there is no clear definition or scientific description) of capitalism, it is hardly surprising to learn that private ownership of the means of production is of scant significance. But the climax of the argument is an astonishing piece of effrontery:

"The official Marxist definition of Socialism denotes a state of affairs which could be perfectly compatible with all the most unbridled abuses of private capitalism. Socialism, by this definition, means the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. But supposing, as might happen under the Marxist definition, that the State owned all the means of production, but that at the same time there was a class of rich rentiers living entirely on the interest on Government securities, and handling them on freely up to 100 per cent to their children . . ." (p. 196).

Mr. Jay has, of course, calmly thrown over the key demand of the working class all over the capitalist world; a demand which has been part and parcel of the official programme of the British Labour movement for half a century, and which is enshrined in the Labour Party constitution in the phrase "common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange." At the same time he has turned the payment of compensation, which is social democracy's contribution to nationalisation, against the Marxists, who have always argued that the ex-owners have no conceivable right to a single penny, but are prepared to support some compensation under present circumstances, only at a far lower level than proposed by the Government.

Mr. Jay's theory of the trade cycle is the sophisticated version of the under-consumption theory associated with the late Lord Keynes. The chief distinction, according to Mr. Jay, between this theory and the Marxist theory is that the latter is "cruder." In the first edition, it was regarded as crude still as advocated by Mr. John Strachey (1st edition, pp. 179-80); but, no doubt out of politeness to his distinguished colleague, Mr. Jay has cut this passage out of the second edition. One disadvantage, however, is that the claim trumpeted in 1937, that at last Marx had been thoroughly refuted, must be dropped. Mr. Jay's remedy for the deficiency of effective demand is, on the one hand, to stimulate investment, and on the other, to stimulate consumption. Such policies are, of course, accepted by the Labour movement. But it is fostering illusions to suppose that these measures in themselves, like redistributive taxation, can be carried very far by the capitalist State, with the calm acquiescence of capitalists.

We have now discovered what Mr. Jay understands by capitalism and by Socialism and shown that his views on Socialism follow from his complete misunderstanding of the nature of capitalism. The final section of his book, on the "Principles of Socialist Policy," is much what one would expect. Seven chapters are devoted to redistribution by taxation and the abolition of inheritance. By that time we have arrived at the Socialist millenium, and, indeed, it is hardly surprising that in the view of one of his colleagues, Mr. H. D. Hughes, M.P., we are already there. "Even today there is less discrepancy between rich and poor in the social democracies of the British Commonwealth than in the Soviet Union." (*Towards a Classless Society*, Fabian Discussion Pamphlet, p. 17.)

There are only two chapters which have the word "planning" in their title, and, significantly enough, one of them is called: "The Limits of Planning." There is, of course, plenty of the familiar stuff about "democratic planning" and "the freedom of the individual." There is nothing about how a plan can be drawn up and put into effect, about economic controls, about capitalist sabotage, and the part to be played by the workers (if any). Mr. Jay's "planning" can, in fact, be summed up in his own phrase.

"Surely, then, the guiding principle on which to plan production and distribution should be to rely on the ordinary pricing processes in neutral cases (and where monopoly forces are not too strong), and adjust its working whenever inequality, or some other social need, makes such adjustment necessary" (p. 257).

How is it that a professed Socialist can reach such an astonishing set of conclusions? One explanation, of course, is that Mr. Jay is, and apparently always has been, completely isolated from the working-class movement. But another is the nature of his economics, and on this he provides a clue himself in the first introduction. "Economics as a science quite rightly investigates economic phenomena in abstraction from their social, legal, and institutional context" (p. ix). Economics of this kind is not a science at all and, therefore, the kind of Socialism which is derived from it cannot be scientific. So much can be seen from a perusal of Mr. Jay's book. What is also evident, however, is that when the thin veneer of "Socialism" is stripped off, either from Mr. Jay's theoretical conclusions, or from the contemporary economic system to which they all too accurately relate, there is left, naked and ugly, the familiar capitalist system.

Mr. Jay, however, although his Socialism is unscientific and is, in fact, nothing but capitalism, and although he is obviously a middle-class intellectual isolated from the working class, cannot be dismissed

as unimportant. On the contrary he represents a section of the Labour Party with enormous influence, a section, indeed, whose theories have had an uninterrupted run with a Labour Government in office, backed by an overwhelming Parliamentary majority. As the Prime Minister says in his foreword: "It is the aim of *The Socialist Case* to set out the basic philosophic arguments for collective management of our economic resources."

After two years it would have been reasonable to suppose that at least a start could have been made with the fundamental proposals put forward by Mr. Jay which are so authoritatively endorsed. Yet in practice no steps have been taken to abolish inheritance, while the three budgets so far introduced by the Government have each succeeded in redistributing the national income *less* evenly than it was on budget day!

This is bad enough, but much worse is the present economic situation, despite all the bland assurances of calm and rational management and control. The plain fact is that the honeymoon is over and the harsh realities, the violent contradictions of capitalism in decline are now being fully revealed. But Mr. Jay declares.

"Since 1939 Great Britain has shown, by conscious planning and resolute use of the financial weapons lying ready, what could have been achieved during the previous twenty years of inefficiency and failure. As a result all the productive forces of the nation were released and unemployment reduced from 1,500,000 to 60,000! This is the measure of achievement by deliberate planning in wartime, and of opportunity for peace" (p. 180)

And this is written on the eve of the greatest economic crisis which has ever faced the British people, with threats of slashing cuts in the standard of life which may make 1931 pale into insignificance.

Mr. Jay is just one more in a long line of complacent opportunists who "refute" Marx and try to persuade the workers that things are getting better, anyway, and all that is wanted to make them better still is a little superior reason. Twenty-five years ago, after the First World War, another well-known "Socialist," Mr. J. R. Clynes, added the mark of his approbation to a pamphlet devoted to the important but continually necessary task of refuting Marx:

"The capitalist system is neither destroyed nor undermined. It is supported by interests, influences, opinion, and prejudice so powerful that the system is not likely to disappear soon. While it is with us it is inflicting poverty and distress, which can be diminished or prevented

only in the degree that the defects of the system are removed. It is better, therefore, to try a new effort on co-operative lines, by which the best would be got out of the system for all, than to submit to its defects in the hope ultimately of nationalisation being accepted. . . It seems probable that for a long time we must accept conditions which have been inherited from generations of industrial development. Every year sees these conditions improved." (Introduction to *The Failure of Karl Marx*, by F. Thoresby.)

Large sections of the Labour Party and the trade union movement are at last beginning to realise where this sort of opportunism leads, to recognise more and more clearly that Socialism, the kind of Socialism they have always instinctively believed in, is something radically different from capitalism, *is* necessary, more necessary than ever. The Labour Party's 1945 election programme is not Socialism. But to carry it out is to take the first step towards Socialism. To do this, the easy opportunist "theories" of the Jays, the Durbins, the Gaitskells, and all the other petty bourgeois intellectuals must be resolutely swept aside.

MECHANISING OUR NATIONALISED MINES

THE NATIONALISATION OF THE MINES by the Labour Government has brought right into the forefront a number of problems relating to the industry, of a political, social, and technical character. The issues now raised are not new, but the act of nationalisation has raised them afresh because the conditions exist to resolve them and thus create a new era in British coal mining.

The long years of struggle for better wages and conditions for miners are now bearing fruit in the almost general recognition that the miner is entitled to the best, in wages, housing conditions, and priority of certain goods. Only the realisation of these things in fact, however, will prove that we mean what we say.

It is unwise to try and isolate any one aspect of mining and say that if only this or that were put right we would overcome the problem of fuel shortage. It is not as simple as that—in fact, there are so many factors affecting the prosperity and progress of mining today that only an all-round approach can have any lasting effect. It is not only a question of wages or housing conditions, rations or safety, mechanisation or manpower; it is all those things together and more.

That is why the nationalisation of the mines brings with it one of the biggest and most urgent jobs this country has ever had to face.

The task of transforming our mines so as to bring them up to date in every way is particularly difficult now because of the shortage of machinery and shortage of steel and other raw materials with which to make these machines. Furthermore, the task is urgent, very urgent, but it is doubtful if anyone not politically convinced of the need for nationalising the mines is likely to realise the urgency and put emergency plans into operation.

The whole history of coal mining is one of man's relentless struggle against the forces of nature. Primitive tools and methods have gradually given way to the more scientific. Although there is justification for the claim that "the Industrial Revolution by-passed the coal mining industry," nevertheless, considerable technical development has taken place in recent years. This development has, however, only been sufficient to fight a gradually losing battle against the deterioration in our coal seams and the reduction in output resulting from declining manpower.

The outstanding factors regarding mechanisation in Britain are:

First that all the mechanical development which has taken place since 1913 has done little more than maintain the output per man shift, the increase being only 9.6 per cent between 1913 and 1936.

Second: that the rate of mechanisation has slowed up very considerably in recent years

Third. whereas in Britain in 1936, the percentage of coal cut was 55 per cent, it was very much higher in other countries, notably in the Ruhr (97 per cent), France (88 per cent), Belgium (98.5 per cent) and U.S.S.R. (77.4 per cent)

This situation developed during the period of private ownership of the mines. Then labour was cheap and the labour market never short of idle hands. So long as the coal owner could get men to "knock their guts out" for 45s. a week, there was little need to spend money on technical research, nor to invest capital in expensive machinery. Restrictive practices, such as the allocation of quotas which resulted from the Coal Mines Act of 1930, also tended to hold back mechanisation. Very many collieries could fulfil their quota in three or four days per week, so why step up production to increase the unemployment or "short time" of the miners and cause further unrest?

Under such conditions, the miner himself seldom welcomed new machinery, because he saw in it a constant threat to his security. Even today, with all the shortage of miners, there are still many collieries

where resistance to mechanisation comes from the men because of their experience of unemployment in the past, and because they have not at present a guarantee of full employment.

Industrial development under capitalism is unequal and hence, in spite of the retarding factors mentioned above, certain colliery companies did introduce equipment in amounts above the average. But even in these more favourable circumstances, the development was far short of what it might have been.

The annual outlay on capital equipment was always related to the companies' dividends, so that a fixed sum was set aside for modernisation, irrespective of whether or not this was the maximum reorganisation that could be carried out. The result of this was that the technical managers, chemists, and research workers in the industry found little opportunity to carry out the mechanisation which the industry required. Sometimes the development would be very unbalanced, as, for example, when the equipment at one colliery would be modernised for publicity and sales purposes, while other collieries belonging to the same company were relatively neglected.

Now the political situation is completely changed. The mines run by the National Coal Board for the people are ready for a complete transformation in technique, organisation, and personal spirit.

A whole industry has to be planned and run successfully. Modern machine methods must become the rule, not the exception. Manual labour must be reduced to a minimum and output per man employed increased far above the present level.

It is to this task that the National Coal Board, through its Regional and Area organisation, must devote its full power and initiative. The task itself can be separated into three parts:

- (1) What are the most urgent aspects of mechanisation that can be carried through now in the light of our present knowledge and experience?
- (2) What problems of mechanisation or safety are still unsolved or only partially solved and yet are of such urgency that they must be studied without further delay?
- (3) What other mechanisation problems, of a less urgent but possibly fruitful character, require close study by our scientists and technicians?

The success or failure of nationalisation will be judged by how task (1) above is tackled, because the avoidance of further fuel crises is dependent on how quickly something can be done. We cannot afford to sit back and wait for beautiful plans to mature in 10 or 20

years' time. It is not possible within a year or two to reorganise our existing pits and to alter the layout of underground workings so as to bring them into line with modern accepted practice, therefore emergency steps must be taken. These steps will mean making available adequate quantities of mining machinery of proved design. In addition ample spare parts must be on hand so that the intricate cycle of mining operations is not interrupted.

There is a tendency in some quarters to belittle British-manufactured machinery and to think that we must rely on foreign ideas and designs, particularly those of the U.S.A. This is not the case. British engineering firms have designed machines in all respects the equal of those produced in America. Recent publication of technical journals in the U.S.A. indicate that they realise that they can learn from Britain, as well as Germany and the U.S.S.R., in the design and production of mining machinery.

The main weakness in Britain has been that we have produced too many designs with the result that costs have been high, spares in short supply, and little opportunity for interchangeability. It is not uncommon for one firm to produce a complete or almost complete range of mining equipment from coal cutters, loaders, conveyors to motors and switchgear. This is further complicated by the fact that they also make a complete range of sizes and types for each class of machine: for example, five or six sizes of coal cutter, and as many more types of conveyor. It is in this sphere that very great benefits would accrue with standardisation. If it is agreed that we need a certain range of coal cutters, let us have them, but let bulk orders be placed in such a way that each manufacturer is producing only one or two sizes.

It is in relation to standardisation and mass production that great and speedy improvements can be made. The National Coal Board should set up an Emergency Committee capable of examining the essential mining equipment and deciding on which types and designs will be accepted as standard for present requirements. Then these machines should be put into production on a big scale. There is no other way of making really big inroads in the task of mechanising our mines.

The size of the job in engineering production that has to be done can be gauged from the following. At present-day prices the total equipment for one new colliery, surface and underground, can cost anything up to £2,000,000. The new Rothes Colliery in Fife, for which sinking operations have commenced, will cost £2,060,000, and production of coal will not start until 1954.

In the year 1946, which was not one in which big orders were

placed for mining equipment because of pending nationalisation, the total value of equipment bought by the mining industry was £11,175,000 (*Coal and Colliery News*, 6.3.47). Of this, only £170,000 was expended in U.S.A., and £50,000 in Belgium.

Now, when pent-up plans of mechanisation can be realised, when many new pits require to be sunk, old equipment to be modernised or replaced, we can see what a big task confronts the engineering industry. It is possible that a total of over £20 million value of mining equipment will be required each year for some time to come. In 1935, according to Census of Production data, the value of underground mining machinery produced was only £3 million, or less than 1 per cent of engineering production. Of this over two-thirds were exported abroad.

The immediate problem is one of producing, in quantities and quickly, the best types of machines we have designed and used in recent years. This will mean using Royal Ordnance Factories and engineering firms not usually producing for the mines to turn out many of the standard parts. There are many items of equipment suitable for mass-production in new factories; for example, cutter picks, conveyor pulleys, tub-wheels, and pumps. Many factories which produced shells or tanks in wartime are admirably suited to produce mining machinery. New materials, such as alloys, will have to be used to relieve the steel shortage. We should realise that for some time there is no fear of over-producing this equipment. Every screw, every pulley, every cutter pick is required and can be used. In addition there is a very big market for mining machinery abroad.

At present the structure of the National Coal Board is not suited to bulk purchase, because the orders have to be placed by the Area General Managers (of which there are 48 in the country), and not by a central organisation. This will require to be changed so that bulk orders can be placed for the standard equipment and the Area General Managers informed of the equipment available from which they can "draw."

It is in the need for this emergency action that greatest danger lies. Many of the men appointed to official positions under the National Coal Board are undoubtedly sound technically, but few had the political conviction that nationalisation was necessary, although many see in the change an opportunity to carry through technical plans which were "pigeon-holed" under private enterprise. But this outlook does not of necessity see the task of reconstruction as one of immediate urgency. The N.U.M. and the A.E.U., as well as all the other organisations of the Labour movement, have the task of speeding up the mechanisation plans and exposing delays and weaknesses when

they become known. The Government, too, will have to use its powers to the full to see that priorities of labour and materials are assured for mining machinery. We should cease to hear of colliery engineering firms looking for orders for non-mining machinery because no colliery orders were being placed. There should be no question of a firm expanding on production of plastic bracelets and ash-trays rather than on the colliery engineering side of their business. There is more than enough for our engineering firms to deal with, so an increasing degree of planning must be introduced at all stages of production.

Much research still requires to be done to solve satisfactorily certain outstanding problems of mining equipment. The power loader has proved its suitability for certain conditions, but further developments are possible. The more revolutionary cutter loader is still in its infancy. The fact that a British cutter loader was available before 1935, but has only recently been used to a small extent, indicates that a speed-up in research and tests is necessary. In this connection, the National Coal Board must carry out much more study and research in the industry than was done under private enterprise. Few private firms designing and manufacturing mining equipment could afford the great expense involved in large technical experiments. Their ideas, therefore, must be taken up by the National Coal Board, and sifted and applied where practicable.

Increased mechanisation and the working of inferior seams brings about an appreciable increase in the amount of dirt extracted with the coal from our pits. It is quite common nowadays to find that coal, before cleaning and screening, contains 30 per cent or more of dirt. This means that one ton of dirt is raised with every two or three tons of saleable coal. Until such time as we have methods of keeping or returning this dirt underground, we must face up to the problem of handling and disposing of this large tonnage of non-combustible matter. This is linked with the design and installation of new surface plant to handle, wash, and screen the run-of-mine coal.

The large and elaborate plant necessary to wash the coal following extraction from the pit, coupled with the fact that ever-increasing quantities of dirt will be raised from thin and inferior seams, naturally raises the problem of underground gasification. All the developments taking place in Great Britain lead one to the conclusion that we must investigate the possibilities of bringing the heat and gases out of the coal without involving the expense of raising the large proportion of non-combustible matter with it.

Underground gasification has been carried out with considerable success in the Soviet Union. The idea was originally that of a British

chemist, Professor William Ramsey. Lenin, with characteristic perspicacity, said that Ramsey's discovery was the herald of a gigantic technological revolution in all industry. "Under Socialism," Lenin wrote, "the application of Ramsey's method . . . will make labour conditions more sanitary, rid millions of workers of smoke, dust, and grime, accelerate the transformation of filthy, disgusting workshops into clean, light laboratories worthy of man." The Belgian coal industry has pooled its resources to investigate the possibilities of underground gasification there. We must do likewise for Britain, particularly in those old mining areas where the only known reserves are in thin inferior seams.

Truly a new horizon opens up before our mining industry today. We have the imagination to see how it can be transformed to meet the needs of the country and raise the standards of the miners. We have the engineering skill and machines to carry through the great task of modernisation. Let us see that we lack neither the courage nor political conviction to carry it through speedily and completely.

EMIGRATION AND BRITAIN'S CRISIS

PETER KERRIGAN

THE DOMINIONS OF CANADA, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Colony of Southern Rhodesia are all in the market, appealing for emigrants from Britain. Hundreds of thousands of people in Britain, it is stated, are contemplating emigration. What should be the attitude of the Labour movement to emigration at the present time?

Inevitably, we have to consider this issue against the background of Britain's economic position, the gravity of which is underlined in the almost daily warnings from Government spokesmen, political leaders of all parties, trade unionists, industrialists and economists. Let us recall a few of the outstanding features of this crisis.

We have to step up production to pay for required imports of food, raw materials and finished goods. For this purpose we need to re-organise and make efficient our basic industries. We are striving to expand trade and find new markets that will make us less dependent politically and economically on the dollar. Our present disastrous foreign policy, accompanied by the disappearance of the dollar loan, is reacting on production, and the Marshall policy, if pursued, will be still more serious in its impact on Britain. Not only will it mean interference in the internal affairs of the other nations who met at Paris, at the Bevin-Bidault Conference in July, but already there are signs that American pressure is being brought to bear against the

5-day week for miners, the nationalisation of the steel industry in Britain, and other steps the Government contemplates, because the American monopolists are using dollars to block any State action which interferes with private enterprise.

In any economic plan for the basic improvement of British industrial production, the following industries and their subsidiaries are paramount: coal, steel, textiles, shipbuilding, agriculture, building, replacement of machinery, transport. Shortage of manpower in these industries, or in key sections of them, is already having a disastrous effect on British recovery, but it is precisely these industries, or most of them, for which the Dominions and Southern Rhodesia want recruits. The Dominions want miners, building craftsmen, engineers, hospital nurses, etc.

Why this demand? I think we can say it is because of the rapid industrialisation and capital development which took place during the war, and, very important, as part of the strategy of the dispersal of industries during wartime. This strategic aspect of emigration was brought out by *The Economist* on February 8, 1947, when it reported that the British chiefs of staff in May, 1946, raised the question of emigration for discussion by the Dominions Prime Ministers, on the grounds that we needed to distribute our skilled workers and scientists throughout the Dominions as an essential part of imperial defence in this period of atomic development. Thus we see the close relationship between emigration and Bevin's foreign policy, which ties Britain to the anti-Sovietism of the dollar imperialists.

Many inducements are being offered by the Dominions. Extensive propaganda is going on, with the issue of booklets, press articles, the sending of recruiting officers, the establishment of agencies and the granting of free passages. Australia provides free passage to ex-servicemen and their dependants, and assisted passages to others who meet their requirements. New Zealand provides free passage to ex-servicemen and women between 20 and 35 years of age without dependent children, and assisted passages to others who meet their requirements. It is noteworthy that they all make a special concentration to get the youngest and most active elements to go. If they are successful it will be even more disastrous to Britain.

There is no doubt about the response. Recent estimates put the number of people known to have definite plans to emigrate from Britain at between 600,000 and a million (*Planning*, July 4, 1947). There are said to be 160,000 on the waiting list for Australia, 80,000 for South Africa, etc. For Australia alone, applications are coming in at the rate of a thousand a week. According to Lord Addison in the House of Lords on April 17, roughly 50,000 emigrants had

already gone to Canada, 5,000 to Australia, 2,600 wives to New Zealand. A factor of great significance, in view of the problem of the former depressed areas in Britain, is that at least one fifth of these emigrants were Scottish.

Shortage of shipping is the main reason why the flow is at present small. However, every effort is being made by the Dominions to overcome this. An Australian representative is in Europe now, trying to fix shipping with the British Government and the International Relief Organisation.

Emigration from Britain on the scale outlined above, and of the types of men and women proposed, will be disastrous for this country. We cannot afford to lose our skilled workers and our youth, who are so vital for the basic industries, which are the key to our salvation in re-building Britain and enabling us to cut free of Wall Street.

It has been suggested that the Poles or displaced persons from Baltic countries will help us out. Surely it ought to be clear to all that 100,000 Poles and the riff-raff from Baltic countries, many of whom are openly Fascist, can in no way solve Britain's problems or be a substitute for our own skilled workers. On the contrary, this cheap unorganised labour with its anti-democratic outlook is a threat to our working-class democracy and conditions, while at the same time it does nothing to solve the manpower problem in basic industries.

Nevertheless, we have to face the fact that large numbers of our people do want to emigrate. Even allowing for the eventuality that some who put down their names for emigration when they were being demobbed or some time previously may no longer want to go, the fact remains that there is this present rush to put names down. Some of this desire can be attributed to wartime adventure, the experience of soldiering abroad, a feeling of unsettlement, and enthusiasm for doing a constructive job of work which the Dominion propaganda seems to offer. I would say, however, that the main reasons are undoubtedly fear of unemployment, and a lack of conviction in the future of Britain which our Labour Government has made little effort to dispel. The high percentage of emigrants from one of the former depressed areas is evidence of this.

The Government, in the House of Lords on April 17, while admitting the gravity of the loss of manpower, has in practice demonstrated its support for the emigration proposals of the Dominions. It has arranged that 3 troopships with a capacity of 6-7,000 tons shall be placed at the disposal of Australia and the same for New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia. In addition, the Government propose to lend aircraft carriers to speed up the job. The South African Government are arranging to take over the "Winchester"

and "Caernarvon Castle" steamships for emigration purposes.

What is the attitude of the Communist Party to this problem? First, we have the fullest sympathy with the problems of the ex-servicemen and women trying to adapt themselves to civilian life. We also fully appreciate the needs of the Dominions and welcome their industrial development, as this enables them to play an important role in the world as great democracies. Last March at our Empire Conference a joint statement of the British and Dominion Communist Parties was made and issued, from which I quote the following relevant passage:

"We have Labour Governments in Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and we believe that these Governments in association with the Governments in Canada and South Africa, should be pressed to get together at once to plan the new forms of economic co-operation and assistance which can strengthen the economy of our countries, lead to new forms of mutual co-operation and assistance to the colonial peoples and strengthen our nations to withstand the common danger of aggressive American imperialism."

It is worth noting, apart altogether from the effect that mass emigration would have on British industry, that for the emigrant himself there is likely to be another side of the picture, not always as rosy as the picture painted by the propagandist. In every Dominion there is a desperate housing shortage. Many of the projects for which labour is required, for instance the hydro-electric works in Tasmania, are under such bad conditions that Australian trade unionists oppose them. The *New Times* of May 1, 1947, published a report taken from the Sydney (Australia) *Daily Telegraph*, of how nearly 500 ex-servicemen had applied for four window cleaners' jobs which had been advertised. Recently, the *Canadian Daily Tribune* reported nation-wide protests against the action of the textile millionaire who organised the immigration of 40 Polish girls to work in his mills in Quebec at 25 cents an hour. The same paper on May 12, 1947, reported that 11,307 Toronto people were living on relief. The London *Evening Standard* printed a letter on July 11, 1947, describing the experiences of a returned and disillusioned emigrant to South Africa, in which he said "I travelled 25,000 miles looking for a job that would provide security. I found that £50 a month was equivalent to £5 a week here."

The Communist Party is concerned to end the complacency with which our Government deals with this question, a complacency that is based on a definite policy dictated by the over-riding needs of Bevin's foreign policy, even when these needs patently

conflict with the requirements of other ministries in the Government.

Our policy is one which demands:

(1) Economic co-operation with the Dominions as outlined in the joint statement of the Communist Parties already mentioned.

(2) The speediest operation of an overall economic plan for this country with complementary manpower plan.

(3) Emigration must not interfere with the needs of this plan. It should therefore be prohibited for three years, except in special cases where emergency needs have to be solved by Commonwealth Governments, and then only after consultation with the British Government and T.U.C.

(4) Government propaganda to win the workers for the implementation of this plan for British reconstruction, with positive inducements to the youth to play a decisive part.

(5) A clear demonstration of the link between emigration policy and foreign policy and the present negative joint effect upon Britain's prospect of weathering the economic crisis.

The Communist Party emphasises that there is a future for everybody, and above all for our youth in Great Britain. We can give the fullest expression to the spirit of adventure and enterprise inherent in this most virile section of our population in tackling the task of rebuilding the greatness of our country. We reject the Tory propaganda particularly directed to the youth that Britain is finished and our only future is in the Dominions, just as we reject the failure of the Government to come out in opposition to emigration with the positive policy that our situation demands. The enthusiasm with which reconstruction is being tackled in such countries as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union can be emulated and surpassed by the British people, and in particular its youth, provided we capture their imagination by applying policies which can be clearly seen as correct and endowed with the vision of a better future.

NAVAL DOCKYARDS AS SHOCK TROOPS

JACK SYMONS

WITH THE ENDING OF the Second World War Plymouth was faced with a number of problems which, broadly speaking, were a local concentration of the country's problems. It is a city of 200,000 inhabitants. Its shopping centre, municipal and public buildings were destroyed during the Second World War, and a total of 12,000 families were left homeless. The Royal Dockyard provides work for 15,000, and during the Second World War this number became

inflated to 23,000. This, together with 15,000 Service personnel, provides the backbone of Plymouth's prosperity. Before the Second World War more than 18,000 distributive workers contributed to the job of spreading this money around.

With so much of Plymouth destroyed, the people were determined to replan, as well as to rebuild, and local enthusiasm reached a high level with the publication of the Abercrombie-Watson plan. The determination to get things done was shown in the return of three Labour M.P.s in place of Lady Astor, Colonel Guest (of Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds, etc), and Hore-Belisha (Prudential, etc). This was followed by voting a Labour majority on to the council and a noticeable increase in trade union activity.

The Plymouth Communist Party Branch issued a programme for Plymouth's prosperity. It called for a change in the basis of Plymouth's economy, which, instead of relying in the main on the Naval base, would seek to develop alternative industries, based on local needs and raw materials, such as agriculture, fruit, fisheries, and china clay. At the same time it called for a mass-production conference of all interested bodies to set up a City Reconstruction Committee to ensure the fulfilment of the plan.

One of the main problems was how to fit the dockyard worker into this reconstruction plan. A vigorous campaign was already being conducted by some of the craftsmen in the yard to get rid of women and end dilution on the grounds that this would ensure security for the established minority. Memories of previous Geddes' axes and the post-war dismissals of 1920 loomed up. Years of the Tory brass-hatted policy of divide and rule have disorganised the "yardy," cutting him off from his natural ally outside the gates. There is no need to go outside of Plymouth to find an iron curtain of Tory manufacture.

The influx of many workers during the Second World War brought in a new fighting spirit. Men returning from the Forces were not inclined to sit down in despair; diluted labour and war widows were not content to return to smaller wages. Also some departments were inflated during the Second World War, and their higher officials realised that a reversion to pre-war numbers must inevitably lead to disrating, from manager down to charge-hand. In such departments the official side played a very important part in the ultimate decisions.

With only four Communist Party members in the yard, the matter was raised in union branches. It was pointed out that all housing components in short supply—window frames of wood or steel; doors, grates, manholes, piping; hot- and cold-water systems; tanks and

electrical equipment—could be produced in the yard. Skilled men could be lent out on housing. The Area President of the E.T.U. (Alderman Bill Millar) was also Chairman of the Housing Committee. The visit of the Civil Lord, Mr. Edwards, M.P., was the tactical moment. A Conference of M.P.s, Councillors, and Yard Whitley Committees announced that "repayment work" (i.e., work done on contract for outside capitalist firms) could be introduced at the discretion of the local officials and that men could be lent out to work on housing.

This success went a long way to breaking down the long-standing prejudice that the Royal Dockyard was for war purposes only; with its corollary that only war could bring prosperity, while peace meant discharges, no piecework, and the threat of discharges for demanding elementary workers' rights.

Tenders were put out, and repairs to merchant shipping, electrical assembly and armatures, joinery parts for houses, water tanks, silver-plated luxury goods, and conversion of coal locomotives to oil were some of the repayment work undertaken.

The fight ahead to mould the yard until it fits into a national plan and take its rightful place as a Government nationalised industry—the shock-troop of industrial recovery—is a long one. The local Labour movement is weak, demoralised, and occupied with petty quarrels. No constructive leadership is forthcoming from the trade union and Labour leaders. Opportunism is rife. The dockyard men are cut off from their fellow citizens by a false sense of security; and the age-long prejudice against work other than warship repair is strong among the older craftsmen. Building workers drafted outside found conditions so bad that by being non-union and becoming nuisances they got sent back, leaving a bad impression and widening the existing breach. Local transport difficulties are also adding to working-class disunity.

In this situation, if the advances already won are to be carried forward to a beneficial conclusion, there is need for resolute Party leadership. We must press for as much constructive action from the three Labour M.P.s as we got disruptive action during the Tory regime. We are entitled, for instance, to expect Michael Foot, M.P., to put his anti-Tory *Daily Herald* ravings into action in his own constituency, and to be as tough with the dockyard Tory employers as he would like to be with Russia. For the present Admiralty policy remains a capitalist one. Naval estimates allow for so many man hours. If repayment work can be got to make up the lack of money all well and good; if not, then dismissals, no overtime or piecework, and the end of dilution must be the order of the day.

The basis for a Socialist Admiralty policy must be that the full productive capacity of the yard should be geared to the available labour forces.

Numerous wartime repair ships (*Alaunia, Aurania*, etc.), now moved up to Dartmouth and other ports, should be moored alongside the yard jetty to act as buffer workshops, thus helping to prevent bottlenecks and production maladjustments. The Admiralty must use its power to override "patent rights" with the same vehemence that it overrides workers' allotments, boating inlets, and public rights-of-way. Engineers and trade unionists must demand a detailed inspection of the yard in order to ascertain the possibilities of producing equipment which is at present holding up the national drive. Greater co-operation must be achieved between local housing officials and yard officials. A permanent Repayment Work Committee should be set up, consisting of management, shop stewards and trade unionists on the one hand, and on the other members of the Housing Committee and building workers, as well as advisory technicians from such bottleneck industries as mining, agricultural equipment, electric generating. Such a Committee, meeting regularly, could ensure a flexible output of essential requirements, amongst which the following would probably be found to be priorities:

- (a) Naval repair and construction, but cut to minimum requirements (foreign policy). The present policy of refitting capital ships and placing them in reserve to rot is wasteful. Wasteful, also, is the policy of expanding training establishments, which suggests an expanded Navy
- (b) Repair and construction of merchant shipping.
- (c) Repayment work in the engineering and building industries

THE SPIRITUAL AGE

The Rise and Fall of the Ex-Socialist Government. CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS, M.P. (Hollis and Carter, 8s. 6d)

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS, CONSERVATIVE M.P. for Devizes, publisher and convert to Catholicism, was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, and was for five years researcher at the Premier Catholic College in the United States. He does not like the Labour Government, Communism, or the Soviet Union. He considers that: "We live in a post-political, a post-economic, and an essentially spiritual age."

Briefly, the argument of this book is that Socialism, having failed, as in the author's view it was bound to fail, we are faced with a new epoch—"Both post-Socialist and post-capitalist"; the epoch of the managerial State, the inevitable result of nationalisation and State control.

In developing his thesis, Mr. Hollis presents a fairly shrewd picture of present-day problems; the coal situation, the production situation, and the mood of the people who have to deal with these questions. But the book is crammed full of inconsistencies. For instance, the author wildly waves the double-sided banner—on one side: "Down with the Socialist State," and on the reverse: "The Labour Government has abandoned Socialism." In the same style he traces a gruesome nightmare picture of the Bolsheviks, the serpents in the grass, weaving their hideous track in all the fair fields of international politics, while at the same time he jeers at the "Stalinists" for their alleged betrayal of Communism.

Mr. Hollis's conception of this managerial State is based on the false premise that the rich are no more, and therefore the State is no longer under the domination of the capitalist class—we are in the epoch "both post-Socialist and post-capitalist." Much struggle lies ahead, he says, before the new bureaucracy, which he considers is bound to win either way, has found its firm seat in the saddle. Meanwhile, he should consult the figures of another Catholic convert, Mr. Clark, the statistician, to see that capitalism still very certainly does exist. As Shaw long ago pointed out, if the trusts and the Soviets are the same, it is a pity that the trusts do not realise that fact.

Dealing with the question of incentives, Mr. Hollis makes much play with his simile of a stick to beat the donkey and carrots to entice him forward. As a faithful child of the Vatican, Mr. Hollis is, of course, an apostle of "freedom," and he has no use for security for the workers, since this, he argues, would undermine people's personal responsibility and initiative.

"If the State promises security from the cradle to the grave to every man and woman, it does in fact destroy one of the great incentives that have in other societies caused people to exert themselves. The great danger is lest such schemes of social security should themselves cause a slackening off of production as a result of which there will not be sufficient goods to make good the promises of the schemes when the time for the show-down comes."

The point is, Mr. Hollis sees incentives merely as rewards. A system which would serve to build up a sense of responsibility and

correct values among people, and in a time of crisis would serve as a method of attracting labour, and would assist the Government to achieve its General Election programme, does not enter his calculations.

So Mr. Hollis merely indulges in cheap jibes at cheap methods of payment—a seat in the House of Lords; opportunities for nepotism so that a Minister can find a seat for his boy; opportunities for parents to procure better educational opportunities for their children, and consequently more choice in their careers.

It is the old story, the vicious circle, the industrious paying for the lazy, the provident paying for the improvident, and so forth, all woven into a pious sermon on the virtues of a simple life, on the fallacy that happiness can be bought with filthy lucre, on pie in the sky, and the consoling thought for a Conservative that men prefer to follow in their fathers' footsteps—a miner's son makes the best miner, the tinker's son the least cussed tinker. Incidentally, Mr. Hollis argues that the two men who have most consistently preached the vanity of high standards, Gandhi and de Valera, have longest retained the support of their followers.

The Socialist Government, as Mr. Hollis calls the Labour Government, is described as having failed either to be a successful Government or to be successfully Socialist. And, having polished it off that way, Mr. Hollis declares that the next step is the managerial State, as under the present form of State Socialism the transition is inevitable. He takes the Coal Board as an example

"No serious student can doubt that, as between a permanent and expert Coal Board and political ministers, here today and gone tomorrow, the continuity of policy is in any event necessary in order to save the country from chaos. . . the new manager is in a very much stronger position than the old capitalist because, whereas the capitalist could always be brought to heel by being robbed of his property, the manager has nothing to lose. As Marx would have put it, he has nothing to lose but his brains."

This hydra-headed monster, the managerial State, is treated as immune from democratic control, especially as Mr. Hollis sees the influence of trade unionism on the decline.

This theory concerning the trade unions is a little unexpected when one remembers how Catholic propaganda at the moment stresses the need of its flock to emulate the Communist Party in winning as many leading positions in the unions as possible, and how much space is given in such journals as the *Catholic Worker* to boost the Association of Catholic trade unionists. (On July 18, the *Catholic Herald* boasted

that in Westminster, since November, this Association has set up 124 groups and 17 deaneries with a total membership of 2,237.)

The managerial State, according to Mr. Hollis, will build up productivity, which "is all drained off into armaments and eventually blown away in gigantic wars."

"A direct frontal attack on the managerial system is foredoomed to failure and futility." So what? Mr. Hollis urges us: "To limit the power of the managers—to ensure that the area outside their field is an area of freedom as broadly based as possible"

Mr. Hollis puts his faith, from the economic point of view, on a wider distribution of property, on a system whereby the people own at least their own houses. But, this being a "spiritual age," he considers it more important to stake a claim for the spirit (Conservative-Catholic brand). The new masters, the men who are endowed with expert knowledge beyond the reach of the ordinary man when it comes to directing our industry and our foreign trade, must also be taught what the capitalists understood: "That there are problems and mysteries of life to which economics did not hold the key and human rights which must be respected, even when it was to the immediate disadvantage of economic power to respect them."

It is on the question of education that Mr. Hollis reveals most clearly his intellectual snobbishness and belief in privilege. To give a classical education to all and sundry would, of course, in his view, be throwing the treasure troves of our civilisation before swine. Only the exceptional can appreciate the beauties of our cultural inheritance.

Mr. Hollis has carefully studied *The Dark Side of the Moon* to inform him about the Russian way of life, and to understand their philosophy he turns to Dostoevsky. In *Tablet* (June 14) he writes.

"With a deeper psychological understanding than Marx, Dostoevsky saw the driving power behind revolutionary movements was not the desire for wealth but the desire for power, and that being so, a revolution could not possibly lead to greater freedom, but must inevitably lead to new tyrannies."

And the lesson of this is? "That tyrannies come to an end, because the moral isolation imposed upon the soul by shutting it off from the rest of mankind cannot be borne."

If this is the case, the virulent anti-Soviet sentiments with which Mr. Hollis bespatters his final pages seem hardly worthwhile—he should follow more closely the new Papal line that war between the Soviet Union and the capitalist States *can* be avoided, that it isn't to the advantage of the Church to be involved in Red baiting, and that

a moral example will eventually bring about a change of heart in the East!

Finally, then, the chief weapon to combat the bureaucratic tyranny of the managerial State must be the never-tiring propaganda of the Gospel of freedom; though it may be surprising to anyone who remembers the history of the Church (or even of Spain and Ireland today) to find the Catholics advocating freedom.

Another Catholic, Mgr. Knox, explains this change of front in the *Tablet* (July 5):

"What has happened in the last hundred years is not that *we* have changed, but the world has changed about us. Yesterday, the morbid element in human thought was in revolt against authority. Today it is in revolt against liberty. Today, as yesterday, the Church throws her weight into the opposition scale. Be assured that we shall get no credit for it; we shall be told that we are manœuvring for position, that our democratic professions are only hypocrisy."

Sceptics may note that when the working class was striving for liberty from exploitation, the Church was against liberty; today, when the capitalist class demands "liberty" to exploit, the Church is for this liberty. Scratch the "spiritual" paint and you find the class content.

Mr. Hollis has written what in many ways is an offensive book, but it is worth reading as a guide to Catholic aims—"spiritual" and political. The reader will appreciate how well-chosen are the words quoted from Rupert Brooke on the fly-leaf—though with a different interpretation from that intended by Mr. Hollis:

"And they were dead. They did not know it.
They did not know their time was done"

OLIVE PARSONS

COMMUNIST REVIEW

OCTOBER
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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Bound copies of the ten issues—March to December, 1946—are available at a cost of 10s. 6d. Orders should be sent to Central Books Ltd., 2 Parton Street, London, W.C.1.

THE MEANING OF THE DOLLAR CRISIS

EMILE BURNS

THE AMERICAN LOAN to Britain had been expected to cover Britain's trade deficit until 1950, and to help Britain to achieve something like a balance of trade. However, as a result of the disastrous foreign policy pursued by the Labour Government, a considerable proportion of the loan was wasted on "commitments" abroad, while no serious effort was made to plan production and modernisation, to develop our agriculture or to find alternative sources of supply; the trade agreement with Russia was refused on flimsy financial grounds, while loans and exports to Greece and Spain absorbed some of our limited resources. Prime responsibility for the early running out of the loan therefore rests with the Labour Government, although the United States Government contributed by allowing the rise in prices which reduced the real value of the loan, and by insisting on "convertibility"—the right of other countries with current claims on Britain to demand payment in dollars instead of sterling. It was this convertibility which was the last straw. It concentrated the dollar crisis on Britain; but this crisis does not only concern Britain.

It is a commonplace that the war disrupted the economic relations between capitalist countries. Yet the war had been preceded by many years of increasing difficulties in trade relations. One aspect of the general crisis of capitalism following on the First World War was a sharp reduction in international trade, especially in Britain's export trade, partly owing to the rise of new industrial countries competing for the export market, but also to the general impoverishment of the peoples. America's loans in the First World War were never met; in the main they were repudiated, because it was impossible to settle them by any channels of trade. The economic crises of 1920-22 and 1930-33 brought a further deterioration in world trade, and every capitalist country engaged in a fierce struggle to retain its share. This struggle was fought out by tariffs, quotas, exchange arrangements, devaluation, and other means, each measure making the total situation worse. And there was already one dominant fact—the shortage of dollars, the piling up of debts to the United States, until practically all the world's gold was in American vaults.

Today's problem in international trade is therefore in essence not a new one. Its basis is *the law of unequal development* which had already before the war raised United States capitalism far above the level of other capitalist countries, and as a result of the war now finds

more extreme expression in the enormous industrial production in the United States, estimated at more than half of the total world production; and in international trade, in the "dollar gap" affecting all countries in their trade with the United States. Therefore no temporary measures to overcome the immediate difficulties associated with the war can bring any solution. The dollar gap affects not only the sterling area or war-ravaged Europe and Asia, but even "hard currency" areas like Canada and Latin-America.

Of course, the war has aggravated the difficulties. United States production is now estimated at 70 per cent above 1939; it is threatened with a crisis of relative over-production, while most other capitalist countries, especially in Europe and Asia, are struggling to overcome a crisis of under-production due to lack of plant, materials and manpower. This gives the present world trade situation its special character, and is the economic background for the political issues arising in international relations; while these in turn react on the economic situation through the continued maintenance of large armed forces and the trade policy pursued by governments.

In "normal" times before the First World War, each capitalist country developed on the basis of international trade. The increasingly social character of production found expression in the growth of a world market; raw materials were drawn from all over the world, the products were sold all over the world. Capital knew no frontiers in the early days. "Free trade" was the weapon with which Britain conquered the world market, so long as it had the monopoly of capitalist production. It was only with the rise of rival "upstarts," the growth of monopoly and the opening of the era of imperialism that capital itself cried a halt to free trade, and the struggle between rival imperialisms was fought out with tariffs and quotas for the benefit of particular national capitalist groups. Yet this has not ended the dependence of each country on foreign trade, or the continuous capitalist search for higher profits through foreign trade. The typical form of trade, developed by Britain as the first industrial country, was the export of manufactured goods and capital, and the import of raw materials and food for the industrial population; in spite of considerable surpluses of exports over a long period, there was no "sterling shortage" comparable to the present "dollar shortage," because British capitalism took payment in rising imports of raw materials and food. This was one reason for the "neglect" of agriculture in Britain.

A peculiar feature of United States trade is partly due to its original capitalist development as a supplier of British industry. For a century exports of grain, cotton and tobacco have been important to it; it was a kind of colonial country (even including low-paid Negro labour) for

a long period, although in more recent times its agricultural exports have fallen in proportion to the huge rise in industrial exports. The United States cannot therefore take payment for exports in agricultural products, except in such items as tea, coffee, sugar and wool. It has a huge import of raw materials, but also a huge home production of raw materials. It cannot therefore accept payment for exports in more raw materials; although the question is complicated. For example, there is no real shortage of oil in the United States; yet the oil monopolies have their eyes on Middle East supplies, because oil from there will be cheaper. A development is occurring somewhat similar to the closing down of the Cornish tin mines and the import of tin for British industry from Malaya. Part of the United States imperialist expansion, as of all imperialist expansion, is directed to sources of cheap raw material, even if this kills home industries; but this process is too slow to affect the immediate future. Finally, the United States cannot accept payment for its excess of exports, or for interest and repayment of loans, in the form of manufactured goods, except in insignificant quantities of special items.

Therefore the dollar gap problem is a serious one, not only for other capitalist countries, but for the United States itself. The gap between what it wants to export and what it wants to import is rapidly widening, and no matter what temporary financial bridges are tried, must continue to widen. That is to say, so long as imperialist monopolies continue to dominate both home and foreign policy. Had Roosevelt lived and been able to carry through his home policy of full employment coupled with rising standards of living; and abroad, his policy of Big Three Unity in support of democracy and the development of resources everywhere—then to begin with a larger proportion of America's production would have been consumed at home, and the export problem would have been easier to solve. But today reaction is dominant, and its policy is widening the dollar gap.

Since the war, several factors have helped to conceal the vastness of this fundamental gap. Lend-Lease and U.N.R.R.A. supplies have been exported from America without any claim for repayment. United States Government outlays abroad have also helped to conceal the gap. There have been Government loans (as, for example, to China, Greece and Turkey); and the maintenance of an extremely high level of war production within the United States, although not an export, has served the same purpose. Capital expansion within the United States has also played a part in the period since the war. As in other countries, during the war period little, if any, replacement of worn-out plant took place. There was therefore a tremendous lag in replacements; and considerable capital expenditure was involved in converting war plants to

peace production. The biggest monopolies, with vast accumulated profits, took the opportunity to modernise their plants—already super-modern by British standards. As a result of all this, the demand for heavy industry products has been at a very high level. The home market for consumer goods, too, has been kept up by war savings and demobilisation grants.

But now the situation within the United States is rapidly changing. Savings have been drained off by inflated prices; real wages have been forced down. The unsatisfied demand from European countries for grain and cotton still keeps prices high, and agriculture is still extremely prosperous. But there are many indications of approaching crisis—the widening gap between industrial production and the total wages bill—itself partially the result of the rise in prices, while wages lag behind; the rising stocks of manufactured goods in wholesale and retail trade; the falling off in building; and—although this is a very unreliable barometer—the fall in prices on the Stock Exchange.

The expectation of an early crisis, against the background of the immense development of America's productive forces, is the key to the political moves of the dominant section of monopoly capital in the United States. As always, their first "solution" of the crisis is to attack the wages and conditions of the working class; and it is in this connection that we must see the legislation against the Trade Unions. The strength of American Trade Unionism, however, makes it difficult to carry this method of solving the crisis very far, and to the extent that attempts are made to use it, industrial struggles are inevitable, together with a new impetus towards a political party of the Left.

The second, far easier, method of attempting to solve the crisis is to increase Government expenditure. This means, in American conditions, an expansion not of social services, but rather of war production, which in turn serves the same purpose as the third method—namely, the drive for economic expansion abroad, which in its present intensity is something new for America. New markets and new spheres of investment must be opened up to absorb America's excess production. This is now the central feature in United States foreign policy; this is the aim of State loans to reactionary governments; of the Marshall offer; of the drive against British Empire preference; of America's insistence on "convertibility," on "free trade," and her opposition to bilateral trade agreements and to planned economies which in effect shut the door to American penetration.

Behind the Government are the big monopolies, needing unlimited exports and spheres of investment, and with a clear policy of how to safeguard them—namely to bring the countries concerned under direct American control, so that they fit in with America's needs as the

colony of an imperialist country has to fit in with the needs of industry in the "motherland." The logical conclusion of this policy is world domination—ownership of the whole world so that the troublesome question of payments from other countries does not arise; the internal contradictions of capitalism are of course beyond their thoughts. That is the solution towards which the most puffed-up and aggressive American monopolists are moving; and each of the immediate steps—to conquer particular markets, to beat down barriers to trade, to impose conditions on particular countries—will, if successful, feed the will to world domination.

At the same time, it is precisely the "dollar gap" which acts as a check to these designs. The example of Britain is typical. Britain's dollar shortage has had the result of breaking, at least partially, the "convertibility" and the limitations on special trade agreements on which the Americans were insisting. It has resulted in reduced British imports; and Britain is extending her agriculture. American exporters complain, and big business spokesmen declare that the opportunity must be used to clear out the Labour Government, or at least to make it abandon Labour's programme. So the question of a British market for America becomes a direct political question; not only because America is posing political conditions, but because it raises the class issue in Britain itself.

In every country the American drive for expansion is posing a similar question. The open hostility to the Soviet Union and the new democracies is seen by everyone, and on the whole the economic basis for it is clear to all. (Though it is partly a smoke screen to cover the actual attack on the British Empire.) Equally clear is the American support for reaction in China, Greece and Turkey. What is not so clear, perhaps, is the effect within these countries. American support for reaction, and American industrial and financial penetration, are sharpening the class antagonisms within the countries, preventing a solution of the problems of the post-war period, encouraging inflation and speculation, and destroying any possible basis for a development of trade.

It is the same with Germany. Support for reaction—essential for American imperialist aims—keeps the country crippled and prevents the only real solution by the working class. In different degrees, it is the same with Italy and with France. The more the United States tries to hold back democracy, the greater the class conflict, the slower the industrial recovery, and the greater the dollar gap.

Yet all the time the economic crisis is developing in America, and the need for the extension of exports is urgent for United States monopolists. Hence the increasing pressure on foreign governments.

The American star, in the ascendant today, is set for a plunge into the abyss. This, among other reasons, is why we must at all costs avoid hitching our wagon to *that* star. As the crisis develops in America, and the drive for exports grows more intense, so also does the dollar shortage in the rest of the world. The United States is the only country which can make capital loans on a scale large enough to speed restoration. Because it will not do this for political reasons, not only will the crisis come more quickly in America, but it will further retard recovery and reconstruction. Prices of raw materials will fall on the world market, it is true; but so also will the prices at which manufactured goods are exported from Britain, France and other countries, while the countries to which we export will have reduced purchasing power, and competition from America will grow more intense.

The unequal development, the high level in America and the low level of production in most European countries, is a single problem embracing all the capitalist world. Above all it is the problem of American capitalism, though the failure to solve it is dragging down the whole of capitalist world economy.

Capitalism today, however, is not the only economy in the world. Over against it stands another economy—Socialism in its full form in the Soviet Union, and the planned economies in transition to Socialism in the Eastern European democracies. There too there is unequal development, the heritage of the past; but the laws of Socialist economy are different from those of capitalism. Because production is for use and not for profit, there is no accumulated profit seeking investment elsewhere, nor is there any surplus of goods unusable within the country. Foreign trade is not to get rid of an unsaleable surplus, but to secure all-round growth and a fuller life. Such trade by its very nature is not "free." It is deliberate, planned, mutual exchange of products for mutual needs. There is not and will not be a "rouble shortage"; a Socialist country has no purpose in exports except to get definite imports in exchange. But on that basis it will develop an increasing volume of trade, because it is always concerned to extend its productive capacity and give its people a fuller life. It is capable, too, in so far as its resources allow, of making "loans" abroad, to help other countries to develop. But such loans are merely one aspect of planning ahead. In effect, it makes no difference whether Socialist resources are used to build a factory within the country or in another country, so long as the products become available to the country making the loan.

In the capitalist world, unequal development, the contradiction between overproduction and under-production, between the unlimited

power to produce and the limited consumption of the producers, between exports and receiving payment for exports, between the policy of supporting reaction and the attempts to get orderly production and trade. In the Socialist world, the steady building up of each country's productive power, no unemployment or crisis, and the steady expansion of trade agreements to help each country forward in a planned way. In the capitalist world, weakness and impending crisis; in the Socialist world, strength and confidence in the future.

The "dollar gap" in the capitalist world cannot be bridged. But each country can secure itself against the dollar shortage from which it suffers, and all the further economic and political consequences of this shortage, if it turns towards the stable part of the world, the countries with planned economies. Foreign trade is and will continue to be necessary for Britain and other capitalist countries. But the contradictions within the capitalist world make this trade increasingly difficult. On the other hand, trade with the Socialist world becomes easier, grows larger and more secure with each year that passes. It is not a question of ideology, but of solid material benefit for the people, that makes it necessary to fight for the conclusion of trade agreements with the Socialist and planned economy countries.

What of the United States? The more countries enter into trade with the countries with stable and expanding economy, the smaller the hopes of American big business to overcome its difficulties along imperialist lines. Political changes there too will become essential, with a return to the Roosevelt policy at home and abroad. In that way, and in that way only, can the start be made to overcoming the dollar crisis.

POLAND: PROBLEMS OF UNITY

DEREK KARTUN

THE TERM MOST GENERALLY USED in Central and Eastern Europe to define the new type of social organisation now emerging in a number of countries is *Popular Democracy*. These popular democracies, whose existence was made possible for the first time by the defeat of fascism, the outstanding work of the Communists in the Resistance movements, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a powerful political and military force on the Continent of Europe, have a number of characteristics in common. They are governed by coalitions of democratic parties, in which workers, peasants and middle class are generally represented by separate groups. Within these coalitions the

Communists are found to be the most active and able element. Within the coalitions also there are found two parties of the working class. Although the political power of the old bourgeoisie has been decisively broken in these countries, the State apparatus has not been entirely transformed and is not completely in the hands of the working class. It is characteristic, however, that the key sectors of the machine (army, police, etc.) have generally been rebuilt, restaffed and placed in the hands of popular leaders. With the State power of the bourgeoisie largely broken, with decisive sectors of the national economy nationalised, and with the larger estates broken up and distributed to the peasants, these countries have started out along a new road to Socialism. They may well be able to avoid the phase of dictatorship of the proletariat, and in most of the countries in question it is believed possible, provided the international situation can be stabilised, to move forward peacefully to Socialism. Meanwhile the class struggle in these countries continues and finds its political expression in the existence of opposition parties, difficulties and hesitations within the coalitions, etc. Poland is perhaps the furthest advanced along this new road—a road which is being mapped as it is being travelled, and many of whose bends and hazards cannot yet be foreseen.

Neither in Poland nor in any of the other countries falling within the category we are discussing has it been possible to by-pass the fundamental question of working class unity. The existence of a broad democratic coalition has not absolved the Polish working class from the necessity to unify itself. Within the coalition it has constantly been the working class parties, and primarily the Polish Workers Party (Communists) who have provided the driving force, the energy, the ideas and the iron resolution which are building the new Polish State. It has been the Polish Workers Party which has put forward the new conceptions of State controls, the development of a mixed economy, the control of inflation by novel methods. It has been the same group which has carried through to success the fight against the fascist underground and the legal opposition. *Within* the coalition the proletariat has had this special role to play and the need for strengthening the working class by unifying it and extending in this fashion the doctrines of Marxism becomes self-evident.

Very considerable progress has already been made in this direction. For convenience in examining the process of unification of the two parties it is possible to consider three distinct phases.

The first phase, unity of action, has long been successfully established. Since the liberation and the first efforts to build up a State apparatus and the organs of democracy, the two working-class parties have achieved an advanced degree of practical co-operation. This

co-operation has grown and deepened steadily in the last two years until today it is part of the consciousness of the workers. Neither party would now dream of undertaking any major action at any level without consultation with the other. The Polish workers will no longer tolerate the divisions and hostility which have bedevilled the Polish working class movement since 1900 (it is significant in discussing the advance along the road to unity in Poland to remember that the split in the Polish movement is some 17 years older than that in most other countries of Europe). The successful completion of the first phase manifests itself, then, in a complete acceptance at all levels of the conception of *day to day unity of action*.

The second phase can be termed broadly the ideological unity of the working class parties. This is the present phase in Poland. It was inaugurated in May of this year when, as a result of a number of speeches by Communist leaders, a series of discussions were started between the two parties. On June 15, Oscar Gomułka, General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, defined his party's attitude to the question of unity.

"Ideological unity cannot be replaced by mechanical unity. A mechanical unity indicates that both parties, paying no attention to the ideological differences existing between them, without analysing the social essence of these differences, recognising neither the aims towards which they are striving, nor the ways and means leading to them—unite into one political body, into one party . . . The Polish Workers Party does not want such a united workers' party as that in which part of its members would go in one direction and the others in another . . . The perspective of organic unity of the Polish Workers Party and the Polish Socialist Party is, in our opinion, strictly connected with the necessity of eliminating the ideological differences still at this moment dividing the two parties."

Having started the discussion along these lines—lines which proved acceptable to the leaders and members of both parties—a series of meetings throughout the country at once began. At these meetings the members of the two parties discussed ideological differences, thrashed out theoretical problems, and deepened in so doing their knowledge of Marxism. I attended one of these meetings in the industrial centre of Katowice. There were some four hundred active members of both parties present. The Socialist spokesman was the Minister of Reconstruction; the Communists were represented by the Secretary of the Katowice region. Each spoke for an hour and then fifteen speakers from the floor took up the discussion. The atmosphere was exceedingly cordial and enthusiastic. The speakers were outspoken and critical of each other and of themselves.

This type of discussion has been going on for some months now, from Executive level down to local branch and group levels. Much progress has been made in clarifying differences. It is worth dwelling for a moment on the differences themselves.

The difference which looms largest at present and has the most immediate practical application relates to the role of the co-operative and national sectors in the national economy. The Socialists wish to develop the co-operatives at the expense of the national sector, do not see any fundamental difference between the two, consider that further nationalisations are hardly necessary. The Workers Party considers that the nationalised sector will have to be progressively strengthened and extended and that while there is a large and growing role for the co-operatives, nonetheless co-operative trading and manufacture cannot be the basis of the new Polish State. It is worth quoting at some length the remarks of Hilary Minc, Communist Minister of Industry, on this important question.

"We know of the feudal, capitalist and socialist systems, as well as the system of mixed economy. But we do not and cannot know a complementary type of co-operative economy. At the present stage producers' co-operatives (mainly farming) can provide a specific and progressive type of link between the small producers and the socialist nationalised sector . . . But it is necessary to realise that under certain conditions the co-operative movement can become, in the hands of small producers (principally of small capitalists), a form of struggle against control by the State . . . The co-operative sector is not a social system but simply a form of association. . . Marxism has always considered the socialisation of the means of production to be the final transfer of these to the State. Socialised means of production can be used in their entirety by the State. Their break-up into co-operatives could mean nothing but a return to the capitalist system in a special, co-operative, form. . . What can be considered as progressive for small producers would be a reactionary phenomenon in relation to socialised methods of production in their highest form, that is to say nationalised methods."

It must be said that one factor in the calculations of some at least of the Socialist leaders is their presence in strength in the leadership of many of the co-operatives. This is particularly true of the giant *Spolem* agricultural co-operative.

In discussing this problem the workers are evolving a clear idea of the economic future of their country. They are acquiring a full understanding of the character of the mixed economy, the role of the private, co-operative and nationalised sectors. A new working class

theory on the economic character of the new type of State is being established.

Second major difference between the parties relates to the fundamental question of the character of the State. The Socialists say that the revolution is complete, the time is approaching for a return to traditional parliamentary democracy with full liberty of organisation and speech. The Communist answer is short. They point to the continued activities of the fascist underground, the intervention of General Anders and foreign powers supporting him, the illegal contacts of the Peasant Party, the unstable international situation. They point out that the period of consolidation is not yet complete, that Poland still has a class society and does not yet have Socialism.

In the process of working out this divergence of view much valuable work is being done in elaborating exact formulations on the character of the new State. It is not yet possible to foretell with any degree of exactness the parliamentary forms of the next few years. With decisive power in the hands of the working class, yet with the continued existence of a class society, new forms of social organisation are bound to emerge. The discussions between the parties are clearly of great value in elaborating them.

Certain sections of the Socialist Party raise a number of other questions of a theoretical character. Hochfeld, who edits the Socialist theoretical journal, has talked of Marxism and Humanism. More subtle than Leon Blum, he does not claim that Marxism lacks a Humanist content and must now be revised in order to inject humanist ideals into its fabric. Rather, he suggests that Marx was a humanist but his philosophy has been distorted by the Communists. He calls for a return to the true thought of Marx and hopes in this fashion to raise in an effective form the old false argument about the individual in Society which has become fashionable among Western Social Democrats.

Certain right-wing Socialists have also tried to raise the boggy of the managerial dictatorship. Seizing upon the inevitable inefficiencies resulting from the very difficult conditions of work in Poland today, Hochfeld has used the arguments of James Burnham in thinly disguised form in efforts to demonstrate that nationalisation does not work. He has maintained that the new class of managers constitutes a danger to democracy. This, of course, is one of the ideological arms of the argument against an increase in the nationalised sector.

Finally, in the course of ironing out their fundamental differences, both parties have had to examine their past histories in a critical light. The Polish Workers Party consider that they have done this and have drawn the necessary lessons from mistakes and weaknesses of

the past. Perhaps the Socialists still have a good deal to do in this direction. Certainly they have some examination to undertake with regard to their present organisation, and many of the best Socialist leaders are making strenuous efforts to weed out of the party the fair number of undesirable elements who have taken refuge there since the January elections.

These then are the differences now being thrashed out in what must be one of the largest scale theoretical discussions of all time. None of the problems are considered insuperable; progress is in fact being made at very encouraging speed. In the course of making that progress the two working class parties are elaborating a new ideology with which to deal with the completely new problems of their social organisation. They are preparing the way for the third phase, which is the organic unity of the two parties.

It is neither possible nor desirable to make predictions, but it can safely be said that nothing now stands in the way of the rapid unification of the two parties of the working class in Poland. The process of preliminary discussion and eventual unification will enormously strengthen the parties within the coalition and will make a major contribution to solving the economic and political problems with which the Polish workers will be faced in the coming years.

HEAVY ELECTRICAL PLANT IN A NATIONAL POWER PLAN

FRANK FOULKE

THE EXCEPTIONAL cold spell at the beginning of the year was not the cause of the coal crisis, although it intensified that problem to a very large extent; and, in the same way the coal crisis and the cold spell served to expose the critical situation in the electrical supply industry, which led, as you all know, to load-shedding, closing down of factories, and, in many cases, systematic short time.

One of the outstanding features of the decline of British capitalism has been the neglect of capital re-equipment and replacement. In such a comparatively new industry as electricity supply, this neglect was no less apparent, though much less pronounced, than in the older basic industries. At the outbreak of the Second World War, the electricity supply industry in Great Britain had a generating plant capacity of 9,500,000 k.w. which produced for a demand of 21,000 million units. The industry possessed 370 generating stations, which included 137 selected stations interconnected by the Grid System and operated together

with 35 non-selected stations, under the direction of the Central Electricity Board.

For an old industrial country like Great Britain, the supply industry was not of abnormal size or strength. It had developed mainly on the basis of lighting and domestic demand. Geared as it was to a declining capitalism, its development in the inter-war years was conditioned on the power side by the needs of industries the capital equipment of which was out-of-date, which were working in some cases to only 50 per cent of capacity, and large units of which went out of production altogether.

As a result of this adaptation to a run-down economy the supply industry was subject to a terrific strain during the war. While capital expenditure was restricted to within the narrowest limits, the demand for electricity increased year by year. In 1940, 361 stations generated 28,772 million units, but in 1944, 345 produced 38,363 million units. There was a slight drop in 1945 to 37,276 million, but in 1946 production reached the record figure of 41,240 million units. There had, however, been an increase in the capacity of generating plant installed to 12.5 million k.w.

The breakdown in February this year revealed the inability of existing plant to meet the demands placed upon it. Some weeks previously, Mr. Harold Hobson, chairman of the Central Electricity Board, had stated the problem in these terms:

During the war there had been no possibility of replacements of and extensions to existing plant. Yet present consumption of electricity was much greater than before the war, and the demand during the past few weeks had been at least 1,000,000 kilowatts higher than a year ago. Although new plant and equipment for 900,000 kilowatts had been planned to come into use in 1946, so far only 200,000 additional kilowatts had been provided. As exports amounted to only about 10 per cent of the plant being produced, the complete cessation of exports would not solve the problem, which was a long-term one. It would take two or three years before the new generating plant could be put into operation effectively. By 1950, it was planned to instal 6,000,000 kilowatt plant at an expenditure of £200,000,000. There was no possibility of re-establishing the balance between plant and production before 1949 and probably 1950.

Naturally the plans to close the gap must be high up on the priority list. But in addition to this it is necessary to provide labour and materials to maintain existing plant at the highest point of efficiency and a system of load-shedding that will safeguard the supply of power to the vital industries.

Following on the crisis of February, the Government began to look

into the problem. The unions were invited to participate on the Heavy Electrical Plant Committee.

The Heavy Electrical Plant Committee has met regularly since its formation. It has discussed many of the outstanding problems of the industry, and put forward recommendations for dealing with them. But its work so far has not had much apparent effect. The seriousness of the crisis demands stronger measures than those adopted at present.

Last winter the gap between available capacity of the power stations and demand was estimated at 1,800,000 kilowatts—a shortage equivalent to the output of six Battersea power stations. Some 1,500,000 kilowatts of plant was out of action from various causes, and of the total plant available some 15 to 20 per cent was 20 to 25 years old. Commenting on this situation, the *Electrical Times* stated: "As there has been, and can be, no fundamental change in the power plant position for a year or two, load shedding is likely to be more severe during the coming winter than last." It estimated the deficiency next winter to be of the order of 2,500,000 kilowatts, and load shedding at 30, 35 and possibly 40 per cent.

Such a serious situation calls for drastic remedies. Although proposals for the staggering of working hours, rationing, and economies in the use of power for lighting and domestic uses can help, the real problem is a long-term one. Unless we can manufacture the heavy electrical plant necessary to re-equip, extend, and build new stations to meet the increasing demand for electricity the industrial and economic crisis will grow worse.

The immediate factor in the solution of the problem lies in the engineering industry. Now that the electricity supply industry is within measurable distance of being brought under national ownership, it is more necessary than ever that the manufacture of heavy electrical plant should, in the first place, be geared to the needs of the supply industry. This will require something more specific than meetings of joint committees and advisory councils. It will require at least a measure of State control and direction. Manufacturers will receive their orders not from individual undertakings, the Ministry of Fuel and Power will be the sole customer, on the basis of estimates submitted by the British Electricity Authority. Priorities in raw material supplies should be given to manufacturers by the Ministry of Supply based upon their production capacity and on the results achieved. Standardisation of design must not be left solely to the agreement of manufacturers, but should be drawn up to specifications of the British Electricity Authority and enforced. Machines and equipment needed by the manufacturers of heavy electrical plant must be given a first priority.

Measures so far put forward for dealing with the labour shortage in

the industry have not yet passed beyond the stage of proposals and suggestions. The Government departments concerned have estimated that immediate unsatisfied labour demands in the generating and boiler firms are of the order of 1,500, of whom over 900 are skilled workers, while the minimum long-term requirements to man-up the industry to capacity are placed at 5,000.

The problem can be broken down to: (1) Transfer of labour within the engineering industry; (2) Introduction of shift systems; (3) Recruitment of old and new labour; (4) Workshop Production Committees.

(1) presents many difficulties. There is the reluctance of a worker to leave his present job for work in a new district. Lack of accommodation. The question of adequate subsistence allowances, etc. The housing of extra workers and staff in already-overcrowded industrial areas.

Short of statutory direction, sufficient inducement should be offered to skilled workers to transfer from less essential engineering shops to the heavy electrical plants. Adequate subsistence allowance should be paid, and travelling time and fares allowed for regular visits home. Priority in housing accommodation should be given to workers employed in the plants by the allocation, as Stafford has already agreed to do, of a percentage of all new houses completed by local authorities.

The introduction of two and/or three-shift systems depends primarily upon the size of the available labour force. Where it is possible to introduce the shift system, this should be done in consultation and co-operation with the workers.

Every effort should be made to direct a larger proportion of apprentices entering the engineering industry to the heavy electrical plant section of the industry. The call-up for military service of apprentices in this section of the industry is being discontinued; apprentices already serving should be directed back to the industry. Older men serving in the Forces who have worked in the industry should, if suitable, be released on condition that they go back to the industry. Unskilled, semi-skilled and female labour should be recruited into the industry.

Recognising the difficulties attached to transference of labour, and appreciating that manpower will undoubtedly be withdrawn from other factories, it is necessary to examine the possibility of switching factories over from current production to essential parts required for heavy electrical generating plant. If done in a co-ordinated way, this would avoid unnecessary transference of labour. This method was carried out with a marked degree of success during the war.

Workshop Production Committees should be set up in every shop and factory. They would deal with workshop production problems, recruitment and training of labour, shift work, etc.

The key factor in solving the power crisis is seen in this analysis to lie not in the power industry as such, but in the heavy electrical plant section of the engineering industry. Therefore it is vital to the people of this country and for our industrial survival that an overall plan should be evolved that would link the two together. This is recognised in the Electricity Bill, which gives the British Electricity Authority power to manufacture electrical plant. The people of Britain, however, cannot wait until the authority has built or bought out electrical equipment factories. Action is needed now, to avoid an industrial breakdown greater than the country has yet experienced. Nationalisation must have principle and direction. To single out certain industries in isolation for nationalisation without consideration of the capital equipment needs of those industries can lead to disaster. Nationalisation, to have any meaning, must be related to and integrated with an overall national economic plan, as it has been in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. This, at least, is the lesson to be learned from the deepening fuel crisis. And it is a lesson which this country needs to learn and to learn quickly.

Given such an integrated, overall economic plan, the Government would then be able to specify clearly to the manufacturers precisely what they wanted them to produce. Failure to comply would naturally pose the question of other measures. Where it was a case of private enterprise deliberately working against the national needs and the national plan, the Government would have the full backing of the people if it resorted to requisition.

It is estimated that even with planned production recurring crises will continue to the winter of 1949-50. The losses will then have been made good. We must work to this end and continue towards the complete electrification of Britain.

“LOOKING AHEAD”

MALCOLM MITCHELL

IN ORDER TO APPRECIATE the full political force of Harry Pollitt's *Looking Ahead*, it is important to study it as a development, in the new circumstances of today, of certain themes and ideas already opened up in his earlier books, *How to Win the Peace* (1944) and *Answers to Questions* (1945). These were written in the period when the Second Front, for which the Communist Party had so long campaigned, at first alone, but gradually with the support of every section of the Labour and progressive movement, was making the rapid military

defeat of fascism inevitable. “British Socialists and Communists,” as Pollitt noted, “are fighting and dying side by side in France, Italy and Burma . . . In the factories, on J.P.C.s and Shop Stewards’ Committees, Socialists and Communists work splendidly together, getting production flowing smoothly, building up the trade unions.” And the fundamental conclusion was drawn that, if only this united action could be transformed into durable political unity, then “no power in the country could prevent a striking success at the General Election—for a united Labour movement would have far greater power to attract to its support many important sections of the community who now stand aloof.”

But *How to Win the Peace* also drew attention to a number of other factors, whose development would make for a great working-class advance in post-war Britain. Powerful as they undoubtedly would still be, British capitalists would be facing a radically new situation. On the one hand, the workers were rapidly gaining in political consciousness, and had made great advances in trade union organisation; they had won a share in “managerial functions” through the J.P.C.s, and were exercising a growing influence over the “middle classes.” On the other, British capitalism was already weaker in relation to the United States and the Dominions, for these countries had taken great strides forward in their production capacity under the stimulus of war. Moreover, as guarantees that for the British working class there would be a fundamental “difference between ‘last time’ and now,” Pollitt pointed to Socialist Russia, emerging from the war morally and politically stronger, with a powerful voice in foreign affairs; to the France of the Resistance movement and the New Democracies that were arising in the Balkan countries and elsewhere in Europe; to the growing success of the colonial people’s struggle for independence; and to the new awakening amongst the people of Britain and their determination “to live in comfort and decency, and reconstruct what war has destroyed.”

What, then, were the main responsibilities confronting the British people as outlined by Pollitt at that time? First, to destroy Fascism completely, in Germany and every other country where it raised its head, as the primary condition for the extension of democracy on a world scale. Secondly, to strengthen the forces working for the implementation of the agreements reached at the Crimea and Teheran Conferences, where the unity of post-war interests between Socialist Russia and capitalist America and Britain was acknowledged; and to assist the colonial countries to achieve independence. Thirdly, to replace the Tory Government by one based on a decisive Labour and progressive majority in Parliament; and, to this end, to win joint

electoral action and Labour-Communist unity. And fourthly, on this basis, to fight for a progressive social policy to raise the standard of living in Britain; and a progressive international policy of help to the war-devastated European countries and the backward colonial countries, thus ensuring the fullest use of Britain's resources.

And here it is well worth while to give one more quotation from *How to Win the Peace*. "It is not how 'left' the immediate programme itself may be that determines whether it carries us forward to liberation, to Socialism. It is the degree to which the workers and the people generally can be united to fight for it and their enemies be isolated and exposed. It is the degree to which the progressive forces can increase their power. Moreover, we have to realise that the actual achievement of this programme, or even part of it, will itself change the country we live in, the conditions in which we work, and—most important of all—it will change the minds of the people in the process of carrying it out and prepare them for yet other far-reaching changes."

Pollitt's next contribution to the Marxist analysis of the world situation that would follow the defeat of fascism and the continued alliance between Russia, America and Britain was *Answers to Questions*.

Here one of Pollitt's main points was that, in the new situation that was developing, it was necessary to develop Marxist theory if it is to be an adequate practical guide to the new problems that were arising. "If in the coming period we really achieve the complete political and moral defeat of fascism . . . then the growth of democracy in forms too strong for fascism to undermine will be an important means through which a lasting peace can be obtained . . . and the possibilities increased of the advance towards Socialism." For though imperialism will still bear within it the seeds of war, said Pollitt, the new relationships that exist between Russia, America and the Soviet Union will allow them to regulate their political and economic differences, to the degree to which these countries use their combined power and influence in the World Security Organisation.

To the specific question whether it will be "possible to carry out economic co-operation, or must it break down through inter-imperialist rivalry, particularly Anglo-American rivalry?" Pollitt replied that, though there were undoubtedly in both countries those who would seek to fight out their differences by every form of extreme economic competition, "there now, however, exist in Britain and America powerful sections of the capitalist class who understand that the intensified economic problems that will arise once the war is finally won require solutions that rest upon international, and not national and sectional, policies . . . Such capitalists have also to take into consideration the strength of the popular forces and the new political developments

throughout the world; both of which are now able to exert a powerful influence on the whole economic and political policy of Britain and America." And he points out that the only way in which the immensely-increased productive power of America can find a market and the British capitalists avert a crisis of unprecedented seriousness, is by raising the living standards of their workers and embarking on great mutual schemes for developing the backward and devastated countries.

In answer to the doubt that had been expressed as to whether "planned capitalism" was possible and, if so, whether it would not be only to the advantage of the capitalists, Pollitt drew attention to the fact that fifty years ago Engels had already noted that: "When we pass from joint-stock companies to trusts which control and monopolise whole branches of industry, it is not only private production that ceases, but also planlessness." But, comments Pollitt, "The basic question is: planning by whom and for what?" Pre-war monopoly capitalism had given rise to planning of a sort: planned restriction, unemployment and poverty in the interests of profits. But today, with the tremendously strengthened political influence of the working class, State-planned and controlled production, consciously interfering in "private enterprise," could ensure full employment for the workers and markets for the capitalists. But what has this to do with Socialism? Isn't it merely an attempt to make capitalism work? No, says Pollitt, because "State planning on the lines we are suggesting will demand democratic changes in the State machine itself . . . in (which) process the State will become less suitable for a switch to fascism, and more and more stimulus will be given to the democratic organisations of the people themselves."

Today, looking back at the main ideas developed in these earlier books two years ago, what must at once strike every working-class reader is the essential soundness of the political line they advocated. True, the advance of the democratic forces has not been so uninterrupted or so widespread as was there envisaged; and the problems of economic reconstruction have all too obviously not been grappled with, as we in Britain have good reason to know. In part this is due to radical changes in the world situation, notably the complete reversal of America's policy of international economic and political co-operation resulting from the victory of the reactionaries in the Democratic and Republican Parties after Roosevelt's unexpected death. But equally it is due to the failure of the Labour Government in Britain to carry out the programme for which it was elected; a programme which, if it had been implemented in a working-class way, would have corresponded with the policy proposed by Pollitt.

Thus *Looking Ahead*, written in 1947, appears at a moment when the crisis, of which Pollitt had earlier recognised the danger, is on the very point of breaking; a crisis not only in Britain's economic life, but also in international relations. In 1947 the forces of post-war democracy, whose strength he had foretold in 1944, are indeed stronger. But so are the forces of reaction. The issues confronting the further advance of democracy are therefore sharper, and present new problems which the working-class movement has to solve if it is to move forward to Socialism. It is with these new problems that *Looking Ahead* is concerned.

We are living, says Pollitt, in the twilight of British imperialism. It is time for the Labour movement and its leaders to realise that they can no longer carry on simply gaining concessions from capitalism and dreaming of a time when we will attain Socialism; for Britain's crisis is not merely another trade depression, but a proof that we are in the transitional stage to Socialism *now*.

For what is the prerequisite for the transition to Socialism? It is "when the capitalist class is *unable to go on ruling in the old way* and is trying to conserve its power by selling out the national interests of the country that the working class has *the opportunity and responsibility to take the leadership of the whole nation*, to bring the country out of the crisis in the way that strengthens democracy and speeds the fight for Socialism." (My italics.)

The key to an understanding of the world situation today is, then, to recognise that the centre of world reaction has shifted. "America, the greatest stronghold of imperialism, has taken the place of Germany. The methods are different, but the aim is the same, to obtain the domination of the world so that the commodities produced by American big business can be sold at a profit." For not only did America emerge from the war the greatest capitalist power, but this power was concentrated into the hands of fewer people than ever in the history of an industrial country; and these people, forming the U.S. trusts, have become the open government of America. (See the article by H.C. in the August *Communist Review*.)

The great advances made by the working class during the war did not pass unobserved by the monopolists of America and Britain. Churchill rushed to instal a government of reaction in Greece, thus provoking civil war; and America, when Britain voted a Labour Government, ended lend-lease as their first move to halt "Communism" and tie Britain to American economy. Why has this policy met with such success? Why has Britain been unable to resist Wall Street in the same way that devastated Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the other new democracies of Europe have been able to? Because not only

do the dominant group of the Tories support Truman wholeheartedly (as Pollitt forcefully puts it, “ The once proud monopolists of the world are prepared to sit at the feet of the American Colossus in the vain hope that it will restore them to their own former position ”); but also because “ even within the Labour movement, sections of the old reformist leadership, fearing and hating the mass movement of the people, turn to Wall Street, that democracy of millionaires and negro-lynchers, and prefer to tie their countries to the U.S. trusts rather than engage in that hard class battle for the defeat of capitalism in their own country.”

What, then, is the way out of the dollar grip for Britain? It is to realise the strength of the international working class—and *Looking Ahead* gives impressive figures of the strength of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the colonial National Liberation Movements, and the International Communist Parties (19,000,000)—and to find new forms of economic co-operation with the planned economies of Eastern Europe and with the rising colonial peoples. “ What folly to allow ourselves to be so at the mercy of the U.S., when unity and co-operation between Britain and its associated peoples could so swiftly bring about those changes of policy inside the U.S. which would then allow even wider forms of economic co-operation to be organised.” But in order to be able to trade with these planned economies, Britain must first put her own economic house in order; and, putting his finger squarely on the root of Britain’s industrial weakness, Pollitt points to coal as the key to Britain’s recovery. “ How many people realise,” he asks, “ that if we could export 30-40 million tons of coal, as we did before the war, we could be independent of the American millionaires and blackmailers? We would begin to pay our way; other countries would be anxious to supply us with the goods we need; we would begin in reality to see the end of our present difficulties and face a bright and happy future.”

But in order that these possibilities may be realised, one fundamental condition is necessary: that the people, led by the working class, shall be boldly drawn into action on a policy clearly inspired by Socialist principles. Only then will the British people be able to exercise its full influence on the side of progress in determining the major issue of our time: the issue between imperialism and Socialism. For this reason, Pollitt devotes one of the most important sections of his book to the problem of achieving unity within the working class itself. This theme inevitably figures largely in all three books, but Pollitt’s treatment of it here demands the closest attention from every militant worker, not only because of the vital importance of the question, but because of the new aspects of the problem as a result of the

Labour Party Conference's rejection of Communist affiliation and the changes in the Labour Party Constitution. For Communists, however, one aspect will transcend all others in importance: the urgent necessity, and the opportunity, that exist for the rapid building and strengthening of the Communist Party itself—a job in which *Looking Ahead* will prove of the greatest possible assistance.

COMMUNISM, THOUGHT AND ART

LAURENT CASANOVA

(Report to the 11th Congress of the French Communist Party)

IN HIS REPORT Maurice Thorez emphasised the fact that reactionary attacks are always accompanied by a violent ideological offensive, and that reactionary ideologists, by concentrating on "man" and "humanism," try to give an appearance of novelty to the old calumny that "Marxism makes human beings the passive playthings of blind mechanical forces."

One of the usual tricks of reactionary ideologists, when they are speaking to intellectuals whom they know to be honest, consists in persuading them to turn away from the practical experience of the people and the lessons that this experience teaches. For the sons of our people have answered in advance all discussions of a philosophical character and the question of what is the type of man most appropriate for our age. The sons of our people, with the blood they have shed and the sacrifices they have accepted, have said: "The type of man most appropriate for our age is he who is forged in the struggle of the peoples for their liberty and a better life."

Maurice Thorez spoke of the inspiring qualities of the literature of optimism. There is one book in our literature which will remain a beautiful and noble testimony, because it sums up both the practical experience of the people—with the Communists at their head—during the dark years, and the reasoned optimism of fighters. It is the book written by those who were shot. After reading these letters of farewell, how crude seem the attempts made to isolate the Communist from his ideal and his Party, and to separate the conscious determination of the Communist from the march forward of the whole people.

The truth is that when the masses are marching forward, essential cultural values have their source in the struggle of the masses.

For example, in the past, we have often thought over this phrase of Lenin's—"Every cook should know how to govern the State." And now, through fighting in the vanguard of the masses, we are beginning

to understand some of the material basis of our master's thought. When the miner, answering the call of the secretary of our Party, goes down the pit thinking "I will get out two extra trucks of coal," and perseveres in spite of bad tools and the jeers of others, we maintain that he has more sense of the meaning of the State than some crafty old politician.

In times of relative equilibrium the thinker or artist can persuade himself that abstract research, personal experiment or technical invention are the decisive means of cultural enrichment. But when the people are on the march, this mistake can no longer be made.

When the peoples are marching forward, the source of cultural values and the motive force which develops those values coincide in a manner that can immediately be sensed by the mass movement itself.

We say "the source of cultural values" and "the motive force that develops those values," because naturally everything does not finish with the elementary movement of the masses. Those values have still to be given form and clarified. In brief, the masses, in their aspiration towards a deeper consciousness of their own effort, set problems which remain to be solved.

We have learnt from Lenin, the unwavering defender of Marxist doctrine against the "economists," that this aspiration of the masses is at the very root of the continual enrichment of our revolutionary theory. We have learnt that ideas, those ideas which have their basis in the objective reality of a society and the social relations that characterise it, react in their turn on material reality and on the movement from which they issue, modifying aspects of it, accelerating or retarding its rhythm.

So the masses in their daily struggle have the right to turn towards the artists and thinkers who struggle at their side, or who follow their effort sympathetically, to say to them: "What are you going to do with this new material that we offer? It depends on you whether the new conceptions we put forward are carried further."

For the renewal of cultural values will depend on artists and thinkers, on the specialists themselves.

This goes to prove that the intellectuals who come to the working class as if they were ashamed of being intellectuals are wrong. It is true that intellectuals can come to the working class for other than purely intellectual reasons; through love of their country and its people, or disgust with their own solitude and helplessness. Militant action and the practical results of their own efforts in solidarity with the effort of a whole class and a whole people bring them the peace they are looking for. But they remain intellectuals, with their sensibility already formed, and the needs that their position as intellectuals has brought into being.

The working class needs them as intellectuals. But there are some who make an effort to repudiate their status: instead of using it in the general struggle. They fling themselves heart and soul into militant activity and do nothing else. The mutilation they impose on themselves is voluntary. It is never the fault of the Party, although by their attitude they give that impression. But the mutilation is real. In this, doubtless, we must see the deep-seated reason for the contemptuous dogmatism that they affect in reaction against what seem to them to be the petty preoccupations of hesitant intellectuals, the reason also for the casualness with which they treat the scruples and stubborn prejudices of other intellectuals. They give the impression of substituting the spirit of dogma for the spirit of principle, polemics for the methods of unhampered research.

And they are too often absent from the battle of ideas itself.

Thus they desert a sector of the front which they alone can hold, and they deprive the working class of the arms that they alone can give it. In fact, they turn away from their social function. There are other reasons still why this is serious. For when the working class has advanced to its present stage it needs to be supported by knowledge that specialists can give on the technical and scientific plane. The working class cannot remain indifferent to this special knowledge, which is an essential factor for the more rapid development of general economy, and which can react very directly on the relations between States and classes. Such, for example, are researches on the disintegration of matter and atomic energy, or the search for a real balance of the national budget. In the knowledge of specialists applied to reality in our country, the working class can find confirmation of its own struggle against defeatists in France, against reaction which degrades our national economy for political ends. This goes to prove that the working class and its Party, rather than fearing anything from the free effort of thought, aspires towards it, as life aspires towards light.

This liberty has become intolerable to the forces of political and social reaction. Therefore the working class and its Party cannot dissociate itself from anything that affects the conditions necessary for that free effort. No one will ever pay such respectful attention to these as the working class shows already.

But it is not only intellectuals who come to the working class with a guilty conscience. There are also those who come to the people to reveal the secrets of culture and to make it accessible. For them, everything reduces itself to intellectual discovery. Their good will and good faith are evident, but they are in an impasse because they confuse things which are of a different order. They confuse the source of values, which no longer belongs to them, with the effort to carry those values further,

which must depend for a great part and directly on themselves.

For a stimulant to the artist's creative effort they give aesthetic emotion alone, making it the measure of all things, and the discussion of ideas which follows it. They place this discussion on such a basis that the masses immediately find themselves excluded. Certainly the metal worker would find it difficult to follow them and to understand. When this is pointed out to them they reply, astonished, "Ought we to pander to the reactionary taste or the ignorance of the people?" Indeed, no one has asked them to, but they put forward this excuse themselves.

It is quite obvious that the understanding of a work of art by the masses depends on many factors, among others on the material effort which ought to be made to organise that understanding. But this effort will be vain if it has not as its basis the capacity of the artist and of the masses to be moved by the same things.

Aesthetics is the expression of a relationship which extends from content to form. If the artist has nothing to say or to do—and there are some who set up nothingness as a doctrine—why reproach the people with not lingering over these proofs of the evils of a social system? The masses have not simply to note the fact that the system is decaying: they want to change it—and that is the most important thing. It is valuable to discuss the forms of popular sensibility which already exist. But the masses' present capacity for emotion is another thing. And it is the only determining factor: it is from there that one must start.

Such are the principles which, in our opinion, the artist should remember, for it is by taking these principles as the starting point that liberty of expression can, and ought, to be fulfilled. Indeed, beyond these limits, liberty risks being a fraud in bad taste or a political calculation. It is in this sense that we must understand Maurice Thorez' reminder that the Communist Party cannot remain indifferent to aesthetics.

But how is it possible for sincere people to imprison themselves in an insoluble argument? The principal reason is that they artificially separate their creative from their political activity. They say: "I am a scientist, a poet, or a painter, and a citizen afterwards. The scientist is a scientist, the painter is a painter, but the citizen is a Communist." The weakness of such reasoning, however, is that the demands of our epoch do not permit this separation so easily; and those who are intellectually sincere would do better, therefore, if, instead of trying to harmonise the contradictions that they recognise, they would imitate the worker who places the citizen and the private individual on the same plane of social struggle. We know that this is more difficult for

the poet or artist: but if they do not do it themselves, their political enemies will oblige them to do so, to the sole advantage of political reaction.

Consider the kind of discussions on art that have been taking place recently. The discussion developed in such a way that the Communist Party was faced with two alternatives. Either it could say nothing, which would mean for everyone, but particularly for the Communist intellectual, freedom to write or do anything according to his personal whim; or if it expressed a point of view everyone would call it intellectual dictatorship. Here again, the arguments were incredibly crude. What does intellectual liberty amount to, if what is permitted to everyone else is to be denied only to Communists? Why should a Communist, because he is a Communist, not be able to say: "This is to my taste, and that is not to my taste?" Why should the Communist Party alone dissociate itself from everything that has a certain influence on the development of the political situation and is visibly related to its own struggle? Yet if Monsieur Malraux can be the propagandist of de Gaulle and Monsieur Mauriac can write in *Figaro* without being held to have jeopardised the sacred principle of the separation of art and politics, why should it be assumed, if a Communist intellectual raises his voice, that this can only be to order and against his will?

It has been suggested that there is an essential incompatibility between art and politics. "True art," it is said, "ought to be in advance of its times. It cannot be harnessed to the daily necessities of the struggle, nor brought into relation with the patient progress of the masses under the pressure of those necessities. Art must go its own way, treading precipices that the masses cannot yet reach." And, indeed, it does happen that the spiritual giants see so far ahead that their vision can only be discerned with difficulty by others who nevertheless desire to follow them. But who should know this better than Communists, since it is our principle to fight in the vanguard of the masses, and to sacrifice none of the values of the future? We will never reproach anyone for looking ahead and being determined by the future. But to be in advance of its time is not the prerogative only of one particular form of art; any more than to flounder in day-to-day reality is the prerogative of only one form of politics. There is an art that flounders in day-to-day reality, even in yesterday's reality. It is reactionary art. There is a form of politics which is in advance of its time because it is based on consistent theory. That is Communist politics. There is reactionary art as there are reactionary politics, and there is a connection between the two because they both apply the rules of bourgeois empiricism. But there is also a progressive art, just as there are progressive politics. And the two are also connected, because they

both set out from a basic principle which is in accordance with the necessities of historical development. What is that art? In our opinion it ought to rest on the same simple principles as those which assure the real liberty of the artist: we mean, the possibility for him to create and his freedom of expression. That is, first, the desire to help the people to become conscious and to attain the ends they set themselves—practical effort with the people; secondly, sincerity in the search for cultural values appropriate for our time and our country; and finally, a feeling of personal responsibility as regards the people.

There are others besides Communists who consider these principles to be valid, and who conform to them in practice. But no one can give them their full value better than a Communist; for our ideal, our theory, our methods of thought and action all go to make these principles the basis for an unparalleled fertilisation of art and thought. This is what the Communist Party can offer. The rest is not in its power. The rest, I repeat, depends on the specialists themselves, who are the chief servants of thought and art.

UNREASON IN SOCIOLOGY

Reason and Unreason in Society. Morris Ginsberg (London School of Economics, 15s.)

SOCIOLOGY in Britain has now reached a stage of development in which the crudities of the nineteenth century evolutionary theory with its overemphasis on biological analogies, have been refined; large quantities of data about civilised and "primitive" peoples have been accumulated; and the study of men in their social relations has been brought nearer to economic reality and given a firmer grounding in fact. Professor Ginsberg is today considered as the foremost exponent of the subject in this country; and the essays and papers which have been collected under the title *Reason and Unreason in Society* may be taken as representative of the outlook and pre-occupations of orthodox sociologists. The range of topics covered by this book is indicative of Ginsberg's wide scholarship; it includes studies of the work of the sociologists Hobhouse, Pareto and Westermarck, essays on national character and the causes of wars, anti-Semitism, Individualism in International Law, and the place of reason in morals. The qualities of Ginsberg's work are brought out in the reasoned treatment of all these subjects, the careful marshalling of facts, the weighing up and sifting of alternative approaches, and the general precision of statement.

Yet in spite of these qualities, Ginsberg fails to provide solutions,

for the problems which he raises. His faith in the reasonable elements in human nature, which permeates all his work, and emerges particularly clearly in the essays on "Moral Progress" and "The Function of Reason in Morals", does not meet the challenge of our time, which demands not only analysis but the understanding that carries over into action, and is incomplete without that active issue. For instance, in the chapter on "Social Philosophy and the Social Sciences", Ginsberg stresses the need for the establishment of a proper relationship between social philosophy and the sciences concerned with human behaviour, in particular sociology and economics. As he points out, the assertion that the social sciences are "ethically neutral" rests on a totally false antithesis between means and ends. But the establishment of a "proper relationship" between philosophy and the sciences presupposes an integrated and self-consistent outlook, and it is here that Ginsberg and the other bourgeois writers cannot help us; although Ginsberg sees the need for this "genuine correlation" between philosophy and science, there is little indication in his own work of a unified set of principles with immediate concrete significance. The central theme of the book is described as "the part played by reason and unreason in human affairs", but beyond the analysis there is little construction. Ginsberg concludes the chapter on "Moral Progress" with a statement of his belief that "we are entitled . . . to put some trust in human intelligence and will, and to feel justified in the hope that the energies which are now expended in mutual destruction may come to be used in the service of ends in which reasonable men may find fulfilment." (p. 324.) Far more than this is needed, for only a philosophy that has its feet firmly on the ground, and which illumines the facts which our experience presents to us, can enable us to play a positive part in building the sort of world in which "reasonable men may find fulfilment."

A true understanding of social problems must lead to action, but there is no clear indication in Ginsberg's work of the relation of the problems which he raises to contemporary social needs. It is now more than ever necessary that the sociologists should draw up and act upon a programme of social priorities, conceived in terms of the social and economic reconstruction of our national life. It is not, then, enough to give an account, as Ginsberg does in the first chapter of the book, "Problems and Methods of Sociology", of a variety of problems with which the sociologists should be occupied, without relating that subject-matter to the immediate concrete needs of the community. One which comes immediately to mind in this connection is the creation of new communities, which, as we know from our experience, involves far more than the building of new

settlements and the transplanting of populations. In this respect, it is significant that small mention is made in this chapter, or for that matter throughout the book, of the achievements of the American sociologists; for in spite of the weaknesses of their work, we must admit that the problems which have occupied the attention of the American writers have, generally speaking, been conceived of as bearing directly upon the health of society. For example, the pre-occupation of many writers such as Cayton and Drake in Chicago, and Davis and Gardiner in the South, with the problem of ethnic groups and of the Negroes in particular, reflects the urgency of these issues in American life.

But though sociology today is faced with urgent practical tasks, its theoretical problems nevertheless have far more than academic interest. An example of this is the case of the school of "Formal Sociology" which was centred in pre-Hitler Germany. Ginsberg's chapter on "Recent Tendencies in Sociology" is mainly concerned with the work of this school, which he rightly criticises for its attempt to divorce the subject-matter of sociology from its historical context, to study forms of social life as "timeless and identical entities". These forms are, as Ginsberg points out, "affected by the varying social life in which they are embedded . . . a category like common ownership, for instance, does not really mean the same thing in different economic systems." But in combating the tendency represented by this school of sociology, we need to go much farther in stressing the reactionary implications of this approach to social phenomena. For if the fundamental facts about social life were indeed certain immutable relationships, such as those of ascendance and submission, regarded as "ultimate and irreducible forms of social life or experience," then efforts to change the historical framework within which these forms are contained would be rendered worthless; for relationships of submission and ascendance would be the same in whatever society, regardless of who was in the ascendant—which was the dominant class—and who was submitting to domination. As against this essentially static view, we must oppose a view of society as undergoing qualitative change, so that its relationships are transformed at each stage of its development. It must be emphasised that the other type of analysis, seeking understanding of social processes through "ultimate and irreducible forms of social life or experience", must always distort the truth about society, simply because society is in a constant process of change leading to qualitative transformation.

But though throughout his work Ginsberg gives much prominence to problems of social change and development, and in particular to the relation between the different factors of the social process, his

view of social change rests upon the correlated development of a number of factors, without any one being recognised as primary or decisive. The reciprocal nature of the social process is expressed in the following passage: "The institutions of a people must reflect the character of the individuals composing it, but this in turn is moulded by the institutions. Men make their institutions but also the institutions make the men." But if the relationship between individual men and their social environment were no more than one of reciprocity, then it would be impossible to find any key to the problem of social change. It is this failure to grasp the nature of the social process which is at the root of the inadequacy and indecision of Ginsberg's conclusions. This is revealed in certain references to Marxism which appear in this book, and which show a basic lack of understanding of the principles of historical materialism. For instance, a palpable distortion of Marxist theory is contained in the following passage, offered as an explanation of the support given to the Social Democrats in Germany before the First World War: "The determinist elements in Marxist theory, the view that Socialism must inevitably be realised as a result of the inner development of the capitalist system, made it possible for the Socialist to preach a doctrine of revolution as an event bound to come in the fullness of time, but which it would be absurd and even dangerous to expect before that time had come. In the meantime, people were to be patient and hopeful, prepare for the revolution that was to come rather than seek to bring it about immediately."

We need only set against this a passage from a letter written by Engels to Bloch on September 21, 1890: "The determining element in history is *ultimately* the production and reproduction in real life . . . if, therefore, someone twists this into the statement that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase." The key to social change is change in the productive forces. As Marx wrote in a letter to Annenkov (December 28, 1846): "Every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity. The productive forces are therefore the result of practical human energy, but this energy is itself conditioned by the circumstances in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already won, by the social form which exists before they do, which they do not create, which is the product of the former generation." Ginsberg and other bourgeois writers fall short of this grasp of the fundamental nature of social movements; therefore their conclusions are weakened, their vision is obscured and they cannot see the way forward to social advance.

J.I.

COMMUNIST REVIEW

NOVEMBER
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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FEBRUARY: *More Production or Breakdown*, John Frederick; *Eastern Agriculture and British Trade*, Arthur Clegg; *People's Democracies of Eastern Europe*, James Klugman; *Trusteeship*, Michael Carritt; *Lenin: Theoretician of Revolution*, Christopher Hill.

MARCH: *Towards a People's Plan*, J. R. Campbell; *Wall Street Imperialism Checked*, William Z. Foster; *Eastern Agriculture and British Trade—II*, Arthur Clegg; *Proposed New Wages Structure for the Mining Industry*, Abe Moffatt, *The Common Secondary School*, John C. Daniels; *Early English Chamber Music*, Rutland Boughton.

APRIL: *The Planless Planners*, J. R. Campbell; *The Communist Party and the Youth*, John Gollan; *British Road to Socialism*, Kitty Cornforth; *Fictitious Capital*, Elinor Burns, *Nationalised Railways and Coal*, A. George; *The Cultural Front*, Mao Tse-Tung.

MAY: *The Immediate Political Struggle*, Harry Pollitt, *Socialist Agriculture*, George Matthews, *Principles of Higher Education*, Joan Peel; *Self-Government for Scotland*, W. Lauchlan, *Swansong of Liberal Philosophy*, M C

JUNE: *Anglo-American Relations*, John Gollan, *England's Democratic Army*, Christopher Hill, *New Wages Structure for Mining*, Lew Miles, *Social Background of the Navy*, G. L.; *The Teaching of Political Economy*, John East.

JULY: *Political Aspects of Planning*, J. Paul, *Britain's Road*, Jack Symons and E. B.; *Joint Production Committees in France*, Derek Kartun, *Textile Machinery in an Economic Plan*, E. Frow, *Extension of Co-operative Trade in the Soviet Union*, V. Bernard, *The Mechanics of Monopoly*, D. H., *Quack Remedies for a Sick World*, Emile Burns.

AUGUST: *Parliament and the Labour Programme*, Phil Piratin, M P, *The Use of Our Cultural Heritage*, R. F. Willetts; *Railway Efficiency*, Frank Moore, *The Trusts' Hold on America*, H C, *The Great Basic Question of Philosophy*, Douglas Garman; *A Planner Explains*, John East.

SEPTEMBER: *A Trade Union General Staff*, J. Gardner, *Is Your Socialism Necessary?* John East, *Mechanising Our Nationalised Mines*, W. Wallace; *Emigration and Britain's Crisis*, Peter Kerrigan; *Naval Dockyards as Shock Troops*, Jack Symons; *The Spiritual Age*, Olive Burns.

“Looking Ahead,” Malcolm Mitchell, *Communism, Thought and Art*, Laurent Casanova, *Unreason in Sociology*, J J

ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIALISM

JOHN GOLLAN

THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY of the great October Socialist Revolution will be received with mixed feelings throughout the world. For the common people it will be an occasion for celebration and joy, and for Wall Street and world reaction, one for dismay.

For the British people, confronted with so many acute problems, it must be, above all, an occasion to assess afresh the significance of Socialism. The successive anniversaries of the Revolution have each their special place in history; that of 1947 must surely be to demonstrate the superiority of the Socialist economy. The invincibility and greatness of the Soviet Union in war stands proved. The next decade will show equally the superiority of Socialism in solving the economic contradictions, now the pre-occupation of the entire capitalist world, and thus in building the material foundations for a great leap forward in the social and intellectual advance of humanity.

In the famous passage in *Capital*, Marx posed the fatal contradiction of capitalist economy in these terms:—

“The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument” (Kerr edition, I, p. 837).

His claim was that Socialism, by abolishing private appropriation, would abolish this contradiction.

“This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.”

Lenin further developed this basic idea of Marx. In *State and Revolution* he wrote:—

“This expropriation will facilitate the enormous development of the productive forces. And seeing how capitalism is already retarding this development to an incredible degree, seeing how much progress could be achieved even on the basis of the present level of modern technique, we are entitled to say with the fullest confidence that the expropriation of the capitalists will inevitably result in the enormous development of the productive forces of human society” (p. 74).

The results of the Revolution were manifold. With the coming to power of the people and the expropriation of the capitalists, the so-called "market problem" was solved. Commenting on the market problem of capitalism, the expression in life of the contradiction of capitalist society revealed by Marx, Engels remarked in *Anti-Duhring* (p. 301):—

"The expansion of the market cannot keep pace with the expansion of production. The collision becomes inevitable, and as it can yield no solution so long as it does not burst the capitalist mode of production itself, it becomes periodic."

Permanent unemployment, permanent excess productive capacity, periodic crises of relative overproduction—these were the hallmark of capitalism. Today the problems of Britain are different for the immediate period, but the shadow of impending crisis overhangs the U.S.A., and once the immediate replacement boom is over and the seller's market collapses, this market problem will again confront Britain to an enhanced degree.

The problem of trying to achieve full employment in capitalist society has produced a whole new economic literature in Britain and the U.S.A. But once the immediate difficulties of reconstruction after the Socialist Revolution were overcome, "full employment," the unattainable in capitalist society, except in war, became the normal in Soviet Socialist society. In 1928 there were still 1,576,000 unemployed in the Soviet Union; by 1930 unemployment was abolished. It has never existed since: it will never exist again. Socialism solved the contradictions of capitalist society, and with them the market problem. Production for social use replaced production for profit. Planned utilisation of all the forces of production, labour, raw materials and machines, with Socialism, had become possible. As early as 1920, in the midst of enormous problems, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee could place the issue:—

"Side by side with the immediate, essential, unpostponable and urgent tasks in the regulation of transport, the elimination of the food and fuel crisis, the combating of epidemics and the organisation of the disciplined armies of labour, it has for the first time become possible for Soviet Russia to proceed to a more systematic economic construction, to the scientific elaboration and the consistent realisation of a State plan for the whole national economy."

By 1928 the first Socialist Five Year Plan was launched.

Full employment and the solution of the market problem had ceased to be the issue. The great and main task of Socialism, the unleashing of the productive forces for the benefit of humanity—this was now on the order of the day.

Closely associated with this task was the building of heavy industry. Britain's crisis has underlined, even to the dullest, how the standard of life of a nation, its very independence, depends on heavy industry.

At the beginning of the Revolution, what heavy industry Russia possessed was devastated by the civil war. As Lenin wrote at the time:—

“ Thus the situation in heavy industry is really a very grave problem for our backward country, for we could not count on obtaining loans from the wealthy countries. In spite of that we already observe a marked improvement, and we also see that our trading activities have already brought us a certain amount of capital. Only a very modest sum as yet, it is true; a little over twenty million gold roubles. At any rate, it is a beginning; our trade provides us with funds which we can employ for the purpose of improving the situation in heavy industry . . . we know that unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without this we shall be doomed as an independent country. This we fully realise ” (*Selected Works*, Vol. X. pp. 327/8).

The modest 20 million gold roubles had become an annual capital investment of 31,500 million roubles in the fourth Five Year Plan. By 1941 heavy industry had not only been founded, but was sufficiently strong to smash the Nazi war machine.

It is the imperishable historical contribution of the Socialist Revolution that by 1947 Soviet economy has brilliantly fulfilled Lenin's prediction of the “ enormous development ” of the productive forces. Just as surely, American economic developments, in spite of enormous production and advanced technique, today show inexorably the “ incredible degree ” to which the fetters of private property are holding back its even greater potential power.

Coal production in the U.S.A. in 1939, which stood at 446 million tons, was 16 per cent *lower* than the level reached before the First World War, and 33 per cent lower than the peak period of 1920, when 658 million tons were produced. Soviet coal production by 1940 stood at 166 million tons, or 472 per cent in advance of the 1913 figure.

American steel production in 1939 stood at 47.1 million tons, or a 66 per cent increase on the pre-1914 figure; but it was 16 per cent less than the peak year 1929, when 56.4 million tons were produced.

Soviet steel production reached 18.3 million tons in 1940, or 336 per cent increase on the 1913 figure.

Industrial production as a whole doubled in the United States between 1914 and 1939, according to the index of physical output of the National Bureau of Economic Research. It should be noted, however, that the 1939 level only represented the achievement, after the slump, of the physical output of 1929.

Gross industrial production in the Soviet Union (in constant 1926-27 prices) was 15 milliard roubles in 1913, but reached 138.5 milliard roubles in 1940, or 823 per cent of 1913.

The industrial picture, therefore, is one of tempestuous advance of the Socialist economy, compared with the capitalist economy of the U.S.A. up to 1929 and the relative stagnation between 1929 and 1939. *At the same time, production per head in America was greatly in excess of that of the U.S.S.R.*

In agriculture a similar situation prevailed. The average grain crop of the United States for the years 1906-10 was 117.3 million tons. In the year 1939, it was 118.8 million tons, or roughly the same. In the Soviet Union, the grain crop was 70 million tons in 1913, and 119 million tons (an increase of 70 per cent) in 1940.

The number of cattle, sheep and pigs in the United States in the year 1900 was 67.7 million, 61.5 million and 62.8 million respectively. In 1940 the number of cattle had dropped to 60.7 million, sheep to 40.1 million and pigs to 34 million. For the Soviet Union, the number of cattle was reduced drastically from 60.6 million in 1916 as a result of imperialist and civil wars. By 1933 the number was still down to 38.4 million, but by 1938 reached 63.2 million. For sheep and goats the respective figures were 121.2 million, 50.2 and 102.5 millions, and for pigs, 20.9, 12.1 and 30.6 millions.

In agriculture, therefore, not only had the Soviet Union advanced while America had stood still or declined, but in absolute figures for many of the main products the Soviet Union had reached the level of the United States.

When Vishinsky, at the United Nations, showed how profitable the war had been for United States capitalism, he was only speaking the truth. The United States economy expanded enormously. Coal production at the height of the war reached 649 million tons, 23 per cent in advance of the 1911-15 period and 45 per cent in excess of the figure for 1939. Peak production of steel was reached in 1943, when output registered 79.3 million tons, 180 per cent in advance of the 1911-15 level, and 68 per cent in excess of the 1939 output. The Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial Production reached a figure

roughly double that of 1939 and about 336 per cent in advance of the 1914 level.

These are significant and important achievements dwarfing any developments in America in the present century, and representing a level of activity hitherto impossible in the capitalist world.

At the same time, these developments emphasise the retarding influence of capitalism on the growth of the productive forces of which Lenin spoke. One can say that United States capitalism was developing until 1929. Between 1929 and 1939 there was decline and recovery reaching its peak at almost the 1929 figure in 1937. Before the war recession had started again. It was the outside stimulus of the war, and not any internal driving force within United States economy, which produced the doubling of the industrial output in 1943 compared with 1939.

Indeed, the very growth of the productive forces in the United States has brought acute problems for capitalism. In spite of the satisfaction of the postponed demand of the home market and the extraordinary demand for United States goods in the countries of Europe and elsewhere, production has dropped from the record 1943 levels. The industrial production index, which stood at 239 in that year, declined to 203 in 1945 and 175 in 1946, a decline of over a quarter compared with 1943. In the first six months of 1947 the figure increased to 183, which was still 24 per cent down on 1943.

It is clear that United States economy faces a slump. The real *per capita* income left after taxes is steadily declining. It fell from an annual rate of 1,038 dollars in the first quarter of 1946, to 956 dollars in the first half of 1947. The totals fixed for the so-called Marshall Plan show that no export boom or capital exports can be on such a scale as to replace the extraordinary demands of the war. Even official government circles are hesitant in predicting the future once the present temporary props to business activity weaken. The President's Mid-Year Economic Report declared:—

“ We shall need to make many basic readjustments to complete the transition to a permanently stable and maximum-level economy. . . They must be made before the lack of them produces serious unemployment and business decline. . . ”

It will be clear, therefore, that any further great upsurge of the American economy is out of the question. The height of achievement would be to try and maintain economic activity at slightly below present levels. However, all previous American economic history shows that stability is unattainable in the American capitalist system.

Entirely different is the perspective opening up for the Soviet Socialist economy. Great problems exist, but problems completely different from those of capitalist society.

For the Soviet Union invasion meant the destruction of years of hard Socialist labour. Some idea of this destruction can be realised by the fact that the damage done by the Germans is officially estimated at £32,000 millions. This bald figure must be translated into the destruction of towns and tens of thousands of villages, schools and factory buildings, and great plants like the Dnieper Dam; the flooding of pits, the destruction of transport and communications and bridges; the theft and slaughter of livestock, the sacking of farm equipment, and above all the loss of seven million of the best of the Soviet people.

Any other society or system could not have survived such trials. Not only did the Soviet Union survive such trials, but during the last three years of the war produced 30,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 40,000 aircraft per annum. These facts alone are the measures of how successful the Soviet Government was in restoring and even in certain spheres of production in developing Soviet economy during the war. It was agriculture which was most severely damaged, since over an enormous area stock, buildings and equipment were completely wiped out and will take years to restore.

It is this tremendous achievement which has laid the basis for the bold objectives of the fourth Five Year Plan, which aims not only to rehabilitate the war-ravaged regions of the country and restore industry and agriculture to their pre-war level, but to surpass this level considerably. Gigantic problems of reconstruction are being solved, but no problems of incipient stagnation face Soviet economy as they do the American capitalist system.

Coal production by 1950 is to reach 250 million tons, a level 50 per cent in advance of 1940 and 762 per cent in advance of 1913; steel 25.4 million tons, 39 per cent in advance of 1940 and 505 per cent in advance of 1913; and the grain crop 127 million tons, 7 per cent in advance of 1940 and 81 per cent in advance of 1913. Gross industrial production is to reach 205 milliards of roubles (1926-27 prices), or 48 per cent in advance of 1940, and 1,233 per cent in advance of 1913.

Personal consumption in the Soviet Union will show huge corresponding advances. Personal earnings (in terms of goods) per worker will be 48 per cent in advance of 1940, State expenditure for cultural and social services two and a half times 1940, and retail trade in 1950 will be 28 per cent above the 1940 figures.

But the targets of the latest Five Year Plan, now being brilliantly fulfilled, are only part of the perspective opened up for Soviet economy.

Already at the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., the leadership of the Party was placing before the country the bold objectives of catching up with the U.S.A. in production per head of population. The speed of advance of Soviet economy, unsurpassed by anything in American history, was not enough. Now the question was put of quantitative equality with the U.S.A. in the near future, in the period 1950 to 1960. In his speech to the electors on February 9, 1946, the year of the launching of the fourth Five Year Plan, Stalin stated:—

“As to plans for a longer period, our Party intends to organise a new powerful upsurge of the national economy which would enable us, for instance, to raise the level of our industry three-fold as compared with the pre-war (1940) level. We must achieve a situation wherein our industry is able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron, up to 60,000,000 tons of steel; up to 500,000,000 tons of coal, up to 60,000,000 tons of oil. Only under such conditions can we regard our country as guaranteed against any accidents. This will require perhaps three new Five Year Plans, if not more. But this task can be accomplished, and we must accomplish it.”

This confident statement, the opposite of those of the economic advisers of the U.S. President, is the measure of the difference between the Socialist and capitalist economies.

And with this great advance now on the agenda of history goes a further stage in the advance of mankind. The chief historical task of the second Five Year Plan was to abolish all exploiting classes, to abolish the causes giving rise to the exploitation of man by man. That was done. A Socialist society was created.

With the overtaking of America in the years ahead, a new phase opens.

“This problem solved” stated Molotov to the 18th Congress, “we shall make the U.S.S.R. the most advanced country in the world in all respects: not only in respect to the political system—that we achieved long ago; not only in respect to its technical level of production—that we have also achieved. By solving this problem we shall raise the U.S.S.R. to world primacy economically as well. Then and only then will the significance of the new era in the development of the U.S.S.R., the era of transition from socialist society to communist society, be fully revealed.”

Years of hard, unrelenting struggle lie ahead before this noble aim is achieved. But the thirtieth anniversary in 1947 will mark an historic milestone on the road to the complete victory of Socialist economy.

NEW PEOPLE

ALICK WEST

OF ALL THE CHANGES in the thirty years since the October Socialist Revolution, none is greater than the change in people themselves. It is no figure of speech when in the Soviet Union they talk of "new people." They are everywhere, these new people: in the Soviet Union, in the new democracies, in China, and in our own country.

People are new because they have done something new. They have carried out a Socialist revolution. Though in 1917 it was successful only in the Soviet Union, yet victory in one country transformed in all countries the character and content of the workers' struggle. They were not fighting their own ruling class for gains for themselves alone; they were defending the conquest of power by their own vanguard. The British workers who stopped the sailing of the *Jolly George*, the French workers who rallied to André Marty were different men from their fathers, because they were a part—and knew they were a part—of an international working-class movement that had in one country taken power.

It is because in the Soviet Union the working class has become the ruling class, that people are new; without that successful struggle of the Russian workers thirty years ago, and the aid given by the workers of all countries, we should not witness the wonders that are taking place today. It was the victory of the Socialist Revolution that brought about, in Stalin's words, "a radical change . . . in the culture and ideology of the exploited masses throughout the world."

That change in culture and ideology, from which new people have been born, is not a spontaneous result of the workers' conquest of power. If millions of people in these thirty years have begun to find their true humanity, millions more have lost what humanity they had. For never before has a ruling class tried to avert death by such inhuman means as fascism; no other dying social order has so debased culture and so corrupted human beings. This irreconcilable, mortal struggle between the forces of life and death has changed people; innumerable men and women, who might otherwise have died barely knowing they had ever lived, have learned so well the value of life that they have consciously risked their own every hour.

Many during these years sought to avoid the struggle, justifying themselves by their impartiality, balancing opposites against one another in order to excuse inaction. But living is doing, and the stronger a man's desire to live, the more deeply he became engaged in

the fight. There was no standing still. Having taken one step, he had to take the next step, or lose his integrity. If he recognised the achievement of the first Five Year Plan, he could not but ask why in the capitalist world the wheat was burned while millions starved and died; and one cannot be impartial about death unless one is dead oneself. If he was revolted by Hitler's concentration camps, he could not but ask himself why his government, the representatives of the people, did not voice the indignation of the people. "Join in the People's United Front" went the song of unity; yet he could not but see the lack of unity. He found that the Communists were most active in the fight against fascism, and liberals who marched beside them in the demonstrations nevertheless declared that Communists were the foes of democracy and their Marxism the demal of culture. The experience of every day taught him more of the issues at stake, and the question: "On which side do you stand?" became with every day more searching. The radical change in culture and ideology goes forward because, once people come into the struggle, they are forced on by the struggle itself to learn the meaning of Marxism.

To learn it is a liberation of the self. Marxism develops as life advances, and since 1917 Marxism has brought out more and more the power of the people to build a new society. Marxism today is the theory of peoples—workers, peasants, and intellectuals—who not only believe that the world can and must be changed, but have already changed it; they have already built Socialist society; they have already begun the complete abolition of classes, and the advance to Communism. Understanding Marxism today means understanding this power of the people; to know that the people have this power and to identify oneself with them means changing oneself.

Multitudes of people have made that change, and it is a tremendous one. For the essence of that old ideology of class society, by which all of us, both workers and intellectuals, are influenced, is to deny the very existence of the people as a creative force, to destroy their faith in themselves, to deprive their lives of purpose. Only in war does the bourgeoisie call on the people to be heroes; in peace, it demands of them to submit. Submission is a base quality, and the ruling ideology of all class society has this common vileness, that it would prevent the people setting themselves aims worthy of man; in as far as it has succeeded, it has degraded and destroyed men. But the people now know their own power, and demand from themselves heroism—not in war only, but in work; and they work to gain, not a wage, but a country.

The understanding of this change transforms the individual. As long as he sees only the old society, he appears to himself to be

but one in a loose collection of individuals, on which only a remote and impersonal State imposes any coherence or unity; society is an abstraction, of which he is, in theory, a part, but to which he feels himself bound by no ties of personal loyalty; his country does not belong to him, and for what is done in it or by it he is not responsible. As he learns to understand Marxism, so he learns to identify himself with the people; and his life as one of the people gains from them and gives to others such sense and purpose as he alone could never even conceive. Society ceases to be an abstraction, against which he asserts without hope a sterile and disintegrating individualism; society is the conflict between the people—his people—and the enemy. He does not look upon his country with indifference; he fights with his fellow countrymen to make it his own. He learns to love his country, and to hate those who would usurp it.

Men had learned this also in earlier times; Frenchmen learned it when they defended revolutionary France against all Europe. But this revolution is a greater revolution than 1789, and today solidarity with the people is a greater force of transformation. The bourgeoisie can no longer exploit it for their own ends. Today solidarity with the people is a solidarity of action guided for the first time by scientific understanding of the conditions in which alone that action will achieve its aim: the people must have power. It is a solidarity of action inspired by the certainty that if those conditions are fulfilled, so also will be the people's aims; for Marxism has liberated men from their frustration by social forces they did not understand.

Therefore, the change wrought in people by their understanding of Marxism is not only their liberation from a barren individualism, the healing of the rift between them and their fellows and of the consequent distortions of their personality; it is a release of new energy, in feeling, thought, and action, through the inspiration of a new, confident vision of what man can make of human life. Marxism, this supposed enemy of culture, kindles in everyone, as he begins to grasp its meaning, something of the spirit of Prometheus, the champion of man. The people, fired by Marxism, are a defiant people; they look to no mystical forces outside themselves; they rely on nothing but their own will, intelligence, science, and art. As an individual learns through Marxism to identify himself with the people, he learns the meaning of Gorki's words: "Man is a proud name."

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Throughout the world, men are being changed as they learn to strive and fight for this new freedom—the freedom to participate with their fellows in making their lives and making their country.

Although the degree to which it has been won differs so greatly from country to country, yet in all countries it is freedom of this new quality for which men are fighting; and in all countries human personality is being enlarged and enriched and exalted by faith and loyalty towards the people—not only as they are and as they will be, but as they have become. For they have a great history.

While a man is still held by bourgeois ideology and regards "society" as an abstraction from which his own "personal" life is separated by an impassable, metaphysical gulf, he also accepts the bourgeois theory of history—that the bourgeoisie made it. The theory, of course, does not thus parade itself, but modestly conceals the bourgeoisie under various disguises, such as "the spirit of the times." As long as a man believes in this bourgeois superstition, which seems to him as remote from his real inmost self as is society, history is not his history; and it is not his life to continue history and to make it. Bourgeois ideology again tells the people that it is not for them to do things; they have only to obey in indifference and apathy.

But it is not "the spirit of the times" that has made history; nor only the bourgeois reality behind that phrase. Unaided, the bourgeoisie have made nothing, neither profits, nor revolutions, nor history. The foundation on which the bourgeoisie with all its culture rests, is, as historical materialism shows, the work of the people. The people did not consciously make history, for man had not gained that freedom; but their productive work determined history. Faith in the power of the people now consciously to make history enables us to see how in the past, behind the shadow-play of abstractions, the work of the people has always been the foundation and substance of civilisation and culture. They have been exploited culturally as much as they have been exploited economically, and the bourgeoisie has been even more anxious to conceal the cultural exploitation than the economic, and has done so more successfully; but the very power to think, to speak, to express was the achievement of the people, and the very idealisms by which the ruling class has subjected the people to its authority are perversions and corruptions of the heroic figures and profound truths in the people's myths and tales.

What the people accomplished in the past, with the bourgeoisie on their backs, is not the measure of what the people can do when they are upstanding and free; but it is a measure of what identification with the people demands of the individual today.

It is no light thing to join the people. They have been the exploited class, but they have also been the creative class, in work and in culture; it is they who have performed the labour of making the world into a

human world. Identification with the people means continuing this labour of humanity. It is not something to be achieved through emotion, though the emotion it liberates is so profound and powerful, but through working and fighting; and however hard one works and fights for the people, it will still be too little.

But for that very reason solidarity with the people changes people. It demands everything of them, and then still more. It demands wonders. And the people perform wonders.

THE PROBLEM OF THE VETO

JAMES KLUGMANN

JUDGING FROM THE GREATER PART of the British and American Press, it would seem that responsibility for all difficulties inside the United Nations Organisation, for its lack of success in achieving the curtailment of armaments and the control of atomic energy, for the inefficiency with which it has so far operated, lay with the Soviet Union. It would seem, above all, that the Soviet Union by misuse of the veto had prevented the successful functioning of the Security Council. It would seem that the veto, greatest of all present-day evils, was the ingenious invention of malicious Bolsheviks developed with the express purpose of hindering the honest efforts of worthy British and United States diplomats.

In these countries the Press and radio are almost wholly controlled by reaction. Over two years of such incessant propaganda has had its effect, with the result that the majority of people in these two countries have no clear understanding of the unanimity principle, of the nature, origin, and purpose of the veto, and the use that has been made of it by the various powers.

What is the veto? The San Francisco Conference, meeting in June, 1945, adopted the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. Article 23 of this Charter laid down the composition of the Security Council, and Article 27 of the Charter on "Voting" laid down in all clarity the nature of the veto power:

- " 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
- " 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of the seven members.
- " 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under

Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."

Thus by the unanimous vote of all the original forty-nine powers who sent representatives to the San Francisco Conference, it was agreed that decisions of the Security Council on all matters, other than procedural, should only be made with the agreement of all five permanent members.

What was the origin of the "Unanimity Principle?" Was its adoption a hasty decision? Or was it, perhaps, the result of some stubborn pressure of Soviet diplomacy steamrolling other powers into agreement? The history of the veto proves the opposite.

The veto was not introduced on the initiative of the Soviet Union, but on the initiative of the U.S.A., supported by Britain and the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union supported the proposal of the late President Roosevelt, believing that the principle of unanimity met the interests of the preservation of peace.

At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (August-October, 1944), where the creation of U.N.O. was first discussed in detail, the principle of unanimity of the five great powers was supported by all the Conference participants (U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China). There was no important disagreement, nor was there any other method of voting visualised. The only question not fully agreed on at that conference was the question of voting in cases where one or more of the great powers was immediately involved.

At the Crimea Conference (February, 1945), final agreement was arrived at in a form subsequently embodied in the U.N.O. Charter as Article 27, quoted above. The new formula was proposed by President Roosevelt. During the Crimea meeting, Mr. Stettinius read a statement on behalf of the U.S. delegation on "the American position on voting in Council." The U.S. statement outlines the new unanimity formula which, it declares, is:

"entirely consistent with the special responsibility of the great Powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures."

During discussion the American proposals were given full support by Mr. Churchill. Mr. Gromyko, speaking on March 5 of this year, reported: "After a study of the President's new proposals, that is the proposals concerning the veto, Mr. Churchill's doubts disappeared,

especially in so far as these concerned the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire." "Mr. Churchill," says the conference record cited by Mr. Gromyko, "recognises that the question whether peace will be built on strong foundations will depend upon friendship and co-operation among the Great Powers."

The official British Government White Paper, "A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations" (Cmd. 6666), gives an interesting account of the conditions under which the U.N.O. Charter embodying the unanimity principle was adopted at San Francisco:

"It is a matter of great satisfaction, therefore, that after this meticulous examination and voting procedure had been completed, all the States represented at San Francisco were able to sign the Charter without any reservations. Considerable differences of opinion were manifested in the course of the discussions and were the occasion of prolonged and sometimes heated debate. The sponsoring powers and France, however, by discussion and negotiation among themselves and mutual accommodation to the points of view of each other, maintained a common front in all essential matters."

Likewise the special supplement to *Labour*, organ of the T.U.C., in a section called "The United Nations Charter Analysed and Annotated," wrote after the San Francisco Conference, referring to the attitude of the British delegation:

"For the United Kingdom delegation it was urged that without the unanimity of the larger nations the organisation would be built on shifting sands, and the Yalta formula was designed to ensure their continued harmonious co-operation; and the British delegate pointed out that through the years of war the collaboration of the large nations was based entirely on unanimous agreement without ever putting any matter to vote. He defended the voting formula as a safeguard to the smaller nations, and said it would prevent the formation of blocs that would tend to divide the Security Council against itself"

From this brief summary of the origins of the veto it can be clearly seen that:

(a) the principle of unanimity grew out of the successful experience of great Power co-operation in the course of war;

(b) that the principle was not invented by malicious Soviet diplomatists, but was proposed in the first place by President Roosevelt,

supported by Mr. Churchill and the Soviet delegation, and adopted unanimously by 49 nations at San Francisco;

(c) that the San Francisco delegates, and in the first place those of the great Powers, including Britain, stated in no uncertain terms that the principle of unanimity was an *essential* principle for the new peace organisation, that, in other words, the veto was the keystone of the U.N.O. without which the whole edifice was certain to fall.

The unanimity principle was developed not only as a result of the successful experience of the war period, but also as a result of the unsuccessful period of League of Nations activity between the First and Second World Wars. The League of Nations was founded at the end of an imperialist war in order to establish an imperialist peace. It failed to defend even the security of the countries of the Anglo-French group, which held a dominating position in it. It was based on disagreement between the great powers, two of whom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., remained outside it. It aimed, for the greater part of its existence, at isolating the U.S.S.R. The unanimity principle, based on agreement between the great powers who had won the war against fascism, aimed at avoiding the errors of the League, and at forming an instrument of a just and durable peace following a just and popular war.

A masterly summary of the aims and purpose of the principle of unanimity was given by Mr. Molotov on September 14, 1946, at the Paris Peace Conference, when answering attacks on the veto made by the Australian delegation:

"According to the United Nations Charter, the veto means that in all important questions concerning the interests of peace, the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China must act in accord, and the Security Council cannot adopt any decisions on those questions with which any of these Powers might be in disagreement. That means that the veto prevents a situation in which two, three or even four Powers agree between themselves and act against one or other of the five chief States.

"The veto stimulates the great Powers to work jointly, hindering the intrigues of some against others, which undoubtedly conforms to the interests of all the United Nations and to the interests of universal peace. It goes without saying that this does not eliminate present disagreements and disputes; however, free and open discussions on disputed questions, when there is a right of veto, provides in the long run a better way towards mutual understanding and concessions, towards co-operation and agreements. Thus the veto is aimed at benefiting all

the peace-loving States, great and small, by the actions of the great Powers. . . .

"The veto principle demands that all the great Powers give attention to their common interests and the interests of universal peace, hindering the creation of narrow blocs and groups of some Powers against other Powers, and still more hindering anyone from bargaining with an aggressor behind the backs and contrary to the interests of peace-loving countries."

Thus the purpose of the veto was to avoid the errors of the League of Nations period, to make the new peace machinery really effective; not, as the reactionary Press would have it, to make co-operation between the Powers difficult, but, on the contrary, to make difficult the formation of blocs and the development of intrigues, and to oblige the Powers to work with all energy for agreed decisions.

"But this is all true," a number of critics will reply. "So far we are in agreement. The unanimity principle is an excellent principle, and we realise it was established, not as a Soviet manoeuvre, but on the initiative of the U.S.A. But what we are complaining about is the misuse of the veto by the Soviet representatives on the Security Council." It is necessary, therefore, to examine concretely, on what occasions the Soviet Union has employed the veto up to now.

The main questions on which the Soviet representatives have used the veto have been the question of British and French troops in Syria and Lebanon, the question of relations with Franco Spain, the Greek question, the question of mines off the Albanian coast, and the question of admission of certain new countries into U.N.O. What was the real issue at stake on these occasions?

The question of Lebanon and Syria was simple. These two countries complained before the Security Council of the continued presence on their territories of British and French troops. Britain and France proposed a vague resolution involving the withdrawal of their troops "at the first opportunity." Syria and Lebanon rejected this. The Soviet Union tabled a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon, which was rejected by Britain and France. A new British and French resolution disguising their refusal to withdraw troops without delay was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union refused to allow U.N.O. officially to countenance the occupation of these two countries by foreign troops.

The question of Spain first arose when Poland raised on the Security Council the need to break off relations with Franco Spain. Australia's proposal to carry out "further investigation" was rejected by the Soviet Union. A Council sub-committee recommended that as

the activities of Franco were "a potential threat to peace," the Security Council should take immediate measures to break off diplomatic relations with the fascist Government of Spain. The U.S.A. and Britain opposed the recommendation. The U.S.A. proposed a further amendment to substitute for ending diplomatic relations the vague phrase of taking "any measures deemed necessary." This proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union, as was also an attempt to remove the Spanish question from the Security Council agenda.

On December 10, 1946, a Commission was sent to investigate alleged frontier incidents along the northern border of Greece. On May 23, 1947, the Commission reported by a bare majority in the sense that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania were responsible for these incidents and recommending the Security Council to establish frontier commissions along the border. A number of powers abstained, whilst a minority report of Soviet and Polish delegates to the Commission reported that the cause of the troubles in northern Greece was due to the repressive actions of the fascist Greek Government and to the intervention of foreign (British) troops and American dollars. They recommended the withdrawal of all British troops from Greece, the end of American intervention, and the re-establishment of normal relations between Greece and her northern neighbours. On July 29, August 18, and September 15, the Soviet Union vetoed resolutions proposed by U.S.A. and Britain which attempted to throw the blame for the internal difficulties in Greece on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The fascist nature of the Greek Government, its persecution of the trade unions, and the reactionary role of the British and American intervention have been recognised by nearly every trade union, Labour and progressive organisation throughout the world. It was the Soviet veto that prevented U.N.O. being used as a cover to sanction the British and United States intervention in support of elements that a few years ago were fighting for the Axis against members of the United Nations.

The Albanian issue was a complaint by the British Government that the Albanians had mined international channels and caused the loss of British lives. The condemnation of Albania was demanded. Yet the British case excluded the fact that British ships were penetrating Albanian waters without warning and permission and gave no concrete evidence for their accusation. The evidence showed that in all probability the mines were laid by Greek ships.

Finally, the Soviet Union vetoed the entry into U.N.O. of Eire and Portugal, and, when Britain and the U.S.A. opposed the entry into U.N.O. of three ex-enemy States, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, the Soviet Union opposed the entry of two others, Italy and

Finland, as it demanded that the entry of ex-enemy States into U.N.O. should be reviewed and decided as a whole. The Soviet vote on these issues is denounced in the reactionary Press as misuse of the veto. The vote of the British and U.S.A., who command an automatic majority on the Council, against Mongolia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, is, of course, not criticised.

It is interesting to study, in contrast, the recent use of the veto by France. During the discussions on the Security Council of the Dutch invasion of Indonesia (August-September, 1947), the Soviet representative proposed the formation of a Commission composed of States' members of the Security Council to observe fulfilment of the cease-fire decision. This proposal received a majority, but was vetoed by France. This veto, also, was not commented on in the great part of the British Press.

What can be learned from this survey? First, it emerges clearly, as Harry Pollitt stated in his recent debate on the veto with Quintin Hogg, M.P., that: "Russia vetoes proposals in the Security Council which encourage reaction and endanger peace."

Step by step since the foundation of U.N.O., the U.S.A., supported by the British Government, have increased their efforts to transform U.N.O. from an organ of international co-operation based on agreement between the Great Powers and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all nations, into an instrument of imperialist and expansionist policy. Commanding a majority on the Security Council which at the present stage is automatic, the United States and Britain do not need to invoke the veto. It is the Soviet veto on the issues of Spain, Greece, Albania, Syria, and Lebanon, and new entries into U.N.O. that has so far prevented the complete subordination of U.N.O. to the aims of world reaction. The point that has to be examined is not whether a power has or has not employed the veto, but to what end the veto has been used—progressive or reactionary. The Soviet veto has been used to a progressive end, true to the real spirit of the Charter. It is this that has roused to such anger all those who are working for war. "These are new times, Hogg," said Harry Pollitt, "and your class will never again be in power. It makes you angry to see the veto used in the interests of the common people and against those of the exploiters and warmongers."

The attack on the veto is not new. The ink on the Yalta agreement, the San Francisco Charter, and the Potsdam agreement was hardly dry when U.S., British, and French reaction, and their satellites, loudly raised their voice against the principles agreed. When the war was over, as months went by, these attacks rapidly grew stronger. They were directed in the first place against the principle

of unanimity, agreement between the Great Powers. The veto stood in the path of the war-makers and reactionaries and haunted them like a spectre.

At the Paris Peace Conference the U.S.A. and Britain, with active Australian support, launched an offensive against the agreed system of voting and in favour of a system of voting by large majorities. Today, in preparation for the Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan, the U.S.A. and Britain are endeavouring to replace agreed decision between the Great Powers, as laid down at Potsdam, by wider conferences in which they can count on an automatic majority.

During the first session of the General Assembly of U.N.O. the offensive against the unanimity principle became stronger, particularly in relation to the issue of control of atomic energy. Molotov, speaking on October 29, 1946, described how:

"The arguments and struggle around the 'veto' show that there actually exists a sharpening of the contradictions between two main political orientations, of which one consists of defence of the generally recognised principle of international co-operation of the great and small States, and the other consists in the striving of certain influential groups for world domination."

The Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, which opened on September 16, 1947, has seen a still further sharpening of the attack on the principle of unanimity. In the very first days of the Session the Australian representative demanded that the question of restriction of the veto be put on the Assembly agenda. Mr. Arce, of Argentina, declared that he was convinced that the inclusion of the veto in the Charter had been a serious error and proposed a radical revision. Mr. Hector McNeil, whilst paying lip-service to the Charter, supported the discussion of veto-modification; the Philippine delegate spoke of the need to "restrict," and the Canadian delegate of the need to "liberalise" the veto. Mr. Marshall, himself, leading the attack, proposed the formation of an "Interim Committee on Peace and Security," consisting of the Assembly sitting in continuous session, to "deal with any situation likely to endanger international peace." As Mr. Manuilsky remarked in his speech of September 27, Mr. Marshall's proposal contradicts the very essence of the Charter, and meant, in fact, "something like a second Security Council or like another Assembly, or again, as many fear, a branch of the U.S. State Department."

Thus, within the first days of the opening of the Assembly at Flushing Meadows, two fundamentally different conceptions of the

solution of international problems were clearly revealed, the one based on the maintenance of U.N.O. as an instrument of international democratic co-operation working for disarmament and peace, the other based on the attempt to transform the U.N.O. into an instrument of imperialism. The imperialists and warmongers who wish to use U.N.O. for their own ends find themselves thwarted by the principle of unanimity, by the veto power, which was originally established by unanimous agreement of all the United Nations. The authority of U.N.O. has already been seriously undermined by the efforts of the U.S.A. and British Governments, supported by their satellites, to render the Charter ineffective, to distort and transform it. The second General Assembly is the scene of a determined attack by the forces of reaction on the Charter, and in particular the unanimity principle. This principle is the essential basis of the whole U.N.O. conception, and if the principle should be removed from the Charter, U.N.O. would lose its character of an organisation capable of working in the interest of peace.

The attitude of the Soviet Union was made brilliantly clear in the speech of Mr. Vishinsky on September 18.

"As to the Soviet Union, its policy in regard to U.N.O. is a policy of strengthening this organisation, a policy of extending and consolidating international co-operation, a policy of unswervingly and consistently observing the Charter and implementing its principles.

"The strengthening of U.N.O. is possible only on the basis of respect for the political and economic independence of States, respect for the sovereign equality of nations, as well as consistent and unreserved observance of one of the most important principles of U.N.O.—that of the agreement and unanimity of the great Powers in passing decisions on the most important problems concerning the maintenance of international peace and security."

A NOTE ON CREATIVE MARXISM

DOUGLAS GARMAN

SPEAKING AT THE SIXTH CONGRESS of the Bolshevik Party, at which the historic decision was taken to advance to the seizure of power and the achievement of the Socialist Revolution, Stalin declared: "We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand by the latter."

Already, at the age of thirty-eight, he had behind him a considerable body of theoretical work that proved how firmly he had taken his stand; notably, of course, his classical study, *Marxism and the National Question*, which had caused Lenin to speak of him as that "wonderful Georgian," and which was to have such immense practical influence in the building of the U.S.S.R. and on the struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples today. For the next six years, as Lenin's closest collaborator and principal lieutenant always at the point of danger, wherever the Revolution was threatened by weaknesses within the Party, as well as from outside, the living quality of his Marxism was to be continuously tested by intense practical activity. And now, today, the whole thirty years' achievement of the first Socialist country in the world bears imperishable witness to his creative leadership.

The volume of his written work is alone prodigious in a man who has at the same time played the key role in carrying through the greatest social experiment in history; and everything he has written is condensed and closely argued. But the scope of his contributions is even more impressive, as one realises immediately one begins to consider them. The development to its conclusion of a planned Socialist economy, on the lines initiated by Lenin, in itself demanded an enormous extension of Marxist theory. For, as Lenin had said in 1918: "There was nothing written about such things in the Bolshevik text-books, or even in those of the Mensheviks"; and there must have been many occasions during the succeeding years when Stalin recalled Lenin's other remark: "Those who are engaged in the formidable task of overcoming capitalism must be prepared to try method after method until they find the one which answers their purpose best."

But this was only the beginning. The carrying through of that "second revolution," the collectivisation of agriculture; the profound analysis of the changing class structure in the Soviet Union and the consequent development of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, its transformation "into a more flexible, and, consequently, a more powerful system of guidance of society by the State" (*Leninism*, p. 597) as the basis of Socialist democracy; the conception of Socialism in one country and its extension to the possibility of the advance to Communism in Russia; and at each step the continual development and modification of the Communist Party to equip it for its changing tasks of leadership: all these constitute a part, and only a part, of the great development of Marxism-Leninism that must be attributed pre-eminently to Stalin. For though in his achievement Stalin, like every great scientist, has drawn upon and co-ordinated the efforts of the growing body of fellow workers that he has trained,

his published writings are the evidence that he has been at each stage the directing force and the creative inspiration.

Without attempting to expound Stalin's special contribution, however, it is perhaps possible to draw attention to one or two characteristic features of his theoretical method which may lead to a deeper understanding, and therefore use, of his work. Two things, it seems to me, stand out in particular. On the one hand, his extraordinary quickness to appreciate new facts and contingencies, however much they conflict with previously-accepted theory, coupled with an unerring power to select from the welter of fresh experience what is significant and relevant; and, on the other, the way in which he constantly combines an unswerving adherence to the fundamental principles of Marxism with his understanding of it as a living organism.

An outstanding example of the first is his development of the theory of Socialism in one country. While the Trotskyists, seeking to provide a theoretical basis for their counter-revolutionary practice, dogmatically reiterated that a "world revolution" was the necessary condition for the achievement of Socialism in Russia, Stalin boldly accepted the new evidence that real life was daily presenting. True, Lenin had already argued and fought for this conception, as a hypothesis which the heroism and determination of the common people could transform into reality; and he envisaged the New Economic Policy as a direct contribution to this transformation. But at the time of Lenin's death there were still many who doubted the outcome of N.E.P. It was Stalin who grasped the full significance of the vast new experience that the Russian working class and peasantry had undergone in the course of the Revolution, the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the fact that the key positions in the economy of the country were now firmly in the hands of the Soviet State, while the united front of the counter-revolution was already cracking under the strain of new contradictions. And it was his ability to recognise these new facts while they were still seething and gestating "in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the crucible of living practice," that gave him the necessary conviction to drive forward to Socialism. Today, the courage of that decision and the creative character of the theory on which it was based are, as it were, dimmed by habit. For the progressive achievements of the Five Year Plans and the emergence of the Soviet Union from the Second World War as one of the two great world powers have accustomed us to the reality of Socialism in one country. But it was quite otherwise in 1924. Then it took a bold man to proclaim in the face of very astute theoretical opposition:

"Formerly, the victory of the Revolution in one country was considered impossible. . . . Now this point of view no longer accords with the facts. Now we must proceed from the possibility of such a victory." (*Leninism*, p. 27.)

It would be easy to multiply such instances, and each one would serve to emphasise Stalin's unrelenting attention to the changing realities of the given situation. To take only one further example: his substitution, as the main slogan of the day, of "Cadres decide everything" for "Technique decides everything." (*Leninism*, pp. 50-55). He begins by explaining why, under what circumstances, the latter had been correct. "Of course," he argues, "we could have used the 3,000,000,000 roubles in foreign currency, obtained as a result of the most vigilant economy and spent on building up our industry, for importing raw materials and for increasing the output of articles of general consumption." But to have done so would have meant that "we would not now have a metallurgical industry, or a machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or aeroplanes and tanks. We would have found ourselves unarmed in the face of foreign foes. We would have undermined the foundations of Socialism in our country. We would have fallen captive to the bourgeoisie, home and foreign." But now, in 1935, he goes on, "having emerged from the period of dearth in technique, we have entered a new period, a period, I would say, of a dearth in people, in cadres, in workers capable of harnessing technique and advancing it." And, therefore, he concludes, the old principle is no longer adequate. In other words, if theory is to remain a reliable guide to action, it must, as Lenin had once put it in *Left-Wing Communism*, find "its final formulation only when brought into close contact with the practice of the really mass and really revolutionary movement."

The second characteristic of Stalin's work to which I have referred is nowhere more clearly exemplified than in the series of lectures he delivered on the *Foundations of Leninism*. In his introduction he makes the point that to expound the foundations of Leninism does not involve an exposition of the whole of Lenin's world outlook, because the basis of that outlook is Marxism. What it does mean is "to expound the new and distinctive in the works of Lenin." This may appear to be obvious; and, in a sense, it is. But nevertheless it brings out a very profound truth, which, however obvious, invariably escapes the bourgeois opponents of, and dabblers in, Marxism. For whereas they always seek to represent Marxism as a rigid system of ideas to which Marxists dogmatically adhere, Stalin proceeds to explain why the exact opposite is the case. With great precision he defines the specific, essential differences between the conditions of

capitalist society as they were known to Marx and Engels, and as they were a whole generation later, in the lifetime of Lenin. And his purpose in doing so is to underline, beyond possibility of contradiction, that Leninism, while using the critical and analytical method of Marxism, is at the same time "the further development of Marxism." For to the dialectician, and only to the dialectician, is it possible to grasp that imperialism is both the same as, and at the same time different from, capitalism.

Years before, while still in his twenties, Lenin had written:

"The Marxists undoubtedly borrow from Marx's theory only its priceless methods, without which an explanation of social relations is impossible. And consequently they consider the criterion of their judgment of these relations to lie in its fidelity and conformity to reality, and not in abstract schemes and suchlike nonsense" (*Selected Works*, Vol. XI, p. 472).

Just because Lenin recognised the necessity continually to develop Marxism, some superficial students of his work have accordingly tried to represent him as the brilliant practical politician, always ready to abandon principle and to accommodate himself to the pragmatic needs of the moment, in contrast to Marx, the pedantic dry-as-dust scholar, formulating rigid directions for the attainment of Utopia in the seclusion of the British Museum. Thus Wells in his *Autobiography* says of Lenin, whom he had met in 1921: "He changed the teachings of a fatalistic doctrinaire into a flexible, creative leadership. So long as it was the substance of Lenin, he did not care in the least if it bore the label of Marx." This estimation, however—quite apart from its being in flat contradiction with the historical record of Marx's consistent, practical revolutionary activity—also completely disregards Lenin's lifelong habit of "consulting with Marx," as he graphically described it, at every fresh turn in the intricate unfolding of the revolutionary process. Indeed, nothing is more remarkable in all Lenin's major works than the way in which, often by direct quotation, he makes his own specific theoretical contribution precisely by elaborating, and giving greater precision to, fundamental principles first formulated by Marx.

Similarly—and in this sense the *Foundations of Leninism* may also be regarded as the foundations of what is the "new and distinctive" in his own work—it is his profound understanding of Lenin's teaching, his ability to penetrate to the essential content of Lenin's thought and so to reveal it as the continuation and development of Marxism, that constitute the basis of Stalin's own creative contribution

to Marxism. And here again a quotation from Wells throws into sharp relief the deep cleavage between the bourgeois and the Marxist point of view. Commenting on his historic interview with Stalin in 1934, at which, as Shaw noted, he was unfortunately "blinded by his Marx phobia to Stalin's strength of mind and realistic grasp of the historic situation," he sums up: "His was not a free, impulsive brain nor a scientifically-organised brain; it was a trained Marxist-Leninist brain." But what the ex-student of the Imperial College of Science had so signally overlooked was that, precisely because Stalin's is "a trained Marxist-Leninist brain," it is therefore also a "scientifically-organised brain."

Just what such training involves has been pungently summarised by Stalin himself in his report to the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), in a passage that deserves frequent repetition.

"It would be ridiculous," he said, "to expect that the classical Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country fifty or one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. But we can and should expect of the Marxist-Leninists of our day that they do not confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account of the experience gained in the twenty years of the experience of the Socialist state in our country; that, lastly, they learn, with the use of this experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to apply the various general theses of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them" (*Leninism*, pp. 660-1).

And, in the light of this advice, it worthwhile as the conclusion to this note to draw attention to one of the most important and fundamental of Stalin's contributions to the study and understanding of Marxism: his *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*. For nowhere has he proved more brilliantly his ability to "delve deeply into the essence of Marxism . . . to apply the general theses of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them." As Engels noted at the end of his long life: "The development of the materialist conception even in regard to a single historical example was a scientific work which would have demanded years of tranquil study. . . . The February Revolution (1848) thrust our Party on the political stage and therefore made it impossible to pursue purely scientific aims. Nevertheless, this basic outlook runs like a red thread

through all the literary productions of the Party. In all of them in each particular case it is demonstrated how every time the action originated from direct material impulses, not from the phrases that accompanied the action; and how, on the contrary, the political and juridical phrases were derived from the material impulses just as much as the political actions and the results." (*Karl Marx: Selected Works*, I, p. 364.). By his masterly popularisation of the materialist conception, Stalin has made it possible for each one of us, if we are prepared to apply ourselves to the study of it, to find our way through the jungle of social-democratic phrases and political actions, guided by that "red thread."

THE QUESTION OF GERMANY

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE on the peace treaty with Germany is due to be held in London towards the end of November. In the interval since their conference in Moscow last April, steps have been taken by the United States and British Governments to complete the splitting of Germany and to lay the foundations for a Western German State as a powerful industrial base, manned by Nazi industrialists and financed by American big business. These steps, which violate not only the Potsdam agreement but the immediate and future interests of all European countries (including Britain), make the possibility of any agreement at the coming conference exceedingly remote.

Under the pressure of world opinion at the conclusion of the war, the United States and Britain agreed to the Potsdam decisions, which were everywhere recognised as the minimum basis for security from future German aggression. The essential points were: complete disarmament of Germany, including the removal of her war potential; reparations, including the removal of industrial plant in part payment; elimination of all forms of Nazi organisation and of Nazi individuals from all responsible positions; and the building up of a united and democratic German State. Attlee, representing the great new force that had displaced the Tories, signed for Britain.

But, as Harry Pollitt reminds us in *Looking Ahead*, British imperialism has for thirty years faced a twofold problem in relation to Germany:

"This double aim of seeking to defeat the German menace to imperialist interests, yet preserve intact German heavy industry and the

landlord and capitalist forces against a democratic and Socialist Germany based on the German working class and common people, has been the constant aim of British policy. It is this same issue which is the kernel of the German problem today, and the root of the disagreement between Bevin and Marshall on the one hand and Molotov on the other. The real issue is who is going to rule Germany: German big business or the German working class " (p. 50).

At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Union proposed a united democratic republic with an all-German parliament, with similar democratic institutions for the separate States and local self-government; free activity for all democratic political parties, and facilities for their unification throughout the zones. Marshall and Bevin opposed this, knowing full well that such a unified and democratic Germany would be a Socialist Germany, linked with the progressive forces in the world and refusing to be a tool of the Western imperialist powers. And following on the Conference, the already decided merging of the American and British zones in Germany went ahead in order to carry through the split, while the Marshall "plan" for European dependence on a restored Ruhr industry was being developed.

And in order that there might be no doubt as to which class was to rule at least in Western Germany—since it had lost all hope of ruling a united Germany—the Americans, by a one-sided deal with Britain, decided what was to happen to the Ruhr coal industry. The economic importance of this industry affects not only Germany, but neighbouring countries, especially France. The Soviet Union had, therefore, proposed Four-Power control, which was rejected out of hand by Bevin and Marshall. In its endeavour to give the right-wing Socialists under Schumacher some basis of popular appeal, the British Government had, however, made various statements about the intended nationalisation of the Ruhr industries, and in his House of Commons report on the Moscow Conference (May 15, 1947), Bevin declared:

"With regard to socialisation, I have seen in the London Press this morning some reports from America which indicate the powerful imagination of journalists' minds. We adhere to the principle of the public ownership of the basic German industries."

But on that occasion at least Dame Rumour was not such a lying jade. Along with the merging of the American and British zones, United States big business proceeded to insist that the British manage-

ment of the Ruhr coal industry was incompetent, and took it over, appointing to manage it a group of its former owners, Nazi big industrialists. Which has to be compared with Bevin's further statement on the same occasion: "It would be impossible if we wished it, or if any wished it, to return these industries to their former owners."

The sixteen-nation plan approved by America has as its basis the building up of the Ruhr industry, and American spokesmen make it perfectly clear that this is to be done in conjunction with the German industrialists. The "British" zone is increasingly becoming the American zone, and Britain's financial difficulties are one of the levers used by the United States to clear Britain out. Similarly, the financial difficulties of France are being used to silence French protests against the one-sided settlement of the Ruhr coal question and against the whole policy of building up the Ruhr, with its obvious threat to France.

Thus the Labour Government's policy in relation to Germany has culminated in complete American domination, the erection of a Western German State in which the political power will be in the hands of the same basic group of industrial monopolists as formerly ruled Hitler Germany, and the separation of the working class of Western Germany from their main progressive base in Eastern Germany.

Bevin's fatal policy in relation to Germany was, of course, only one aspect of his unrelenting hostility to the Soviet Union and Communism, and his unwavering tendency to support the reactionaries in every country. It was this that prevented the operation of the Potsdam decisions as far as the British zone was concerned. Yet, as Harry Pollitt says:

"The big thing for every Socialist to grasp is that if these decisions had been applied, German capitalism and the landlords would have been finished, and the possibility created for a real advance of the German working class" (*Looking Ahead*, p. 51).

But the Labour Government, and Bevin in particular, feared this no less than it was feared by the big business interests of Britain and the United States. These interests had a threefold aim:

"First, to maintain German strength while delaying the recovery of Russia as much as possible. . . . Secondly, to halt the unity of the German working class, federalise Germany, and keep political power in the hands of the reactionaries. Thirdly, to attack the new

democracies, and delay their recovery, while assisting reactionary forces in every country of Europe" (*Looking Ahead*, pp. 51-2).

In pursuance of these aims, the British occupation authorities in Germany, on instructions from the British Labour Government, not only obstructed every attempt to carry out the Potsdam decisions, but: "No serious land reform was carried out and no factories were nationalised. . . . The old German ruling elements were left in key positions."

That is the background for the foreign ministers' conference in November. United States and British imperialist interests, deliberately furthered by the Labour Government against the interests of the German democratic movement and the peoples of Europe, have created a position from which a united and democratic Germany can only be achieved at enormous cost to the working class. Nevertheless, this remains the central issue in regard to Germany, and the Labour movement and all progressive opinion in Britain must continue the fight against the splitting policy which will no doubt be put forward by Bevin and Marshall at the November conference.

BRITAIN'S PLAN FOR PROSPERITY

SUGGESTIONS FOR ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1948-50

The Communist Party has continually called for a comprehensive and detailed National Economic Plan to increase production, solve the Crisis, free us from American domination, and take us forward on the road to Socialism. The Government has not produced such a Plan: *the Communist Party has.* It will shortly be available in book form, price 2/-.

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COMMUNIST REVIEW

DECEMBER

1947

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The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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THE F.B.I. CALLS THE TUNE

H. FAGAN

ON AUGUST 29, 1947, the Federation of British Industries issued a statement of policy for meeting the crisis, which laid down very clearly indeed the capitalist way out. It called for the economic grouping of Western Europe, and acceptance of the Marshall Plan. Exports had to be maintained at all costs. At the risk of "some underemployment this winter" we should make strenuous efforts to export coal to Europe. Furthermore, Europe could not recover unless Germany was put on her feet economically, and therefore the situation did not call for "the ruthless scrapping of German industry." So far as home policy was concerned, the F.B.I. called for the scale of expenditure to be reduced, especially in the field of National and Local Government expenditure. Consequently they proposed cuts in capital expenditure of some £450 million. They knew that these cuts mean "the postponement of many very desirable projects." (Sir Clive Baillieu of the F.B.I. in a personal statement referred to the curtailment of long-term capital projects like housing, schools and hospitals.) Finally, the statement called for cuts in imports of food, in raw materials which would be used for home consumption and not for re-export in the shape of finished goods, and a greater exploitation of the Colonial Empire, the land and labour of which, the F.B.I. felt, was not being "sufficiently actively developed."

Following on the publication of this statement, representatives of Big Business visited Downing Street on September 5, 1947. On the deputation were Sir Clive Baillieu, Sir G. Nelson (Chairman of English Electrical Co.), Sir Peter Bennett (Director of I.C.I.) and Lord Dudley Gordon (Director of Barclays Bank). It is not too difficult to guess what this deputation, which was received "sympathetically," discussed, for a week later Sir Stafford Cripps, in the name of the Labour Government, made proposals which faithfully carried out the main points of the F.B.I. policy statement. It differed in one or two details, such as a cut in capital expenditure of £200 million instead of £450 million, but to all intents and purposes it was the same thing, especially in its spirit, that of placing the burden on the working class.

A Tory Home Policy had now been fully adopted to fit in with the Tory Foreign Policy. As the Executive Committee of the Communist Party stated in the resolution which it passed:

"The Government's new programme announced by Sir Stafford Cripps, represents a complete surrender to the demands of the F.B.I. and of the National Union of Manufacturers . . . It is a programme

which means the abandonment of the aims for which the Labour Government was elected two years ago."

In view of this, it is extremely important to note the tactics of the Tory Party in general, and Churchill in particular. The Labour Government, having adopted the Tory programme, is attacked with the greatest of demagoguery by the Tories for carrying out that policy.

Take food. The attitude of the Tories to the ration cuts is one of horrified outrage. Yet this is one of the key points of the F.B.I. statement, and the F.B.I. is the backbone of the Tory Party. It pays the piper. The same with fuel, consumer goods, unemployment, direction of labour and all those things about which the Tories have been whipping themselves into a frenzy. Yet the Labour Government is simply carrying out the policy laid down by the Tory F.B.I. on all these things. Indeed, the results of the municipal elections can be directly traced to the fact that the people do not want the present Tory policy of the Government, yet have voted for the very Party against whose policy they cast their votes. The tactics of the Tories have indeed been successful, in discrediting the Labour Government for introducing and carrying out the Tory programme.

In *Let Us Face the Future*, the Labour Party correctly blamed the "Hard-Faced" business men for the crisis before the war. Now, instead of limiting their power, Cripps undertakes to carry out their plans for them, and uses his power to place the burden on the backs of the working class.

Will the F.B.I.-Cripps proposals help the country to find its feet? The programme is an adventurist one from start to finish. Export targets have been fixed. Hitherto certain proportions of goods have been reserved for the people, and the excess exported. This has now been reversed. Export targets are to be guaranteed first. But who is going to buy our exports? That is indeed a question, for the market is unplanned— anarchic, and who is to guarantee the *purchase* of our exports? Yet the export target is treated as Holy Writ.

In order to carry through the textile exports target the workers must increase their output by one-eighth, if it and the present coupon values are to be maintained. But the present textile machinery and the mills are old and antiquated. New machinery and new mills must be built, if the increase in production is to be obtained. Nevertheless, we are to export 93 per cent of all new textile machinery, and new mills will probably not be built in view of the £200 million cut in capital expenditure. But who is to buy our tweeds and broadcloth? Not starving Europe, nor the new democracies.

The same applies to agriculture. An increase has been called for, but if the 1948 programme is to be carried out we must export more

agricultural machinery than is actually being produced at the present time. And our farms need the machines badly.

Where shall we find the markets? Cripps wants to trade with the hard currency countries, and it is precisely here that we have to meet formidable competition from the U.S.A. According to the U.S.A. Office of Information, America produced, in the first quarter of 1947, 325,000 cars *per month*. Our *yearly* production of cars is 400,000. Steel production in America over the same period was 7,270,000 tons *per month*. The plan for Britain is 14 million tons *per year*. This is only one small example of American productive capacity. Britain has wanted a million tons of U.S. semi-finished steel, but it has not come: the United States steel industry desiring to export finished steel products only. Where, then, are we to find the markets in face of this competition and in view of a shrinking world market? The U.S.A. is determined to capture the world market. She will not stand aside for Britain, no matter what the F.B.I. and Cripps have planned. This can be seen from one example. American exports to this country have been, in the main, luxury imports, whilst the loan was still available. She sent £1,000,000 worth of peas in the first six months of 1947, but only £110,000 of mining machinery. She could not "spare" any more machinery. The same with electrical equipment, etc. The 26,000,000,000 dollars which the U.S.A. has put aside to boost its exports is no small obstacle to the Cripps-F.B.I. plan. Why should United States Big Business subsidise and help to develop the industries of its trade rival? Small wonder that the U.S.A. cut the loan from £937,000,000 to £500,000,000 approximately, by price increases in a market freed from controls, the day after the loan agreement was ratified.

Nor is this all. The Government wants to increase the present total of exports of £100,000,000 by an extra £31,000,000 *per month* by the middle of 1948. But the military expenditure of this country abroad is roughly £14,500,000 *per month*. Thus nearly half the increase to be raised in the export drive is neither for food increases nor increases in the social services, nor for raw materials or capital construction. *It is for maintaining the Armed Forces*. Here, indeed, is a policy of "guns before butter."

A. V. Alexander, at the recent dinner of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, stoutly maintained, when the officers allowed him to speak, *that the Government intended to maintain its expenditure of £900,000,000 for the Armed Forces in 1947/48.*

And with all these cuts in food, housing, hospitals, health, education and schools; with all this export of badly needed machinery and the stopping of the building of new factories and the modernising of plant,

what will we achieve? Britain will still be left with a deficit of £250,000,000 in dollars in 1948.

As for the Autumn Budget, opposition by the T.U.C. and the Co-operative Movement to the proposed reduction of food subsidies prevented the Government from doing this now. But the Budget is, nevertheless, directed against the working class and middle class, imposing new burdens which will soon raise the average family budget by at least five shillings a week. And food subsidies will not be increased—which means that food prices will rise rapidly as the months pass.

It is noteworthy that the speech which Cripps made on the Address on the King's Speech, combined with his earlier statement, has won him the praises of the entire Tory Press, and the Tories in the House of Commons. Whilst not admitting it is their policy, they praise Cripps to the skies for proposing it. The Tory political commentator, "Cross-Bencher," says of Cripps:

"Whether it will help him or not, he carries the approval of two Tory Premiers. 'There is a future Conservative Prime Minister,' said Earl Baldwin after a speech by Cripps. 'He is certainly the ablest brain in the Administration,' said Churchill, '... and at least we have one first-class intelligence brooding upon our affairs'" (*Sunday Express*, Oct. 26, 1947).

This is why the debate on the Address turned into a farce, with two leading spokesmen, Churchill and Morrison, shadow-boxing and jeering at each other. The Tories had nothing to criticise, for it was their policy which was being carried out. That is why they seized upon the slight proposal of reform of the House of Lords and have used it to the hilt. What else had they? Out of the four or five Ministers who spoke in the debate, only one, Cripps, spoke on policy. The rest played the Parliamentary game, and threw undergraduate jibes at each other across the floor of the House. ("Shut up, pip-squeak," was one witty sally.) It was English Parliamentarianism at its worst. Bevin, of course, seized the opportunity, when speaking on Germany, to make his usual attack on the Soviet Union.

If the attack of the Tories was a sham, the speeches of the best section of the Labour movement were decidedly not. Alarmed at the King's Speech and the speech of Cripps which followed, the Communist M.P.s put down an amendment. It was an attempt to bring the House back to realities, and to draw attention to the real problems facing the people, as well as the solution of the crisis. The Communist M.P.s regretted

"that there was no provision for the nationalisation of the steel industry;

no provision for a drastic reduction in the armed forces, and nothing to inspire the workers to a greater effort in the urgent drive for production, as well as a complete failure to help provide a solution for the economic crisis, through trade agreements with the Soviet Union and the food-producing countries of Eastern Europe on the basis of goods for goods".

It was on this amendment that Willie Gallacher made his contribution to the debate. His speech, that of Mr. Ellis Smith (who, it will be remembered, resigned from his position as Junior Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps, when he was President of the Board of Trade) and that of G. Thomas, of Cardiff, were the only ones that got down to realities and exposed the King's Speech and the Cripps policy for what it was.

Mr. Ellis Smith called on Attlee to meet Stalin in the same way as he had met De Valera. The international situation was growing worse, and it was about time we declared war on War. By meeting Stalin the Labour Government could ease both the international crisis, and the internal situation. He showed that such a step would materially help the people of this country. "Let me be brutally frank," he added, "no real Labour man can agree to any cuts in our housing programme. The most hard-working, harassed people of our country will now be going home with their baskets half filled. . . . Why have we not worked out a programme to give them more food, shoes, clothes and household goods?"

He then went on to give in detail, with dates and references, the attempts he had made to get Cripps to agree to a national plan. He had suggested a "National Resources Planning Commission," together with a "United Kingdom Trading Corporation," which would open up trade "with the Soviet Union, and with all the countries that would be prepared to co-operate with us." He had further proposed a Royal Commission to investigate, and make recommendations, on rings, cartels and monopolies in Britain, but none of these had been accepted by Sir Stafford Cripps. (Here is evidently the real reason for his resignation.) He continued:

"It should have been obvious two years ago that there were only two roads for our country to-day. One is the road backward. That is the Federation of British Industries road which . . . would lead to pre-war chaos, to a world trade war, and to further slumps. The other road is the road forward—building upon a planned economy."

The King's Speech, and the elaboration of it by Cripps, has revealed only too plainly that the first road has been chosen. Small wonder that in his peroration Sir Stafford called for help:

"I wish that today our country could refresh its heart and mind with a deep draught of that Christian faith which has come down to us over 2,000 years."

It was left to Gallacher to dot the I's and cross the T's, both of the King's Speech and of Cripps's statement. He spoke in good, solid working-class language, exposing the Government in its home and foreign policy.

"I am very sorry that the Government accepted the proposals of the F.B.I. That is a tragedy from the point of view of the great Labour movement. . . The decision to cut capital expenditure is all wrong. It means the cutting down of schools, hospitals and homes, and what we want more than anything else is to solve the housing problem.

"As one who wants to see the Labour movement and the Government prospering in the great cause of Socialism, I say to the Government: Cut down profits to zero, cut down the Armed Forces, build homes for the people, keep up wages, keep down prices, give the workers a real say in the control of industry. Above all, hit the Tories and those whom they represent. Hit them hard, and the harder you hit them, the greater the response will be from the workers of this country."

Here is the policy which will rally the forces of the country, not the tinkering with the House of Lords, or a few bits of social legislation which were left over from the reforms passed during the latter part of the 19th century, and now painfully scraped together to form a Parliamentary stew. Given the policy outlined by Gallacher in the House, such legislation could be taken in the stride of Parliament as it faced the problems, carrying out a genuine working-class policy, with the people massed solidly behind it. The Liberal paper, *The Star*, wrote on November 2, 1945:

"Once again the people who pay rates and taxes, who fought the War, and suffered cruel losses, and who are set upon the return to prosperity of their great country have shown a clear determination to scrap the bad old order. As in the General Election, there is an air of quite realistic idealism. It is faith in Labour's plans, just as much as revolution against the muddled antiquity of Toryism, that has brought out these results."

It is the great task of the Communist Party to bring back that spirit of the people. It must fight to implement the policy outlined by Gallacher in the House. It must fight to carry out the policy outlined in Pollitt's *Looking Ahead*. The country still has enough possibilities

in it to astonish the world, given a real working-class policy. Here is our task. Let us face up to it.

UN-AMERICAN HISTORY

V. G. KIERNAN

THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY is now busy turning out arsenic for democracy. True, the label on the boxes has not changed; we are all to be drugged or dragooned into *democracy*; only it must be the true, pure, transcendental—in a word, *American* kind of democracy. Not, for example, Greek democracy. (One day someone will tell the Committee on Un-American Activities that “democracy” is a Greek word. Still, American technique has the answer to everything. *Atom* is another Greek word, and means “indivisible”; so there is no reason why, with the march of time, democracy should not come to mean the dictatorship of big-business.) Uncle Sam, with his famous Way of Life, bestrides the narrow world like a headmaster—like the one in *Vice Versa*, who tells his pupils: “I’ll establish a spirit of trustful happiness and un murmuring obedience in my school, if I have to flog every boy in it as long as I can stand over him. I’ll have no mutineers in my camp!”

The American Way of Life consists, of course, of different tracks, along one of which the billionaire rolls in his car, while the workman plods along another on foot. That makes no difference to the principle of the thing, because all the tracks are going the same way—towards the next slump. The Negro has no Right of Way at all, and it is highly un-American of him to be appealing to the United Nations for protection against American democracy. It is un-American of him to exist at all. Nobody asked him to come to America. As a matter of fact, when he was removed from Africa by a British businessman and sold to an American businessman, nobody asked him anything at all about it. That was free enterprise, free initiative, the mystic free Way of Life in a nutshell; as the Negro would have seen for himself had he, like Ukridge, cultivated the big, broad, flexible outlook.

Mr. Byrnes, Mr. J. P. Thomas, Mr. Rankin, etc., cultivate this flexible outlook, which enables them to see that whatever suits big-business is democratic, and whatever doesn’t is Communistic. This is likely to multiply the number of Communists by leaps and bounds, for the longer the hunt for “dangerous thoughts” goes on, the more it will be discovered that *all* thoughts are dangerous. Next year,

perhaps, anyone in America who thinks that the earth goes round the sun—or that men have evolved from the apes—will be a Communist. The Un-American Committee does its best in the meantime to show that some of them have at least not evolved very far.

History will go on, in spite of these preposterous committeemen the American inquisitors or "thought-police," who now, like the brave drunkards in Shakespeare, "smite the air for breathing in their faces." Luckily, in a way, these saviours of their country seem to be practically illiterate; otherwise by now they would have set about making an expurgated edition of Shakespeare, who is often decidedly un-American. He gave a good description of committeemen hired by the rich to protect their wealth. "Thou hast seen a farmer's dog bark at a beggar? And the creature run from the cur? There thou mightst behold the great image of authority: a dog's obeyed in office."

History repeats itself with ironical inversions and counterpoints. From the beginning there has been a struggle for the soul of America, between the ideal of human co-operation and the "ideal" of the devil taking the hindmost. At every stage, each point of view has had its affinities in Europe, and the opinion that Europe and America have had of each other has fluctuated according to which point of view happened to be more vocal on either side of the Atlantic. When the first emigrants went over, they were escaping from a Stuart government whose philosophy was well expressed by one of the first English Tories—a bishop: "If the people dare to murmur, there is no remedy but the rod and correction; they must be chastised out of their peevishness and lashed into obedience." When the 1642 Revolution against the Stuarts broke out, some emigrants came back home to take part in it. When the Revolution was brought to a halt by Cromwell and the "Grandeecs," the champions of property, a fresh mass of emigrants crossed the Atlantic in the hope of finding a freer soil for progressive ideas to grow in.

American soil was not quite so free as they hoped. Heresy-hunting is no new thing over there, nor are its roots new. The Pilgrim Fathers landed in 1620, bringing with them beliefs—in freedom, Calvinism, private property—in which already the prime contradiction of American history lay concealed. Before the end of 1621, a sermon was preached at New Plymouth on the Socialistic text: "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth." (The Bible, too, is prone to un-American lapses.) The preacher criticised the sort of settlers who came out with the mentality of "idle drones," wanting to be "gentlemen, landed men, or hoping for office, place, dignity, or fleshly liberty"; and he thought that private

property must have been invented by Satan, who longed to set himself above his equals. Among the many sects of advanced Protestants that soon began to spread in New England, several were "infected" with Communistic notions; and if the stern Puritan ministers and magistrates fiercely persecuted Anabaptists, Antinomians, or Quakers, it was not solely on account of their errors in pure theology. "That pernicious sect called Quakers," wrote a pillar of respectability in 1657, held ideas that "tend greatly to the disturbance both of Church and State." Their "corrupt and damnable doctrines" might well alarm the orthodox, for many of the early Quakers were old Levellers, who had fought hard for a social revolution in England. 1647 was one of those moments (1947 is another) when England happened to be ahead of America in progressiveness, and official America in consequence viewed England with dislike and distrust. Then, as now, toleration of dangerous ideas was strictly un-American. When Mr. Thomas Dudley, several times Governor of Massachusetts, died in 1653, they found in his pocket some pious verses he had lately been writing, which contained the maxim:

"Let men of God in courts and churches watch
O'er such as do a toleration hatch."

The men of God watched vigilantly, then and for long after. Those of the Roman Catholic persuasion are still watching: the Roman Church is truly American, in spite of being an international organisation which meddles in politics all over the world, because it believes in private property. A hundred years ago Oliver Wendell Holmes was denouncing clerical intolerance. "The very end and aim of our institutions," says this professor at the breakfast table, "is just this: that we may think what we like and say what we think." "You must look to yourself," replies the divinity student, "if your democratic notions get into print. You will be fired into from all quarters." Holmes knew that the struggle for free speech in America was not yet finished.

After the Stuarts had been got rid of in England, there continued between the colonists and the English governors, judges, and so on, the same long tug-of-war as had gone on at home between Parliament and Crown. The War of Independence did for America what 1642 and 1688 had done for England. During this American Revolution, the same kind of people in England who had supported the Stuarts now supported the Hanoverians. Dr. Johnson maintained that: "Whatever we allow the Americans short of hanging, they ought to be grateful for." How Mr. Churchill would have bellowed agreement if his cigar had been alight in those days! Burke and the Whigs,

the progressives of that day, were all for American freedom. "This glorious spirit of Whiggism," said Chatham, "animates 3 millions in America who prefer poverty with liberty to gilded chains and sordid affluence." All the party cries of the time can be brought up to 1947 terms by slight adjustment. There are nearer 300 millions in Europe today who refuse the "gilded chains" offered them by the American bankers. Horace Walpole wrote in 1775 that the rebel Americans were "the only people by whom one would wish to be admired. The world is divided into two nations—men of sense that *will* be free, and fools that like to be slaves." So it is today.

The Americans felt that they were fighting against imperialism on behalf of all humanity. "The superiority Europe has long maintained," wrote one of them, "has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound philosophers . . . have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America—that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere. . . . It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the human race." Today, if those profound philosophers, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Thomas, etc. (who doubtless believe that dogs lose their bark in Soviet Russia), keep the upper hand, *America* will insist on being Mistress of the World, and it will fall to *Europe* to vindicate the honour of the human race.

One thing the Tory Government did in the War of Independence, which aroused bitter resentment in America, was to hire mercenary soldiers from the German princes, at so much a head, and ship them over to crush the colonists. One thing the American Government now seems to be planning is to rebuild Western Germany as a war base, and hire mercenary soldiers from the German capitalists to crush Socialist Europe.

America was not entirely united then, any more than Europe is now. Just as European Tories today are loyal to their American patrons, the American Tories then were loyal to their British patrons. The latter cajoled or compelled them to serve in arms against their countrymen; this brought the name *Tory* into deep odium and led to guerrilla fighting which was really the blazing-up of the class struggle that had always smouldered in America. When the war ended many Tories removed to Canada; but some were left, the Southern slave owners, and a new class of war profiteers, especially speculators who had bought up loads of depreciated paper money. These wished their paper to be redeemed by the public at its face value, at the expense of farmers and all the poorer people. To secure

payment, since the poorer people were rioting against their burdens, they needed a strong Federal Government. Hamilton, the great propagandist for Union of the thirteen colonies, was their spokesman, and he was Secretary of the Treasury when a Union Government was set up. There were bad motives, as well as good arguments, for the Union.

Hamilton believed that the Constitution should rest on property, and his Federalist party was supported by Washington, most of the monied people, and all the old Tories. They admired the English oligarchical system; while to Jefferson, Madison, and the old radicals Tory England continued to be anathema. When the French Revolution broke out in 1789, the Federalists shared the hysterical alarm of the English Tories, while the opposition was enthusiastic. When England went to war with revolutionary France in 1793, the Federalists insisted on neutrality; many of the radicals wanted America to join the French.

It is amusing to read the furious diatribe which Cobbett, when in America in his earlier days, wrote against Madison for having the impudence to criticise the British Lion. Cobbett was then an ignorant young fellow and a Tory, who, as a boy, had heard the folk in his village discussing the American Revolution, and had grown up to regard Americans as seditious rogues. Later on, when he had developed into the greatest English radical of the day, the scourge of the Tory oligarchy, he revisited America with very different feelings about its people.

Throughout the nineteenth century the two Americas, that of the rich and that of the poor, went on developing, and growing further and further apart. English Toryism surveyed both with disdain. Thus in 1830 the author of *Tom Cringle's Log* (a book with some admirable qualities as well), who made his living out of West Indian slave plantations, wrote that the Americans were simply "all the cleverest scoundrels of Europe" in a new home. Even Vanderbilt, when he spent half a million dollars in 1853 on a luxury steam-yacht cruise to Europe, was cold-shouldered by the Whig aristocrats, who now differed only in name from the Tories. Some Americans might be comparatively less disreputable than others, no doubt. Virginian slave owners could pass for "gentlemen," by comparison with Yankee abolitionists. In the Civil War English conservatism sympathised strongly with the South, and almost forced England in on its side, while the Lancashire cotton spinners, half-starved for lack of cotton and jobs, supported the anti-slavery North and the Union. By the end of the century the European ruling classes were beginning to feel

the need of dollars, not collectively as now, but at least individually, and American heiresses were able to do a brisk trade in titles with out-at-elbows counts and honourables.

American liberals viewed the Old World with disgust, as a place where parasitic courts and aristocracies sucked the blood of the masses. Everyone will remember how in "A Yankee at the Court of King Arthur" the honest American visits the castle of the cruel Morgan le Fay and releases the prisoners who have been cooped up for years in her dungeons. "When I brought my procession of human bats up into the open world and the glare of the afternoon sun . . . they were a spectacle to look at. Skeletons, scarecrows, goblins, pathetic frights, every one: legitimate possible children of monarchy by the Grace of God and the established Church." That, probably, is how Mark Twain thought of the millions of wretched emigrants escaping out of the feudal gloom of Europe into the democratic sunlight of America.

Now Wall Street wants the descendants of those emigrants to supply dollars and guns to keep up monarchies, established Churches, and the rest of it, in Europe—to keep up the same organisation of social privilege that forced their fathers into exile. History presents no grislier irony than this. All the royalties, nobilities, estates, Stock Exchanges of Europe (and Asia) are looking for salvation to revolutionary America—to the children and grandchildren of their own victims.

Already sixty years ago Engels remarked that American capitalism was the corner-stone of world capitalism, as Tsarism was of all the military despotisms. Now it is the refuge of *everything* that is obsolete, that history is ready to discard. Layer after layer of the rottenness of the Old World is peeled off, and the oppressors of Europe follow their former victims across the Atlantic. The gathering of *émigrés* will not be complete until Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, and sundry others, have joined it; but already under the baton of Mr. Marshall a grand international choir is singing away—De Gaulle's bassoon notes, Eva Peron's falsetto, battalions of Cardinals intoning curses in Latin, the machine-guns of the Greek gestapo, all in wonderful harmony, and all with a strong Yankee twang.

The story of how American capitalism's Way of Life grew is a sordid record of profiteering and swindling in the Civil War and every war before and since, Stock Exchange racketeering, wholesale bribery and corruption. The Wall Street mentality that has evolved from all this is, inevitably, a gangster mentality. Since Roosevelt

died it has been busy trying to impose itself on the whole nation, and make the world accept it as *the* America. A time was bound to come when the *other* America would begin to react against all this bawling and bullying. Perhaps the reaction began this October, in Hollywood of all places. The diehards who had purged the Civil Service and browbeaten the universities must have expected little resistance in Hollywood. They must be feeling like Balaam, rebuked by his ass.

One had often wondered, watching the famous faces on the screen, whether they were only masks with heroic sentiments daubed on like greasepaint, or whether there was human life behind them. It seems that there *was* something behind some of them. Considering a film star's temptations to be a mere spoiled doll, this revelation speaks well for human nature in general. If the best of the film actors and writers stand up to the Un-American Committee, others are likely to join in the fray, and America may redeem her reputation sooner than we expected. Polonius, who shared the Committee's low opinion of Shakespeare's profession, was warned by Hamlet not to treat the actors too cavalierly—"let them be well used; for they are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time; after your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live."

Meanwhile it is for us to discourage the friends and allies of Mr. Thomas and Mr. Rankin over here. An Almighty Dollar would in the end mean the same for England as for Poland or China. Wall Street is eager to take over the Tsar's old duty as "the hangman of the nations." England, out of respect for her national rank, might be allowed the privilege of being hanged in a silken rope—but it would be a rope, like all the rest, made in America.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ECONOMIST

A NEW BOOK BY PROFESSOR LIONEL ROBBINS is something of an event, the more so since the latest one has the imposing title *The Economic Problem in Peace and War* (Macmillan, 3s. 6d.). It is a reprint of lectures at Cambridge in which he discussed "Some of the larger questions of economic policy." Professor Robbins is Professor of Economics in the University of London, and spent most of the war and immediate post-war period as a senior civil servant and economic adviser in the offices of the Cabinet. He played a considerable part at various times, for example, in negotiations with America. What is still more important is that he is at once the most "distinguished"

hear to a whole economic tradition and the authentic voice of nearly all the bourgeois economists of the day. These economists are influential in every walk of public life and are accepted as advisers by the Labour Government in numerous ways; in the planning machine, in Government departments, on working parties, and other Committees.

Professor Robbins begins his latest book by arguing that the price-mechanism is by far the most satisfactory and most efficient means of distributing goods and services in the way people want. He assumes at this stage that competition can be perfect and unfrustrated. Admittedly, as will be seen later, there is a cursory glance at the problem of monopoly in a subsequent lecture. But this does not alter the fact that at the stage when he deliberately argues in favour of the price-mechanism as against rationing or direct allocation, he implicitly assumes that competition can, in fact, be perfect. He admits that inequality of incomes affects the social consequences of his proposal and states that he wishes:

"to prevent hardship and gross inequality . . . But let us do this via taxation and income from civil rights (i.e., family allowances and the like) rather than muddle about with systems of artificial prices which are grossly wasteful, which frustrate incentive and which make it progressively more difficult to get anything like equilibrium" (pp. 9 & 10).

Now this is nothing more than a piece of sleight of hand. Nothing more is heard of inequality and the need for progressive taxation.

The second stage of the argument is that the different amounts of the various goods and services to be produced should be regulated by reference to anticipated demands as reflected by relative prices determined in a free market. When it is decided to produce goods without reference to the price system "the overriding of minorities" is necessary, while "if we consider these decisions realistically we must recognise that, with the most democratic machinery conceivable, it is stretching language very far indeed to speak as if the mechanism of particular decisions was, in fact, democratic" (pp. 11 & 12). In short,

"where private goods are chosen on the same basis as public goods, there the response of the productive organisations to individual wants and fancies necessarily becomes so attenuated as for all practical purposes to be non-existent—instead of the daily market, the quinquennial election; instead of the detailed vote on individual goods, the total plan on a take-it-or-leave-it basis" (p. 22).

These passages have been quoted at length since they show clearly Robbins is either (1) living in the fairyland of his text books, in which the mass of the people can have adequate means, and that in spending these means on what they must have and want, a pattern of price will arise which the controllers of the means of production will automatically take as a signal; indeed, a directive to produce what is needed and wanted; or (2) that he is prepared wilfully to turn a blind eye to the way in which capitalist production really works.

At the third stage, the question why controls and planning were necessary during the war is asked, but not very adequately answered. In fact, at this point the whole argument is frankly rather silly, as the author is more than half aware. There is a long discussion as to whether or not the war could have been run without controls and via the price system. Professor Robbins does finally reach the right answer, but that this particular public performance could take place without the Lord Chamberlain stepping in is sufficient commentary on the state of academic economics.

Fourthly, Professor Robbins argues that war controls were pretty inefficient. In his view, the only reason why they worked at all was that everyone agreed that it was a good thing to win the war. His final comment is revealing "It was for that reason, I am convinced, that *despite the suspension of the ordinary apparatus of calculation and the absence of any objective value denomination of the ultimate physical resources* (our italics), the machinery of control did not lack a certain minimum of coherency and force" (p. 50). He conveniently forgets that in his theoretical system an objective law of value, indeed any law of value, has been discarded long ago.

At the fifth stage of his argument, Professor Robbins reaches the conclusion that, in the transition from war to peace, war controls must become progressively less effective or suitable. There is, alas, no longer a unity of purpose in society; there are no incentives to effort; above all, there is no control over labour. "I am afraid there is no way out of these difficulties by the frequent reiteration of the magic formula social priorities" (pp. 53-54). With this point, at any rate, it is not difficult to agree, for, unfortunately, many Labour Ministers have got little further than this type of incantation. But, of course, what the mass of the people expect the Government they elected to do is not really so obscure.

Sixthly, Professor Robbins deals with what he regards as the real problem of the transition. Here, of course, he makes no claim to originality. He is merely singing in unison with his colleagues—and with the Tories, the F.B.I., and the Government. The great danger,

he argues, is inflation. The capital programme, especially in the public section, is too big.

Seventhly, Professor Robbins makes his one concession, his confession that in the past he has been less than just to Keynes, in particular, and that in one respect he has modified his pre-war views. He is now prepared to accept that there is what he calls a problem of maintaining "aggregate demand." Naturally, his solution lies in the realm of what he calls "overall financial planning." He is still extremely cautious, but it is possible to believe that he has now got used to some of the ideas in Lord Woolton's Coalition Government's White Paper on employment policy.

Eighthly, when he is nearing the end of his story, the professor remarks that his pupils will know something about monopoly, that monopoly has undoubtedly some evil effects, and that it is certainly impossible to deny that monopoly exists. But, he considers, there is nothing inevitable about monopoly and no inherent reason why competition cannot generally be restored. "A competitive order . . . involves the systematic revision of the whole apparatus of law and order—the law relating to patents, the law relating to restraint of trade, the law relating to limited liability of companies . . ." (pp. 83-84). Just that, and monopoly will be killed!

Ninthly, and last, the grand conclusion is reached, with the inevitability of the climax in a Greek tragedy. A competitive order is to be preferred to collectivism. In plain language, let us have capitalism, not Socialism!

The policies advocated by economists are not always obvious. In the case of Professor Robbins, however, there is no real difficulty in summarising his main proposals, in the main in his own words. "We must prune the programme in the public sector" (p. 62). In other words we must build fewer houses, schools, and hospitals. "We should budget for a real surplus," especially by means of a "higher purchase tax" (p. 62), i.e., by means of a tax which hits all incomes equally, irrespective of the capacity to bear.

It would then "be safe to begin to make more use of the price system," which means "letting prices rise by stages, in the hope that as in this way the system becomes better organised and less obviously wasteful production may so expand that a point is reached when most of this machinery (of controls) becomes unnecessary" (p. 63). How in a state of full employment of real resources a rise in prices is going to increase production is not explained. (Professor Robbins does not appear to be an advocate of reducing the armed forces or making a trade agreement with the Soviet Union). In answer to the criticism

that a rise in prices would cause hardship, Robbins, showing a touching faith in the official cost-of-living index, coolly states that "in a community in which about as much is spent on beer alone as on rent and rates and water charges, it is hard to argue that any rise anywhere in the price of necessities is really an intolerable matter" (p. 63).

From this it is a short step to "a diminution of the food subsidies" (p. 64), authorising of import quotas, and, to help the export drive, "a strong continuing incentive in the shape of an appropriate relationship of prices and costs" (p. 66)—a delightful euphemism for lower wages! In short, the real meaning of Robbins's argument, the ultimate consequence of the policies he advocates, is unbridled, predatory capitalism.

It would be easy to write Professor Robbins off as a case-hardened reactionary, but unfortunately, whatever may be his own or, for that matter, any other economist's innermost political leanings, these clear-cut, utterly reactionary conclusions are regarded as inevitable corollaries of the whole theoretical system known as economics. Arguments based on the authority of "economic science" are heard everywhere; in the press, on the radio, on the lips of Government spokesmen, in the factory. The minds of generations of students have been and continue to be confused and befuddled by the apparent plausibility and specious precision of the arguments.

Yet the theories themselves do not really bear close examination in the light of Marxism. For example, it is no accident that incomes are unequal in capitalist society; it is not simply that governments take no heed of the advice on taxation policy given by professors in their benevolent moments. The object of capitalist production is to make profit. The capitalist uses his money capital to buy labour power, and, together with machinery and raw material, sets it to work to produce commodities which, when sold, he expects to yield a greater sum of money capital than that with which he started. The difference represents his surplus value, or profit. The wages he pays tend to equal the value of the workers' labour power, determined by the cost of subsistence of the worker and his family. Now since the capitalist wishes to make as much profit as possible his aim must be to keep wages down to, or even below, the value of labour power. On the other hand, workers try, by trade union action, to force their wages above the low subsistence level, obviously at the expense of the capitalists' profit. To augment his profit, the capitalist uses part of his surplus value as further capital with which to start the cycle again on an extended scale. Moreover, it is not simply the drive to increase profits which makes the capitalist struggle to keep down wages, on the one hand, and accumulate surplus value to use as new capital on

the other. He is impelled to do so to maintain profits; indeed, to remain a capitalist at all, owing to the presence of competition from other capitalists. He must, therefore, keep down his costs by direct downward pressure on wages, and by investing his surplus value in better machines which will produce more cheaply. Hence the struggle of classes and, so long as there is capitalism, the growing inequality of incomes.

In such a system, compelled by its own laws to keep down wages and therefore the market for necessities, it is hardly suprising if the "directives" of the market lead the owners and controllers of the means of production to produce, in the first place, luxuries which can be bought by those whose incomes are large enough to afford the capitalist producers' substantial profits. "I do not think," says Robbins scornfully, "we need waste much time on the complaint that the choice of goods on this principle involves the production of luxuries before necessities, cigars before calories, cars before cottages, etc., etc. This argument, although very popular, clearly rests on a confusion between the price system considered as a mechanism and the distribution of income to which it may be made to respond" (p. 15). Once again, of course, this is the text-book fairyland. The unequal distribution of incomes is as much an integral part of capitalism as the price-mechanism.

Professor Robbins's treatment of monopoly is equally fantastic, as has already been indicated. The transformation of competition into monopoly is a straightforward process capable of analysis. The process of capitalist accumulation leads to the concentration of capital. The struggle of capitalists leads to their merging together in centralisation, on the one hand by falling of some by the wayside, and on the other from the need for larger units and closer control through which to carry on the struggle. Monopoly power makes it possible for the monopolists to increase their profits at the expense of smaller or weaker capitalists. Meanwhile, the State, which is the servant of the monopolists, and not a kind of referee who occasionally has a frivolous afternoon off, is used to promote company legislation, Patents Acts, and restriction schemes which are framed in the interests of the monopolists.

These few illustrations show the power of Marxist analysis to sweep away the sophistries of Robbins and his kind. The task may be a large one, if only because the enemy is thoroughly entrenched and because the battle has to take place on so many fronts. Yet it must be carried out quickly, for the whole standard of life of the people is at issue and with it the prospect of further advance.

BRITISH-POLISH RELATIONS

J. SHIELDS

WITH THE RATIFICATION OF THE Polish-British financial agreement and the signing of the recent trade agreement between the two countries, British-Polish relations have entered a new phase. The significance of this development is that it represents a move forward in the direction of achieving normal relations between Britain and Poland and creates a more favourable basis for that economic co-operation which is to the mutual advantage of both the British and Polish peoples. Provided that it is speedily followed up by the taking of further steps to bring to a satisfactory settlement the questions and issues still outstanding between the two countries, the future course of British-Polish relations can be the means of not only further strengthening and consolidating the ties of friendship between the two peoples, but also considerably assist in the promotion of the peaceful, friendly development of the nations in Europe.

According to the Trade Agreement which Britain and Poland have signed, trade to an estimated value of approximately £58,000,000 between the two countries will take place over the period of the next three years. Under the agreement, scheduled to end on May 31, 1950, Poland will import from Britain about £35,000,000 of goods, while Britain will import from Poland some £23,000,000 worth.

In the main, Polish imports from Britain will consist of capital goods to the value of about £15,000,000, raw materials, such as wool, jute, ferrous alloys, etc., chemicals, dyestuffs, tools and various other industrial articles. Export credit guarantees up to 40 per cent are to be provided to British industrial exporters by the British Government in this connection.

Exports from Poland to Britain will consist of coal, zinc, furniture, agricultural products, and foodstuffs. Within the first twelve-month period from June, 1947, Britain will import 250,000 tons of Polish coal at an estimated cost of £800,000. The arrangements for the import of Polish coal cover only the first year of the agreement period. During this same period imports of food into Britain from Poland will be limited in quantity, but as food conditions improve exports of food from Poland to Britain will be stepped up.

Thus, under the Trade Agreement, British capital goods and raw materials will contribute to Poland's reconstruction, while Polish coal and foodstuffs will render much-needed help to Britain at a time of serious economic difficulty.

So far as the British-Polish financial agreement is concerned, this is, as M. Drozniak, the President of the National Bank of Poland,

stated in a press interview, actually a treaty of liquidation, settling accounts between the two countries and providing for the freeing of Polish assets in Britain. Among the important features of this treaty are the cancellation of British claims for £73,000,000 spent on war materials (lend-lease) for the Polish forces in the West, and the suspension of other claims for £47,000,000 representing the pay for Polish forces in the West. In respect of another claim for £32,000,000, Poland pays £3,000,000 in gold now, and a further £10,000,000 in instalments over a period of 15 years. The remainder of the Polish gold in Britain and assets of the former emigré government are transferred to Poland.

Attention has here to be drawn to the fact that the financial agreement between Britain and Poland, regulating the financial relationship between them, was signed as far back as June 24 of last year. Why was a year allowed to elapse before this treaty was officially ratified?

The delay in ratification was solely due to the attitude taken up for political reasons by the British Government. A few days after the agreement was signed in June, 1946, the British Government announced that this agreement would not be ratified before elections were held in Poland. The purpose of this move, as was obvious at the time, was to give encouragement to the Polish reactionaries and to all the hostile forces seeking to weaken and undermine the new Poland. In other words, Britain was guilty of an act of bad faith at that time, and was acting contrary to the whole spirit and meaning of those undertakings with regard to Poland which had been made at the Yalta (Crimea) and Potsdam (Berlin) Conferences of the Big Three.

At the Conferences held in the Crimea and Berlin, the Big Three (Soviet Union, United States of America, Great Britain) decided the question of Poland's frontiers and reached agreement which resulted in the formation of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recognised by the Three Powers.

Together with the American Government, the British Government pledged itself at Potsdam to "measures to protect the interests of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognised government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be." The Potsdam Agreement also committed the Three Powers to assisting the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland of all Poles abroad who wished to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces.

Instead of adhering to these pledges, however, the British Government pursued a course calculated to bedevil British-Polish relations.

The lying and slanderous propaganda conducted by the leaders of the spurious "government in exile" was allowed free rein. The fascist gang of General Anders and his high-ranking officers who had their links with the bandit, terrorist underground organisations in Poland were not only tolerated, but encouraged in their diabolical activities. Mikolajczyk, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party, who was seeking to disrupt and undermine the building up of the new Poland, was played up as being an honest patriot, instead of the reactionary that he was. All this, of course, was detrimental to the real national interests of both Britain and Poland, and quite contrary to the wishes and desires of the overwhelming mass of the British and Polish people. It could, and did, create difficulties for the Polish Government and the Polish people, but it could not prevent that government and the forces of Polish democracy from proceeding with establishing the basis for building a strong, independent, democratic people's State.

Led by the working class, acting in alliance with the peasants and all progressive democratic forces, the Polish nation steadfastly proceeded on its course of building up the people's Poland. The accusations and charges levelled by Bevin against the Polish Government failed to intimidate.

Basing themselves on the experiences of the whole nation, and especially upon the experiences of the workers' movement, the Polish people, now masters of their own destiny, are in their third year of building up the new Poland, a Poland without landlords and big capitalists, a Poland animated by the spirit of a people's democracy, and a planned economy, whose policy is in direct contrast to the rotten pre-war policy which marked the Poland of the Pilsudski regime. The great triumph won in the elections by the block of democratic parties, the notable achievements in the work of economic reconstruction, the successful development of the settlement in the regained territories in the West, the great improvement in the state of internal security through the liquidation of the hostile, criminal underground organisations; all this reflects the greatly consolidated and strengthened position which the new Poland has now reached.

Of course, there are still many difficulties yet to be overcome. Reactionary elements who cherish the old type of Poland, where scoundrels of the Colonel Beck kind ruled the roost, are still striving to sabotage and undermine the Polish State. But these remnants of the underground are being rooted out and dealt with more and more effectively; some, like Mikolajczyk, fled.

As was inevitable, faced with the growing strength and consolidation of the new democratic Poland and the fact that its own situation and needs were increasingly demanding a policy more in relation to

the actual realities of the position confronting it, the British Government was compelled to reconsider its attitude. Whatever hopes had been entertained that the policy of hostility to Poland would enable the Polish reactionaries to attain their aims were shown to be futile, as the results of the Polish elections so vividly demonstrated. The heavy defeat of Mikolajczyk and his supporters put paid to the pipe-dreams in that connection. Again, too, the burden of the upkeep of the reactionary armed forces of General Anders was a drain bringing anything but benefits to a Britain experiencing increasing financial strain. Moreover, it had roused strong resentment in the British Labour movement and was threatening to estrange relationships between the rank-and-file and the Labour Government responsible for its perpetuation. The toleration and encouragement of the fascist minded Polish elements in Britain had already produced many resolutions of protest from trade union and working-class organisations. Added to all this was the fact that Britain's economic needs were more and more emphasising the desirability and necessity for more satisfactory British-Polish relations which would permit of an exchange of goods and materials vital to both countries. The longer the delay in effecting a settlement, the more it became clear that not only Poland, but Britain also, was the loser, and the latter even more so than the new Poland which was busily going ahead concluding trade arrangements with other countries on an ever-increasing scale.

While there is an improvement in the state of British-Polish relations, nevertheless the situation still cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory. There are a number of questions between the two countries which still require to be dealt with. The Polish Prime Minister, Cyrankiewicz, made reference to this in his speech when opening the session of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) on June 19. In the course of this speech, which concerned itself with the home and foreign problems of Poland, the Polish Premier, referring to Polish-British relations, said

"I want to emphasise with satisfaction the substantial progress recently made in normalisation of Polish-British relations. Minister Bevin's visit to Warsaw, our friendly conversations with him, the British Government's decision to ratify the Polish-British financial agreement and the signing of the Polish-British trade agreement have all prepared the ground for further endeavours towards rapprochement and normal economic co-operation, with an undoubted benefit to both countries. It is our desire that these initial steps, received favourably by the public of our countries, should be followed by efforts for the solution of fundamental problems, first of all of the German problem and that of our Western frontier. Problems con-

nected with the demobilisation of the former Polish armed forces under British command and the restoration of Polish property also require clarification. I would point out at this juncture that despite difficulties, the desire to return among the soldiers of the former Polish armed forces has not been weakened. About 15,000 soldiers returned from Britain to Poland in May. The problem of the repatriation of Germans to the British zone still awaits solution. We should also like the repatriation of emigrants from Westphalia to be speeded up. This problem was discussed during Bevin's visit to Warsaw."

But quite apart from the matters referred to above, it must also be stated that there is need for still further extending and expanding the trading relations which have now been entered into. On the Polish side there is no question of the willingness of the Polish Government to undertake this.

At the moment the Labour Government in this country, the economists, and all official spokesmen are laying great stress on the crisis with which the British nation is confronted owing to the running out of the American dollar loan. In this connection we are told that imports of food have got to be cut in order to save dollars. The picture has been presented of more rigid future austerity for the British people because of the financial position.

The fact remains, however, that among the basic reasons responsible for the developing crisis which confronts Britain is the disastrous foreign policy which the British Government has been conducting, particularly *vis-à-vis* relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Yet these countries want to receive the industrial goods and equipment which Britain can provide and in return are prepared to let us have out of their resources vital foodstuffs and raw materials which are absolutely essential for British economy. In their own interests the people of Britain must insist that the attitude hitherto adopted with regard to the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies on these questions must be completely altered. If, as the Government spokesmen claim, the question now facing the British nation is one of its very existence, then nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of that normalisation of relations between this country, the U.S.S.R., and the States of Eastern Europe.

Recently there have been indications of slight symptoms of change in this respect. The Polish-British trade agreement is one aspect of this. The negotiations regarding certain trade being undertaken with such countries as Hungary, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are another. The sheer logic of developments is compelling those responsible for the reactionary foreign policy which Britain is carry-

ing out to make changes in this regard. It would be naive, of course, to imagine for one moment that British reactionary circles contemplate acceptance of the fact that the new democracies have come to stay. Inevitably, the reactionary elements will continue their activities in various forms. However, as the experience with regard to Poland shows, these hopes which the forces of reaction entertain are doomed to failure. And just as in the case of Poland the British Government was compelled to revise this attitude, so also will it be compelled to modify relations with the other new democracies.

The longer the delay in acting upon the realisation of this, the more will it be the British people themselves who will have to suffer.

The people of Britain are faced with the choice : either the continuance of the disastrous policy which makes a crisis situation for the British people inevitable, and threatens to bind the British nation more tightly under the dollar chains—or abandonment of the policy of hostility to the Socialist Soviet Union and new democratic States in Eastern Europe and entry into friendly economic and political relations with them.

APPRENTICESHIP IN THE BUILDING TRADE

FRANK PHILLIPS

IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED that the yearly intake of apprentices needed to replace normal wastage and provide craftsmen to carry out the Government programme of building in London alone should be 5,000. During the past three years an average of only 1,400 apprentices per year have been registered as having entered the building trade in the London area. The seriousness of this in relation to any long-term building programme must be obvious to every thoughtful individual, but the solution of the problem may not be so apparent.

First, what is offered to any lad wishing to become a bricklayer, carpenter, or other building tradesman? The wage the lad receives is less than one-third of a labourer's rate during his first year of apprenticeship, and the agreed rate at which the boy's wages rise is so slow that five years elapse before his 8d. per hour becomes the full rate (2s. 7½d. in London). Moreover, the average employer tends to use an apprentice as a general mate for one or more tradesmen, as a kind of cheap labour—though this can be prevented by an appeal to the ticket steward or branch.

The training the boy gets depends very much on whether he is

lucky enough to be placed with a craftsman who not only knows his job, but is capable of teaching it to others, as well as whether the employer tends to keep the lad on the same kind of work in his particular trade, which, of course, there is a strong tendency for the employer to do, because in this way more work is got out of the apprentice. An application may be made to the National Joint Apprenticeship Committee by the boy to bring his employer into line and provide those things which are set out in the apprenticeship agreement; or the boy can get help from the trade union representative or the juveniles' department at the Labour Exchange.

The lads, of course, are much more likely to get a square deal when there is a lively trade union organisation on the job to enforce the agreement.

But building trade apprentices are particularly liable to such exploitation, partly because building lends itself to extensive sectionalisation. In carpentry, for instance, there is a simple division into roofing, flooring, first fixing, etc. In each section a lad becomes as useful as a man in a comparatively short time, and consequently earns as much profit for the boss as an adult, while receiving a third or half of the man's rate.

It is true, however, that the apprenticeship agreement drawn up by the National Federation of Building Trade Operatives and the Master Builders does place on the employer an obligation to provide suitable training for the boys, to permit them to attend a technical school for one whole day or two half-days per week, and to employ an apprentice for five years, whatever the weather or the contracts he may have. The employer must also raise the lad's wages in accordance with an agreed scale, so that the apprentice receives $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{5}{8}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, and $\frac{7}{8}$ of the craftsman's rate during each of the respective years he is apprenticed between the ages of 15 and 21.

Although this apprenticeship agreement might appear to be a reasonably progressive one, it does not, in fact, work satisfactorily, mainly because employers on the whole just will not accept anything like the required number of apprentices under this scheme. The alternative scheme, known as "The Apprentice Master Scheme," therefore warrants careful consideration. This scheme, which is financed by the Ministry of Works and operated by local authorities, arranges that a selected employer shall be responsible as the "Apprentice Master" and be given a small contract, say, of 10 to 20 houses or flats which he builds using only the labour of apprentices. The only tradesmen on the site are instructors, usually one or two for each trade. The rate of building progress on the job is necessarily slow, but financial compensation by the Ministry is made to allow for

this and other expenses incurred by the "Apprentice Master." The important thing is that the lads working under this scheme are on the site to be trained, and are not just employed, with a chance to pick up the trade if they are lucky enough to be working with a man who can teach it to them.

Another feature of the Apprentice Master Scheme is that the apprentices are not required, when starting on the site, to choose the trade for which they will ultimately be trained. This gives them an opportunity of experimenting in the choice of a trade and also gaining valuable general knowledge of all trades employed in building.

According to a number of architects and surveyors, quoted in the Ministry of Works' handbook "Apprentice Builders," the Apprentice Master Scheme has immense advantages over ordinary apprenticeship. A lad, it is claimed, will learn in six months as much as he would in eighteen months or two years in an ordinary apprenticeship. The fact that a number of lads are working together as a team promotes a feeling of pride and arouses a competitive spirit, as far as their craft is concerned. Many quotations include references to the exceptionally high standard of craftsmanship attained.

Wages and attendance at technical school are the same as they are for the regular industrial apprenticeship.

The Apprentice Master Scheme, has, I believe, tremendous social significance for progressive people inasmuch as it is the only method by means of which boys can enter the building industry in a planned way, and in doing so play their part in the construction of essential building work. It also gives the lads confidence in themselves, because they feel they have been trained by those fully qualified in their craft. The fact that these apprentices work very largely under the guidance of a joint committee of the trade unions and employers and not just for an employer, is also of some consequence in the formation of a progressive social outlook amongst our building trade youth.

From a purely practical point of view, the scheme provides the possibility of absorbing into the industry, in batches, all the boys available at the end of each school year. This is a thing which private contractors have always found it impossible to do, due to the nature of their organisation. The Apprentice Master Scheme is not only an excellent scheme worthy of extension, but is, if we are to get the necessary number of young recruits in the building industry, a virtual necessity. Evidence of this is a recent statement of the London Master Builders Association when it said that as far as the absorption of apprentices into the building industry is concerned saturation point has been reached.

The reason advanced by the London Master Builders Association is that competitive contracting, with its thousands of contractors in the London region alone, means that employers have so little security of contract that to enter into an agreement to keep any number of lads in their employment for five years is extremely difficult.

We can believe this, in view of the fact that the Ministry of Labour has found it difficult to place with suitable employers even the limited number of applicants wishing to be apprenticed to the building trade. It would appear, therefore, that the Apprentice Master Scheme is the only solution to the provision of sufficient young building trade craftsmen to cope with the demand for 5,000 recruits per year estimated to be necessary if the present Government plans for essential building are to be carried out. But the provision of a good scheme is not the only thing that is necessary, however good the scheme, because the prospective apprentice will not be interested in any form of training which does not lead to a decent job at the end. Hence, vast improvements in the wages and welfare conditions of building trade workers must be made immediately if the recruits are to be forthcoming. Few lads are going to be enthusiastic about going into the building trade while a full week's work produces only £5 15s. 6d. for a tradesman who has served a five-year apprenticeship, which wage, in any case, is not guaranteed all the year round because of weather conditions.

Also, during the period of apprenticeship, rates of pay are not attractive compared with blind-alley jobs, when the starting rate is one-quarter of the craftsman's money (about 30s. per week for the first year), whereas many semi-skilled jobs offer £3 to £4 per week within the first few months.

To attract apprentices to the building trade, therefore, I would make the following suggestions. First, reduce the apprentice period from five years to three. This, I believe, is practical if the Apprentice Master Scheme becomes the primary channel through which training is given, and taking into account the fact that modern methods of building are becoming simpler and prefabrication means that much of the craft work is now done in the factory, rather than on the site.

Second, a revision of the boys' wage scale to enable the apprentice to start at about 1s. per hour and reach the full rate by the end of his three years' training. This increase in wages for the lads would act as a very great incentive to taking up the trade in preference to other less essential work. It would also reduce the opportunity of exploitation of youth by employers who take on apprentices simply as a form of cheap labour. Thirdly, a balanced combination of theoretical and practical training should be given with a qualification certificate at the end of the apprenticeship. The theoretical training might well

be given full-time for the first six months of the lad's apprenticeship at a Government Training Centre, followed by a period of practical work under an Apprentice Master in conjunction with further theoretical work carried on at a technical school during the one day per week allowed for in all present apprenticeship schemes. That the lad should have a definite standard of technical knowledge and skill to aim at in a final examination before the granting of a qualification certificate would be, I believe, a very necessary part of any successful training scheme. The necessity for adopting some training scheme which will attract young lads to the building trade in large numbers reasonably quickly must be obvious in view of the present manpower shortage.

This country cannot afford in the present crisis, or for that matter, in relation to long-term building plans, to ignore the potential building trade labour amongst our young people. Every man with the slightest inclination to do a practical job in his own home must have experienced the thrill of having created something with his own hands. This instinct is inherent in a very large proportion of youth, and all that needs to be done is to give the right opportunities for its expression. Here, parents have a big job to do in pointing out to their sons the contribution they can make to society by entering the building trade. The need for building power stations, gas works, and houses for those who dig our coal or grow our food in order to solve immediate problems of shortages should not be difficult to explain to the young person. And for the future, the prospect of helping to construct beautiful, well-planned, healthy towns, where their families may grow up under ideal conditions, is surely something which can inspire British youth in the same way as the youth of the Soviet Union or the new democracies in Eastern Europe have been inspired to astounding efforts in assisting Socialist building construction.

Let us not forget that Socialism depends to a very great extent on a high standard of technical development, which in turn will make possible the production of such quantities of goods as will lay the material basis for the next stage of society, namely, Communism. These goods will not be produced in any section of industry without an adequate supply of skilled men to do the job. Therefore, attention to the training of these future technicians is the responsibility of every Socialist and Communist.

Why is it, then, that we experience among our trade union friends who are professed Socialists, strong opposition to the reduction of the period of time necessary for a full apprenticeship? Partly because there is a feeling that the lads should go through the same hard school as the older craftsmen; partly because there is a fear that the trade will

be flooded with young labour if apprenticeship is made too attractive. There is also the fact that such schemes as the Apprentice Master Scheme are not known about by the average trade unionist, and, therefore, he does not understand how the concentration of training by such a method, giving five years' training in three, is possible.

Greater general knowledge of the needs of the industry, training schemes available, and, last but not least, a greater confidence in the power of organised workers to force the Government to pursue a policy which will, in fact, mean continued full employment are among the things needed to overcome existing trade union prejudice to a shorter training period.

The question of improved apprenticeship conditions is, however, not solely one for the building trade unionist. A very large section of the public who need the products of the building industry, or who are connected through the teaching profession with youth problems, are also interested in the fight for better facilities for training young builders. Another interested section are those who have been employed in the Government Training Centres set up as a temporary measure, through which adult trainees could be supplied to the industry in a very short time. These centres are now on the point of being closed down and excellent use could be made of the instructors, buildings, and equipment if such centres were turned over to the training of apprentices in conjunction with the Apprentice Master Scheme.

I am convinced that the training facilities exist, the skilled personnel are available to do the instructing, and many lads would take advantage of these, provided that those both in and out of the building industry made an effort to let them know, first, what are the needs of the industry in the way of manpower; secondly, how that manpower can be got and trained; and thirdly, that it is only by mobilising all the available forces that the whole programme of social building projected by the Labour Government can possibly be carried out. For immediate action on the question of an Apprentice Master Scheme in one's own borough, an approach should be made to the local authority or building trade union. They will, in turn, refer the inquirer to the Joint Apprenticeship Committee for the locality, where all information can be obtained. When 20 suitable boys have been found, whether they are already apprenticed in the trade or not, the Joint Apprenticeship Committee can then proceed to make the necessary arrangements with an Apprentice Master and the local authority for a contract. The present threatened slowing-up of municipal housing work due to the crisis position, may cause difficulties in getting the local authority to start anything fresh at the moment, but

it must be most forcibly pointed out that unless these schemes are put into operation immediately, those young people who are now of a suitable age to start a building trade apprenticeship will, in a short time, have taken up something else, or consider themselves too old for a lengthy term of training and so be lost entirely to the building trade.

The point, however, which I believe cannot be over-emphasised is that until building trade workers' wages and conditions are something worth training for, no matter how good the schemes are, sufficient young recruits as apprentices to the building trade will not be forthcoming.

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COMMUNIST REVIEW

JANUARY
1948

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

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NATIONALISATION OF TRANSPORT

E. BARREIT

ON JANUARY 1, 1948, the second great British industry passed into public ownership. This could be a tremendous step forward on the road to Socialism, but vesting day was not welcomed by the railwaymen as hopefully as their vesting day had been by the miners, and there are few signs at present of as many improvements, either to the public or the workers, from the nationalised railways as there have been from the nationalised pits. Why is this and what can be done about it?

There has been growing dissatisfaction among the miners on the nationalised set-up due to the composition of the Board, nationally and regionally. The old attitude of the owners has been in too many cases carried over into the management of the nationalised pits. There is every indication that nationalisation means no real change in management whatever. The Railway Executive is the old outfit with a new label. At least the Coal Mines Act contained the provision that improvements in the conditions of the mineworkers was an object of the Board—there is no such provision in the Transport Act. Furthermore, while the Act is detailed and specific about compensation for the old owners and arrangements have already been agreed for the compensation of the higher officials who might be affected by the Act, it is suspiciously general when it comes to the position of workers who might be affected.

The railways are being nationalised primarily because it had become obvious that under private ownership they would be too great a burden on the rest of industry. Their published post-war plans showed that the old problem of competition with the roads had been overcome by a deal with the big hauliers which would leave railway inefficiency to flourish behind a monopoly fence. The L.N.E.R., most backward of the lines, even demanded that the Government should take over their track and rent it back to them at less than cost.

But the Labour Government has many hangovers from the old system and there are at present few signs of that real co-ordination of all forms of transport which should have been the result of nationalisation.

Nationalisation of transport was also on the Labour Party's programme because the railwaymen for many years have seen in this the hope of better conditions. The private companies, having failed to modernise their system or co-ordinate it with the roads, squeezed

millions out of the railwaymen by cutting their pay, leaving them to work in conditions filthier than most other industries would put up with, and indulging in the meanest cheese-paring of every sort at their expense. What is nationalisation going to mean to the railwaymen?

Nationalisation takes place in the middle of an economic crisis in which transport can play a big part for good or ill. The Government responsible for finding a way out of the crisis is a Labour Government, and railwaymen have always been among the most loyal and active of Labour supporters (they took the lead in pressing for a Labour Representation Committee in 1898). What part will they play in the nationalised industry?

Mr. Barnes recently told a railway conference that rail workers would be "public servants" soon, and he asked them to "roll up their sleeves." This sort of exhortation does not ring the bell. When it is really a question of public service railwaymen respond as well as any other section of the workers, as they showed in the fuel crisis and as they are showing in the drive to turn the wagons round now. But as they see the same old faces on the Railway Executive, as they see their own wages and conditions little altered, they have a deep suspicion that there is going to be very little public service about it.

In this difficult situation, what should the railwaymen's policy be? It is suggested, first, that there ought to be no hesitation about demanding improvements—nationalisation does not *only* impose obligations; second, that they have a real interest in helping to secure an efficient service since that will help to solve the economic crisis and on this the very independence of the country depends; and, third, that a serious fight must now be made for unity between the three rail unions.

No one can suggest that improvements in the railwaymen's standards are not needed. The minimum wage is still 91s. 6d.—money on which it is certainly impossible to keep a family in good health. The lower-paid grades are bound to look for overtime, and the lack of leisure is acutely felt. Further, workers in industries which come under the Factories Act find it hard to believe the primitive and disgusting conditions under which most railwaymen have to do their work.

Up to now the railway unions, unlike the miners, have not officially adopted any charter of improvements which they hope to see carried out under nationalisation, though the London District Council of the N.U.R. recently gave a fine lead along these lines. It will doubtless be suggested that any improvements will come up against, first, the financial crisis on the railways and, second, the Government's policy of building cuts.

But increased pay need not mean another steep rise in rail charges. Reorganisation could mean cheaper transport in a couple of years, and as immediate measures there are the possibilities of a subsidy, financed by taxation on the rich, and a cut in compensation. At the time of writing it is not certain whether the big investors will win or lose their battle for a 3 per cent compensation stock instead of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, but compensation will in any case take £26½ million a year, and if the Government gives in on the 3 per cent issue there will be another £5 million on top of this.

As to welfare, it is clear that Government policy means that railway conditions will actually get worse. The White Paper on capital cuts proposes that day-to-day maintenance and small works on the railways shall be "reduced to a minimum by postponements" and that as many as possible of the staff at present engaged on these jobs shall be absorbed on big capital works such as electrification schemes. Thus, while the "Savoy" can continue to employ 150 building craftsmen on a permanent basis, thousands of railway workers will continue to work in gas-lit offices, in sidings and signal boxes without a single lavatory, and so on. It is not possible to accept this as the prospect under nationalisation.

On the efficiency side there are alarming hangovers from the old system, both technically and in relations between management and workers. The public is well aware of the critical wagon shortage at present existing. The Government attributes this entirely to six years of war, but this is simply not true. In the first place it is the coming home to roost of neglect of the equipment *before* the war (and in view of this the compensation being paid for private owners' wagons is a disgrace). And in the second place the slow turn-round of wagons is not only due to the coal merchants and the five-day week in factories, it is largely due to operating methods on the railways themselves.

Railway operating methods have not changed fundamentally since the days when the only way of collecting traffic for them was by horse transport. That is to say, traffic is still to a large extent collected by rail and sorted out on rail. This involves pick-up trains collecting small lots from wayside stations, and it involves the whole apparatus of marshalling yards and transshipping goods from one wagon to another. The result of this is low average speed, low average train-load, and the locking up of a quite unnecessary number of locomotives and wagons.

It was estimated before the war that reorganisation along the lines of a real co-ordination of road and rail, with road lorries being used to collect and deliver traffic for the railways to a far greater extent

than at present and the railways being used to carry full train loads at high speed between main concentration centres, would save £30 million and 6 million tons of coal a year.

But it is now clear that the "nationalisation of transport" which the Government is carrying out is really only nationalisation of the railways. Having practically left docks and buses out of the Bill they then cut the ground from under any real co-ordination by letting traders' own road vehicles go free. And after all the fuss with the hauliers no public haulage vehicles have yet been taken over.

Further, an efficient service is being made more difficult by the cuts in equipment. The White Paper promises 48,000 wagons in 1948, and 62,500 tons of rails a quarter "for at least the first six months." But this is little over the pre-war rate for rails, and on pre-war standards there is $1\frac{3}{4}$ years' backlog of renewals to be done. As to wagons, it is true that fewer would be needed if the system were reorganised, but *better* ones are also needed. It is useless to work for faster trains with the present grease-box, hand-braked wagons, which heat up at high speeds and which demand that before any steep incline the guard gets out and pins down the brake. New tools are needed in almost every department, apart from big improvements like the extension of automatic train control and colour-light signalling.

If the Government, the Transport Commission and the Railway Executive do not do their part it is useless to think that the railwaymen can produce an efficient service by themselves, however much they roll up their sleeves. But furthermore there is too little sign at present that anyone is seeking the railwaymen's co-operation.

The composition of the Transport Commission and the Railway and London Transport Executives, and the men nominated as chairmen of the new regional organisations can give little satisfaction to the workers. There is one trade unionist out of six on the Transport Commission, and one out of seven full-timers on the Railway Executive. All the regional chairmen are the old familiar railway officials. It is recognised that there must be many railway officials on the new Boards, but it is also considered that there should be more trade unionists, and no one can imagine what General Slim has done to earn a seat on the Railway Executive.

Locally the position is little better and there are still too many officials who are clearly not concerned to seek the co-operation of the men and when the new consultative machinery is set up it is absolutely essential that it should have teeth in it, that local and regional bodies should be able to take some decisions, both on welfare and on operating questions.

Finally, one thing needs to be said. To gain improvements under

nationalisation the most devoted work by trade union branches and officials will not be enough, *unless a better position between the three unions is brought about*. The measure of success won by the miners would not have been possible if they had not amalgamated the district federations into one union. The problem on the railways is more difficult because the basis of the difficulties is the difference between the better-paid and worse-paid man, but it is ridiculous to suppose that a common programme cannot be worked out, so long as the leaderships are clear that the question is fighting for improvements, not dividing up a cake that is too small.

The responsibility rests on branches as well as on Executive members. There is not a depot in the country where improvements affecting all grades and all unions could not be fought for, and victories on this front would make the question of a joint recruiting campaign easier. There is no single question affecting railway trade unionists today which is more important than this question of union unity.

ON "ILLUSION AND REALITY"

MY PURPOSE IS TO OUTLINE the fundamental ideas of *Illusion and Reality*. They concern every comrade. It is essential to grasp that this is not a book only for those with a particular interest in poetry and literature; its significance is not only that it suggests a solution to problems in aesthetics. Its basic theme is a matter of vital importance to the whole people. We owe it to Caudwell to set his ideas working not only among intellectuals, but among the masses. Caudwell wrote *Illusion and Reality* that he might give to the workers what he had learned from them. That his ideas shall get back to the workers is our responsibility; and to fulfil it we must master the ideas ourselves.

The strength of Caudwell's work is in his profound understanding of Marxism and in the calm confidence with which he fights for the ultimate victory of Communism. Speaking of Marx's theses on Feuerbach, of which the last is the famous sentence: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point however is to change it," he says that they opened a new era in human thought. Never did he forget this, and never did he forget that with the Russian Revolution a new era had opened in human life. He drew the conclusions, applying with single-minded directness the simple essential truth of historical materialism. We are living in the

epoch of the greatest revolutionary change there has ever been—the change from the society of exploitation to the society that has ended exploitation, from class society to classless society. The change in ideology must necessarily be correspondingly profound and complete. Since the change can only be accomplished through human activity, we have to and we shall radically transform all our thinking; we must and we shall transform it as radically as we are transforming society. This book is part of that radical transformation. It is radical because it does not make the mistake of applying Marxism to the old bourgeois conception of poetry; it asks how does this period of revolutionary change enable us to form a new and truer conception of what poetry is.

The condition of Caudwell's new understanding of poetry is his vision of change, of the advance to Communism. That vision enables him to see poetry as a means to winning the freedom, as being itself a form of the freedom, which Communism will enlarge and extend. The bourgeoisie cannot reach this understanding of poetry, because for them progress stopped when they reached the height of their power. They cannot see the content of history which is the content of poetry : man's advance to "conditions that are truly human." The consciousness and conviction of this advance is the basis of *Illusion and Reality*; the main lesson to be learned from it is to gain the same quality of vision. Caudwell's ideas about poetry concern every comrade because the lifeblood of these ideas is that the history of man is the advance to freedom.

"Poetry is something economic." That is the foundation of the argument of the book. But if we are to understand it aright, we must always be conscious of the forward movement of man's advance to freedom. Otherwise we shall think of economic activity, not as man's economic activity, but as something static, and we shall think of its relation to poetry as something mechanical and dead. Such a conception would falsify the whole book.

Caudwell always emphasises that economic activity is activity through which man makes himself. And he has to make himself; for there is no creator. By his own activity, through work, through the use of tools, and co-operation in labour, he has raised himself from the level of animals who blindly use nature to the level of man who masters nature; and through this activity he has developed his powers of thought, speech and expression.

There is a passage in *Capital* (Vol. I, ch. VII) which is very relevant to Caudwell's argument :

* Man opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body,

in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We presuppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. . . ."

When Caudwell says that poetry is something economic, we must always remember that there can be no economic activity without work, and that work is a process by which man changes the world into what he wants it to be, making it a human world, and thereby changes himself. That poetry is something economic means, first, that without the attainment through work of the power to conceive purposes and realise them in work, poetry would be unthinkable.

But there is also a more immediate relation. Caudwell stresses that economic activity is conscious activity, not instinctive. Work does not go by instinct; it needs, as Marx says, deliberate attention. Yet the instincts must provide the energy for work, since the source of all our energy is in the physical body and its instincts. The instincts only provide this energy for work through a long process of change in man, in the course of which instincts are transformed into emotions, and emotions are associated with thought and the aims of consciousness. This transformation of man's energy from the instinctive into the conscious is an inseparable part of economic activity; it is accomplished through economic activity and is at the same time its indispensable condition.

Poetry is something economic in the sense that it actually is this transformation of instinctive energy into conscious energy.

To illustrate this idea, Caudwell discusses the function of the harvest song in a primitive society, before the division into classes. The ground must be prepared for sowing. This demands the service of man's instinctive energy, but no instinct tells him to give it. "It is necessary to harness man's instincts to the mill of labour, to collect his

emotions and direct them into the useful, the economic channel" (p. 27). That is the function of the harvest song. It portrays in phantasy the sowing and the growing of the corn, the granaries bursting with grain, the pleasures and delights of the harvest. The aim for which the instinctive energy has to be mobilised is represented as already achieved

"As man by the violence of the dance, the screams of the music and the hypnotic rhythm of the verse is alienated from present reality, which does not contain the unsown harvest, so he is projected into the phantastic world in which these things phantastically exist. That world becomes more real, and even when the music dies away the *ungrown* harvest has a greater reality for him, spurring him on to the labours necessary for its accomplishment" (p. 27)

Since men now feel what their work is for, their energy is freed to do it. "The poem adapts the heart to a new purpose" (p. 30).

The poetry not only spurs men on by portraying in phantasy the real harvest which has not yet been gathered. Through the collective emotion which it arouses and which it actually is, the poetry heightens that human solidarity, the power to work together for a common aim, which is achieved through economic activity. "Just because poetry is what it is [i.e., the arousing and directing of collective emotion —A. W.], it exhibits a reality beyond the reality it brings to birth and nominally portrays" (p. 30). It exhibits not only the harvest, but the new collective human life which the harvest will sustain. "For poetry describes and expresses not so much the grain in its concreteness, the harvest in its factual essence . . . but the emotional, social and collective complex which is that tribe's relation to the harvest" (p. 30). The poem does not only help to gather in the harvest; it also helps to make society.

That poetry is something economic means that poetry is economic activity become articulate: it expresses the real content of the work that often seems so laborious—that it is work that changes the world and changes ourselves. Poetry and economic activity are inseparable from one another, part of the same process. Through both together, through neither alone, man makes himself human and the world a human world. That is the basic human activity, and thereby man advances to freedom.

He becomes free to the extent that he recognises objective necessity in the world of nature—the ground must be prepared and ploughed for the sowing, the growing crops must be tended; and through recognising necessity in the forces of nature, he is able to make these

forces serve him. He becomes free to the extent that he recognises necessity in himself, the necessity of transforming instinctive energy into conscious energy, available for the aims he consciously sets. Poetry, says Caudwell, is the recognition of the necessity of the instincts, and is itself the transformation of the instincts. It is a means to freedom, and a form of freedom. "Art is one of the conditions of man's realisation of himself, and in its turn is one of the realities of man" (p. 298).

These seem to me the fundamental ideas of *Illusion and Reality*.

II

The discussion hitherto has been concerned with poetry in classless society. Of the function of poetry in class society (represented by England under capitalism) Caudwell appears to me to give two different interpretations.

According to the first and the more prominent, poetry is still a means to freedom, but the freedom is illusory. It is the illusion of Rousseau: Man is born free and is everywhere in chains. In reality, man is born unfree and only wins freedom through living struggle. Their illusion about freedom springs from the historical role of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois class abolishes all the restrictions of feudalism, and creates the free market and free competition; but free competition leads to trusts. The bourgeois class abolishes feudal rule—and creates the strongly centralised bourgeois State. Bourgeois freedom turns out to be the negation of freedom, an illusion.

This contradiction is expressed in bourgeois poetry. Just as the bourgeois sees himself as the individualist battling against all the social relations which fetter the natural man, so "the bourgeois poet sees himself as an individualist striving to realise what is most *essentially* himself by an expansive outward movement of the energy of his heart, by a release of internal forces which outward forms are crippling" (p. 60). And the bourgeois poet also finds that his freedom is an illusion. "He finds the loneliness which is the condition of his freedom unendurable and coercive. . . . He ejects everything social from his soul, and finds that it deflates, leaving him petty, empty and insecure" (p. 61).

But there is no escape from the contradictions of bourgeois freedom except new Socialist freedom; and so long as poets are bourgeois, they can only fly from reality, as Keats did, upon "the viewless wings of poesy" to a shadowy, enchanted world which is "defiantly counterposed to the real world" (p. 94).

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty"—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.

Pay no heed to the world and its happenings, Keats is saying; be content to contemplate such timeless beauty as that of the Grecian Urn, knowing that beauty is the only truth that matters.

According to this interpretation, then, bourgeois poetry is the expression of the false illusion of the bourgeoisie and of the reaction of the bourgeoisie to its falsity. The bourgeois poet "speaks for the bourgeoisie," as Caudwell says of Shelley, whose Prometheus he calls "fit symbol of the machine-wielding capitalist" (p. 92).

But in another passage Caudwell says that the illusion in bourgeois poetry is "begotten of the tension between productive forces and productive relations" (p. 104), the tension which drives on not merely the bourgeoisie, but the whole of bourgeois society to future reality. He also says that the individualism of bourgeois poetry does not express merely the individualism of the particular poet; "it expresses the collective emotion of its era" (p. 71). Bourgeois poetry "focuses all the emotional life of society in one giant 'I' which is common to all" (p. 72).

According to this interpretation, bourgeois poetry is not bourgeois in the sense that it speaks only for the bourgeoisie; Shelley's Prometheus is not only "fit symbol of the machine-wielding capitalist." Bourgeois poetry is bourgeois in the sense that it is the expression of bourgeois society; not of one class only, but of the community made up of warring classes, the capitalists and the workers.

The first interpretation implies that bourgeois poetry can never transcend the bourgeoisie's false illusion. The second interpretation implies that it can foresee what bourgeois society is creating against the will of the bourgeoisie; in *The Tempest* Shakespeare had, says Caudwell, a prophetic glimpse of Communism. The illusion of bourgeois poetry is then not the false illusion of bourgeois freedom only, but, as in primitive poetry, it is a foreshadowing of what society is going to create through economic activity—a new, a real and a higher freedom.

Of these two interpretations the second seems to me the truer, according better with the fundamental ideas of the book. We must now read and study bourgeois poetry with the question in our minds: In what way does bourgeois poetry arouse and direct collective emotion towards the necessarily impossible realisation of the bourgeoisie's illusion of freedom? In what way does it at the same time arouse and direct collective emotion towards the real freedom of the future? Clearly these questions must be approached historically, since the bourgeois illusion of freedom changes its significance and loses its value as the bourgeoisie ceases to be revolutionary. But I believe that at all periods the significance and value of our bourgeois poetry comes

from the fact that it is an expression not only of the bourgeoisie, but of bourgeois society, of the English nation as a unity of opposites. In order to know our cultural and national tradition as a living force and to lead the people in its defence, it is imperative that we should think these questions out.

The key lies in the fundamental ideas of Caudwell's book—the interpretation of poetry as something economic, as part of man's activity of changing the world and changing himself. We must apply to poetry that Marxist understanding which makes *Illusion and Reality* an important work not only for the study of poetry, but also for the immediate political struggle.

Caudwell's work heightens class consciousness. When we see work reflected in poetry and find in the poetry the real purpose of work—to make ourselves and the world human—then we know better how to hate and fight capitalism, which frustrates the purpose of work and exploits the workers for its own inhumanity. For we understand that the workers are robbed not only of the surplus value they produce, but of the world their work should make and of themselves. The beauty of poetry is the measure of that horror. We know better how to fight for Socialism which brings the new work and the new poetry, the songs of the Yugoslav Youth Railway, where poetry is work become articulate and work makes the country the people's country.

To understand our political task we need, all of us, the ideas expressed in this book. I am not proposing that we all should study *Illusion and Reality*, nor that we should desert politics for poetry. But I believe our politics will be wrong unless we understand and make actively our own the spirit of poetry as Caudwell has revealed it. Our politics will be wrong because we shall under-estimate our forces; we shall think too low of humanity and the people. The content of the people's work—the activity by which they change the world and themselves—is so high and great that only in great poetry does it become articulate; only great poetry can reveal the people's creative energy. The measure of the greatness of the people is the greatness of the poetry of Piers Plowman, Shakespeare, Milton, Shelley; for the work of these poets lives with the true life of the people's work. Our task is to change society so that the people's work shall no longer be degraded and thwarted by capitalism, but shall release in Socialism all its creative power.

We need the ideas in this book, we need the spirit of poetry, in order to understand both the greatness of our task and the people's strength.

A MASS COMMUNIST PARTY

W. LAUHLAN

IN RECENT YEARS the question of a mass Communist Party has been considerably debated and discussed in Britain. With the election of the Labour Government in 1945, and the creation of a certain political "stickiness" with the spread of illusions regarding the course of the fight for Socialism and the methods and organisation required in this country, the issue of a mass Communist Party slipped into the background. There was undoubtedly an intensification of the fight for understanding of the role of and the necessity for the Communist Party. This tended to overshadow the question of a mass membership Communist Party.

Now, however, with the end of the period of illusions, the necessity of building a really mass, powerful Communist Party in Britain is an all-important political question. It is incontrovertible that we do need a larger membership—and quickly. Even so, many genuinely keen comrades see only the difficulties which affect us organisationally. They regard the whole problem as an inner-Party, organisational one, rather than a political problem that must be faced determinedly. But the clearer we get on the politics of a mass Communist Party, the sooner will we fight to solve the practical, organisational problems.

It is argued that until and unless we improve our organisation, there will only be endless trouble with the heaping of extra burdens on to the backs of already harassed and overworked comrades in the branches. Building a mass Party, of course, does not mean that we accept or persuade people to come into our ranks who cannot be of any value to the Party. But then, almost everyone can be of use in the work of the Party if this is properly arranged. Leadership which will not take the trouble to make efficient arrangements to facilitate the work of the Party must not then blame the members—and use this as an excuse for not recruiting in a really big way.

In support of the "organisation" versus mass membership attitude, we even have Comrade Stalin drawn into the argument, because he said that "organisation decides the fate of the political line itself." Quite true, but organisation is political, as well as being technical and administrative. Organisation properly understood means more than inner-Party efficiency. It also means contact with the masses. After all, it is possible to have complete organisational efficiency plus a correct policy and yet fail to move masses of people into action.

The size, the numerical strength of the Party, as well as its strong organisation, is a most important factor determining the extent to which we are, or shall be, successful in our campaigns. Size gives a necessary quality to the Party; gives it more authority in the eyes of the people, and more talent to use in its tasks.

"More new people from the masses into the Party for independent

participation in the erection of a new life—such is our motto in the struggle against all difficulties, such is our road to victory” (Lenin *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, “Workers State and Party Week”).

It is contrary to our whole fundamental conception of politics to view the achievement of Socialism as the special preserve of a Party, or of a section of the working people. The Communist Party is clearest in its views, most determined in its efforts to influence events, but it moves together *with*, although it *leads*, the working class and the mass of the people.

What does this mean? It means that we need to build up a Party big enough, and distributed widely enough, to be able to exercise a permanent influence on the decisive section of the people, namely the working class. The question whether our Party is yet able to do this need only be asked to get the answer. And it is in the negative.

Can we achieve a mass Communist Party in Britain? We certainly can. The entire political situation is favourable to bringing into our ranks hundreds and thousands of men and women willing and able to help our fight. Indeed, the winning of new members on a mass scale is a vital condition for fundamental progress. The workers learn by experience, as well as (even more than) from our propaganda. When their experience shows that our arguments and proposals are correct, our influence is extended and strengthened. But unless that process is marked by a great accession of new members into the ranks of the Party, the influence we gain during a special crisis, or on a particular issue, tends to weaken again, and is not consolidated, and we fall back to almost our former “permanent” level.

In throwing the doors wide open to all people who agree with our policy, we should remember that the Communist Party is, before anything else, the Party of the working class. This does not mean that we should neglect the professional, middle-class sections of the community. Indeed, the very process of building the Communist Party able to exert such influence as we envisage will exert an influence on the ideas and political conceptions of the most significant and politically important sections of the professional and middle classes, thereby bringing additional and valuable forces into the fight for Socialism. Only with and through the working class can we hope to influence the widest masses of the people. It is the traditional role of middle sections of the people to vacillate. Most of them would like to be amongst the capitalists, and, whilst many are afraid of going into the ranks of the working class, they will be attracted by the working class if it is united, confident and clear-minded.

In *Left Wing Communism*, Lenin declared that the organisational role of the working class is its principal role. The potential organising

power of the working class in Britain becomes clear when we consider it in relation to the rest of the people. Out of a total population of 48 millions in these islands, there is a working population of 20 millions. And within the working population a majority—almost 12 millions, or six out of every ten of the working population—are employed in a limited range of key productive and service industries. The influence of this grouping within the community is enormous. The organised trade unionists are a minority of the working class, but by their organised power they influence the general standard of life for all workers in the country. If the main, decisive sections could be influenced to accept and follow the leadership of the Communist Party, this would profoundly affect the political outlook of the entire working class and wide sections outside the working class.

For the Communist Party to be able to achieve such a position of influence where it is bound up with the class and the masses "into one single, indissoluble whole," there must be a rapid and wide building up of its membership. Only a mass Communist Party with great and growing influence over the working class, if not as a whole, then at least a majority, will be able to keep track of and influence the mood of the masses of the people. This is a requirement for decisive political change in Britain. It is certainly a pre-requisite for decisive struggle to achieve Socialism.

SOME NOTES ON MENTAL TESTING

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE in this country have, at some time or another, had to do a mental test. They have been used mainly in the schools, the army and in industry. What is a mental test? It has three main features:

(1) It requires a person to carry out some kind of productive effort like doing a series of arithmetic sums, filling up uncompleted sentences, finding the missing parts of pictorial designs, or assembling parts of a simple apparatus, etc.

(2) A test is always presented to the individual in the way laid down by the designer. Even the wording of the instructions is controlled exactly.

(3) The result of the test is always expressible in some numerical form, or at least a form lending itself to statistical treatment.

In short, a mental test is a way of measuring certain aspects of human behaviour. In essence the practical aim of a mental test is to provide, in a relatively short time, data which enable one to predict

how well or badly an individual will cope with a given situation. Will he make a good carpenter? Will he profit from a secondary school education? Should he go into signals or tanks?

How are mental tests made? Does someone sit down and merely think tests up out of his own head? The answer, for the best tests, is: "No."

The first step in the designing of a good test is really an elaborate experiment. For example, here is the way a psychologist called Thurstone set about devising his test of "Primary Abilities." He gave 57 well-known tests to about 300 students, each student doing about fifteen hours' work. Using elaborate statistical methods he analysed the results to get an answer to the question: How far do these tests measure the same functions and how far do they measure different functions? He was thus able to put forward the theory that between them these tests seemed to measure nine abilities. They were induction, reasoning, deduction, immediate memory, perceptual speed, number calculations, and abilities to handle verbal relations, spatial relations and word forms. He also found that sixteen of the original fifty-seven tests measured these abilities most adequately.

Now came the second stage of Thurstone's work. His practical aim was to devise tests which would measure the abilities of Californian school children. He had to be able to tell, from his test results, to what extent a person was good or bad in the various tests. He therefore gave his battery of sixteen tests to a few thousand children, taking 1,000 children at each age-level and selecting them so that they were thoroughly representative of the Californian population. The results of this work enabled Thurstone to say that certain results place a Californian child in the top 1 per cent of the population in perceptual speed, that he is average in deductive ability, etc. Thus, what the psychologist calls the "standardisation" of the test had been completed.

From this stage research in what is called the validity of these tests will have to continue in order to show how far these "primary abilities" are involved in school and industrial work, how far they change with growth, from one geographical environment to another, from one social class to another, how far they are affected by brain disease and mental disorder, etc. Thus the validation of a test is an even longer process than its devising and standardisation, and it might end up with radical changes in the initial "Primary Abilities" proposed by Thurstone.

Unfortunately, Thurstone's massive objective approach is not very common and most of the tests current in Britain could not compare with his for design. The main reason for this is that psychologists do

not usually have enough money at their disposal to do a thorough job, and so they are often forced, when faced with practical needs, to turn out tests which they know could be much more adequate.

Despite their limitation, current tests are of some use in our kind of society. They can be useful in helping to decide how far a given case of scholastic backwardness is due to intellectual or other reasons. In the clinic, tests provide a useful check on other data about a patient, and sometimes throw useful light on the nature of his difficulties. Used wisely, they are helpful in the grading of schoolchildren and in checking up on their progress. Many current tests proved useful in the selection of recruits for the armed forces. Finally, the mental test movement has laid the basis for the scientific study of the nature of individual differences and their relation to social and biological factors.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that if any institutions, such as the educational authorities, decide to use tests on a large scale, they must be pressed to finance the large-scale research which the devising of good tests necessitates, and to produce an adequate number of people, fully trained, to do the research and interpret the results.

How did the use of mental tests arise and what social functions do they serve? One can offer a few generalisations in reply to these questions, though a further development of technical competence, experience and discussion might well show them to be inadequate.

One of the first things that leaps to the eye is that the mental test movement developed almost simultaneously in different countries at the beginning of the twentieth century, in France, Italy, Britain, Germany, and the U.S.A.

We can also note that mental testing developed first in those capitalist countries which had changed from competitive capitalism into monopoly capitalism. Monopoly capitalism could be said to possess at least four features which made the development of mental testing necessary. (1) the development of mass education; (2) the development of large-scale enterprises employing very large numbers of workers; (3) the outbreak of world wars fought by mass armies using diverse specialised arms and skills; and (4) the atomisation of human relations and the resulting development of the "unknown" individual.

(1) Mass education made it necessary to sort out the "ineducable" from the "educable." Some kind of objective measure of potentialities of the school child was necessary. The development of education, resulting from the needs of capitalism and the demands of the people, posed further problems, such as the sorting out of the more educable from the less, the technically capable from the academic, and so on. The mental test was put forward as an objective instrument, relatively

free from subjective bias and environmental influence, which would help in this work of selection.

(2) The growth of large-scale industry with its increased capitalisation and employment of large numbers of workers made it necessary to refine methods of extracting surplus value. Individuals differ in the quantity of labour power that they possess. They also differ in quality, some being good at one kind of job, others being good at another kind of job. The problem here for the individual firm is to select, from a large number of applicants, those workers with the greatest ability for the job required so that there will be the maximum production of surplus value. The scientific selection of workers for industry developed, especially in the more advanced imperialist States like Germany and U.S.A. In both countries large firms set up psychological laboratories to cope with these and other problems and they found that scientific methods of selection increased their dividends.

(3) In both world wars the authorities in capitalist countries were faced with the problem of the proper disposal of a mass of new recruits among a variety of specialised arms. This problem was specially acute in the Second World War. This need gave a great impetus to the testing movement, and there is no doubt the percentage of failures on training courses was materially reduced where sensible methods of selection were used. These successes have in turn given greater prestige to the psychologist, both in education and industry.

(4) Under conditions of monopoly capital the individual has neither the opportunity nor the encouragement to show what he is really capable of doing. For example, a teacher once told me that she was in very bad need of a test of musical ability. Questioning showed that she had to teach musical appreciation to a large number of children who had practically no opportunity of learning to play musical instruments. She had no way, in the short time at her disposal, of finding out which children were really worthwhile concentrating on. If these children had been provided with the opportunity and the incentive actually to play musical instruments, their possession or lack of musical ability would soon have been demonstrated, at least to their audiences.

Again, how many factory workers, under the authoritarian and class-ridden conditions of capitalist industry, are going to show creative initiative and really reveal their potentialities? The individual must remain largely an unknown quantity, both to himself and to others.

The mental test becomes a way of reaching out at the individual, of probing him. This special technique has had to be developed to compensate for the failures of capitalist society. The need for the mental test was made more imperative in education, industry, and the armed forces.

As a result of these developments theoretical questions about the nature of human ability have inevitably been raised. How far are human abilities general and how far are they specific? How much does a person's relative ability change during his life? To what extent is human ability inherited or acquired?

In the first rush of naive enthusiasm, psychologists believed that their tests gave them measures of native ability, and that once a person's intellectual ability was established by a test his position in relation to his fellow men was fixed to his dying day.

Experience and experimental work have worn these illusions rather thin. The correspondence between test and re-test, after a few years, of the same group of individuals has been shown not to be very high; e.g., if a person of average ability were re-tested after ten years there would be a 33 per cent chance that he would get a "score" as good as the top 20 per cent of the population, or as bad as the bottom 20 per cent of the population. Some individuals show much greater changes. For very young children the discrepancies over a period of time are still greater, and for adults it has been shown that their test results will depend to some extent on whether their work keeps them on their toes intellectually.

So much for the "constancy" of human ability. However, mechanical notions that test results give a hard and fast measure of native ability are also having their day. For example, Bernardine Schmidt, in a well-designed experiment, raised the average performance, in a test called the Binet, of a group of defective children from a grossly defective level to the level of below average, but not defective, children. She did this by placing the children in a specially-designed social and educational environment for three years. The control group, which did not receive this treatment, actually showed a slight further fall in ability. Attacking the problem from another angle, there are indications that glutamic acid treatment can significantly improve the test performance of defective children.

While such experiments do not decisively decide the nurture-nature issue, they at least show that test results cannot be taken at their face value as measures of innate ability.

Such evidence, of course, has to be related to the fact that while social factors, within the general framework of a capitalist environment, can be responsible for, say, a twenty points difference in test performance, the difference between individuals in any one group can be as great as two hundred points. This means that idiots and geniuses will emerge from the same social class, and that the primary factors determining the differences between them would seem to be of a hereditary and constitutional character. This is further illustrated

by the fact that a pair of identical twins, brought up in the same environment, will give test results which are as alike as those obtained from testing a single person twice with the same test. On the other hand, the superiority of the upper social classes in test performance is small enough to be explained by differences in environment.

Perhaps the best approach to problems of human efficiency is illustrated by two often-quoted Marxist statements: "Man's social being determines his consciousness," and "The brain is the organ of thought"—i.e., the social-biological approach.

Many psychologists seem to look upon human abilities as aspects of "mind" unrelated to the external world. However, "abilities" are not Kantian "things-in-themselves." First, when an individual does a test, he brings to bear all his previous experience and training. Secondly, the test itself is a part of his immediate environment to which he is reacting. This interaction between the individual and the environment is finally expressed in terms of a test "score."

The psychologist makes a statistical classification of the scores of a number of people in a variety of test situations, and in life situations like the production of a certain commodity. He classifies the scores in a way which will facilitate his prediction of people's efficiency on the basis of test results and a way which will simplify his theories about it. He calls these classifications "abilities."

It is now possible to make a preliminary classification of some aspects of "ability" in such terms as general ability, verbal ability, numerical ability, abilities to handle two and three dimensional spatial relations, etc. However, we have a long way to go before we can say that we have fully charted the social and biological nature of human ability within a capitalist society, and how it will change under Socialism.

THE PUTNEY DEBATES

DAPHNE MAY

JUST OVER THREE HUNDRED YEARS AGO, in the autumn of 1647, there took place in London amongst the soldiers of the New Model army, which had just defeated Charles I in the Civil War, some very remarkable political debates. They reached their climax at meetings held in Putney Church between October 28 and November 1. The debates of those days were written down on the spot, in shorthand. Later they were published. We can therefore read the arguments word for word, just as they were thrashed out in the heat of the fight. They are the record of a fierce, open class struggle to decide who should have the power in the country now that the King was vanquished. They

have great significance and inspiration for us in our struggle today.

On one side were ranged the senior officers, the Grandees as they were called, led by Cromwell and his son-in-law, Ireton. They were gentry, and they spoke in defence of the interests of the big bourgeoisie, the capitalist landowners and merchants. They were well content with their lot. Their enemies, the feudal nobility, had been beaten in the field; the most dangerous part of the machinery of State (such as the royal prerogative courts) which the King had worked in the interests of the feudalists, had been destroyed; laws such as the law about feudal tenures which restricted the free sale and use of land, and so prevented also the full exploitation of labour by capital, had been repealed. The capitalist class had won power in the State and had freed the forces of capitalist production; it desired nothing more.

The capitalists had only been able to defeat the feudalists, however, by calling in the help of the broad masses of the people; they had had to organise a democratic army; and the artisans and peasants (the petty bourgeoisie) who had joined that army had developed in the course of the war a new unity, an acute political consciousness and war aims very different from those of their senior officers. These democrats were designated "Levellers" by their opponents, because they wanted greater social and political equality. What had they gained from the war? Nothing, they said, or rather, less than nothing, for their pay was badly in arrears. Moreover, they knew that the Grandees were plotting the return of "the capital enemy," the King (even to giving him command of the militia!), and were planning to uphold the power of the House of Lords, "the very offspring of the King's corrupt will."

The Levellers organised resistance to this betrayal. They evolved a programme for a genuinely democratic form of government, and throughout the army they elected "Agitators" to press for their demands. By the summer of 1647 their organisation was so strong that the Grandees were obliged to set up "A General Council of the Army," which included the Agitators as well as the generals, and to hold meetings of the Council to discuss the Levellers' proposals.

The proposals were finally embodied in a document known as *The Agreement of the People*. It was presented to the Council on October 28 by Robert Everard, a "Buff Coat," one of the rank and file. The two leading spokesmen for the Levellers were a certain Colonel Rainborough and a civilian, John Wildman. First, and most important, they proposed a democratic Parliament: no King and no Lords, but Commons elected without any restrictive property qualification.

"All soldiers and others, if they be not servants or beggars, ought to have voices in electing those which shall represent them in Parliament, although they have not 40s. per annum in freehold land."

The Levellers knew that it was they, and not the rich, who had won the war: ultimately, power lay with the people. What was it, then, that gave a government the right to exercise power? Clearly, the Levellers argued, only the will of the people.

"I conceive that's the undeniable maxim of government," Wildman said, "that all government is in the free consent of the people." The Levellers would not give a vote to beggars or servants, nor even wage-earners (a small class in 1647) because they said their vote would follow their masters'. Still less, however, would they give a vote to their enemies in the late war. Candidates for Parliament, moreover, were required to have taken an *active* part *against* Charles, either by fighting or by giving their wealth.

The second fundamental proposition of the Levellers was that even a Parliament as democratic as they asked for was still *inferior to the men who chose it*. They named certain essential liberties which it could on no account do away with, such as freedom from impressment and freedom of religion.

Within these bounds, Parliament was given full powers. It was to elect a "Council of State for the managing of public affairs." All magistrates and officers of State were to be answerable to it. In addition, the Levellers demanded a thorough democratisation of the law courts, with elected judges and simplified procedure, and democratic taxation: a single tax on income, with exemption for small incomes, and the removal of all indirect taxes on beer, cloth, etc. The royal forests and church lands were to provide the rest of the revenue. Parliament was "to have special care to keep all sorts of people from misery and beggary."

The Leveller demands were mostly political. They wanted political liberty. But as soon as the debates began the Levellers learnt that the fight for political liberty, for a shift in political power, involving an alteration in the balance of class forces, necessarily involves a struggle against the established class relations, that is, against the established property relations and the current mode of production. The Levellers found the road to liberty blocked by the capitalist ownership of land. "Sir, I see that it is impossible to have liberty but all Property must be taken away," said Rainborough.

Their enemies understood the same thing. In reply to the Levellers' contention that the right to share in government was birthright, the Grandees asserted that it was a property right. "No person hath a right to this," Ireton argued, "that hath not a permanent fixed

interest in this kingdom"; and the people who have such an interest are "the persons in whom all land lies, and those in corporations in whom all trading lies." To Ireton this was "the most fundamental part of the constitution of the kingdom." Supposing the franchise were extended, and men elected to Parliament who "have no local or permanent interest. Why may not those men vote against all property?" "All the main thing that I speak for," Ireton concluded, very truthfully, "is because I would have an eye to property."

The soldiers were filled with indignation at Ireton's arguments. They did not want to do away with property rights, either; they especially laid it down in their *Agreement* that it should be unlawful for Parliament to "level men's estates, destroy propriety or make all things common." But they saw no reason why only the considerable freeholders should have the vote. Rainborough declared in memorable words :

"The poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it's clear that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his consent to put himself under that government."

"It seems now," said one of the Buff Coats, "except a man hath a fixed estate in this kingdom, he hath no right in this kingdom. I wonder we were so much deceived." Rainborough echoed his bitter feelings :

"I would fain know what the soldier hath fought for all this while? He hath fought to enslave himself, to give power to men of riches, men of estates, to make him a perpetual slave."

The fight of liberty versus property was the heart of the debate. The class issue showed up sharp and clear. For that very season the Grandees had spent the first day and a half using all sorts of "juggling, falsehood and double-dealing" to deflect the arguments into safer channels, or to evade the discussion entirely, and to bemuse and slander their opponents. First Cromwell tried to say that the "Agreement" could not be discussed because it was so new, and so sudden. The Levellers answered that the political situation was much too critical to permit any delay. "Mr. Wildman says, if we tarry long, the King will come and say who will be hanged first." So then Cromwell protested that the proposals were wildly revolutionary and involved "alterations from that government that the kingdom hath been under, I believe I may almost say, ever since it was a nation." Rainborough retorted that in fact English government and laws had undergone constant change as the result of struggles between opposing classes :

"If writings be true there have been many scufflings between the honest men of England and those that have tyrannised over them; and if it be true what I have read, there is none of those just and equitable laws that the people of England are born to, but are entrenchments on the once enjoyed privileges of their rulers."

Besides, a Bedfordshire man added percutently: "If you keep the government as it is and bring in the King, there may be more dangers than in changing the government."

Cromwell and the other Grandees next tried to change the argument into an abstract and arid discussion on the ethics of prior engagements: was the army *free* to adopt the Agreement? There was so much talk about "engagements" that eventually the Bedfordshire man said pointedly: "I hope those engagements have given away nothing from the people that is the people's due." Wildman brought the discussion back on its course again by asking: Is the Agreement just? Cromwell steered away from that question. Perhaps it was just, he said, but was it practicable? They had to be realistic and consider the difficulties. "Difficulties!" Rainborough exclaimed impatiently, "Oh, unhappy men are we that ever began this war! If ever we had looked upon difficulties, I do not know that ever we should have looked an enemy in the face."

Eventually the Grandees brought in religion to their rescue. One Lieutenant-Colonel William Goffe, who always tried to turn every debate into a prayer meeting, asked that there should "be a seeking of God in the things that now lie before us." In his view it was irreligion that was at the root of all their troubles: "It hath been our trouble night and day that God hath not been with us as formerly."

The Levellers knew that the way to counter the craft of the Grandees was to appeal for support to the masses, both soldiers and civilians. On October 29 Wildman published an urgent pamphlet exposing the Grandees and exhorting the soldiers to stand firm. He pointed out how two-faced the generals were: "They hold forth the white flag of accommodation and satisfaction, and of minding the same thing which ye mind," but they also hold forth "the bloody flag of threats and terrors," accusing the agitators of being anarchists—"an old, threadbare trick" as he very justly observed. The reason for such behaviour, he explained, was that Cromwell and Ireton had betrayed the people's cause and were now promoting the interests of the reactionaries, so that loyal fighters felt ready "to weep for grief to see such a sudden and dangerous alteration." The way to avoid disaster from such treachery was to maintain solid unity between people and army. Wildman assures the soldiers that the people "will

be ready with all their might and strength to assist you whilst you are faithful, and really for them." The soldiers must be confident in their ability to manage affairs; they should not hesitate to take direct action and replace the old governing clique in the army by new, reliable men who will not be corrupted by "titles, fine fare or compliments."

"Ye have men amongst you as fit to govern as others to be removed
And with a word ye can create new officers Necessity hath no law
and against it there is no plea. The safety of the people is above all law."

Cromwell also knew, however, that the way to break the Levellers was to put every obstacle in the way of unity : to divide the Agitators from their regiments, and the regiments one from another. So when in the Council a motion in favour of the extended franchise was "concluded by vote in the affirmative," he hastily had all the rest of the Agreement referred to a committee. On November 11 several Agitators wrote a letter to their regiments explaining what had happened at that committee. They had demanded that the question be debated whether or not any power might safely be given to the King. Cromwell had agreed. But :

"when they met he wholly refused and instead of that, spake very reproachfully of us and our actings. And to prevent any further debate they have dissolved the Council for above a fortnight."

Moreover, the Agitators warned their regiments, the Grandees were planning to trick them over the general rendezvous of the army which they had obliged the Grandees to allow :

"They declared they would divide the Army into three parts to rendezvous severally And all this appears to be only to draw off the Army from joining together to settle those clear foundations of freedom propounded to you"

This would be fatal. The regiments must work for "a general rendezvous and no parting each from other." And finally, the Agitators add, "if any declarations or propositions about pay and arrears be offered to you, remember you have been fed with paper too long."

Unfortunately, Cromwell *did* manage to hold several rendezvous. Two of the most influential regiments (Lilburne's and Harrison's) were sent off to Ware, where they were faced with hostile troops. The Leveller soldiers marched up shouting out for "England's liberty ! Soldiers' rights !" and wearing copies of the Agreement in their hats. They were ordered to remove the papers. They refused. They were then attacked and ridden down and some leaders were picked out and shot. Already so early in its career the bourgeoisie

showed its fear of the people and resorted to force to maintain its position.

The Levellers were defeated. Two hundred years later, however, the working class, the Chartists, put forward similar demands which, as the result of hard, prolonged struggle, have been substantially realised. In face of the workers, the capitalists have had to retreat. Bourgeois historians have tried to gloss over the revolutionary struggles of our people, and to present the growth of democracy as the story of "freedom broadening slowly down, from precedent to precedent," thanks to our enlightened rulers. That leads to the conclusion, so convenient for the ruling class, that the Communists with their nasty talk about class struggle are "alien" to English politics. The fight of the Levellers (and many similar battles) demonstrates the opposite: that it is precisely the Communist Party which is the true heir and successor of the most heroic champions of liberty in the past.

SOCIALISM FOR GENTLEMEN

F. & J. CORMACK

IT IS PERHAPS UNFAIR to saddle the Fabian Society as much with the blame for the more hair-raising productions published under its imprint; after all, it professes to have no policy. Yet when a Special Study Group under a General Secretary of the Society publishes a report on *The Reform of the Higher Civil Service* (approved of course as "embodying facts and opinions worthy of consideration within the Labour movement"), we may be pardoned for regarding it as a representative piece of social-democratic thinking. We open it with interest, for the subject is vital; we shut it with something like awe. We may not have looked for a very clear Socialist statement; but at any rate we had expected an advanced liberal one. Alas for the great days of Shaw and the Webbs: there is not one line in the 61 pages of this Fabian document which a reasonably conservative Permanent Secretary to the Treasury would not consider with benevolence.

What is wrong with the Higher Civil Service? Socialists would say: in the first place, the fact that success or failure of Labour's programme depends on an astonishingly small number of (strongly non-Socialist) key figures in the State apparatus. The Report's figures, though not new, underline this. The entire Administrative Class—the monopolists of policy making—consists of 4,200 men and women.

But, as everyone knows, within that group the real policy decisions are taken, on the whole, by a much smaller group of heads of departments, Deputy Secretaries and Under-Secretaries. Of these there are (or were, Jan. 1946) 192. Knock out the departments of minor importance and you are left with a number which barely runs into three figures. Most of these men entered the Service at least 20 years ago, when practically no young public schools and university men were Socialists. For that matter, even today (1945-6), 65 per cent of the men who passed the entrance examination came from Headmasters' Conference, i.e., public schools; 35 per cent from boarding schools.

It need hardly be said that the Report is quite unruffled by the threat of high officials so selected endangering a Socialist programme. Recruitment is fine, though perhaps a few more candidates should be admitted, taking good care, however, "not to upset the essential pyramid of promotion by opening the gates too wide" (p. 7). Plunging hard, the Fabians even go so far as to suggest that "recruitment from the clerical and executive classes should be facilitated." On the other hand, they strongly oppose "recruitment on a political basis," for officials brought in by Ministers to carry out a given policy "interfere with the working of departmental machinery without necessarily invigorating it" (p. 21). We need hardly follow these revolutionary proposals further.

Perhaps it was too much to expect Fabians to realise that Socialism is not constructed through the agency of the bourgeoisie, unofficial or official. But there remains the almost equally urgent problem, which preoccupies many honest non-Socialist civil servants: How can the Service be technically fitted for the tasks of national planning which confront it today. As it happens, the Report claims to have been written precisely to discuss this problem, and its utter failure to advance beyond conservatism is thus even more striking. For the Fabian conception of a national plan is a very modest one. Someone drafts a Plan—the Report is vague on Central Planning machinery, though it makes useful suggestions about adopting wartime staff techniques at lower level. Then the "Plan" is handed to the nationalised and non-nationalised industries, and after that, really, little remains to be done. In nationalised industries a small committee in the relevant Department will be sufficient, for the Government will have "almost no hand in the day-to-day running of the industries." In the private ones, an occasional control will be set up over materials or components which happen to be scarce, and abolished immediately the scarcity has passed (p. 43). It is hard to say whether the writers are really kidding themselves that this is what national planning in Britain would amount to today, or whether they are merely falling over back-

wards to avoid "compelling" industry any more than the Tory Industrial Charter would. However, it is clear that, holding such views, they are, by and large, quite satisfied with the ability of the present Civil Service to deal with planning. A little streamlining, a little face-lifting—but nothing like a revolution is needed. There are few civil servants in production departments who would agree.

Such are the theoretical contributions of Fabianism 1947 to the problem of reforming the Higher Civil Service. It is therefore only natural that the bulk of the Report is filled with interesting, but minor matters: how old ought Assistant Secretaries to be before they are promoted? Should high officials have refresher courses?

No sensible Socialist will pooh-pooh such problems, which have their place in, say, a Report issued by the staff side of the National Whitley Council (though even that would turn out a more daring document than the Fabians); but other questions are more urgent. How are we to solve the problem of power in the Higher Civil Service? How are we to ensure (a) that a National Plan is drawn up; and (b) that it is not sabotaged? How are we to get the Civil Service out of the habit of regarding itself as a sort of glorified butler-valet to Private Enterprise, who, if he "controls," does so at best in the manner of Bertie Wooster's Jeeves?

We must face the problem of cleaning up the Service and of keeping constant control over its running. The top 100 or so officials could and should be replaced by reliable supporters of Labour, from outside and inside the Service; if necessary, junior men rapidly promoted. The war has given many sound Socialists administrative experience. Class distinctions in recruitment, which give a small group the monopoly of key decisions must be dealt with. (Though the Report doesn't consider it from that angle, we must strongly welcome its proposal to equalise the status of scientific and administrative officials.) The problem of control is more difficult, but even non-Marxists have tackled it. The Webbs, who had fewer illusions about the Service than the Fabians of today, used to make a number of suggestions: Parliamentary control was to be strengthened by special Standing Committees, one for each public service, charged with "continuous oversight"; and they rightly pointed out that permanent control must mean setting up some independent standard of measurement by which policy can be judged independent of what the leading officials say about it: statistics, sample checks, etc.; we should today add such devices as "Operational Research," the teamwork of scientists and administrators. (But the Report, which also—rightly—stresses the importance of Operational Research, though without the Webbs' political considerations, fails to point out that it can never be effective,

and may be completely stultified so long as the hostile high officials, who can side-track it, are not removed or crippled.) We do not mention these proposals of the Webbs (in the "Constitution of the Socialist Commonwealth") because they are necessarily the best, or even adequate; but to demonstrate a possible approach to the problem and the decay of social-democratic ideas in the last 30 years. For our Report Parliamentary Control is something which increases the amount of form-filling and, perhaps, unavoidably, decreases efficiency. Perhaps (we can hear the Permanent Secretary speaking!) as we can't very well abolish it, we might at least see that M.P.s don't ask so many damn fool questions (p.54). The only problem in the relations of Civil Service and citizens at large which preoccupies it is how efficiently the Service can "sell itself" by means of normal business publicity technique. It does not mention trade unions.

Is this, then, "worthy of consideration within the Labour movement"? Unfortunately, yes, as a hideous example. For this is no aberration. This is what people who call themselves Socialists honestly believe about the Civil Service and State power. God's in his heaven, and nothing's wrong with our State that a good business consultant wouldn't cure. And 30 years after *State and Revolution*, a representative organisation of social-democrats, gives its blessing to this stuff and sends it into the world. Not even Fabians can any longer pretend that they do not know about problems of political power. If they talk as though the new Jerusalem were to be built by people like the present Higher Civil Service, it is simply because their kind of "Socialism" is one which will suit people like—let us not mention the names of existing officials—Sir John Anderson. There is a melancholy lesson to be learned from that.

THE ROOTS OF OPPORTUNISM

E. B.

"Why is the Labour Government carrying out a policy not in the interests of the working class, when it has a big parliamentary majority and support in the country for a real working-class policy?"

THIS IS A QUESTION OFTEN asked by Labour Party men and women who are bewildered by the frustration of their hopes after Labour's election victory in 1945. It is of exceptional importance for the Labour Left, as well as for ourselves, to understand the historical reasons for the domination of the Labour Party by right-wing leaders, and what is the essence of the right-wing outlook and policy. In 1882 Engels wrote

"There is no working-class party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers merrily devour with them the fruits of the British colonial monopoly and of the British monopoly of the world market."

Quoting this, Lenin observes that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism "to create privileged sections even amongst the workers, and to detach them from the main proletarian masses," showed itself earlier than elsewhere because of Britain's vast colonial possessions and monopoly of the world markets (*Lenin on Britain*, p. 65). In another passage, Lenin notes that the industrial workers cannot fulfil their historical mission "if they isolate themselves in narrow craft, narrow trade interests, and self-contentedly restrict themselves to improving their somewhat tolerable petty-bourgeois position" (p. 67). It was the Liberal-Radical (later "Lib-Lab") outlook, combined with the narrow craft outlook, which sought only the improvement of conditions *within capitalism*, that held up for so long the formation of an independent working-class party in Britain. And this outlook persisted when the Labour Party was at last formed, permeating not only the trade union leaders, but the Fabians and the Independent Labour Party.

Nevertheless, in 1908 Lenin supported the admission of the Labour Party to the Second International on the ground that "it represents the first step on the part of the really proletarian organisations of England towards a conscious class policy and towards a *Socialist Labour Party*" (p. 94). But then this development was checked. Britain had long lost her monopoly in world trade, but in the years before the First World War the opportunism of the previous period blossomed out into full alliance with the ruling class in defence of British imperialism against its rivals; and in 1914 the Socialist movements of all countries (except Russia) sided with their own imperialists.

True, in 1918 the Labour Party for the first time put Socialism (in moderate language) in its programme. But this did not alter the outlook of its leaders, as MacDonald showed clearly enough. For the First World War had meant a further decline in the power of British imperialism, and the right-wing Labour leaders saw their task as the restoration of that power, or at least defence against further weakening. Therefore the betrayal of 1931; carried forward by MacDonald's successors in the betrayal of Republican Spain and the condonation of Munich. Hence also the conscious and deliberate fight of the right-wing leaders—from Hodges and MacDonald to Bevin and Morrison—against the Communist Party, which alone, through its Marxist outlook, could have transformed the Labour Party into a really

Socialist organisation. It has been a tragedy for the Labour Party that the genuine Lefts within it, and the mass of its members who really want Socialism and a Socialist policy, have for so long allowed themselves to be deluded by the right-wing leaders in regard to the Communist Party. The result has been the continuation of the right-wing domination of the Labour Party, showing itself now in the policy of the Labour Government—its protection of imperialist interests, its subservience to American imperialism and hatred of the countries of Socialism, its accommodation with monopoly capitalism in Britain itself, its attempted solution of the crisis at the expense of the workers. This policy is not due to the weakness of individuals, but to their whole outlook. Once the Left realises that this outlook can only be fought with Marxism, and in alliance with the Communist Party, the winning of the masses will not be so distant.

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COMMUNIST REVIEW

FEBRUARY
1948

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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1848 AND 1948

J. R. CAMPBELL

NO POLITICAL DOCUMENT HAS STOOD THE TEST of subsequent experience to the same extent as the *Communist Manifesto* published one hundred years ago. It was a hazardous venture for the young Marx and Engels (aged 29 and 27 respectively) to base their political orientation "on those strata which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force" (*History of the C.P.S.U.*). To see within the rapidly expanding capitalist society the seeds of its decay, to see the working class, which was barely beginning to organise itself, as the revolutionary force which would overthrow capitalism and construct the classless Socialist society, was indeed a startling example of the Marxist method.

For in 1848, capitalism in its factory phase was only predominant in Britain, though it was beginning to expand in France and America. Even in Britain, there were still industries in the pre-factory stage of development. The bourgeoisie were confident that the world was witnessing the beginnings of a social system which would bring great benefits to all mankind. In the debates on the Reform Bill some sixteen years previously, Macaulay had declared :

"Our fields are cultivated with a skill unknown elsewhere, with a skill which has extracted rich harvests from moors and morasses. Our houses are filled with conveniences which the kings of former times might have envied. Our bridges, our canals, our roads, our modes of communication, fill every stranger with wonder. Nowhere are manufactures carried to such perfection. Nowhere does man exercise such a dominion over matter."

The boastful, optimistic spirit of the British bourgeoisie had grown by 1848, for it had achieved the extension of the franchise, arrived at the "Victorian compromise" with the landed aristocracy, won the struggle for free trade and was looking forward to years of almost uninterrupted expansion. On the other hand the working class was far from being the homogeneous class which it is today. As Maurice Dobb points out :

"In cotton it was not until the 1830s that the power loom was in widespread use. . . . In the woollen industry power machinery only won its victory in the course of the 1850s, and even in 1858 only about half the workers in the woollen industry worked in factories. . . .

"In trades like tailoring and shoemaking, production was overwhelmingly in the hands of small firms employing less than ten

workers apiece. . . . The survival into the second half of the nineteenth century of the conditions of domestic industry and of the manufactory had an important consequence for industrial life and the industrial population which is too seldom appreciated. It meant that not until the last quarter of the (19th) century did the working class begin to assume the homogeneous character of a factory proletariat."

The 1830s had seen the failure of premature attempts to build trade unionism on a class basis. It was difficult to build stable trade unions in the great factory districts. The Chartist movement, the first independent movement of the working class (though with a heavy petty bourgeois adulteration), had awakened the workers, instilled the beginning of class consciousness, and shaken the ruling class with mighty demonstrations, which reached their most acute point in periods of bad trade; but it had been able to develop neither a consistent leadership, nor permanent organisation.

The only other non-Communist working-class party which the *Manifesto* mentions is the Agrarian Reformers in America. The Communist League which adopted the basic principles of Marxism and commissioned Marx and Engels to write the *Manifesto* was an organisation of artisans rather than factory workers and was not a mass organisation. The Paris proletariat was organised in Red Republican secret societies with a Communist tinge. It was to be the main fighting force in the insurrection which overthrew the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe in February, 1848. It was in the same year to display tremendous heroism in the June insurrection, in which it rose against the counter-revolutionary measures of the bourgeois republic, but it lacked a leadership with a clear understanding of the actual relationships of the class forces, and of the tactics which the working class should pursue.

That was the extent of working-class organisation at the time when the *Manifesto* was written. It appeared feeble beside that of the bourgeoisie, which was expanding in wealth and in influence and was preparing to wrest power from the automatic governments which then dominated most of Europe. In these circumstances, to be able to analyse the driving forces of social development, to see the forthcoming victory of the bourgeoisie as ephemeral, and to regard the proletariat barely emerging to an independent organisational existence as designed to end class society, was a remarkable achievement.

Alongside the movement of the bourgeoisie for political power, there was the movement of the oppressed nationalities, particularly the Poles, the Italians and the Irish. It was a movement confined to Europe and to European transplantations like Canada. The masses in Asia were not yet astir.

Over the entire European scene there loomed the sinister reactionary power of Tsarist Russia. The *Communist Manifesto* called for "the union and agreement of the democratic parties of all countries," for its conception was that the bourgeois revolution in Europe would have to wage a successful war against Tsarism before it could consolidate its victory.

The *Manifesto* was issued as a guide to action in the maturing democratic revolution in Europe. It outlined to the workers the meaning of the movements which were taking place around them, urging them not to stand aloof from the fight, but to help the bourgeoisie in its struggle for power, while recognising the need to develop their own independent policy, and carry the revolution beyond the limits set by the bourgeoisie, to turn the revolution of the minority (the bourgeoisie) into a revolution of the majority (the workers, petty bourgeoisie and peasantry under the leadership of the former).

It was expected that when the revolution broke out it would follow a similar course to the great French Revolution of the eighteenth century, the more moderate sections of the bourgeoisie being displaced by the more radical, who would finally be challenged by the proletariat which had grouped around it the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.

As it was the bourgeoisie took fright at the rise of the masses behind it and scuttled back into the arms of monarchist feudal reaction, while the mass parties of the petty bourgeoisie like the Social Democrats in France (the "Mountain") showed a terrifying ineptitude, alienated the workers, supported reaction during the June insurrection and prepared the ground for their own subsequent defeat.

The movement on the Continent did not even achieve the aims set by the more moderate section of the bourgeoisie. It was left for Napoleon III in France and later for Bismarck in Germany to create the conditions for the expansion of capitalism in their respective countries, and with it the creation of a great factory proletariat. This, as Engels pointed out almost fifty years later :

"created a genuine bourgeoisie and a genuine large scale industrial proletariat and has pushed them into the foreground of social development. But owing to this the struggle of the two great classes, which, apart from England, existed in 1848 only in Paris and in a few big industrial centres has been spread over the whole of Europe and has reached an intensity such as was unthinkable in 1848" (Preface to *Class Struggles in France*, 1895).

Consider the situation in 1948. Capitalism has reached the stage of its decadence. Within the previous thirty-four years it has plunged the world into two devastating world wars, a world-wide economic crisis, and has tortured great nations by setting up Fascist dictatorships

in an attempt to preserve its menaced privileges. Gone are the bourgeois optimists, except in a few sheltered enclaves in the United States of America. Today all responsible bourgeois thinkers admit that there is a world crisis, though of course they do their best to conceal its real character.

Over one-sixth of the world the tyranny of capitalism and landlordism has been abolished and a planned Socialist economy is in being. The Chartists of 1848, the "Mountain" in France, wanted to conquer power in order to improve the conditions of the people, but they had really no idea what to do if they ever had attained power. The Russian Revolution has given to the world rich experience as to how a Socialist society can be built—an experience which the workers in other lands need not slavishly copy, but which they will find of the utmost use when they are transforming their own lands. In addition a whole series of new popular democracies have emerged from the Second World War—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary—which have liquidated the great landlords, taken over the basic industries and are beginning, in defiance of Anglo-American hostility, to advance to Socialism in their own way. Prominent in the leadership are tested mass Communist Parties.

In 1848, Tsarist Russia was the gendarme of Europe, ready to intervene against the revolutionary movements. In 1849, its troops, co-operating with those of the Hapsburg Monarchy, helped to suppress the Hungarian Revolution. Thirty-one years ago, however, Tsarism was overthrown and today its successor, the Soviet Union, is the friend of all progressive mankind. But for the Soviet Union the Anglo-American reactionaries would long since have intervened to suppress the popular revolutions in Eastern Europe and to restore in its place the rule of the collaborators and black marketeers as in Greece—all in the name of democracy, of course. In 1902, Karl Kautsky, then a Marxist, wrote in the Russian Revolutionary paper, *Iskra*:

"The Russian revolutionary movement which is now flaring up will prove perhaps to be the most potent means for driving out that spirit of flabby philistinism and sober politics, which is beginning to spread in our ranks; it will cause the lust for battle and passionate devotion to our great ideals to flare up in bright flames again—they will nourish the shoots of social upheaval throughout the whole civilised world and cause their more rapid and luxuriant growth. In 1848 the Slavs were a biting frost which blighted the flowers of the people's spring. Perhaps now they are destined to be the storm that will break the ice of reaction and will unrestrainedly bring the peoples a new, happy spring."

Though Kautsky was later to turn a renegade, his prediction is being fulfilled in the world today.

One of the most remarkable of the new features of our time is the successes won by the liberation movement of the colonial peoples. Large measures of self-government have been achieved by India and Burma, though full independence and freedom from all entangling alliances with the Anglo-American reactionaries has still to be won.

The *Manifesto* said in 1848:

"The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls."

Today in North China there is a powerful people's democracy, under Communist leadership, whose armies are delivering shattering blows at the feudal reactionaries supported by American imperialism. The movement of the common people is today world-wide.

In Western Europe great mass Communist Parties stand at the head of the working class in France and Italy, have extended their influence amongst the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, and are playing the foremost part in the struggle against those who would sell the independence of their countries for dollars and would make them counter-revolutionary bridgeheads in Europe. General de Gaulle, who is operating precisely the same tactics as Louis Bonaparte in 1849—so that he sometimes appears as an elongated caricature of the latter—will find that the French proletariat of 1948 is vastly better organised and infinitely more politically mature than that of 1848, and its influence over all genuinely democratic sections of the French people is infinitely greater.

Fortunately, although the reaction in Europe is far from beaten, there is no great counter-revolutionary power on the European Continent today. The stronghold of the counter-revolution is in the United States on the other side of the Atlantic.

The *Manifesto* declared:

"Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society which has conjured up such gigantic means of production and exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world which he has called up by his spells. For many decades past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their

periodical return put the existence of the entire bourgeois society on its trial, each time more threateningly."

That might almost be written with the U.S.A. of 1948 in mind. There has never been a capitalist nation which has developed the productive force to such an extent. There has certainly never been one less confident of its power to control these. In the midst of a luxuriant boom it is shaking with apprehension as the signs of the approaching economic crisis become visible. To mitigate the crisis and to transfer the larger part of its burden on to the shoulders of other countries is the essence of its commercial policy.

There are marked differences between the United States and Britain whose place it has taken as the leading capitalist State. For one thing, its economic and political power is much greater than Britain's was in the days of its glory. Even when it was the predominant capitalist power Britain was only "first among equals." In all but the first years of the Industrial Revolution it held its superiority by a very narrow margin. It had always to manoeuvre very carefully to prevent a combination of powers against it.

The U.S.A. has vastly greater strength in relation to any capitalist combination which could be organised against it. It has set itself vastly different aims than Britain, which was always prepared to leave other capitalist powers scope so long as they did not menace its vital interests. The U.S.A. will be content with nothing less than complete world domination. This it expresses in a variety of ways. It seeks to impose upon the world a trade charter which will benefit the U.S.A. at the expense of all others. It denies the right of any outside country to intervene in the affairs of the Western hemisphere, while it asserts its own right to intervene wherever it pleases in the Eastern. It seeks to make the United Nations an appendage to the State Department. Its propagandists are beginning to advocate a world government dominated by the U.S.A. and its satellites.

But it cannot develop its campaign against the Soviet Union and the progressive forces of Europe and Asia without the assistance of France and Britain—and above all Britain. That is why this country holds such a key position in all U.S. schemes.

There have been big changes in Britain in the last 100 years. After 1848 the British ruling class was able because of its monopoly position in the world market to give special concessions to the skilled workers and to wean them away from the idea of an independent political movement of the workers. It was able to continue this process through the imperialist stage up to 1914. Now, however, it is suffering not merely from the economic damage caused by the Second World War, but also from its weakened imperial basis, from the

inability of the ruling class to modernise its productive equipment between the wars, from the parasitic traits in its economy which are the consequence of imperial exploitation. No small reforms, no partial nationalisation, no Keynesian financial techniques, no injection of U.S. aid will restore Britain to its former greatness. Only a fundamental social change, which will wipe out the deadweight of property claims, bring all the great industries under social ownership as the basis for a fully-planned economy, can give our people a new lease of life.

The broad division in Britain today is between those who want Britain to mobilise all its strength and to enter on the path of fundamental change, and those who want it to help the capitalist counter-revolution in Europe and then to take the downward path as a satellite of U.S. imperialism, occupying the same relation to the U.S. juggernaut as the Dutch imperialists did to Britain in the past three-quarters of a century. The former is the path indicated by the Communists and by the growing body of genuine Socialists in the Labour Party. The latter is the path chosen by Attlee and Co., whose talk about "the middle way" cannot conceal that they are in the camp of reaction.

This year will decide whether the British people who broke with Toryism in 1945 is going to allow itself to be hoodwinked into supporting a policy indistinguishable from Toryism, or whether it will join with the ever-growing forces of Socialism and democracy in all lands. If the Communists and all genuine Socialists in the Labour Party do their duty, the British people will proudly tread the Socialist path.

THE BATTLE OF IDEAS

JOHN GOLLAN

AT THIS MOMENT American big business, the British ruling class, and British and French social democracy are waging a fierce ideological campaign. The sharpening of the struggle politically and economically is accompanied by the sharpening of the battle of ideas.

The purpose of it all is clear. Cynical Wall Street big business and its instrument the State Department cannot openly proclaim its real aims of world domination, its new imperialism. So the more sinister the aims and the more shameless and flagrant their capitalist profit motives the more unctuous and self-righteous become the public speeches of the President and the Secretary of State. Certain main ideological arguments are used, Christianity, human liberty, individual

freedom and political democracy. As Zhdanov put it in the Conference of the Nine Communist Parties: "The aspiration to world supremacy and the anti-democratic policy of the United States involve an ideological struggle."

In Britain, to which has been ascribed the role of junior partner by the Wall Street master, there is a special problem. The more subservient the policy, the more the relationships approach that of master and servant, the more lofty becomes the tone of the propaganda. Thus the cynical Marshall Plan is eulogistically described as "the most unsordid act in history." But we are supposed to have a different kind of Government, one which was to usher in a new social era. A division of labour therefore emerges in Britain between the Tory Party and the right-wing Labour leaders. The "fundamentals" are supposed to be held in common—Christianity, human liberty, political freedom; and Cripps certainly outdoes all in his constant spiritual appeals. Then comes Social Democracy's special contribution (from Attlee and Bevin to Laski and Crossman): the ideology of the middle way. Attlee in his recent broadcast "boldly" attacked the "extremes" of American capitalism and Russian Communism.

Despite all the noise and tumult the entire ideological campaign of Wall Street and Social Democracy is essentially defensive. The bold advancing forces of Socialism, bringing new hope and inspiration to millions of mankind, are essentially the challenger; the capitalist propaganda suffers from the fundamental defect that it defends the old order, an order which has meant unemployment, misery, privation and war for the mass of the people. Even the Social Democratic propaganda suffers from the same weakness. The "middle way"—the very term has a defensive ring; it is not even new, it was first advanced by the Tory M.P., Harold Macmillan, in the years immediately prior to the Second World War.

The ideas are wearing a bit thin. They have all been answered time and again—most of them a century ago in the *Communist Manifesto*!

Attlee summed them up when in his recent broadcast, in reference to the new democracies, he said the Communist Party

"While overthrowing an economic tyranny of landlordism and capitalism, had renounced the doctrines of individual freedom and political democracy, and rejected the whole spiritual heritage of Western Europe."

In debate, of course, attack is always the best form of defence. The tyranny of capitalism has only been overthrown in the Soviet Union and in these new States; it never has been and never will be overthrown in any country where Social Democracy has come to power.

Dismiss the uncomfortable fact and concentrate on the "loss" of individual freedom!

But who have lost their freedom? The spies, the intriguers, the capitalists, the landlords and the kings. The workers and peasants are freer than ever before. Their unions are legal, while hitherto they were illegal or semi-legal. Their parties exist, with press, organisation and radio. The elections are contested with secret ballot. Above all, they have economic freedom, they own the land, the work-shops and the real wealth.

Long before Stalin and the Communist Parties were born Marx, with that uncanny accuracy for which he was famous, forecast in the *Manifesto* the events which would take place when the workers came to power and Socialism was developed.

"When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so-called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class; if by means of a revolution it makes itself the ruling class and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class."

Long before Attlee had the Soviet Union to criticise as a "one party State" Marx foresaw that genuine Socialism would bring fundamental changes which had nothing in common with the ordinary political game of now the Labour Party in power and now the Tory Party, a game which by implication the right-wing Labour leaders see going on for ever!

In an historical moment when fundamental change is both possible and necessary, there are men who have the courage and vision boldly to lead the masses forward on new paths. Zhdanov, representing this new generation of Communists, answered the hack politicians thus:

"The pith and substance of this fraudulent propaganda is the claim that the earmark of true democracy is the existence of a plurality of parties and of an organised opposition. On these grounds the British Labourites, who spare no effort in their fight against Communism, would like to discover antagonistic classes and a corresponding struggle of parties in the U.S.S.R. Political ignoramuses that they are, they cannot understand that capitalists and landlords, antagonistic classes, and hence a plurality of parties have long since ceased to exist in the

U.S.S.R. They would like to have in the U.S.S.R. the bourgeois parties which are so dear to their hearts, including pseudo-Socialist parties, as an agency of imperialism. But to their bitter regret these parties of the exploiting bourgeoisie have been doomed by history to disappear from the scene."

At the same time, he added, these politicians had no difficulty in supporting the bloody dictatorship in Greece or the violations of democracy in America and other capitalist countries.

Not only will the Communists fundamentally advance democracy, but with the inevitable victory of world Communism politics as such, and with it the Communist Party, will cease to exist! As Marx put it "the public power will lose its political character," the proletariat "will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class."

In the face of such fundamental, noble and far-reaching conceptions how paltry appear the ideological arguments of Wall Street, of the advocates of the "middle way," of the "talk success" campaign of the *News Chronicle*.

J. B. Priestley, who so often reflects the thought of the common man, did a tour of Britain to write articles for the *Daily Herald* on the new Britain. He complained that he could discover no sense of drama, no spirit of adventure, no feeling that great things were happening. Quite so. Because nothing fundamental has changed in Britain. It is still the Britain of profits and subsistence wages, of master and man, of privilege and lack of privilege, of class and class.

Compare this with the real drama in Eastern Europe, the drama of fundamental social change—the peasant in Hungary with his own land for the first time in centuries; the great Bata Works without Bata; King Michael goes and the working woman becomes foreign secretary; four hundred factories built in backward Yugoslavia in a year. The people are supreme, they grow in confidence, in bearing, in humanity, dignity and stature. Here is the greatest historical drama of all times bearing out Marx's prophecy of 1848.

No wonder capitalism's ideological campaign is so defensive in tone. We want to defend the Western way of life, exclaims Wall Street. Avril Harriman wrote in a *Financial News* supplement:

"What the average American feels towards the economic system of which he is a part is not so much faith as confidence—confidence based not on the blind acceptance of a creed, but rather upon the objective evidence that on balance he has been served well by his institutions; that although adjustments must constantly be made, there is at the same time no justification for a wholesale jettisoning of the system."

Ours is a philosophy in its own right, explains Attlee in his broad-

cast; we will attain a good life for all, free from oppression. He claimed that :

"Already great strides have been made towards a fairer distribution of wealth. Broad measures of social security have been passed. Basic industries are being steadily brought under public ownership without sacrificing any of the liberties which we all hold dear."

In the *Manifesto* the answer is given. "Property, in its present form," wrote Marx, "is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour." In bourgeois society, he said, "capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality." By freedom, he accused his attackers, you mean "under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying." In your existing society, said Marx defending the working class right to take over bourgeois property, "private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of the nine-tenths."

The longer capitalism exists, the more resounds the compelling truth of the *Manifesto*, and no amount of ideological arguments about human liberty can obscure the fact that in capitalist society there is no real liberty for the many.

The fundamental class inequalities of American society make a sham of the talk of equal rights and the sanctity of the individual. Harriman's society has served the American capitalist class so well as to create these fundamental human inequalities. The false complacency of his claims is already being shattered by the approaching American economic crisis, in which the common people of America will have to battle for their very lives.

The British worker asks Attlee : Where is our good life? A good life there is for the employer, with profits higher than ever before, while the working-class housewife wrestles vainly with rising costs and prices. Where is the fairer distribution of wealth? We cannot find it. The great social schemes are a shadow of what they are intended to be, as Cripps forbids the schools, the hospitals and health centres and cuts the houses. The pace of nationalisation could not be slower, the nationalisation boards are the old gang thinly disguised, and profit sanctified by the name of interest on State bonds still remains profit.

The truths of the *Manifesto* are greater than the high-powered ideological campaign of the capitalist class, but what was theory and logic in 1848 is the living reality of Socialism in 1948. This is the reason why capitalism's ideological campaign and the apologetics of social democracy's "middle way" will fail.

THE FIGHT FOR AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

CHRISTOPHER HILL

BEFORE THE RULE OF MR. BEVIN we have got to go back over 300 years to find a period at which Britain's foreign policy was dictated by a foreign power. It is the object of this article to recall this shameful episode and how it ended.

The international situation in the reign of James I (1603-1625) was as follows. The structure of European feudalism was beginning to disintegrate. Already it had snapped at its weakest link, and a bourgeois republic had been set up in Holland, which had survived decades of bitter warfare against the greatest reactionary power of the day, the House of Hapsburg ruling in Spain and Austria. Other countries had tried to follow Holland's example. In 1618 a revolution in Prague aimed at setting up a new regime, and James I's son-in-law the Elector Palatine, was elected King of Bohemia (Czechoslovakia), in the hope of winning British support for the cause of Czech independence and protestantism. All Europe was dividing into two camps—the protestant camp, looking to the revolutionary Dutch republic for aid and protection, supported by democrats and progressives in all countries; and the reactionary pro-Spanish camp, supported by conservative landlords everywhere, organised by the Roman Catholic Church, with agents in all countries purchased by the gold and silver which Spain drew from America. Between the progressive and reactionary camps, uneasily poised, then as now, stood England. The outcome in Europe, then as now, was closely related to the struggle of Englishmen to understand the issues and to take control of their own destinies.

At one time it had seemed all right. A great war had been fought, with England in close alliance with the Dutch republic, against the might of Spain. In 1588, the Spanish Armada had been defeated and England saved from invasion. But the approach of peace put an end to unity among the allies. Many people in England, including Queen Elizabeth herself, had been half-hearted about the alliance with Dutch "rebels," seditious and vulgar burghers engaged in setting up a new social system. Spanish aggression had forced England to ally with Holland for mutual defence; but conservative elements in the government had concentrated, even whilst the fight was on, on winning strategic advantages for England whilst leaving the main fighting to the Dutch. England won the war; but many Englishmen were afraid she might lose the peace. A year or two after the defeat of the Armada,

Shakespeare's proud lines in *King John* ended on a note of warning

"This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself . . .
—Nought shall make us rue
If England to itself do rest but true."

The warning was needed, for with the return of peace, reaction triumphed in England. Internal treachery was more dangerous than "the proud foot of a conqueror." Under the new king, James I, there was no sensational change in the direction of foreign affairs; but popular pressure on the government ceased, vigilance relaxed, and gradually England's whole policy fell under the domination of Spain; the Spanish ambassador in London came to treat the British Government as the American ambassador in Athens today treats the Greek Government.

Why? Why did the ruling class in England break with their late allies, and line up with the reactionary forces of Spain and the Roman Church? The reasons, as we find them in contemporary documents, are explicitly social: James I and his courtiers were as class conscious as the magnates of the F.B.I. today. When his son-in-law sent an envoy to ask for James's support for the independence of Bohemia, where the new regime was threatened by a Hapsburg attack, the King replied:

"Can you show me a good ground for the Palatine's invasion of the property of another? . . . So you are of the opinion that subjects can dispossess their kings? You are come in good time to England, to spread these principles among the people, that my subjects may drive me away and place another in my room."

So James did nothing whilst Czechoslovakia entered upon 300 years of slavery. James even allowed his son-in-law to be driven out of his hereditary dominions in the interests of the trade union of kings and the sacred principles of feudal property. And in those days of absolute monarchy, we must recollect dynastic alliances meant more than they do today, when British imperialism has other reasons for intervening in Greece than love for George VI's son-in-law. James broke with the Dutch, too, because they were even more dangerous revolutionaries; and (again in the sacred interests of property and legitimacy) he suggested to the Spanish Government that England and Spain might partition the territory of Holland between them. Spain, who had

already experienced the military might of the young republic, proved unexpectedly reluctant to undertake military action against it herself.

A reactionary foreign policy inevitably led, then as now, to a reactionary home policy. Papists were regarded as a Spanish fifth column in England. Certainly many of them were enemies of English representative institutions. In 1605, they tried to blow up the Houses of Parliament. Parliament passed penal laws against them. But they enjoyed the protection of Spain. The Spanish ambassador, Gondomar, successfully demanded the liberation of over 100 imprisoned Roman Catholic priests, largely Jesuits. James, busily engaged in making good his boast that he would "harry Puritans out of the land," saw the virtues of toleration with regard to the papists. He found as many difficulties in enforcing the penal laws against them as Mr. Ede finds in taking action against fascists today. In 1621 Gondomar complained against one of the two Secretaries of State, Sir Robert Naunton, for enforcing the law against papists: Naunton was sacked suddenly and mysteriously. In 1622 the Earl of Oxford was sent to the Tower for saying that James I was no better than the King of Spain's Viceroy.

The most outrageous case was that of Sir Walter Raleigh, last survivor of the great Elizabethan tradition. He had been imprisoned on James's accession. After 13 years in jail he was allowed out in 1616 to prospect for gold in South America—on what the Spanish Government alleged to be its territory, though Raleigh denied it. After strictly instructing Raleigh on no account to engage in military action against the Spaniards, James obligingly gave Spain precise information as to Raleigh's destination and the size of his fleet. Naturally, Spanish forces were ready for him, the expedition was a failure, Raleigh's son was killed in a brush with Spanish troops, and Raleigh himself returned to England a broken man. Gondomar demanded his head. James offered to hand Raleigh over to Spain. But Gondomar, like the American ambassador in Greece today, prudently preferred to allow heads to be removed by native hands. Raleigh was despatched by an English executioner. Raleigh was regarded as a martyr for English independence: his name became a rallying cry for all opponents of James's policy, for all patriots.*

The real enemies of Gondomar were the Parliament and people of England. The House of Commons in the seventeenth century represented only a small section of the population, mainly merchants and landlords. But among both groups there was a progressive bourgeois

*For Raleigh, see the excellent book by Professor D. B. Quinn recently published in the Teach Yourself History Series, *Raleigh and the British Empire*

sector, descendants of those who had forced Elizabeth's government to stand up to Spain and ally with the Dutch revolutionaries, predecessors of those who were to overthrow the Stuart regime and bring James's son to justice in the English revolution of 1640-1649. Unrepresentative as the House of Commons was, it was far more responsible to the demands of the nation than the narrow court circle. Whenever Parliament met it voiced the bourgeoisie's opposition to the policy of subservience to Spain.

Gondomar and James accordingly entered into a conspiracy to disregard and, if possible, suppress Parliament, the first direct Spanish intervention against English institutions. In 1614, James asked Gondomar whether, if he broke with Parliament, he could depend upon the support of the King of Spain. On receiving ambiguous assurances of Spain's goodwill, James dissolved the "Addled Parliament" before it had time to pass any legislation.

Seven years later financial need forced James to summon another Parliament. Before it met, he was careful to assure Gondomar that he would take care that nothing was done which might be displeasing to his Spanish majesty. Nevertheless, things were said which Gondomar disliked, and in December, 1621, he wrote to James in terms whose insolence the American ambassador to Italy today might well envy: if he had not been sure that James would punish the House of Commons, Gondomar said, he would have packed up and left "as you would have ceased to be a king here and as I have no army here *at present* to punish these people myself." James grovelled at this threat of force, and within a month Parliament was dissolved. Gondomar wrote home in triumph.

"It is certain that the King will never summon another Parliament as long as he lives, or at least not another composed as this one was. It is the best thing that has happened in the interests of Spain and the Catholic religion since Luther began to preach heresy 100 years ago. The King will no longer be able to succour his son-in-law, or to hinder the advance of the Catholics. It is true that this wretched people are desperately offended against him; but they are without union amongst themselves, and have neither leaders nor strong places to lean upon. . . . it is not likely that there will be any disturbance."

Spanish domination seemed complete. There was only one fly in the ointment: "this wretched people." They were not as helpless or as incapable of achieving unity as Gondomar thought.

Before proceeding, however, it is worth considering the Spanish technique for reducing a country to subjection. Gondomar's most

powerful asset, of course, was the economic and military power, real or imagined, of the Spanish Empire. Threats of military intervention alternated with "Doubloon diplomacy." His second asset was the fear of James I and the narrow clique of his supporters that the economic and social system which maintained them was threatened, their belief that their only defence against their own people was the help of a foreign reactionary power. But Gondomar also pursued a policy, adopted with monotonous exactness by Hitler in the nineteenth-thirties and by the U.S. Government and its stooges today, of smearing all patriotic Englishmen who opposed Spanish domination as dangerous rebels and "reds." Substitute "Communists" for "Puritans" in the following analysis by the very shrewd Venetian Ambassador in London, and the modern parallel is clear :

"The [Spanish] ambassador has reduced his Majesty out of mere suspicion, by making him consider as Puritans those who do not depend upon him [i.e., Gondomar], or even without this merely to do him pleasure, to deprive various persons of their charges and of his favour, although he really loved them . . . This happened to the Secretary Naunton, a minister of singular integrity. . . . Upon this ruin he [Gondomar] built his own designs, and in place of the fallen raised persons not so rigorous against the Catholics, indifferent though about the Church, but very jealous for his party. Thus the principal charges of the government, council, army, treasury, admiralty, ports, in fact everything, have fallen into the hands of his dependents, who have rendered him great service even against the royal intentions. . . .

"It would be better . . . if matters were not guided by those who think more of their passions, private interests, and pleasing the Spaniards than of His Majesty . . . This people have been smitten to the heart about their religion, being troubled . . . by the peril of their nation. . . . Yet though they were touched on the raw in so many ways, apparently they have not dared to do anything worse than speak, and the futility of it all even bridled that. But it is clear that if one hears of no disturbances, this is not because they lack the will, as they would flare up like straw the moment the slightest fire was applied."

It will be observed that the Venetian Ambassador, whilst noting the familiar frustrating and disillusioning effect of a policy of subservience to a foreign power, speaks like Gondomar of the possibility of a day of reckoning. This is a moral story, and it has a happy ending. The day of reckoning came soon. Or rather there were two days of reckoning. The first came in 1624, when James was again forced to call Parliament, and by sheer financial need had to

agree not only to abandon the Spanish alliance but to submit to parliamentary control of the money they voted him on condition of a change in foreign policy. (Refusal of taxation was for the bourgeoisie in opposition what a general strike is for the working class, a means of enforcing its will upon the ruling class). But 1624 was a temporary victory. The conflict was renewed in successive Parliaments under James's son, Charles I, and for 11 years Charles ruled without Parliament at all, during which period England sank to a third-class power, of no importance in the affairs of Europe. Pirates raided our coasts with impunity.

The final reckoning came in 1640, when Charles had to summon the Long Parliament. This deprived him of sole control of foreign policy and the executive, forced him to agree to accept Ministers trusted by Parliament, fought a civil war to prevent the King double-crossing them, and finally—when Charles proved incorrigible—cut off his head to make the point clear to his successors. From the revolution of 1640-1649 dates parliamentary control of the central government and a new independence of English foreign policy, proclaimed by the Navigation Act of 1651.

Mention of the Navigation Act reminds us of the limitations imposed on the struggle for national independence in the seventeenth century by the fact that it was carried on under *bourgeois* leadership. In the seventeenth century there was as yet no developed working class. The fight against the feudal-absolutist monarchy and its international Catholic allies led to the establishment first of a bourgeois republic (1649), then of a bourgeois monarchy (1660 and 1688). For the bourgeoisie "national independence" meant primarily the right to win markets for English merchants. The Navigation Act was followed by one war against Holland and another war to break down the Spanish monopoly of trade with the New World. Thus the class roots of the bourgeoisie's opposition to Spain were revealed; the coming to power of the bourgeoisie in England led to war with the other bourgeois republic which had hitherto been regarded as an ally.

These limitations do not apply to our struggle for national independence today, since this struggle must be led by the progressive class of today, the working class; and the working class has no motive for foreign aggression. For this reason, a real Socialist government in England could have no reason for hostility towards the existing Socialist State, the U.S.S.R. Bourgeois England at once attacked bourgeois Holland in the seventeenth century: a really Socialist government in England today could establish the same friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. as Czechoslovakia has established.

Nevertheless, allowing for the differences between the struggle led by the English bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century for national independence and our struggle today, the similarities are striking. Subservience to Spain was the last hope of the doomed monarchy and the feudal ruling clique in the seventeenth century England, just as licking Mr. Truman's boots is the only hope of reaction in England today. In opposing this policy the bourgeoisie led a struggle of the whole *nation*, just as the working class can today. Gondomar wrote contemptuously that "this wretched people" were "without union among themselves" and without leadership: 20 years later a great leader, Oliver Cromwell, proclaimed that unity of the progressive forces was the one essential. "Combination carries strength with it," he wrote to his constituents. "It's dreadful to adversaries." The New Model Army, which won the war against Charles I, was based on the widest possible unity in action.

The bourgeois revolutionaries were led by an exalted dream of patriotism. They wanted a new, free England. "Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation arousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks" so wrote Milton in 1644. They obtained some but not all of what they hoped and fought for, because the bourgeois mode of production placed necessary limitations on the amount of national and individual freedom that could then be secured. Feudalism could be overthrown, national independence established; but it was independence for a *bourgeois* nation, and brought with it as necessary consequences capitalist exploitation at home, subjection of other nations and war abroad. The battle for a free England had still to be won. This is what the great Socialist poet, William Morris, was thinking about when he reflected :

"how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name."

Today we are more fortunate. National independence can be won only by ending capitalist exploitation. Patriotism and internationalism are no longer opposites, for patriotism in Britain today demands the reversal of the policy of subservience to American imperialism and a break with the instigators of a new war. "Under another name" this is what Milton fought for : today there is a chance that we may make England what Milton and Morris dreamed she might be.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS' PRESENT TASKS

MAO TSE-TUNG

(From a speech on "the present situation and our tasks" at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on December 25, 1947.)

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR waged by the Chinese people has now reached the turning point. This means that the Chinese People's Liberation Army has beaten back the offensive of the seven million strong reactionary army of the Kuomintang watchdog of the United States, and has itself passed over to the offensive.

During the first year of the war, from July, 1946, to June, 1947, inclusive, the People's Liberation Army repulsed Chiang Kai-shek's offensive in several sectors of the front and forced him to the defensive. In the first quarter of the second year of the war—from July to September, 1947—the People's Liberation Army launched a nationwide offensive, and frustrated the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary plans extending the flames of war to the liberated districts for the purpose of completely crushing them.

The war is now already being waged chiefly in territory controlled by the Kuomintang and not in the liberated districts: the main forces of the People's Liberation Army have fought their way through to Kuomintang-controlled territory.

The People's Liberation Army firmly advances along the road to victory. This is a decisive turn toward victory, a departure from the road of destruction which the country has trod for over twenty years of counter-revolutionary Kuomintang domination. This is the end of the extermination which our people have suffered in the course of more than a century of imperialist rule in China.

This is a great event, because it is taking place in a country with a population of 450 million. And since it has already begun, it will inevitably go on to victory on a national scale. This event is all the greater in that it has taken place in the East, in the continent inhabited by over 1,000 million people. One-half of humanity is suffering under the imperialist yoke. We must defeat the Kuomintang because the war it has started is a counter-revolutionary war directed by American imperialism against the independence of the Chinese State and the freedom of the Chinese people.

After the Second World War and the overthrow of Japanese imperialism, the goal of the Chinese people was to attain democratic,

political, economic and cultural reforms, to attain the unity and independence of the country and to convert it from an agrarian into an industrial State.

The Kuomintang reactionaries launched their offensive in the belief that they would need only three to six months to defeat the People's Liberation Army. They believed that they had a two million strong regular army, over one million irregulars, over one million rear militia and the personnel of rear establishments—over four million men in all—and that these forces would soon be completely ready for the offensive. The Kuomintang had large cities at its disposal, over 300 million population; it had captured all the armaments of the one million strong Japanese army which had occupied China. It also received enormous military and financial assistance from the United States Government. And moreover it believed that the strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army had already fizzled out as a result of the tense eight-year war against the Japanese, and that this army was much weaker than the Kuomintang Army in regard to its numbers and armaments.

The Chinese-liberated districts had only something more than one hundred million population, the reactionary feudal forces in the rear were not yet destroyed, the land reform was not yet completed, the rear of the People's Liberation Army was not yet consolidated.

In view of all this, Chiang Kai-shek's group ignored the Chinese people's peaceful aspirations, tore up the agreement signed by the Communists and the Kuomintang in January, 1946, violated the decision of the Political Consultative Council composed of representatives of various political parties and groups, and launched an adventurous offensive against the People's Liberation Army.

The war being waged by the People's Liberation Army is a patriotic, just, and revolutionary war, which must inevitably enjoy the support of the entire nation. This is the political foundation of victory. The experience of the past eighteen months has fully confirmed this.

Within seventeen months of the struggle, from July, 1946, to November, 1947, we smashed up Chiang Kai-shek's regular and irregular forces with a total strength of 1,690,000, of whom 640,000 were killed or wounded and 1,050,000 taken prisoner. Our troops repeatedly repulsed Chiang Kai-shek's offensives, preserved their main positions in the liberated districts and passed over to the offensive.

From the military point of view the victories scored by the People's Liberation Army were due to the correct strategy worked out by the People's Liberation Army in the course of the protracted war against the internal and external enemies of the Chinese people. The

American militarists offer Chiang-Kai-shek strategy and tactics for destroying the People's Liberation Army, and with this end in view are training Kuomintang troops and supplying them with war equipment. Nevertheless, all these efforts cannot save the Kuomintang Army from defeat. This is due to the fact that our strategy and tactics are based on the principle of the people's war, and that no anti-popular army can use our strategy and tactics.

The efficient organisation of revolutionary political work within the People's Liberation Army, based on the principle of the people's war and aimed at achieving solidarity of officers and men and at disintegrating the enemy ranks, forms an important factor of our victory over the enemy. We have abandoned many towns on our own initiative, and thus misled the enemy, who regarded this as his victory and our defeat. The so-called successes of this offensive turn his head. The day after the occupation of Kalgan, Chiang-Kai-shek ordered the convocation of his reactionary National Assembly, believing that henceforward his reactionary rule would be as firm as a high mountain. The American imperialists also rejoiced in the belief that henceforward their base plans for converting China into an American colony could be carried out without hindrance. As time went by, however, the Kuomintang and its American bosses started to sing another tune. Now, all the internal and external enemies are in the grip of pessimism. They sigh deeply, and loudly complain of their crisis. No trace of their joy is left.

In the eighteen months the majority of the higher field commanders in Chiang Kai-shek's army have been dismissed or replaced because of defeats they sustained. They over-estimated their own forces and under-estimated the forces of the revolution when they started their war gamble. Thus they fell into a trap which they themselves had set. The strategical calculations of our enemies have utterly collapsed.

The allies of the People's Liberation Army in the rear are now united more closely than they were eighteen months ago. This is the result of the firm alliance between our Party and the peasantry for carrying out the land reform. Our policy is to rely upon the poor peasantry and maintain a stable alliance with the middle peasantry, in order to abolish the system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation created by the landlords and rich peasants of the old type, whose land and properties are to be divided among the masses of the peasants. While the landlords and the rich peasants constitute only about 8 per cent of the families registered in the Chinese countryside, they own from 70 to 80 per cent of all the land. Thus the land reform is aimed against a small group of the population, while the number of people who can and must take part in carrying out the land reform proposed

by the United Front amounts to more than 90 per cent of the rural population.

Within 11 years, from 1937 to 1947, the membership of the Party has grown from several scores of thousands to 2,700,000. This is a great success, which has rendered the Party unprecedentedly strong. This enabled us to crush the Japanese imperialists, repulse the Kuomintang offensive and supply leadership to liberated districts with a population of over 100 million and the People's Liberation Army of 2 million.

The economic platform of the new democratic revolution in China sets us three tasks: confiscation of land owned by the feudal classes and its distribution among the peasants, confiscation of monopoly capital headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu and its transfer to the control of the new democratic State, and protection of national industry and trade. In the twenty years of their power the four families—those of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu—have accumulated enormous capital aggregating from 10,000 to 20,000 million American dollars, and monopolised the country's economic life. This monopoly capital merged with the Government and became State monopoly capital, closely connected with foreign imperialism, while the national landlord class and the rich peasants of the old type turned into compradores and feudal capitalists.

This is the economic foundation of the Kuomintang's reactionary regime. This State monopoly capitalism oppresses not only the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie, but also the middle bourgeoisie. The development of State monopoly capitalism reached its peak during the war against Japan and after Japan's surrender. It prepared all the material conditions for the new democratic revolution.

There must be no return to the "ultra-Left" erroneous policy in regard to the petty and middle bourgeoisie which the Chinese Communist Party conducted between 1931 and 1934. The basic programme of the land reform in China contains a provision to the effect that "the property and lawful activities of industrialists and merchants should be protected from interference." The expression "industrialists and merchants" refers to all individual petty and middle industrialists and merchants.

Since the Kuomintang sold the national interest to American imperialism and started the nationwide anti-popular domestic war, and since the crimes of the American imperialists and reactionary ruling Kuomintang bloc were fully exposed to the Chinese people, the National United Front in China has really expanded. Our new

democratic revolutionary United Front is now broader and more united than ever. This is due not only to our agrarian policy and the policy towards the urban population, but to a greater extent to the general political situation marked by the victories of the People's Liberation Army, the Kuomintang's change from the offensive to the defensive, the People's Liberation Army's change from the defensive to the offensive and the beginning of the new period of rise of the Chinese revolution. The people now see that the collapse of the Kuomintang rule is inevitable, and therefore they have placed their hopes on the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army.

This is natural. The victory of the new democratic revolution in China is impossible without a broad united front embracing the overwhelming majority of the population of the country.

But this is not enough. This United Front must also be firmly guided by the Chinese Communist Party. The revolutionary United Front cannot achieve victory without the firm guidance of the Chinese Communist Party.

In 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary bloc started the nationwide domestic war, it ventured upon this gamble not only because it relied on its own armed forces, but chiefly because it relied on American imperialism, which in its opinion was an extremely powerful and irresistible force in possession of the atomic bomb. Is American imperialism after the Second World War, however, really so powerful as imagined by Chiang Kai-shek and the reactionaries in various countries. Can Kai-shek and the reactionaries in various countries really reckon on constant aid from America? By no means. The economic might of American imperialism, which grew during the Second World War, has been confronted with an unstable and constantly contracting domestic and foreign market. Further contraction of this market will result in economic crisis.

America's wartime prosperity was but transitional, apparent and temporary. American imperialism is daily threatened by a crisis like the eruption of a volcano. The American imperialists are literally sitting on this volcano. This situation has compelled the American imperialists to work out a plan for enslaving the world, invading Europe, Asia and other continents, uniting the reactionary forces in various countries into an imperialist anti-democratic front against all democratic forces headed by the Soviet Union, and preparing a third world war. Such is their plan on a world scale.

The democratic forces of the world must thwart this plan. The forces of the anti-imperialist camp are superior to those of the imperialist camp. All the anti-imperialist forces in the various

countries of the Orient must unite to come out against imperialism and the reactionaries in their countries, and set themselves the goal of liberating the more than 1,000 million people of the oppressed Oriental countries.

We must take our destinies into our own hands. We must purge our ranks of all backward and vacillating elements. Every opinion over-estimating the enemy's forces and under-estimating those of the people is erroneous. Along with the democratic forces of the world we only need to exert efforts, and we shall without doubt be able to defeat the imperialist plans for enslavement, to prevent the outbreak of a third world war, in order to rid ourselves of the oppression of the reactionaries and to ensure the triumph of eternal peace to humanity.

INTELLIGENCE TESTS IN SCHOOLS

MARY FLANDERS

IN THE PREVIOUS ARTICLE on Mental Testing, it was suggested that despite the inadequacies and limitations of current tests, they have some value in present day society. It is proposed in this article to deal in more detail with the use of intelligence tests in one of the various fields mentioned—the field in which they probably have the widest use—the schools.

Although research on some of the theoretical problems to which intelligence testing gives rise is still incomplete, the use of tests in schools at present can be judged empirically—that is, how they work out in practice. Do they give the teacher additional information about the children? Can they predict future success? How do they compare with other methods of assessment which the teacher uses.

Our judgment must be based on the actual facts and available evidence on the use of tests, and not on pre-conceived notions and general impressions. The merits of tests must be considered in relation to the purpose for which they are used.

We need to know something of the general ability of the school child. By this, teachers mean an all-round level of attainment and potential learning capacity of the pupil—what he can do now and what he can be expected to do in the future.

It is an inescapable fact that there are individual differences in this general ability, which need to be taken into account in deciding on the right kind of education for each child. Equality of opportunity does not mean uniformity of education—in fact, we can only get equality if each child is free to develop his own maximum potentialities in an educational environment suited to his needs. Some grading, or

classification, of pupils will be found to be necessary, in most schools.

At present, pupils are usually classified on the basis of teachers' estimates of their ability, on their school progress and examination results, by intelligence tests, or by a combination of two or three of these methods.

All the available evidence indicates that teachers are far less consistent in their estimates of intelligence than tests. The same teacher will give the same individual different ratings at different times and different teachers will differ significantly about the same individual at the same time. For example, McClelland carried out the following experiment: All the children aged 12 in a Scottish city (the actual number was 3,229) who were ready for transfer from primary to secondary schools, were given, besides an ordinary examination in English and Arithmetic and standardised scholastic tests, group intelligence tests. Part of the group took the whole examination twice, doing an alternative, equivalent form of the intelligence tests the second time. The amount of agreement between the results of the first test and those of the second was measured. The teachers were asked to give an estimate of the ability of each child who entered for the examination, and, for the group who took it twice, the amount of agreement between the first set of teachers' estimates and the second set was measured.

McClelland found that (1) teachers' estimates do not discriminate as well as tests; their mean variability is less; i.e., they tend to underestimate good pupils and overestimate weak ones; (2) individual teachers' estimates of the same children vary considerably; (3) standards vary considerably from school to school and a teacher's estimate must be considered in relation to the school he comes from. This is very important when teachers' estimates are being used for any kind of selection for different schools, as they have been used in the past in the scholarship examination. The intelligence tests should be standardised on a representative sample of children and so give a better comparison of a child's ability with that of others of his own age, independently of standards in a particular school or class.

This result has been confirmed by other investigators. Burt, for example, in a thorough experiment on this, found that the consistency (that is, the extent to which re-test or re-estimate would agree with the original) of two intelligence tests—the Stanford-Binet and the Northumberland—was higher than that of teachers' estimates of intelligence.

The advantage of the best well-standardised intelligence tests is that their consistency is known. Most of the well-known group intelligence tests, such as the Otis, have a consistency of about .9. This means

that the chances of a set of results being the same again for the same children are about 90 per cent. The Binet test (the New Revision) has a consistency from .98 to .90, depending on the I.Q. range, and the probable error of a Binet I.Q. is from 1.5 to 4.5 I.Q. points. This means that we can tell just what are the chances of an intelligence test result being a reliable estimate of the child's ability. We cannot say this of a teacher's estimate.

This evidence on the greater inconsistency of teachers' estimates does not mean that they have no use at all. McClelland used a special scaling method to make estimates of teachers from different schools comparable and increased their consistency in this way.

It must be noted as well that these conclusions apply to teachers' estimates of *intelligence* only. Burt found that in assessing ability in the 3 Rs and qualities such as industry, with which teachers are familiar, the consistency of teachers' estimates was quite as good as that of tests of the subjects or qualities. For character qualities, it was better than that of any tests at present available and also than the result of a single psychologist's interview.

The main objection to judging ability by school progress is that there is often a discrepancy between capacity and output. A child may not be doing his best; he may not be using all his ability. He may be backward but is not necessarily lacking in intelligence. His backwardness may be caused by many other factors, such as absence from school or psychological maladjustment, which means that his energy is being used up in emotional problems instead of being applied to school work. A large proportion of children referred to child guidance clinics are found to have educational attainments well below their capacity. Burt found that for 40 per cent of backward children, the causes were other than lack of ability. Thus a teacher going by school achievement alone may make mistakes in a considerable number of cases.

But are not tests open to the same objections? Undoubtedly this is true to some extent, especially of the verbal group intelligence tests, which require a minimum reading ability.

The tests, however, have two advantages. First, they are relatively independent of educational attainment. They are designed to test ability as far as possible apart from what the child knows. Some succeed better than others. We cannot maintain at present that they test innate ability, but when used with children of fairly similar background, they do distinguish individual differences in capacity.

Second, they require co-operation and effort for a short time only. Thus, the unstable or emotionally disturbed child may be able to put his full effort into a short test, while he fails to exert the continual effort needed for success in school. Tests are often novel and inter-

esting to the children and succeed in enlisting their enthusiasm, provided the right attitude is induced by the tester. Of course, this argument cuts both ways. A nervous child may do better in day-to-day work than in a test. This is why a test result below expectation for a particular child must always be suspect. Tests, however, often reveal greater ability than had previously been suspected.

This discrepancy which sometimes arises between ability and achievement is of the greatest educational importance, especially in the diagnosis of scholastic backwardness. In any group of backward children, some will be backward because of limited ability (Burt puts this proportion at about 60 per cent) and some will be backward for other reasons. It is most important to distinguish which is which, as the treatment will obviously depend on the causes. Intelligence tests may thus be very valuable in indicating cases where backwardness is due to environmental or temperamental factors.

If such discrepancies arise, however, can intelligence tests be used in predicting school success? Are they helpful in telling us what a child's future performance is likely to be?

Harris, on results of nine investigations (of the kind carried out by McClelland) found that the average agreement between intelligence test results and school work was about 60-70 per cent. Holzinger found a similar agreement between his tests and school success. Ames reports that investigations published in America show an average agreement of 40-60 per cent between test results and school performance.

These results point to the conclusion that in capitalist society, at any rate, important factors other than intelligence are involved in school success. Alexander's study showed that temperamental or interest factors were at least as important as intelligence. This would account for the cases we have already mentioned of discrepancy between ability and achievement.

On the whole, all investigations show that present scholastic achievement is the best *single* criterion of future scholastic achievement, at least as far as older children and students are concerned, though not necessarily with younger children. And one cannot therefore put forward intelligence tests, in their present form, as a *single* better method of predicting success or selecting children.

But that does not mean that intelligence tests have no uses.

McClelland, whose investigation on selection for secondary schools in a Scottish city I have already mentioned, compared the comparative predictive value of (a) ordinary examinations; (b) teachers' estimates; (c) group intelligence tests; (d) standardised scholastic tests. He found that no single method was reliable in predicting success in the secondary school, but that a battery of intelligence test plus examination, plus teacher's estimate, was the most predictive.

From the evidence at present available, we may conclude that:

(1) intelligence tests are a highly consistent method of assessing ability, their consistency being greater than that of teachers' estimates, but that—

(2) they should not be used as the *sole* measure of future school success. For this purpose, a combination of intelligence test, examination, or attainment test and teacher's estimate is best.

(3) Intelligence tests are therefore valuable in increasing the efficiency of grading within the school, and also in dealing with scholastic backwardness as they throw useful light on cases where there is a discrepancy between ability and achievement.

Great care must however be taken in the selection and use of tests. It is very important that only well-devised and well-standardised tests should be used and that they should be administered by people with adequate training who will be able to interpret the results correctly.

Test results should be used with discretion. They should be taken as useful indications of ability in conjunction with other factors, but must never be taken as hard and fast scores. They can discriminate among children fairly adequately but not with the precision that enables one to quote an "Intelligence Quotient" as something exact and unalterable. Above all, one must be awake to the discrepancies which may arise, especially with group testing, and individual cases of doubt or difficulty should always, if possible, be referred for individual testing.

This is usually considered more satisfactory than group testing, as care can be taken to establish adequate contact with the subject, and the influence of disturbing factors can be assessed by the psychologist. Individual testing is essential for children under seven and for certain types of test, but in the schools at present most testing will need to be done in groups.

Any classification of children based on intelligence test results must never be rigid; there must always be easy transfer between groups. The available evidence on the constancy of intelligence quotients shows that we must never give a child a fixed I.Q., which determines his opportunities for the rest of his life. It is always advisable to give more than one test to each child—to test at regular intervals, using different types of test (e.g., verbal and non-verbal), rather than giving only one test in a child's school career. The results can then be compared and confirmed.

A great deal more research on this subject is needed. But there is at present sufficient evidence to indicate that, used properly, intelligence tests have an important use in present-day schools.

A NOTE ON A. N. WHITEHEAD

M. C

THERE RECENTLY DIED Alfred North Whitehead, at the age of 85, thought by some to have been the greatest philosopher of our times. For the last 23 years of his life he lived in the U.S.A., where he was Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. He was the son of an English clergyman, received a classical education, became a distinguished mathematician, was fellow and lecturer in mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge, and was later appointed Professor of Applied Mathematics at Imperial College, London. He did not begin writing his philosophical "system" until past the age of sixty.

As a mathematician, Whitehead was keenly interested in the question of the philosophical foundations of mathematics, and collaborated with Bertrand Russell in the production of the monumental *Principia Mathematica*, published in 1910. The aim of this work was to deduce mathematics from logic. The idea was that all mathematical entities, beginning with the cardinal numbers, could be defined in terms of certain "primitive ideas" taken as intuitively self-evident, and that their properties could then be deduced from the axioms of formal logic.

Principia Mathematica thus presented mathematics as a pure deductive system. In Whitehead's words, mathematics "deals with properties and ideas which are applicable to things just because they are things," and the whole of mathematics could be worked out from first principles, without any reference to experience.

Recent criticism has cast considerable doubt on the definitions and deductions of *Principia Mathematica*. The attempt to deduce mathematics from logic was, in fact, a failure. And in this respect, criticism has borne out the very different account of mathematics given by Engels, who wrote: "It is not at all true that in pure mathematics the mind deals only with its own creations. The concepts of number and form have not been derived from any source other than the world of reality. . . . We are obliged to import (into mathematics) real relations, relations and space forms which are taken from real bodies."

Later, in *Principles of Natural Knowledge* (1919) and *Concept of Nature* (1920), Whitehead went on to apply the deductive method of *Principia Mathematica* to the task of working out the ultimate space-time structure of the universe. In these books he picked a quarrel with Einstein's general theory of relativity, which had postulated a curved space: Whitehead thought he could prove that space was necessarily Euclidean in structure.

As against Whitehead's view, developments have once again borne out what Engels said, i.e., that space and time are to be regarded as the basic forms of matter, and that geometrical conceptions are ways of describing the real relations of bodies and not of registering eternal

and necessary truths about such abstract constructions as points, lines, planes, and so on.

The habit of metaphysical construction which Whitehead developed in these mathematical works was given full scope between 1924 and 1930, when he published a complete philosophical "system," sketched in his *Science and the Modern World* and *Adventures in Ideas* and summed up in *Process and Reality*.

In these works of his old age Whitehead conceived of the whole universe as an eternal process of what he called "creative advance," in which everything was in transition and everything was related to everything else. But, unfortunately, his method, carried over from his earlier work, was to try to fit the whole "creative advance" of nature into an abstract metaphysical scheme, in which were specified the ultimate units of which the universe was constructed.

These metaphysical ultimates he called "actual occasions"—though exactly what such an "actual occasion" was supposed to be like was left obscure to the reader. He wrote down a most elaborate theory of the way in which the "actual occasions" were "organically" related to constitute the total cosmic process.

Amongst other things, Whitehead proclaimed that every "occasion" was "experienced" and constituted an "enjoyment." In this way he claimed to have solved the problem of the relationship of matter and mind—by announcing that every material event without exception had necessarily a "mental" side.

Whitehead's most fervent admirers have had to admit the extreme difficulty of reading his books. In this respect, his books were in no sense directed to the majority of people, but, like most contemporary philosophy, to a narrow circle of "professionals." That within these limits his standpoint was in many ways progressive (in comparison, at least, with that of most of his professional colleagues) cannot be doubted. At the same time, we may well doubt whether his "system" has added anything of permanent value to the storehouse of philosophical thought, and whether it will be remembered in later years as anything other than a curiosity.

From the Marxist point of view, we may praise Whitehead's recognition of the need to study things in their changes and interconnections. But we cannot but regard his metaphysics as constituting a living proof of the futility of any philosophy which sets out to formulate ultimate truth in the shape of a philosophical "system of nature." To quote Engels again, such a philosophy is "not only superfluous, but a step backwards."

COMMUNIST REVIEW

MARCH
1947

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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We regret that publication has been delayed by the fuel situation. We hope that the April number will be out at the usual date.

TOWARDS A PEOPLE'S PLAN

J. R. CAMPBELL

SINCE THE Labour Government assumed office we have now been told from innumerable platforms that Great Britain is pursuing a "middle way" between the completely planned economy of the Soviet Union and the laissez faire economy of the United States.

The Government White Papers recently issued enable us to form some judgment of how the policy of the middle way is being applied. It cannot be said that they give justification for optimism much less enthusiasm.

Shortage of labour in the coal, foundry, and building materials industries is holding up the progress of the entire economy and creating unemployment in the midst of a pent-up demand for goods. The vital consumers industries are starved of labour and the end of consumers rationing is not yet in sight.

The essence of the Government's economic policy we are told is the nationalisation and the intensive reorganisation of the key industries of coal and power, transport and steel. The high efficiency of those industries under nationalisation will, it is argued, provide a stimulus to the whole industrial system. The State in possession of those industries, and in control of credit, investment and raw materials would be in possession of the necessary control levers to control the capitalists in the private sector to conform to its purposes.

By July, the Labour Government will have been in office two years and only one of those key industries—coal—will be operating under national ownership. For 18 months there has been an interregnum in this industry, where managements have been sitting back and refraining from carrying out much needed measures of re-equipment. Even now when the Coal Board has taken over, re-equipment for reasons which we will deal with later is likely to be very slow indeed unless vigorous emergency measures are taken.

Yet the Coal Board is fortunate. It has at its disposal the Reid Report—a comprehensive survey of the industry with concrete suggestions for reorganisation. Take, however, the Transport Board. It will come into operation early in 1948. It will not have at its disposal any plan for reorganising transport, and there will be great temptation to delay decisions on reorganisation until a survey of the industry has been made. The same considerations apply with greater force to electricity and to steel.

One of the most extraordinary features of the whole situation is the Government's attitude to the engineering industry. It pays lip-service to the need for the reorganisation of the mining, electricity, transport and steel industries, and yet takes no steps to control the engineering industry and ensure that the necessary capacity would be devoted to the manufacture of the equipment, which those vital industries require. Thus the Coal Board might have the best re-equipment plan in the world, but the mining machinery firms in Great Britain are simply not capable of supplying the needed equipment in a reasonable period of time.

Indeed, so low is the production of mining machinery, that the Government does not list it under a separate category in its monthly Digest of Statistics.

With regard to textile machinery production, the Digest shows that it has now reached the level of some £8,000,000 per annum, half of which is being exported.

Even if we were able to contemplate a certain cut in exports, it is clear that this industry is quite incapable of supplying the necessary machinery in time.

What kind of planning is it, which talks loudly about the need for re-equipping our industries, and does not take steps to ensure that the machinery necessary for this purpose will in fact be produced?

In a number of recent speeches, Mr. Morrison has described with love and affection the so-called planning machinery which is now in operation. There is a Central Planning Committee consisting of the heads of the chief economic departments, the Central Statistical Office, the Economic Section of the Cabinet Secretariat and the office of the Lord President of the Council. As far as can be seen, this Central Planning Committee is really a co-ordinating committee, harmonising the sectional plans of Government departments, and not a body which has either the time, the power or the personnel, to survey the workings of the economic system and to formulate plans for guiding it in the requisite directions.

Mr. Chris Mayhew, M.P., who was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Mr. Herbert Morrison, and who therefore saw something of the workings of this machine, has described the working of this machine in relation to investment policy.

"The procedure used by the Labour Government for framing its Investment plan is not unlike that used for the Man-Power plan. Government departments are asked to supply the Central Planning Committee with the investment programmes for a future year covering those sectors of the economy for which they are responsible. For

example, the Ministry of Fuel and Power might put in a £30 million programme for the coal industry, the Ministry of Health £300 millions for housing, and the Board of Trade £20 millions for the textile industry. These programmes cover not only new capital expenditure required—e.g., new machines and buildings—but also the repairs and renewal of old capital. The total demand might come to £2,000 million at current rates.

"All these programmes are received and put together by the Investment Sub-Committee of the Central Planning machine, which then has an overall picture of intended capital expenditure" (*Socialist Economic Planning*, Fabian Society).

The planners, according to Mr. Mayhew, then decide what the total investment should be in the light of prevailing circumstances

"Once the total investment figure is agreed, sectional programmes are scaled up or down, according to estimates of productivity and the importance of a particular programme, until this level of productivity is achieved."

This is surely the picture of a Government "more planned against than planning." What does this machine really do? It takes steps to see that a balance is kept between the amount of resources devoted to the production of consumers' goods and the amount devoted to investment. It then arbitrates between the demands of the various industries, cutting their investment programme down here, and suggesting that they should extend it elsewhere. In short, the investment plan is really made by the capitalists who inform the appropriate Ministry what their intentions are. The Government planning machine then works to ensure that the total amount of investment outlay is not too great and that each industry gets a fair share of whatever re-equipment is available. In short, the planning appears to consist of an attempt to reconcile sectional capitalist plans and not an attempt to get industry to conform to a plan which is worked out by the Government. No wonder that machinery is now being produced for the chocolate industry in advance of the mining and textile industries.

No doubt this method of control is, in the aftermath of the war, preferable to a free for all scramble and wild cat speculation. It will prevent many harmful things being done. But it does not guarantee that the necessary good things are done on time.

A feature of this type of planning is that it takes place on top and in secret. Nobody but the Government and perhaps the big indus-

trialists can see the picture as a whole. The British people are not let in on this "top secret."

If planning is to be effective it must be brought into the open.

We need much more than a small planning committee of harassed heads of Government departments, maid of all work politicians, assisted by some overworked economists.

The time has now come to set up a real planning commission composed of trade unionists and technical experts, as well as civil servants and industrialists. This commission must have sub-commissions of men and women with industrial experience in each of the main branches of industry.

It should have clearly defined links with the trade union movement, the employers' associations, the Regional Boards, as well as the Joint Production Committees in the larger factories. It must enlist the advice and part-time help of men who have personal knowledge of the problems of particular localities and industrial factories of importance. It should naturally concern itself not only with drawing up general plans, but with their supervision and implementation.

This commission could be built around the existing Central Planning Committee, which will have to carry on with such planning as is possible while the full planning organisation is being developed. In short, we need an interim plan while the long-term plan is being elaborated.

One of the first things that should be made clear in an interim plan is the production targets for the major industries.

The Government's second White Paper, which I examined in the *Daily Worker* of February 22, is quite inadequate as a plan. It cannot help to make either workers or managements aware of what production targets they should aim to reach.

If there is going to be a real production drive, the workers must know what their particular industry and particular factory is supposed to do, and joint production machinery must be set up in order to drive for the achievement of the individual factory and industrial targets.

Further, the Government must be prepared in the last analysis to impose a wage policy which ensures that labour goes to where it is most needed. Fractious and obstructive opposition to such a policy of differential wages and conditions must be overcome.

There are three ways of allocating labour. There is the familiar Tory way of creating an unemployed army so that workers prodded by hunger will go even to the so-called unattractive industries. There is direction of labour, which interferes with the freedom of the

worker to choose his job, which the T.U.C. has rightly objected to, and there is the method of inducing labour to go where it is most needed by methods of inducement on which the T.U.C. has not yet made up its mind.

Obviously, if one rejects the first two methods, only the third remains, and the Government is simply undermining itself and making nonsense of the whole idea of planning, and imperilling the country if it refuses to apply it.

Next, the Government must make up its mind to have a re-equipment policy in which it lays down the industries which are to receive prior consideration and organises the engineering industry in order to ensure that they get it. It is better to ensure that a really efficient job is done in priority industries than to get little bits of re-equipment done haphazard throughout the entire system while no really outstanding piece of re-organisation takes place anywhere.

This, of course, means that the engineering industry must be brought within a really effective system of State control. To refrain from doing so is not only to make a mockery of all the talk of re-organisation, but to invite disaster. Everyone knows that there is scope for the development of light engineering for the production of durable consumer goods. There is every reason to believe, however, that an unconscionable number of firms is engaged on this type of production without consideration of the present situation of the country or even the future prospects of this industry, and some of them are settling in the depressed areas. The result is that labour is being wasted now without good prospects of employment being created for the future. Clearly engineering capacity must be allocated on the basis of first things first.

Beginning with the engineering industry and the industries which are scheduled for priority in re-organisation, the Government must establish an inspection and progress staff for all key industries (analogous to the staffs employed by supply departments on munitions production during the war).

The services of such staffs should be made available to joint production committees as well as managements for seeing that help is provided for overcoming bottlenecks threatening production, technical difficulties, placing of sub-contracts, etc.

The aims of the interim plan can only be achieved if the managements of industrial undertakings exert themselves to this end. The labour movement must adopt the standpoint that it is the clear responsibility of the Government to see that managements use their powers to further and not to sabotage its aims.

While the problems of management in the public and the private

sections of industry are different, the principle of full consultation between managements and workers must apply to both.

Joint committees should be given legal status and a legal right of full information on production plans, orders, costs, profits, etc.

It should not be the function of the unions to assume responsibility for managerial decisions, but it is their duty to expose the shortcomings of managements. For the Government must unhesitatingly deal with any directorial or managerial inefficiencies and sabotage when they are brought to light. At the same time, both the Government and the unions must make wholehearted efforts to obtain the co-operation of managers and technical experts who have a genuine contribution to make to the organisation of production.

These are the first steps in a genuine people's plan.

WALL STREET IMPERIALISM CHECKED

WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

THE MASSES of the American people are generous and democratic and they have a sense of solidarity with the war-devastated peoples. Consequently, when the war ended, they undoubtedly expected that the United States, undamaged by the war, would use its vast economic power and political prestige in a democratic spirit to help repair the devastation of the war. They took seriously the Rooseveltian anti-fascist slogans under which the war was fought, and they looked to this country to fulfill its responsibilities by taking a leading part in the creation of a progressive, prosperous and democratic world.

But Wall Street big business had quite different ideas and plans. It saw a golden opportunity for huge profits in the ravaged condition of other countries, and it set out to take full advantage of this situation by utilising America's great power to establish our imperialist control of the world. Hence, hardly had President Roosevelt died and the war been ended than these big business interests, using the Truman administration as their pliable tool, launched a blitzkrieg diplomatic offensive aimed at immediately making the United States, or more properly, its big trusts, the masters of the world. Specific objectives of the drive were to halt the world-wide drift of the peoples to the left, to beat down the rising wave of democracy in Europe, to smother the fires of revolt in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and especially to intimidate the Soviet Union and reduce it to a second-class power. American big business strove to create an all-powerful Anglo-American alliance (with the U.S. in full command) that would run the United Nations as Wall Street saw fit.

The Wall Street imperialists have made no little progress in their reactionary programme. They have a "standardised arms" agreement with Great Britain, and they have constructed an Anglo-American bloc of capitalist States that usually controls the majority in the United Nations. They have held on to air and naval bases far and wide which enable American bombers and warships to dominate the airways and oceans of the world. They have made Japan into a puppet of the United States. They have kept Franco in power, preserved a rotten royalist regime in Greece, protected Nazi business men in Germany, and strengthened every reactionary party in Europe. Together with the Vatican and the opportunist Social Democrats, they have made themselves objects of the fervent hopes of every fascist in the world.

Especially on the domestic scene, in the United States, the Wall Street imperialists have scored important victories. They have secured control of both Houses of Congress, bridled and saddled the Truman administration, defeated the miners in their national strike, launched an unparalleled orgy of profit-grabbing, plunged the United States into the deepest militarisation it has ever known in peace time, and filled the country with such a dense fog of sabre-rattling, Red-baiting and Soviet-hating as to confuse millions of our citizens on domestic and foreign questions.

Nevertheless, the drive of the American reactionaries for world control is far from having achieved the blitz success they had planned for it. This is because their imperialist campaign has met with such powerful resistance in various countries that it has been distinctly slowed down. It is too early to say yet that the world drive of American imperialism has been definitely defeated, but certainly its time schedule has been ruined and it is meeting with mounting difficulties on many fronts. The get-tough-with-Russia policy has proved a failure. The war-racked, post-war world is showing itself not to be the easy victim that Wall Street calculated on.

The imperialists based great hopes upon the war-scare which they launched immediately after V-J Day. Brandishing the atom bomb, conducting military manoeuvres in Canada and naval demonstrations in the Mediterranean, sending our bombers on spectacular world flights, adopting a gigantic peace-time military budget, filling the world with "screaming-eagle" speeches, they publicly threatened the U.S.S.R. with an immediate "defensive" war. The whole purpose of this outrageous jingoistic campaign was to frighten the Soviet Union and to force it to knuckle under to the demands of the Anglo-American delegates in the United Nations.

But, surprising the imperialists, the Russians sturdily stood their ground. It so developed that, if need be, they also could get tough. Not only that, but lots of Americans, as evidenced by Wallace's celebrated speech in Madison Square Garden, also did not like the get-tough-with-Russia policy, and said so plainly. Finally, Stalin dramatically deflated the whole fantastic war-scare by calmly declaring there was no imminent danger of war. This left the war-mongers with an exploded balloon in their hands, plus a most inconvenient, world-wide, Soviet-initiated demand for a radical reduction in armaments all round.

The imperialists have hardly fared any better with their aggressive loan policy than with their threats of war. Their original idea was that with their monopoly of financial credits they could compel the rest of the world to do their bidding. Whoever would not sign on the dotted line for the political and economic conditions Wall Street saw fit to impose would get no funds with which to rebuild their shattered economies. But this imperialist weapon also was not as effective as planned. The peoples of the world are not peddling off their birthright for Wall Street's mess of pottage.

Congress voted the British loan in the shamelessly-expressed hope that it would be the means of checking the spread of democracy, the nationalisation of industry and the growth of Communist Parties and Socialism in Europe. It was an unvarnished investment in Wall Street's "free enterprise." But obviously the loan has failed in its political purpose. Its hard terms have even considerably antagonised large sections of the British people, and it has distinctly not defeated European democracy and Socialism. The billion-dollar loan to France, brazenly solicited by Leon Blum as a weapon against spreading Communist sentiment in France, also did not achieve its purpose, as has been demonstrated by the powerful growth of the French Communist Party. Nor did the outright refusals and reductions in size of American loans to the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe succeed in forcing these countries to kowtow politically to the would-be world conquerors in Wall Street. This is not to say, of course, that American loans are not a potent weapon; but it does mean that these loans are not at all as decisive politically as the capitalists had hoped.

In a starving world, food, of course, can also be a powerful political weapon. The Wall Street imperialists figured that inasmuch as the United States controlled the world's greatest food reserves they could, with the schemes of such famine-juggling experts as Herbert Hoover, dictate economic and political terms to the war-devastated peoples.

Consequently, wide discrimination was made in the distribution of food by the American-controlled U.N.R.R.A. Naturally, this discrimination was directed against the militantly democratic peoples. The worst example was in the Communist-controlled areas of China. Although these regions contain some forty per cent of the Chinese people, they have received only 2½ per cent of the U.N.R.R.A. supplies sent to China. Despite such discrimination, however, the bulk of the hungry nations of the world have refused to trade their liberties for food.

The world today does not present a picture that brings joy to the hearts of Wall Street millionaires, who had planned to make themselves quickly into that world's masters. While in the United Nations the Anglo-American bloc is usually able to command a majority, it can by no means enforce its wishes at will. The smaller countries, the colonial lands, and especially the Soviet Union, display a most disconcerting spirit of independence. Indeed, in the matter of Spain and the Indians in South Africa, the American and British delegates to the United Nations found themselves voting in a minority. They even raised dismal complaints that the Soviet Union, which was to have been ruthlessly put in its place as a second-class power by an all-controlling Anglo-American bloc, now finds itself, instead, with greatly strengthened prestige. It stands out as the main leader of the world's democratic and oppressed peoples.

The status of the Anglo-American bloc itself is also by no means satisfactory to the Wall Street imperialists. Many of them had hoped for the immediate realisation of an aggressive anti-Soviet military alliance of Great Britain and the United States, carrying along most other capitalist countries, on the model proposed by Winston Churchill. Or, at least, they wanted a political arrangement whereby Great Britain would tamely go along as a "junior partner" of the United States and do the bidding of Wall Street.

But, certainly, as yet, neither of these things has happened. The majority of the British people evidently do not relish the prospect of becoming a satellite and catspaw of the United States, while Wall Street slowly picks the Empire to pieces. Large numbers of British, including a big section of the trade unions and the Labour Party, look with increasing disfavour upon Foreign Secretary Bevin's reactionary pro-American, anti-Russian policy and are bringing heavy pressure against it. They do not want another war. What they do want is to develop more co-operative relations with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, British business men, ignoring American demands for international "free enterprise," are moving energetically to protect Empire markets

against vigorous American competition. These Anglo-American contradictions and antagonisms naturally reduce the effectiveness of the two-power bloc as a means for imperialist world control.

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe is also highly unsatisfactory to the Wall Street imperialists. For all their economic and political pressure, they have been unable to prevent the growth of democracy in these vital areas. Vigorous Communist Parties exist in all the countries, and the peoples everywhere are determined to set up far more democratic regimes than existed before the war. Several of the countries are obviously marching on to Socialism.

A major objective of Anglo-American diplomacy in Eastern Europe was to re-erect a ring of hostile, reactionary states along the western borders of the U.S.S.R., a repetition of the infamous *cordon sanitaire* of pre-war times. The type of State the imperialists had in mind for this purpose is illustrated by the ultra-reactionary regime they are maintaining in Greece with their money and bayonets. And the long fight they made to impose the semi-fascist "London Government" on the Polish people was a sample of their determined struggle generally to prevent the growth of democracy in Eastern Europe. The failure to re-establish the *cordon sanitaire* was a real defeat for imperialism in general. The States on the borders of the U.S.S.R., consequently, instead of being a stronghold of fascism as they were before the war, are now, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic, a major fortress of world democracy and Socialism. Similar attempts to organise an anti-Soviet bloc of Western European States have also failed.

But it is when one turns to the colonial and semi-colonial lands that there are to be found conditions that strike fear into the hearts of the imperialists. The oppressed peoples of the Near, Middle and Far East are on the march to national liberation. India, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, Burma, Korea, Egypt, Palestine, Syria—are all surging with vigorous independence movements. The more than a billion people of these vast areas are gradually breaking the chains of imperialist-capitalist slavery, and the British, French, Dutch, Belgian and American imperialists are frantically trying to "save the pieces."

American policy in China especially has also been anything but successful. While with the help of U.S. soldiers and marines and \$4,000,000,000 worth of munitions and food it has succeeded in buttressing the rotten Chiang Kai-Shek government and reducing it to the status of American puppet state, it has by no means achieved its major objective of defeating the vast Yenan people's liberation movement.

In Latin-America, Wall Street imperialist policy is also encountering unexpected difficulties. The peoples south of the Rio Grande by no means form the docile bloc of votes in the United Nations calculated on by the Wall Street manipulators. Like other colonial and semi-colonial nations, the peoples of Latin-America are sharply feeling the world-wide upsurge of democracy following the victorious anti-Hitler war. And the Wall Street imperialists are dismayed at their growing spirit of independence.

Obviously, Wall Street imperialism has not achieved the blitzkrieg world victory that it counted upon winning in the immediate post-war period. It has not halted the world trend to the left, and its central slogan of "free enterprise" is discredited on a world scale. Its drive for American world control has been definitely slowed down by the resistance of the democratic peoples who, after defeating the Hitler slavers, refuse to put on the yoke of Wall Street. Despite the aggressive policies of Anglo-American imperialism there has even been considerable progress made in the United Nations towards the establishment of a compromise peace.

But it would be unwise to conclude from all this that the imperialist danger, with its dread implications of economic chaos, fascism and war, has passed. On the contrary, it is still full of malignancy. The fact remains that the United States government is now controlled by Republican Tory reactionaries of the Hoover-Dewey-Vandenberg strip, while the fascist-like McCormicks, Hearsts, Pattersons and Brickers play a greatly increased role. These elements and their Southern poll-tax friends definitely have the imperialist perspective of making the Wall Street multi-millionaires the dictators of the world. And they are counting on still further increasing their political power by capturing the presidency in 1948. To further their imperialist ambitions they have at their disposal by far the biggest navy and air force in the world, the greatest supplies of available capital and food, and the largest industrial production. These imperialists consider an anti-Soviet war inevitable and they are relentlessly preparing to provoke and to wage it. Nor will this country's foreign policy cease to constitute the major danger to world peace until it is reshaped by the democratic masses of the United States.

The American people, especially the labour movement, must much more clearly learn the basic fact that the present foreign policy of our government is not a national policy. It is not a policy conceived in the interests of the whole American people; on the contrary, it is one primarily designed to advance the profits and power of the Wall Street magnates. Wall Street's imperialism is highly detrimental to the most

vital interests of the American people. The toiling masses of this country understand that the great capitalists are thoroughly greedy in their domestic policies, and they are waging increasing struggles against their exploiters. Nevertheless, they do not yet sufficiently grasp the facts that these same capitalists are also dictating American foreign policy and that they are just as profit-greedy in their foreign policies as they are in domestic policies. Many workers are still deceived by hypocritical talk about politics ending at our shorelines.

The great menace to world peace and democracy now lies in the activities of the Wall Street trusts and multi-millionaires. Hence the tremendous importance of defeating them and their Republican-Democratic political stooges during the legislative battles of the present Congress and especially in the elections of 1948. The American people are basically opposed to the trusts and to aggressive imperialism, and they will respond to a strong democratic, anti-imperialist leadership. But if the Wall Street imperialists are to be defeated at home and abroad, the organised labour movement especially must show the highest political understanding and united action of its entire history. The trade unions must bridge over their internal quarrels and jointly take up the fight against imperialist foreign policies and against reactionary legislation in the Eightieth Congress. They must spare no efforts in making all preparations to administer a real defeat to reaction in next year's elections. The outcome of our developing political struggle is of decisive world importance.

EASTERN AGRICULTURE AND BRITISH TRADE— I I

ARTHUR CLEGG

WE HAVE seen that the peasants, who form the vast bulk of the population of Eastern countries, suffer from a double exploitation. First, landlords take away by rent all surplus grain above the minimum necessary for subsistence; the minimum being defined as the amount required, not to maintain health, but merely to keep the peasant and his wife just alive until they can raise a son to till the land. Second, the peasant has to pay the additional levies imposed by imperialism, either in the form of taxes or in the form of high prices for the goods he buys and low prices for the goods he sells. The only Far Eastern peasants exempt from these additional imperialist levies before the war were those of Japan, for Japan itself was an imperialist country.

It is naturally extremely difficult to judge exactly the intensity of this additional exploitation, but the facts on declining standards of

living and declining consumption of cotton textiles per head clearly reveal its results. The increasing frequency of famines in China and India are another sign, as also the decline in China's irrigation system, due to heavy foreign exactions and interest payments, which unbalanced the Chinese budget in the 1890's and which, with civil war, have kept it unbalanced since.

One figure, however, is available. It is for the Philippines. In a recent Hearing (Hearing on S.1488) the U.S. Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs heard evidence that : " The income of the Filipino family of four averages only \$75 (£19) a year, about \$20 (£5) of which goes in taxes." Thus in the Philippines, after the landlord has deducted 50 per cent of crop as rent, taxes (direct and indirect) take over 25 per cent of the income remaining to the peasant. Yet even in this wretchedness, the Filipino peasants have a higher standard of living than those of most other Far Eastern countries.

The conditions so far described apply to Far Eastern countries, but of course the peasantry of these countries are not the only peasants who experience the double exploitation of feudal rent plus imperialist levies. An article on "The background of Iran's revolt" in *Communist Review* for October, 1946 set out the conditions of the peasants in that country, and they are not noticeably different in any other Middle Eastern area. The peasantry of Africa and of Latin America are also doubly exploited in this way. The result is that the people of all these countries have a standard of living which is qualitatively different from that of imperialist countries such as Britain or the United States. Thus, before the war, while Britain had a national income of £110 per head, the income per head in colonial and semi-colonial countries was everywhere less than a quarter of this :

Jamaica	£26
Palestine	£26
Turkey	£19
St. Vincent	£14
Syria, Egypt, Iraq	£10 to £13
China, India	£5

Since these figures include both rich and poor, they still over-estimate the standard of the average peasant family.

But the effects of imperialism are not limited to intensified exploitation. The repercussions of that intensification extend much further. The deterioration of Chinese irrigation and flood control due to the disorganisation of Chinese government revenues has been mentioned. A further effect is that where imperialism coerces the peasants to turn from grain crops to cash crops, such as tobacco and oilseeds (the

money rent paid in such cases is still on the percentage basis, being up to 70 or 80 per cent of the total proceeds of selling the cash crop) the whole balance of agriculture may be upset and the fertility of the soil reduced, thus leading to still greater poverty for the peasant. Mr. R. A. Pepperall, Chief Regional Officer of the Milk Marketing Board, who was sent to India in 1945 to investigate milk production, speaking to the Growmore Club at Fareham on his return, said (as reported in *The Times*, 8.1.46):

"One reason for the decline in the (Indian) dairy industry under British administration had been the practice of exporting from India large quantities of cotton seeds, linseed, ground nuts and other commodities . . . these exports had starved India's own stock and deprived her soil of its fertility."

Here again the impoverishment is cumulative. In such facts as this, and not in overpopulation, lies the root of Eastern poverty.

The effects of the war have been to increase this poverty still further. Huge areas of China have been devastated. India has been gripped by immense famines. Everywhere the prices of the manufactured goods he buys have risen enormously against the peasant, and attempts are being made to extend the grip of the imperialist monopolies by such measures as the "Project Boards" in Burma and the exclusive purchase agreements negotiated (at low prices) by the U.S. Commercial Company for oilseeds with the Philippines and the "Netherlands East Indies Government." Obviously the situation calls for immediate and radical action. What, then, can be done?

One method often advocated is that of improving methods of farming in these countries and improving the seeds used. This is urged in China by various Kuomintang spokesmen and has been tried in Japan for thirty years or more. When the landlord takes more than half of the crop grown the peasant has of course practically no incentive to improve his methods. Nevertheless in Japan, using various kinds of pressure on the peasants the rice yield per acre has been raised and before the war was nearly as high as the rice yield per acre in Italy. But of course the bulk of the extra rice went to the landlord and not to the peasant, and Japanese peasants remained in their sorry plight. By themselves such schemes only serve the interests of the landlords.

A second method is that of rent reduction. In China Sun Yat-sen advocated that, as a temporary measure, rent should be reduced to 30 per cent of the main harvest. Rent reduction was enforced as a war-time measure in the Communist-led liberated areas in China, and this is the only extensive use of the method to date in the Far East, though

it was also used by the anti-Japanese Filipino guerillas. It does not solve the problem but merely eases it. But this method can also be used as a cover for restoring landlordism, as, for example, its present use by Chiang Kai-shek, who restores landlords in the districts he reconquers from the democratic areas of China under the slogan of "reducing rents to 30 per cent of crop."

A third method is to provide the tenant with credit to enable him to buy the land from the landlord. This is the method contained in the Agricultural Act passed by the Japanese Diet, with MacArthur's sanction, in September 1946, and the method which the American authorities in South Korea say they have adopted there. But the effectiveness of such measures depends upon the lowness of the rate of interest at which the credit is offered to the tenant, the price at which he has to buy, and the pressure put on the landlord to sell. In any case the result is that the peasant only becomes an owner through shouldering a heavy burden of debt. In addition to this disability, the Japanese Act only refers to large absentee landlords and even then in no way limits the size of an estate which can be worked with wage labour. All landlords are still allowed to keep seven and a half acres of land (enough for three tenants), they are to receive a high price for their land (some 3,000 yen per acre) and a State subsidy of nearly 1,000 yen per acre in addition. The actual operation of the law is in the hands of local committees on which landlords are equally represented with tenants. Even if the Act is strictly interpreted only 40 per cent of the total of landlords' land will be affected. Thus the whole Act can be described as an Act to preserve petty landlordism. In Korea, though it was announced that credits for peasant purchasers of land were available in the U.S. zone early in 1946, by the end of the year 65 per cent of cultivated land was still in the hands of a few Korean landlords and the joint Korean-American joint stock company set up to take over (after compensation) the land owned by Japanese landlords. Evidently this method of credits, in addition to its other disadvantages, is not very effective in actually transferring land to tenants.

The fourth solution is that of confiscating the landlords' land outright. The elected People's Committees which govern the Soviet zone of Korea have adopted this method. By the spring sowing of 1946 landlordism had disappeared there and over 2 million acres of land had been divided among some 700,000 former landless and poor peasants, with the result that none of the food and agriculture problems which curse the American zone are found in north Korea. This method has also been adopted in the democratic areas of Manchuria and by the decision of the elected village committees has been spread-

ing to all the democratic areas in China. Hence, in part, the fury of the Kuomintang banker-landlords against them. But the peasants of China have adopted the only method of solving the agrarian problem in the East, and of playing their part in enlarging world trade.

But it is not enough merely to welcome what Chinese peasants are doing. It is necessary for Britain to have a policy, for the question is vital to our future welfare as well as theirs. It is also inescapable.

First, in the Allied Council for Japan, in the Economic and Social Council of Uno, and its subordinate Food and Agricultural Organisation, questions of rent and landlordism have already been raised. Yet in the Allied Council for Japan, the British representative, MacMahon Ball, while favouring some agrarian reforms, refused his support to the proposal of the Soviet representative that all landlord's land should be confiscated, and on another occasion stated that "I feel it would be precipitous to advocate the abolition of tenancy." And in the Food and Agricultural Organisation, with Britain's approval, proposals for radical reform have been smothered under the discussions and proposals for such projects as the creation of buffer stocks of grains in "surplus" supply, projects which can only aid the big grain merchants.

Second, in British colonial policy, it is a constant question on the political side whether the British Government is to give special favours to landlords (rajahs, sultans, emirs, chiefs) in the shape of special positions in local assemblies, etc., as is proposed in the new Malayan Constitution, or whether it takes a democratic stand on universal suffrage and the abolition of special privileges; and, on the economic side, whether to assist the peasants by cheap credits and the encouragement of democratic buying and selling co-operatives and other measures leading up to the abolition of landlordism. Obviously every assistance must be given to the peasants and their co-operatives. The provision of cheap government credit to peasants and local industrialists is not only an excellent way of reducing the grip of the big imperialist banks, but ensures against the further growth of landlordism and, once landlordism is abolished, helps to check its recrudescence, while cheap credit to local industrialists stimulates industrialisation.

Third, since Britain's foreign trade is still almost entirely in the hands of the big monopolies, and this is especially true of Far Eastern trade, some method of reducing that hold and finally eliminating it must be found, along with methods of taking foreign lending entirely out of the hands of the present private banks and lending houses. A small start has been made in the setting up of the British Cotton Purchasing Board, but obviously it is necessary to extend such boards till they cover every major import and export and so break the

grip of such companies as Unilevers and other monopoly parasites.

Finally, the upsurge of national movements in the post-war period has led to the emergence of new republics in south-east Asia—the Republics of Indonesia and of Vietnam. They will be followed by others, and in the negotiation of trade and credit agreements with them there will be excellent opportunities of assisting their plans for industrialisation, thus bringing big orders for British machinery, and still further raising world living standards and export trade.

Today, however, it is no longer a matter of abstractly debating the measures which can be taken to improve the lot of Eastern peasants and therefore of British working people. Nor is it even a matter of mere propaganda for them. There is a movement of the people in all Eastern countries today, and in Africa tomorrow, which stands for the end of landlordism and the end of imperialism. The great question of politics is whether one welcomes that movement and seeks to aid and advance it, or the reverse. Each measure advocated must be judged by whether it aids or hinders this movement of national liberation. It is such things as the struggle of the World Federation of Trade Unions to assist the workers in the colonial and semi-colonial countries to build their own trade unions; the struggle against U.S. big business policies of backing Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Filipino reactionaries; and the struggle for the withdrawal of British troops from India and south-east Asia which are the essence of the struggle for a prosperous Britain. For only through such struggles can the hold of landlordism and imperialism be broken.

It is for British workers to realise how much they stand to gain, in terms of full employment and increased standards of living, from the end of imperialism and landlordism; and constantly and increasingly to throw their weight, the weight of the vast bulk of the British people, on the side of the Eastern peoples struggling to be free. This is not a matter of sentiment; for us ordinary people of Britain it is a matter of economic necessity. Colonial freedom is Britain's progress.

PROPOSED NEW WAGES STRUCTURE FOR THE MINING INDUSTRY

ABE MOFFAT

NOW THAT the mining industry has been nationalised, it is important that an entirely new wages structure should be established, to eliminate the conflict which existed under private enterprise, with one of the most complicated wages structures in any industry. In my opinion the introduction of a new wages structure will be one of the basic features

in determining the success or failure of nationalisation. It is impossible to carry on a nationalised industry under the same conditions as existed under private enterprise and which were the root cause of so much friction in the past.

This is the reason why I consider it necessary to submit proposals which could form the basis of discussion amongst all mineworkers, so that this important question may be tackled without delay and thereby enable the first nationalised industry to succeed in this country.

In drafting proposals for a new wages structure, it will be necessary to discard the present wages structure which exists in any particular district. To endeavour to establish a new wages structure in relation to anything which exists in any particular district would immediately undermine the principle of a National Wages Structure. We have to make an entirely new approach to this question, leaving behind the traditions, customs and wide variations which existed in District Wages Agreements which led to so much conflict in the past.

Our approach should be to establish a completely new wages structure, keeping in mind that we shall have one unified industry, with one employer, as against a disorganised industry with 800 different coal company employers, such as prevailed in the past and was mainly responsible for the wide variations which existed in district versus district and pit versus pit.

The main principle of a new national wages structure should be to guarantee to every mineworker a decent standard of living, and no matter what part of the coalfield he works in or at what grade, he should be in a position to know what minimum daily wage he should be paid. The idea should be eliminated for all time that, because he works in a poor and difficult part of the coalfield, over which circumstances he has no control, his wages should be less than those of men in more favourable districts.

Illustration of the differentiation in wage rates prevailing in the industry can be obtained from a study of the *Statistical Digest* issued by the Ministry of Fuel and Power. The average wage for the whole of Britain in 1945 was 23s. 11d. per man-shift worked, including cash and kind. The rate in the twenty districts varied from 21s. 0.82d. per shift to 28s. 8.2d. per shift in the highest district.

This average wage, of course, includes the wages of all youths, and since youths' wages are much less than the average it is quite evident that the average paid to adults is slightly higher than that shown in the statistical digest.

It is also recognised that the majority of mineworkers are day wage men, and since the vast majority of day wage men earn less than £1

per shift (some of them as low as 13s. 6d., excluding the 2s. 8d. cost of living bonus), it will then be observed that the piece rate earnings are higher than the average wage as outlined in the statement of average wages paid in 1945.

I make this explanation because I think we will make a very serious mistake if we approach the question of a new wages structure on the grounds that the gap is too narrow between the day wage worker and the coalface worker, or vice versa. At least one could not convince a skilled mechanic, who is being paid 16s. 6d. per shift, that this is the true position, and what applies to a skilled mechanic could be applied to other grades as well.

In our approach to the question we should, therefore, begin on the premise that both day wage and piece rate workers in general have wages which are too low, and any new wages structure should take this into consideration. The need for reducing the number of grades is vital and important, and I would propose the following as a basis for discussion. The other and important question is the wages to be paid, and in my opinion the main task is to establish a daily minimum rate for each grade, less than which no workman could be paid, no matter in what district or pit he worked.

The question of piece rates is another important matter to be discussed and I submit an entirely new basis for consideration under a new wages structure. However, if we establish a reasonable daily flat rate for all grades, then we make the question of piece rates a much easier problem than we have experienced in the past, as wages were always on a low daily flat rate, even for piece rate workers at the coalface.

LIST OF GRADES AND SCALE OF WAGES :—

- No. 1 Grade* : Coal face workers, stone miners including face brushers, machinemens—Wage 30s.
- No. 2 Grade* : (Other face workers), prop and check drawers, timber cotters, packers, conveyer shifters. Wage—25s.
- No. 3 Grade* : Skilled mechanics, i.e., electricians, engineers, fitters, bricklayers. Wage—25s.
- No. 4 Grade* : Rope splicers, shaftsmen, head onsetters, repairers. Wage—22s. 6d.
- No. 5 Grade* : General oncost, including haulage, enginemens, pumpers, etc. Wage—£1.

SURFACE ADULTS :—

- No. 1 Grade* : Skilled mechanics, i.e., electricians, engineers, fitters, bricklayers, winding enginemens, boiler firemen, blacksmiths, etc. Wage—23s. 6d.
- No. 2 Grade* : All other adult surface workers. Wage—£1.

It would be understood that all workmen would be available for all categories of work under the specified grade, except in the case of skilled mechanics.

One point would have to be made clear, to avoid any divisions in the miners' ranks. At present in certain districts, such as Nottingham and Derbyshire, we do know that piece rate workers (although not all of them) can earn as much as £2 10s. per shift. There are also day wage men in these districts who have over £1 per shift. If it were understood that the new wages structure would mean a reduction for any of these rich districts, then our new wages structure would fail in the Miners' Trade Union in the first place.

We also require to be on our guard against any question of the higher paid districts being reduced to the scale of the lower paid districts. This would be fatal to the industry, although the suggestion is frequently expressed in certain quarters. Our objective must be to raise the poorly paid districts to the level of the better paid districts, and with a nationalised industry, there is no reason why this should not be accomplished.

It will be necessary, therefore as a safeguard, to have a clause in any new wages structure to ensure that districts or pits having higher wages (either day wage or piece rate) shall continue to be paid at the higher rates.

With this understanding, I am quite sure that the above scales would provide a new wages structure and, above all, provide that security desired by all mineworkers.

The question of piece rates is still important in a nationalised industry, and particularly for production. To retain the old system of piece rates would mean a continuation of the old conflicts which existed within the industry.

Let us endeavour to place piece rates on an entirely new basis. All piece workers should be entitled to a percentage on the daily rate. Already this is in operation in the engineering industry; there is no reason why it should not be established in the mining industry. All piece rates should be subject to a minimum percentage of 50 per cent above day wage rates, this percentage to be recognised as a national principle and part of the national wages structure. This would eliminate much of the conflict in the past when discussing price lists, either on a sectional or pit basis. In my opinion it would lead to better relationship between management and men, as everyone knows that the fixing of price lists in the past has engendered bitter hatred between management and men.

The acceptance of this national principle would also eliminate the difference in piece rate earnings existing between adjacent collieries and districts because of geological differences entirely outside the control of the miners. It would also eliminate a long-standing grievance of the miners, that because a man is unfortunate enough to be working in a poor seam or coalfield he should be compelled to work for lower wages than those paid in a richer seam or coalfield. I am quite confident that such a system of piece rates would be welcomed by all mine-workers.

The foregoing scale of wages and piece rates is proposed on the understanding that we proceed on the basis of the miners being paid six shifts for five shifts worked. If this principle is not included, then the above scales would require a corresponding increase to make up for the loss of earnings if a five day week were in operation.

The question of youth wages must also be considered under the new wages structure. Already certain progress has been made in the establishment of a wage for age scale under the Porter Minimum. In certain districts the daily wage rate for youths is higher than that contained in the Porter Minimum and in my opinion we should have uniformity on this question. To obtain this, the highest wage paid in any district should become the rate for the whole of the coalfield.

The other main question in connection with youth wages is the age at which adult wages should be paid. In Scotland we have already established the principle that all war wage advances, of 6s. 2d. per shift, shall be paid at the age of 18 years, and if a youth does an adult job he is also entitled to be paid the adult basic rate. It should now be established, in a new wages structure, that all youths be paid the full adult rate at 18 years of age. This would be one of the greatest means of attracting youths to the industry, a factor which is of vital importance in determining the success of the coal mining industry in the future.

Also an important question is the guaranteed minimum weekly wage. It is known that the present guaranteed minimum weekly wage is £5 for underground workers and £4.10s. for surface workers, as awarded by Lord Porter's Tribunal on 22nd January, 1944.

The demand for coal is even greater to day, and it is recognised that increased manpower is a vital necessity to the industry. In these circumstances it is not unreasonable to suggest that the guaranteed minimum weekly wage under the new wages structure should be £6 for underground workers and £5 for surface workers.

It will be noted that I have not attempted to deal with the wages which should be paid to deputies and colliery clerks. This, in my

opinion, would have to be worked out with the appropriate trade unions catering for these classes of workmen.

I know that opinions on this important subject will be varied but this is a sincere effort to create discussion on one of the most complicated and difficult questions facing a nationalised industry.

If the article creates that interest and discussion which the subject warrants, then I am confident that the movement can become conscious of the need for the early introduction of a new wages structure which will lay the basis for a smooth working arrangement such as never existed under private enterprise, and will at the same time ensure good wages and security for the men who are responsible for producing the coal so essential to the reconstruction of a prosperous Britain.

THE COMMON SECONDARY SCHOOL

JOHN C. DANIELS, B.SC., DTH. P.T.

IN JULY, 1945, the Labour Government inherited the 1944 Education Act, part of which had been put into operation in April, 1945. This Act, the Butler Act, describes a new framework for the whole educational system of this country. Its main features centre around the provision of nursery schools, the provision of universal secondary education and the "further education" of adolescents and adults. It is with the second point, the provision of universal secondary education that we wish to deal.

It is necessary first of all to be clear on certain changes in terminology which the 1944 Act introduces, for here much confusion can and does arise. Before 1945, education was roughly divided into two main streams (1) Elementary—the free education provided by the State through the local authorities for all children between the ages of 5 and 14; (2) Secondary Education—education provided by various bodies, including local authorities, mostly with State financial aid directly or indirectly for about 20 per cent of all the children between 11 and 18 years old. To a proportion of these children, proclaimed by the scholarship examinations conducted by the local authority to be "specially gifted intellectually", this secondary education was free. For others, fees varying from about £6 per annum to well over a hundred pounds per annum were payable. Various off-shoots of this system, selective central schools, the preparatory schools, etc., merely served to reinforce the dominant pattern of the dual system—elementary and secondary education.

The terminology of the 1944 Act changes all this. All education

is divided into three parts (a) Primary Education—that education received by pupils under 12. (b) Secondary Education—full time education received by pupils between 11 and 18. (c) Further education—adult and adolescent part-time education, university and college education.

Secondary education covers three types of schools which are inherited from the old system—secondary grammar schools (formerly secondary schools); secondary technical schools (formerly junior technical schools) and secondary modern schools (formerly either modern or senior schools). Education in any of these types of schools, if maintained or aided by the local authority, is now free of charge. No fees have been paid since April, 1945. All entrants to the grammar and technical schools have been selected by "Scholarship" Examinations or whatever they are called in the locality. In certain other types of secondary school, called the "Direct Grant" grammar schools, however, fees are charged but as a condition of the subsidy which they get direct from the State, at least 25 per cent of its intake must be "scholarship" winners paying no fees. In other types called Independent Schools—including all "public" schools, fees are charged and no State grant is given. They are, however, inspected by the Ministry of Education. It will be recognised that one of the main weaknesses of the 1944 Act is the fact that it has allowed these two types of ruling-class supported schools to continue. Those who engage in campaigning for the full implementation of the 1944 Act will find that this loophole is the reactionaries' mainstay. However, whilst campaigning for the amendment of the Act on this point, much can be done within the existing framework.

It will now be seen that when the Act promises universal secondary education it does not mean that every child is promised a grammar school education. Nor is this either desirable or possible. Here we enter into the field of controversy on the future of secondary education.

It was stated above that the three types of secondary school were inherited from the old system. However, since the Act, the Ministry of Education has issued a pamphlet called *The Nation's Schools* (and other material since issued supplements its point of view) which professes that there are, conveniently enough, three types of child. These are the (1) Intellectually gifted type who will be able to profit by grammar school education and from which then the professional and higher clerical and administrative workers will be drawn; (2) the Practical type who are of second grade intelligence but very practically minded—capable of profiting from a technical school education and from which technical foremen, etc., will be recruited;

(3) the Modern [sic] type—"the hewers of wood and drawers of water" says *The Nation's Schools*. These, the Ministry pamphlet states, need a good general education as a background to their coming dreary life as toilers with a special background to help them improve the quality of their leisure activities. This classification into three types is at first plausible enough. But it must be plainly said that it is nonsense and that those who propagate the theory have no shred of real evidence to support it. Most leading educational psychologists have already rejected the theory as false or at least not proven. It must, however, be emphasised that the idea is plausible and acceptable to a large proportion of people. The theories of "typology" are deeply ingrained in popular philosophy and such a new and easy system of "types" is readily acceptable especially since it conforms so nicely to the existing tripartite school system. It is therefore essential at all times to be on guard against the introduction of such false notions into discussions and to head off the development of schemes based on them. Marxists will easily recognise in this "typology" a mirror image of the bourgeois conception of how industry and society is administered in capitalist society. Capitalist theorists, believing as they must in the unchangeable and eternal character of capitalist relations, see the types not as products of this particular system of social relationships but as fundamental characteristics of human nature. From the same source comes the error of Social Democracy in selecting the Boards for administering nationalised industries. This selection is based again on this same false "typology"—they feel they must use the best "administering brains" (Lord Hyndley, etc.,) who may at times be helped in some matters by the practical man ("technical" type). Another way of characterising this typology is to say that, believing as it does in the rigid and unchangeable nature of human personality, it does not believe in the capacities of the working class to govern and organise, and fails to see the possibility of so developing the positive features of an individual worker's abilities that, as Lenin said, eventually "every cook can be taught to run the State".

This leads us back directly to the educational field. For if men (and children therefore) are of these three types, in order to select pupils for the brand of education appropriate to them at 11 years of age, all that is needed is an efficient examination for labelling the types. Hence the "scholarship examination". Now the written examination is deeply ingrained in Britain. Most adults, whilst criticising certain features of scholarship examinations, for example, believe fundamentally in the ability of written examinations to prove something.

And they are probably right in so believing. But whether that "something" is that the examination can identify these so-called "types" is quite another matter. It is true that a written examination at 11 years can to some measurable extent forecast the future examination ability of a child. When we measure to what extent, we find that it does not exceed *in the best cases* an improvement on chance of more than 15 per cent. To build a system of education on tests as efficient as these is to ask for trouble. And of course, every grammar school teacher knows that he gets it. It has been reliably estimated that 65 per cent of the entrants to our grammar schools are misfits in such a school while as many as 25 per cent of the grammar school intake is being excluded by the examinations incorrectly.

The selection of pupils for technical school admission is even more uncertain and inaccurate. To select "the practically-minded" pupil of "fair intellectual ability" is a task at which any teacher or trained psychologist boggles. It just cannot be done. You will, of course, know the reason why—because these "types," anyway, have no real existence.

Finally, some authorities fall back on the "intelligence test". How many have accepted with relief this panacea? How many too have been disillusioned? The intelligence test can, they believe, grade children in "all-round mental efficiency". More than that, it can be shown that it can do more than the old written examination could ever do—viz., grade a group of children on two different occasions and get something like the same results each time. But as forecasts of all-round efficiency as grammar school pupils, intelligence tests are very disappointing. No wonder. Using an intelligence test result *in this way* presupposes that intelligence grows at equal speeds in all children. Because the average growth of ability to do "intelligence tests" is smooth and regular, it is assumed that growth of intelligence in each individual child is smooth and regular. The *average* child grows regularly in height and weight but any parent knows how there are spurts and then periods of stagnation followed by another spurt and so on. Nor do spurts and quiescent periods occur at identical ages in every child. So in intelligence. You can forecast mental or examination or practical efficiency only with difficulty because the average child at 11 might quite easily be brilliant at 14, or the brilliant one at 11 might be only average at 14. It must be recognised that a child's intelligence quotient is not static but variable. The most recent psychological research has exploded the myth that any one intelligence test result finally describes the past, present and future intellectual stature of a child.

So much for the efforts then of those whose answer to reorganising secondary education is the improvement in the efficiency of the selection examination at 11.

What then is the answer? *It is to rebuild the system of secondary education on what, is for this country, a new principle—the Common Secondary School.* This would mean that at the age of 11 all children in a given neighbourhood would be transferred from the primary school to the common secondary school. Children of all ranges of ability and social background would be educated in the one common secondary school. The consequences of such a reorganisation of the system would be far-reaching.

The social implications will immediately be obvious. Every child would be able to make his or her contribution to the fuller social life of the school and every child will begin to feel that his or her contribution is valuable and valued. Schools would become, therefore, real schools for democracy, for the essence of democratic society is that each individually is appreciably a part of society. This would begin the process of integrating the school as a society into the neighbourhood instead of remaining the mysterious 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. abode as many parents regard the present-day school. The common secondary school becomes the common property and concern of the neighbourhood. Parent-teacher co-operation grows into a unity of parent-teacher and pupil.

The academic implications of the common school are even more important in the immediate future. It is at the heart of the question of being able to utilise to the full all the available ability the country possesses—for on an adequate supply of trained, broad-visioned workers of all grades in the next few years, Britain's future depends. This is in part the long-termed solution to the man-power problem, and it is underlined by American experience. One of the reasons for American technical superiority is undoubtedly the vastly larger number of technically-minded workers produced by her common secondary school system. Britain produced Lord Rutherford, but America backed by many thousands of trained scientists finally crowned Rutherford's discovery by unleashing atomic energy.

Above we criticised the classification of children into three types. This, far from meaning that therefore all children are equal, means that there are as many "types" as there are children. Human beings are not equal. Marxism does not subscribe to the Rousseau doctrine of equality. Marxism teaches that it is the rigid stratification imposed by capitalist social relations which stunts the growth of individual differences. It contends that only under Socialism can individuals

develop their full potentialities for originality, can individuals fully make their own distinctive contribution to society.

The common school system would recognise this uniqueness of a child's abilities and would so arrange its inner-school organisation as best to develop each individual child. It would seek to implement the 1944 Act when it promises each child an education suitable to its "age, abilities, and aptitudes." *It is important, then, to recognise that a common school is not three types of school under one roof, it is not three streams, grammar, technical, and modern streams who happen to be able to belong to the same football team.* For this reason the term *multilateral school* (which many people use instead of common school) is to be discouraged since it suggests a continuation of the three-fold classification into types.

There are many stock objections raised. Would this mean a lowering of standards? Would it hold back the brilliant pupils? Would it so lower the standard of achievement of the senior pupils that the universities would be hampered? It would mean none of these things. It is increasingly being recognised that grammar school education is too narrow and specialised, and too hastily and superficially covers certain important branches of knowledge; is too "classical" and formal in its approach not only to Greek and Latin but to science and geography. It is, for example, seldom realised by non-teachers how circumscribed and formalised is the teaching of chemistry, physics, and biology in grammar schools. For the most part it bears as much relationship to the socially functional science of the outside world as does Greek or Latin itself. The mathematics of schools is concerned with the problems of Greek philosophy instead of the problems of the declining birth-rate and the re-planning of our cities.

The curriculum of the common secondary school, however, cannot be built around the preparation of pupils for the School Certificate Examination. Too long has the School Certificate Examination deformed secondary education and in the bargain deformed and constrained the content of education in the remainder of the school system—modern school, technical school and primary school alike. *Any fundamental advance in the secondary system will necessitate the abolition of the School Certificate.* A Ministry of Education Committee is considering the matter at the moment and every effort needs to be made to help it to make up its mind in the right direction.

Progressive university teachers now recognise that too early specialisation in the grammar schools is bad for their students. They would much prefer to start to teach university matter themselves to students whose cultural background is wide and enlightened.

The common school, therefore, would need a new approach to each subject and a new curriculum. There is a common core of subjects now recognised by all schools, viz., English, history, geography, mathematics, science and foreign languages. A common course of studies by several classes of varying ability (studies not at equal levels but common subject matter) would be the starting point for a real diversity of specialist studies in subjects in which pupils show special aptitude and interest. Consequently, this would not mean the abolition of selection, but would ensure efficient selection by enabling selection and study guidance to operate throughout the whole of the secondary education stage. It would be possible for pupils to change their minds about this career or that career because no irreparable damage will have been done by too early specialisation. It would enable the "late-developers" to receive adequate and prompt attention and those who begin to fall off to be given guidance to prevent the appalling intellectual hurt inflicted on so many grammar school pupils today by the realisation that they cannot keep the pace.

Such a system, flexible beyond measure in comparison to the present system, would reduce wastage of ability to negligible proportions and would also produce a generation of capable, confident, socially-minded youngsters who would play a noble part in the coming Socialist transformation of our country.

Finally, the organisation of a common secondary school system can be accomplished within the framework of this Act. It cannot be done overnight but if education authorities take the decision that all new building and reorganisation done shall be in conformity with the principle of the common school, a big step will have been made. One or two authorities are favourably considering it. The West Riding have decided in favour. We have the responsibility of seeing that the vast majority of education committees take such a decision in the near future.

EARLY ENGLISH CHAMBER MUSIC

English Chamber Music. ERNST MEYER. (Lawrence & Wishart, 30s.)

DR. ERNST MEYER is an historical student and a lover of instrumental chamber music—that is, music for the fiddle family with or without a piano, or its precursor, the harpsichord. Dr. Meyer found refuge in England from Nazi oppression, and found also, to his surprise, that Early English music could bear comparison with the great schools of the Continent. So he has written a book to remind us of the musical beauties we possess in the Tudor and Caroline periods;

and he has related those beauties to the social conditions in which they were produced.

Ignoring for a moment his first chapter on The Medieval Background, the subsequent chapters afford the musician an opportunity of studying our instrumental music written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while the fact that the author continually refers to other contemporary forms of art, and to social conditions, gives his book a value absent from other books on the subject.

He points out that this early music was neglected from the time of the "invasion" of Handel to Victorian times. He pays just tribute to the work of Arnold Dolmetsch and Dr Edmund Fellowes for their steady propaganda in favour of the revival of the music; and in fact, since the attention of younger musicians has been brought to the inheritance they possess, this music has had a greater influence upon our national musical life than the German tradition that prevailed from the time of Handel to the time of Wagner and Brahms.

Nationalism in the arts is important because it is not in opposition, is even favourable, to the conception of international organisation. We have an added interest in life as we look at the pictures and hear the music of other peoples. We enjoy the music of Russia the more because it contains idioms that are not to be found in the natural development of our own music; but no English musician wishes to imitate Russian idioms, because we have our own forms of expression. The neglect of those forms became serious from the time that the people of England were deprived of leisure and the means of their own culture—that is, from the time of the industrial revolution. The musicians of that time, more and more separated from the masses, more and more parasitical in their material lives and capacity for expression, lost touch with the original national music. So there followed a slavish imitation of the Italian and German idioms. It was, in the sphere of musical expression, the sort of tyranny that has happened when a conquering nation has denied to a defeated people the right to use its own language.

So it will be realised how important it is for us to recover our own musical tradition; and it is no mere coincidence that the will to recover that tradition during the last three or four decades has been associated with the revival of British folk music, and the revival of interest in the period treated in Dr. Meyer's book.

I have said that the value of this book is greatly increased because it associates music with actual life, a matter ignored by most musicographers with unsatisfactory results in the general understanding of the music; but it is just here that I would question one important

detail in the first chapter. The author gives credit to the Church for the great art of choral polyphony—the sort of music in which many people can sing at the same time, and yet sing different melodies. He describes that sort of music as “the reiterated assertion of the unchallenged stability of the Church and the worldly order of things.” Dr. Meyer has been misled, I think, because of his own special devotion to instrumental as distinct from vocal chamber music, for the earliest examples of polyphony were vocal and secular. What the Church did, as Dr. Meyer allows, was to put the multitudinous vocal style into shackles by trying to get rid of its rhythmic basis and most popular phrasology in what we call the major scale. He records the technical facts, but does not, apparently, realise their implications.

It was not without reason that the greatest church composers were obliged to trick their clerical employers by a clever subterfuge. Knud Jeppesen, the Danish musicologist, has shown how the Italian composer, Palestrina, made music rhythmic in spite of clerical authority. Jeppesen's study would equally apply to the music of Palestrina's English contemporary, Byrd. And it must not be forgotten that long before this period there existed many-melodied popular music. Superior musicians referred to their cultivated art as polyphony or many-sounds, and to the popular thing as heterophony, or the other sort. But it was in fact from that other sort that came the real life of music, for it had real tune in it and appealed to the emotions of men, and it had rhythm in it and set their legs going. And it seems almost certain that when the monk of Reading wrote down the popular round “Sumer is icumen in” he was, in fact, applying his cultivated skill in the technique of music to what already existed in cruder form. For we know that many of the monks came from the people and retained popular sympathies.

Many-melodied music was not, I submit, an expression of “Church stability” but of the popular will to enjoy in mass form. A truer expression of the Church was the Gregorian chant in unison—that is, free from all popular implications. That fact the Papacy itself has recognised as recently as 1923, when the reigning pope issued his musical instructions in “Motu Proprio.”

So I think that Dr. Meyer's first chapter needs some reconsideration; but that does not alter the value of the rest of the book, which should be on the shelves of all musicians and people interested in music as an expression of real life.

RUTLAND BOUGHTON.

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COMMUNIST REVIEW



APRIL
1948

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ON THE ROAD TO SOCIALISM

JAMES KLUGMANN

THE EVENTS in Czechoslovakia at the end of February were not a bolt from the blue. They were the result of a long period of increasing activity by Czechoslovak and foreign reaction to stem the onward progress of the country towards Socialism. Nowhere is this more clear than in the economic field. By September 1947 the nationalised sector of economy, calculated by the number of workers employed, was about 61 per cent of the total. The basic industries—mining, metal and power—had been completely taken over by the people, the chemical industry around 75 per cent. But important sections of the national economy were still privately owned. Nationalisation had given the new Czechoslovak democracy a *real* economic foundation, creating a State of a new type, where the principal means of production had been taken out of the hands of the capitalists.

The letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to all Party members issued at the end of November, 1947, explained that the new people's democratic regime had proved itself, that the *first* important steps on the road to Socialism had been taken, that revolutionary changes had been carried out in the national, political and economic life of the country, that —

"We have removed the clique of industrial and agrarian big bourgeoisie from the positions of political power, which in the pre-Munich period gave them the decisive say in the Government and State administration.

"We have secured for the people the possibility of taking a direct part in State and public administration by replacing the former police-bureaucratic administration by a system of National Committees . . .

"This time the leading force of the national democratic revolution has been the working class and the working people headed by the Communist Party. The Communist Party has been the initiator and the driving-force of all these revolutionary changes. It has taken care to prevent a repetition of the mistakes made 30 years ago, when things came to a halt at the very outset . . .

"We have proved that we can manage the State and the nation's economy better than the capitalists, that the people are capable of managing their public affairs themselves, that they can carry out a speedy transition from war-time to peace-time economy."

Yet, at the same time, the Central Committee had to point out the growing efforts of reaction inside Czechoslovakia, aided and supported by reaction outside, to check that continual onward development towards Socialism, which is an essential feature of popular democracy. Reaction aimed not only at stemming the onward march of history, but at turning it backwards towards the past. The Central Committee showed how the remnants of the Czechoslovak capitalist class were getting hold of the values created by the working people and enriching themselves, how capitalists, deprived of their positions in banks and large industries, were finding a foothold in those sectors of economy not touched by the nationalisation measures, above all, in the wholesale trade, the export and import trade, large building enterprises, and various branches of light industry, in particular the food industry. It was shown how these people were diverting large quantities of goods to the black market, causing prices to soar, whilst they pocketed large profits, and how these capitalist elements, whilst opposing the further nationalisation measures demanded by the people, were finding protection among reactionary circles of certain Parties of the National Front. The Central Committee's letter declared —

"These are no small tradesmen, as their friends from the Nationalist Socialist and Catholic People's Party would have us believe. They are big capitalist racketeers, tax defrauders, infringers of the currency regulations and parasites of the Republic."

This struggle between reaction and the people, between the remnants of the old ruling class and the progressive classes and strata of society, was being fought out also in the field of agriculture.

More than three million Germans had been evicted from Czechoslovakia following liberation. The land of internal traitors had been confiscated without compensation. Between May, 1945, and September, 1947, 4,250,000 acres of land had been distributed to the people, mainly to the poor peasants and to the landless. Yet considerable sections of the land was still in the hands of a small group of large landowners.

Three thousand large landowners still owned vast areas. The Revision Committee on Land Reform, for instance, discussed the property of four families (Lobkowicz, Schwarzenberg, Colloredo-Mansfeld and Paar) who owned together more than 125,000 acres of land—Church property in land still included 62,500 acres of farm land and 437,000 acres of forest in Bohemia and Moravia, 100,000 acres of farm land and 250,000 of forest in Slovakia. Three Archbishops alone owned more than 250,000 acres. In this situation, in order to develop the country's economy along democratic lines towards Socialism, further land reform and agrarian laws were urgently necessary. Czechoslovak reaction that fought nationalisation fought at the same time the new land reform.

The Communist Minister of Agriculture, Djuris, had proposed during 1947 a series of six agricultural laws. (i) A law concerning new land reform providing for distribution of all landed properties above 123 acres. (ii) A law on the reorganisation of purchase and sale of agricultural products. (iii) A law extending new credits to peasants (iv) A law on the democratisation of agricultural co-operatives affording the small peasants easy access to the co-operatives and increasing their influence on the co-operative administrative bodies. (v) A law on a single agricultural tax which would lessen the burden of taxation falling on small and middle peasants (vi) A law on the mechanisation of agriculture, guaranteeing credits for the purchase of machinery for machine stations and co-operatives

These Bills were very vigorously opposed by the Nationalist Socialist and Catholic People's Party, whose leaders, in the course of discussions, showed themselves as supporters of the agricultural policy of the large landowners. Above all, they were intent on stopping the revision of the land reform. Even when under direct pressure from the mass of the peasants themselves, they were obliged to accept five of these laws, they succeeded to a considerable extent in limiting them and hampering their effectiveness.

Beyond the fields of industry and agriculture, the same battle between progress and reaction was waged on many other issues of financial and social legislation. A striking example was the special tax on millionaires proposed by the Communist Ministers and resisted by the other Parties of the National Front. When the Communists drew public attention to the names of the eleven Ministers who voted against this tax, the volume of protest from factories, trade unions, local National Committees, and whole organisations of the various Parties, reached huge proportions. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party arranged discussions with the leadership of the Communist Party and agreement was reached that the two Parties should work out in common a proposal for the millionaires tax.

Thus, concealed behind the crisis provoked at the end of February by the resignation of twelve right-wing Ministers, was the growing effort of Czechoslovak reaction, *working from bases inside the right-wing Parties of the National Front* to stem the economic and social development of the country in the interests of the people and towards Socialism. It was in this position that at the great congress of 8,000 delegates from Works Councils, organised by the T.U.C. and held at Prague on February 21, the workers unanimously made their demands that this sabotage should stop, and that the programme of economic and social legislation, that had been held back by reaction, should without delay be put into effect by whatever new Government was formed. They demanded measures for National Insurance, old-age

pensions, further extensive measures of nationalisation to cover all wholesale, import and export trade, department stores, and all enterprises with more than 50 employees, whilst urging at the same time that the property of small and medium enterprises should be safeguarded by the Constitution and that steps should be taken to reduce the taxes on small traders.

Behind the façade of the crisis provoked by Czechoslovak reaction at the end of February stood the burning issue: Was Czechoslovak economy to develop in the interests of the people and towards Socialism, or in the interests of home and foreign capitalism, back to the old pre-war rule of the bourgeoisie?

It was the work of these capitalist and reactionary elements that had wormed their way into leading positions inside certain Parties of the National Front that had led to the general weakening and deepening crisis inside the Front itself.

The National Front in Bohemia and Moravia consisted of four Parties: Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, Nationalist Socialist Party and Catholic "People's" Party. In Slovakia it comprised the Communist Party, the so-called Slovak Democratic Party, and later two smaller Parties, the Slovak Social Democratic Party and the Slovak "Freedom" Party.

The Kosice programme of the National Front adopted in May, 1945, on the initiative of the Communists, with the support of all other Parties of the Front, included measures for establishment of National Committees as organs of State authority, nationalisation of heavy industry and the credit system, eviction of the Germans from the country, agrarian reform and the establishment of friendly relationships on the basis of equality between the Czech and Slovak peoples. These measures began to be implemented from the first days of liberation and developed with increasing speed and efficiency with the formation of the Gottwald Government after the elections of May, 1946.

In the course of the victorious national and democratic revolution a number of Parties that had collaborated with the Axis were banned, including the Agrarian Party, the so-called National Union and the (Hlinka) People's Party in Slovakia. Yet the prohibition of these Parties by no means meant the end of Czech and Slovak reaction.

At first, the reactionaries considered reforming and reorganising their old prohibited Parties and organisations, but facing failure, decided to regain their former influence and strength by *infiltrating into the Parties of the National Front*. More and more former leading figures of the ex-collaborationist groupings crept into leading positions of the Nationalist Socialist, Catholic "People's" and Slovak Democratic

Parties and began to develop an organised bloc directed against the fulfilment of the Kosice programme.

Already in January, 1947, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Prime Minister Gottwald raised the question of the need for a more vigorous struggle against reaction, relying on the support of the working class and all democratic elements.

Rudolf Slansky, General Secretary of the Communist Party, at the Conference of the Nine Communist Parties last September, said:

"We must take into account that there is no unity in the leading circles of the National Front. Such is not the case in the lower bodies. The working citizens, members of the different political parties, are working in harmony to fulfil the Two Year Plan. The people have learned how to work together in the factories, in the villages and towns. The idea of unity has preserved its mobilising force."

The open letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, at the end of November, 1947, stated that the efficiency of the Government, Parliament and the entire National Front was being more and more paralysed mainly owing to the fact that reactionaries were trying to prevent measures necessary for the implementation of the Government's programme and that it was evident that those delaying tactics were intentional.

"The Communists want to maintain and strengthen the National Front and to overcome all the disputes which may arise. This can only be achieved if all those individuals and groups which are attempting to split the National Front and undermine its work are removed. For us the National Front is not a coalition of political parties which barter and makes contracts behind the people's back. Reactionaries would like to see such a state of affairs, when they oppose the participation of representatives of the nation-wide organisations in the discussions of the National Front, and when they do not want representatives and members of the different Parties of the National Front to meet and come to terms with each other. They try to prevent the working people of town and country from taking part in the decisions of the National Front. For us the National Front is not just a meeting of the leading representatives of all political parties. For us it represents the union of all honest workers, peasants, tradesmen and intelligentsia, the union of all honest patriots and constructive workers for the Republic, a union which is a lasting one and must be constantly strengthened."

Two days before the resignation of the right-wing Ministers on February 21, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party warned that "Every attempt of reaction to destroy the National Front and our

popular democracy will come up against the opposition of a *real* National Front composed of representatives of all working people."

What happened in the next critical days was a logical development of what had gone before. Reaction had tried to exclude the people from the National Front, the people ended by excluding reaction. By admitting into leading positions the elements of reaction and collaboration, the right-wing Parties of the Front lost their democratic character, and more and more ceased to become representative even of their own members. At the *top*, the National Front, co-ordinating the leading Committees of all Parties, was more and more hampered by the work of reaction. The National Front *at the top* ceased to be representative of the people. In this situation the people were not prepared patiently to allow a handful of reactionaries to turn back their democratic and national revolution. Instead, they turned out the handful of reactionaries. This was the aim, function and achievement of the Action Committees of the National Front on a local, district and national scale. To the National Front they restored its true popular and democratic character. It has been the profound experience of the working class and democratic movement that when National and Popular Fronts degenerate into co-ordinating Committees of leading Party organs it is possible for small groups of reactionaries to limit and distort the aims of the people, and that real popular and national fronts must be based on the fullest and most constant participation from *below* and in action of every section of the people. The Action Committees, under the leadership of the Communists, Socialists and trade unionists, brought the masses of the people back into full participation in the National Front.

It is natural and logical, therefore, that among the first actions of the Action Committees was the purging from office of such elements as Dr Feierabend and Dr Machnik, who had held leading positions under Hitler in the Protectorate Government, and that, following the decisive defeat of reaction, the economic and social measures, demanded by the people and held back by reaction, should be implemented without delay by the new Government formed on February 25 and representative of all sections of the National Front.

In contrast to the national revolution of 1918, carried through under the leadership of the middle classes, and which led finally to the formation of a bourgeois Czechoslovak State, the national and democratic revolution which arose out of the Second World War was headed by the working class and the working people. In the course of the revolution, the working class secured a number of key positions, and several of the changes transcended the limits of the national and democratic revolution. As a result of these changes, a new democratic rule was established, known as popular democracy. The Communist

Party—which had reached 1,172,000 members by the end of September, recruited over 40,000 in January, 1948, over 50,000 in February—reached 1,400,000 members in early March, with a target of two millions. It embraces the large majority of the working class, and is the biggest Party in the countryside. In the election of May, 1946, Socialists and Communists together won 154 of the 300 seats, and have since greatly increased their influence.

In such a situation it was natural that the working people should themselves secure a leading position in the new popular democratic State. The Attlees and Morrisons are content, under a Labour Government, to leave all leading State positions, including army, police and internal security in the hands of representatives of the capitalist class. They cannot, or will not, understand the radical transformation that the Czechoslovak workers, peasants, and trade unionists have demanded and secured in the State machine. But the Czechoslovak people themselves well understand the character of these changes.

Lenin once, after the October Revolution, summed up his conception of what the revolution meant for the people by reporting a conversation he had overheard in a railway train. An old peasant woman had said:

“Today you don’t need to be afraid of a man with a gun. While I was in the forest a man with a gun met me, but instead of taking away my firewood he helped me gather some more.”

In a moving part of his speech to a mass meeting in Prague on February 21, Prime Minister Gottwald vividly illustrated the meaning of the new State to the Czechoslovak people:—

“Yesterday I received many delegations, among them from the ‘Zbrojeva’ plant in the town of Brno which represented all political parties. When I asked them what in their opinion was the difference between the present national security authorities and the old gendarmerie and police corps, they answered: ‘We see a difference consisting in the fact that officials of the present national security corps welcome us workers, whilst under the old regime policemen and gendarmes clubbed us and cast us in prison’ . . . I think you will agree with me when I say, addressing the reactionaries, ‘Never, and at no price, gentlemen, will we place the national security corps in your hands! The national security corps will never come out against the people, but will always fight together with the people against reaction, sabotage, spies and the enemies of the Republic.’”

How often have the efforts of a dying class led to the very opposite of what they aimed at! Reactionaries, home and foreign, aimed at stemming the tide of popular democracy. The result of their efforts was to quicken the tide in its onward sweep. They aimed at moving back from popular democracy to bourgeois democracy and capitalist

exploitation. They achieved a forward sweep of popular democracy towards Socialism

Reaction could not, or would not, understand what the Czechoslovak people think of its frantic exhortations to return to the past, accept the old bourgeois rule, return to the fold of "Western civilisation," accept the Marshall Plan, sever contact with the Soviet Union and the other new democracies of Europe. Neither Wall Street nor the *Daily Herald* can understand what the Czechoslovak people have already suffered at the hands of Western reaction. It is hard to believe that memories can be so short. It is only five short months to the tenth anniversary of the Munich betrayal—ten years since British and French reaction, with the aid of the right-wing circles within the country, handed the Czechoslovak people over to Hitler.

"All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia receded into darkness. She has suffered in every respect by her association with the Western democracies."

Whose voice? Bolshevik propaganda? No, the voice of Mr. Churchill speaking in the House of Commons on October 5, 1938. Six months later came the final betrayal of March 15, 1939.

"His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to come to an agreement with other Governments represented at Munich on the scope and terms of such a guarantee [Guarantee of what was left of Czechoslovakia after Munich. *J.K.*], but up to the present we have been unable to reach any such agreement. In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee, and *which has now ceased to exist*, and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by their obligation."

Thus spoke Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 15, 1939, when Nazi troops had occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia which Chamberlain had formed and guaranteed. In the same debate (for details see the illuminating book of Professor Namier—*Diplomatic Prelude*, 1938-39) Lord Simon, then Sir John, also having quoted Goebbels' words that "the State of Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist," put forward what he called an "obvious point" that "in that situation it was indeed impossible to suppose that a guarantee to maintain the State of Czechoslovakia could have any meaning at all."

These are the people who today have plotted a new Munich for Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Czechoslovakia was handed to Hitler as a bribe and a base in the war against the Soviet Union which world reaction so anxiously awaited. Today, ten years later, Wall Street and the City, U.S., British and French reaction, the right-wing Labour

leaders, saw Czechoslovakia as the weak link in the new democracies, plotted its downfall with the remnants of Czechoslovak capitalism, and prepared to use it once again, as a base in the third world war, an American *place d'armes* in the war against the Soviet Union. It is the defeat of this plan that causes the anger and fury of reaction everywhere—because Czechoslovakia, instead of becoming a new base in the American zone of Europe, has become an even stronger base of democracy and peace, because their plots and bribes and blackmail have led to the very opposite of what they aimed at.

Blum and the whole leadership of the French Socialist Party loudly welcomed the Munich betrayal. Blum himself has described his own feelings as ones of "cowardly relief." Willie Gallacher, in his recent book, *The Rolling of the Thunder* (pp. 205-208), describes the scenes in the House of Commons on the eve of Munich; he describes how Chamberlain read to the House his letter to Hitler (see Hansard, September 28, 1938), in which he says.—

"However much you distrust the Prague Government's intentions, you cannot doubt the powers of the British and French Governments to see that the promises [To hand over Czechoslovakia to Hitler, J.K.] are carried out fairly, fully and forthwith."

Gallacher describes how Attlee as leader of the Opposition got to his feet and gave Chamberlain his blessing for this Munich journey of unsurpassed treachery. He describes how Sinclair, for the Liberals, and Maxton, for the I.L.P., one by one, echoed the Tory wishes for success. One man only in the House, Willie Gallacher, representative of the Communist Party, raised his voice in protest at the Munich voyage.

Today it is the same right-wing leadership of the Labour Party in Britain and France, following the same tradition, making their vicious attacks on the Czechoslovak people. This means, declares Sam Watson, the "destruction of social democracy" (*Daily Herald*, 13.48). Czechoslovakia, declared Hector McNeil, "raped by the right wings of Europe before the war, is raped once again by the extremists of the left" (*Daily Herald*, 13.48). The "seizure of power by the Communist faction in Czechoslovakia" are the words of the Labour Party declaration of March 2, which declares that for "democratic Socialists" the Czechoslovak events are "a warning and a lesson" that "Communists cannot achieve their aims without support from a minority within the camp of democratic Socialists."

These gentlemen are forgetful. They forget that the "Communist faction in Czechoslovakia" is a mass Party of 1,400,000 members, organising the great majority of the working class. They choose to forget that in the February events in close co-operation with the Communists were the T.U.C. of Czechoslovakia and the great majority of the Czechoslovak Socialists. In their anger and indignation at the

victory of the Czechoslovak people, indiscriminately the British right-wing Labour leaders attack their own Socialist colleagues in the greater part of Europe, and the overwhelming majority of trade unionists

Right-wing social democracy in its downward path of collaboration with capitalism, becomes more and more closely linked with U.S. and British imperialism. The only enemy it sees is on the left. Blum and Bevin shout treason at their own Socialist colleagues in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Greece and Italy. They attack as chief enemies the Communists of France and Britain and those members of their own Parties who wish to struggle alongside the Communists against capitalism.

The leaders of Czechoslovak Social Democracy and of the Czechoslovak TUC have spoken in no uncertain terms. In the Czechoslovak Embassy at London (not many thousands of yards from Transport House) on February 27, 1948, General Bohuslav Ecer, leading Social Democrat, member of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, gave the following description of Czechoslovak developments:—

“Whilst the Socialists and Communists advocated a land reform Bill expropriating everything above 123 acres, and a new nationalisation Bill which gave the Government the opportunity to take over essential enterprises, the other Parties opposed such measures. They wanted a Government either without Communists or with the Communists in subordinate positions, although they are the largest Party in Parliament. In this situation the Trade Union Congress summoned a mass meeting . . . and at this meeting the feelings of the people were expressed unmistakably. The next day, another meeting of the National Front took place, extended to such nation-wide organisations as the TUC, the Peasants' League, the former political prisoners' association, etc. This was from a legalistic point of view an emergency meeting, but the purpose of it was to avoid any disaster which might have arisen from the prolonged Government crisis. This meeting decided to create the Central Action Committee, envisaged by the Kosice Agreement of 1945 . . . The Action Committees purged public life from everything hostile to the nation's interests.”

Euzen Erban, the Social Democrat and General Secretary of the T.U.C., has spoken in similar terms. The Czechoslovak Socialists are denounced by the right-wing Labour leaders. Now the Czechoslovak Orthodox Church has publicly expressed its sympathy for the new Government and for the strengthening of popular democracy. Will the Czech Christians become infidels for the Archbishop of Canterbury and Sir Stafford Cripps?

A growing section of the British Labour movement in the months before and during the war came to understand how the treachery of

Munich had been a blow struck at the Labour movement everywhere. Attlee and Bevin defend a policy of a new Munich in Czechoslovakia. It is necessary at the present time that the Labour movement should understand that the Czechoslovak events of February were a defeat of a new Munich, a victory for Labour, for the trade unions and co-operatives. The experiences in Czechoslovakia carry profound lessons for the Labour movement, of which the chief is that the unity of the working class, Communists, Socialists and trade unionists, by the side of the other sections of the working people, can defeat reaction, home and foreign, and lead the nation forward to Socialism.

CHARTISM IN 1848

MAX MORRIS

ON APRIL 10, 1848, six weeks after the opening of the revolution in France, the third Chartist Petition was presented to Parliament by Feargus O'Connor. The event has been described with relish by bourgeois historians. The Petition, we are told, was drowned in a sea of ridicule, its size had been greatly exaggerated, and it contained numerous false signatures. Instead of the expected bang, it produced merely a whimper. In a generation even "the word Chartism was already beginning to be forgotten."

The moral drawn by bourgeois historians is, of course, obvious. Chartism, as a revolutionary movement, had no mass basis among the British workers, its resurgence in 1848, when strictly speaking it ought to have lain still, was due, we are told, to the unfortunate contagion of the events across the Channel under the influence of which "the Chartists lost whatever balance they had retained." But happily, as they put it, the loss of balance was temporary, the British workers were too sensible to take the revolutionary path. 1848 is thus a year of little significance in the story of our working-class movement. Thus is history written.

Properly to estimate the course of events in April, 1848, it is necessary to examine the development of Chartism in the years since 1842 when it had reached its last great peak of mass agitation. In that year the second petition had received over 3 million signatures in the country, a figure probably three times that of the electorate, which consisted of the propertied classes. The rejection of the petition in the spring was followed by a general strike in the summer, a movement which was accompanied by widespread concerted and sometimes violent action, but for which the Chartist leaders and organisation were

unprepared. The Government intervened with the full force of the law. Feargus O'Connor, Thomas Cooper, Julian Harney and other Chartist leaders were arrested and put on trial at Lancaster. Peter McDouall, the President of the National Charter Association made an adventurous escape to France.

The movement was temporarily suppressed, but it was by no means dead. Now, guided by O'Connor, it took a different turning, and while not compromising one jot on the agitation for the six points of the Charter, it concerned itself increasingly with a plan to settle workers on smallholdings on the land. The plan was fundamentally a reaction away from an agitation around a political programme whose social objectives were often confused and ill-defined. Though it was defeatist in the sense that it looked back to the pre-industrial economy instead of strengthening the struggle against capitalism, it did present a limited objective which could appeal to the masses now being increasingly influenced by the "Cheap Bread" slogans of the Anti-Corn Law League. The movement was going through difficult times. Capitalism in spite of recurring crises was on the threshold of an era of great expansion, and the bourgeoisie, conscious of their growing wealth and strength, were more united than ever in their anti-Chartist front. In this situation the Land Plan fired the enthusiasm of tens of thousands of workers and kept the Chartist organisation functioning.

It is this which is overlooked by the historians who see in the plan just a personal manoeuvre of Feargus O'Connor, and who are, therefore, surprised at the widespread nature of the mass movement later on in 1848. The point is that the agitation never died - it changed its form. Though the Land Plan absorbed most of the attention of the Chartists, general propaganda continued for the Charter and for immediate economic reforms, especially the demand for factory legislation. "The Ten Hours Bill," wrote O'Connor, "is one of the legs of Chartism." Increasing attention, too, was paid to the trade unions, and the *Northern Star* of the middle 1840s is full of accounts of their activities.

This was not the dead period of trade unionism as it is so often portrayed. The unions, it is true, were concentrating less on visionary ideas of a golden future than on the pressing problems of improving the workers' position "at the point of production," but this did not mean a weakening of the spirit of struggle. 1844 was the year of the epic campaign of the Durham miners against Lord Londonderry, immortalised by Engels in his moving account in *The Condition of the Working Classes in England*. In 1845 a new attempt was made at a national trade union organisation in the formation of the National Association of United Trades, with the full backing of the Chartists and their press.

Thus it is not surprising that when economic crisis developed in 1847

the whole movement of the people was welded together in greater strength. In the general election of that summer many Chartists took to the hustings. Feargus O'Connor defeated a cabinet minister and was elected for Nottingham, the first Chartist M.P., Ernest Jones, fought the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Julian Harney, in a memorable campaign, attacked Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, in words which ring for us today. "The foreign policy of the present administration," he wrote in his election address, "has been ruinous to the cause of freedom, and disgraceful to the character of the country. Lord Palmerston [has] . . . successfully laboured to win for England . . . the hatred of the oppressed of every land."

This was the background in Britain of the new wave of agitation which followed the revolution in France and which in Ireland led to the attempted insurrections of 1848. For many years internationalist feeling had been fostered by the Chartists, and the workers had learned to look across the Channel with respect for the revolutionary achievements of the European proletariat, and with sympathy for their bitter struggles; they had always, too, expressed their solidarity with the oppressed Irish. London had long been the home of revolutionary exiles, and the Society of Fraternal Democrats had provided them with a platform. Marx and Engels were names well known to the many readers of the *Northern Star*, it was in London that the decision was taken to produce the *Communist Manifesto*, and where it was later printed.

Thus the whole working-class movement was thrilled at the news of the events in Paris in February, 1848. The mass movement, which had never died and which under the stress of the economic crisis was developing, was now reinforced by the French Revolution. Gammage, the great contemporary historian of Chartism, described as follows the days of February and March, 1848:

"The distress that existed was terrible—men could scarcely be worse off. Starvation glared from the eyes of thousands . . . in the provinces, things began to look very threatening. At Glasgow . . . on the 6th of March a serious riot took place. The unemployed operatives had expected a distribution of provisions, which, however, did not take place . . . The people marched through the streets, crying: 'Bread or Revolution.' The police were almost useless, and the military were called out. . . . The excitement became so great that the authorities sent to Edinburgh for more troops. On the following day, crowds again collected at Bridgeton . . . [the] Superintendent of Police gave orders to fire. The result of this precipitate order was that five persons were shot and some of them died on the spot. . . . At Manchester the people met in front of the Union Workhouse . . . The police

marched in a strong body to the spot but it was seven o'clock in the evening before they could disperse the crowd, having been engaged in the conflict for four hours. Later in the evening, the people attacked the police station in the Oldham Road. . . Newcastle, Dumfries, Sunderland, Bath, Nottingham and a host of towns were roused at the summons of the people of Paris. Public meetings were held, and the spark of democracy seemed to light every breast. . . "

The Chartists took direct action to express their solidarity with the French revolutionaries. The Executive Committee of the National Charter Association, in association with the London Chartists and the *Fraternal Democrats*, issued an address to the people of Paris:

"Heroic citizens! The thunder notes of your victory have sounded across the Channel, awakening the sympathies and hopes of every lover of liberty. We hasten to express to you our congratulations . . . for the glorious service you have rendered to the human race. By your courage and magnanimity, your heroism and devotion to principle, you have consecrated the right of insurrection, the last resource of the oppressed—the last argument against oppression.

"Honour to those noble soldiers who refused to turn their arms against the people! . . . The fire that consumed the throne of the royal traitor and tyrant will kindle the torch of liberty in every country of Europe.

"You are the advance guard of freedom's army, and we can assure you that the British people will never sanction a fratricidal war against their brethren in France . . ."

This theme of the determination of the Chartists to prevent a war of intervention in favour of Louis Philippe, the dethroned French king, recurs in the Chartist speeches of the time. It derives directly from the Chartist view of the French War of 1793-1815 not as a great patriotic war against French imperialism but as a reactionary war to destroy the democratic gains of the first French Revolution. The theme recurs in the speech of the delegation which the Chartists sent to Paris to present the address quoted above. Ernest Jones presented this address, and speaking in French declared:

"Citizens, we come as a deputation from the oppressed to the free . . . To thank you for showing how an enslaved people can liberate themselves, and to tell you that the example of France is not lost upon the heart of England . . . We come to thank you in the name of England and the world, and to assure you of the friendship of the British people, which will never permit its government to make war on the French Republic . . ."

The *Northern Star* reported that the delegation was received by

leading Ministers in the new French Government, that the Chartist address was hung over the presidential chair in the Hall of Audience, and that the liveliest sympathy was expressed by the people of Paris at this expression of British solidarity.

In the meantime, preparations progressed for the signing of a third Chartist Petition and the summoning of a new Chartist Convention for the beginning of April. When the Convention met, enthusiasm in the country was at a high pitch and the delegates immediately passed a resolution:

"That in the event of the 'National' Petition being rejected by the House of Commons, this Convention prepare a National Memorial to the Queen to dissolve the present Parliament, and call to her council such Ministers only as will make the People's Charter a Cabinet measure

"That this Convention agree to the convocation of a National Assembly, to consist of delegates appointed at public meetings, to present the National Memorial to the Queen, and to continue permanently sitting until the Charter is the law of the land "

A great meeting was arranged for April 10 on Kennington Common to be followed by a procession to Parliament to present the Petition for which over 5 million signatures were claimed. The Government took fright and made preparations which turned London into an armed camp. Apart from the deployment of the military, over 150,000 special constables were sworn in, and many of the upper classes filled their West End mansions with armed retainers. Similar measures were taken in the provinces where insurrectionary action was feared. Finally, an Act of Charles II was invoked to make the London procession illegal and to cast doubt even on the legality of the meeting.

O'Connor appears to have been intimidated by the Government show of force, the procession was called off, and the meeting passed off fairly peaceably. The Petition was, instead, driven to the House of Commons where it was examined by a committee which reported that there were just under 2 million signatures and that a number of these appeared to be false. Great publicity was given to this "exposure" which has been used by historians to denigrate the whole 1848 movement as a "fiasco." Chartism, it is claimed, was killed by the laughter of its opponents.

Little attention, however, has been paid to the defence that O'Connor put up in Parliament, when he challenged the findings of the Commons committee as grossly underestimating the size of the Petition. And it is remarkable that historians familiar with Home Office practice of using spies and *agents provocateurs* to undermine the working-class movement from within should be so easily impressed by the presence

of a number of forged signatures on a Chartist petition. If the Members of Parliament laughed at the "fiasco" it was less from the joke of finding that Queen Victoria had signed for the Charter than from relief that the Government's armed preparations had saved them from what had seemed to be a serious threat of revolution.

Once again, as after the earlier movements, the Chartists had failed to organise their "ulterior measures," while the Government had left nothing to chance. Once again the Chartist leadership was divided on the practical steps to be taken after the collection of signatures and the holding of a Convention, while the Government deployed the army and the police, and the bourgeoisie prepared to defend their possessions. The whole problem of organisation was, of course, inseparably connected with the problem of achieving clarity on the ultimate aims of the movement. Thus the Land Plan, while it had served some useful purpose in keeping the organisation together in difficult times, was hardly a suitable medium for the organisation of a frontal attack on the capitalist State machine. The National Assembly which the Convention had ordered was indeed held, but only at the cost of a split with O'Connor, who refused to participate, and with a meagre attendance. The truth is that the moment for decisive action had passed, and after meetings and demonstrations were held and disturbances occurred throughout the country Ernest Jones and other fighting leaders were arrested and sentenced on the usual charges to terms of imprisonment.

Thus the English workers, like their colleagues on the Continent, did not achieve the immediate demands for which they fought in the spring and summer of 1848. But it would be wrong to underestimate the movement that had developed. In the economic conditions of the time, when Britain was entering its era as the workshop of the world, when already the sharp edges of the distress of the early 1840s were being blunted for many of the workers, it was a tribute to the Chartists that they could rouse their comrades in the way they did and that they could inspire such terror in the heart of the ruling class. The Chartists continued to fight. Chartism was still a living force for another decade during which changing economic and social circumstances were being reflected in new forms of struggle in the working-class movement. The spirit of rebellion and of independence which had characterised the Chartist agitations still expressed itself in the trade unions, in the franchise struggles and in the growing co-operatives. But it also expressed itself in the undying flame of internationalism which had burned so brightly in 1848. *From the ranks of the Chartists and from their efforts to create democracy the whole international working-class movement drew support and inspiration. Repeatedly in the years that followed 1848 the British workers, nurtured in the*

Chartist tradition, were to give evidence of their solidarity with the Continental workers and their exiled leaders in England

CHINA'S AGRARIAN REFORM

RAYMOND WONG

IN SEPTEMBER last year, the Chinese Communist Party convened a nationwide agrarian conference in which it made a detailed investigation of China's old agrarian system and studied its rich experiences of agrarian reform in the past twenty years. As a result, the basic programme of China's Agrarian Law was drawn up, and this was published by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on October 10 last year.

! According to this law, the agrarian system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation is abolished, the system of "land to the tiller" is established. The land ownership rights of all landlords are abolished. All lands of landlords in the village and all public lands will be taken over by the village peasants' union and, together with all other village land, they will be completely and equally distributed among the total population of the village, irrespective of sex and age. After equal distribution, the land will be the individual property of each person. Landlords' animals, agricultural implements, houses, foodstuffs and other properties, and surplus property of rich peasants, will be expropriated and distributed among peasants who lack these things. All debts incurred in the countryside prior to the reform of the agrarian system are cancelled.

This Law is, in fact, a great historical document. It not only declares that the more-than-3,000-year-old agrarian system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation will come to an end but also gives the 360,000,000 peasants, who form over 80 per cent of China's total population, an important, detailed programme with specific policies which will guide them forward to emancipation.

Hence, after its publication, it immediately met with a great response and support from the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. It has dealt a mortal blow to Chiang Kai-Shek's reactionary regime, which represents the interests of big landlords and big capitalists, and to the American imperialists who fully support this regime. The first and the greatest response, of course, comes from the liberated areas, which now have a population of 168,000,000—over one-third of China's total population. In every liberated area, a great agrarian

conference, with over 1,000 peasants' representatives, has been convened. They studied the experiences of the agrarian reform in their area in recent years, accepted the Agrarian Law, and discussed how to carry it out. A great mass movement of the peasants who are determined "to turn over to a new life" is now going on in all liberated areas. Many old areas, where agrarian reform has already been carried out, are in the main coming to the stage of "adjusting" land so as to fit in with equal distribution, while the reform goes on in full swing in all newly liberated areas.

It will be difficult to appreciate fully the significance of this great reform without trying to understand what feudal exploitation in China actually means. According to the Society for Investigation of Chinese Rural Economy, which made a widespread survey of China's rural areas in 1936, 50 per cent of China's cultivated land was owned by landlords who formed only 4 per cent of the rural population, poor peasants and tenant farmers who constituted 70 per cent of the rural population only owned 17 per cent of the cultivated land.

During the war against Japan land ownership became still more concentrated, because of malignant inflation, forced conscription and extortionate taxation by the Kuomintang government. In the Japanese-occupied areas, it was even worse. In addition to barbarous looting of rice, burning of villages and heavy taxation, both Japanese and puppet officials seized land by force. After Japan's capitulation, the Kuomintang government brought back to the rural areas exactly the same feudal system as it took over from the Japanese army. In waging the civil war in the last two years, it has ruthlessly suppressed the peasants, destroyed the agrarian reform already achieved in the areas it captured, armed the landlords and reinstated the feudal system of exploitation.

Concentration of large amounts of land in the hands of landlords is only one side of the picture of the old agrarian system. Landlords' cruel exploitation of the peasants is the other. According to the Kuomintang Legislative Yuan, which made a rent survey in 23 Chinese provinces in 1930, landlords received annually, on an average, from 45 to 50 per cent of the total harvest from the peasants. With the balance of 50 to 55 per cent, the peasants had to pay for their agricultural implements, seeds, house rent, manure, high taxation and to maintain their families.

During the war against Japan land rent increased rapidly in the Kuomintang areas. In many places it rose even to as high as 80 per cent of the harvest. Extortionate taxation and corruption of Kuomintang government officials often took away most of what was left. It was because of this that in 1943 several million peasants in

Honan Province had to abandon their land and were driven to starvation.

Usury is another kind of exploitation in the rural areas. Poor peasants usually have to borrow money or rice from landlords before their new harvest comes in. Interest rates are extremely high. A *monthly* interest of 15 to 20 per cent is very common. In many places, one bushel of rice loaned one month before harvest has to be repaid by two bushels immediately after harvest.

It is exactly because of this that the resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the basic programme of the Agrarian Law says "China's old agrarian system is unjust in the extreme." This old agrarian system has, for a very long time, brought poverty and backwardness to China, it has fettered her productive forces, hindered her from developing into an industrialised country. Moreover, in the past 100 years foreign imperialist interests, by supporting Chinese feudal forces and using them as their agents in China, have succeeded in their aggression upon the Chinese nation and in enslaving the Chinese people. Today, American imperialism is using Chiang Kai-shek's compradore-feudal regime to colonise China.

Without changing such a colonial, semi-colonial, feudal and semi-feudal state—that is, without fulfilling her tasks of eliminating imperialism and feudalism—China cannot become an independent, free, democratic and prosperous country. But the root of imperialism and feudalism in China lies in the existence of the old agrarian system. It is only by wiping out such a system thoroughly and digging out its roots entirely that the Chinese people can achieve complete liberation and the tasks of the Chinese revolution can be fully accomplished.

The Agrarian Law is not of Socialist or Communist character, it does not advocate abolition of capitalism at the present stage of Chinese revolution. On the contrary, it encourages the development of private capitalism and gives it help and protection. It stipulates clearly that "the property and legal operations of persons engaged in industry or commerce shall be protected from infringement." This is one of the three main economic policies of China's New Democracy. Of course, private capitalism does not include monopoly capitalism which is actually controlled by Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary regime and is known as "bureaucratic capital" in China. In his December 25, 1947, report, Mao Tze-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, makes the economic policies of China's New Democracy very clear.

"All that the New Democratic Revolution aims to eliminate are feudalism and monopoly capitalism, the landlord class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (the big bourgeoisie), not capitalism in

1) general nor the petty bourgeoisie or middle bourgeoisie. Owing to the backwardness of China's economy, even after the nationwide victory of the revolution, the existence of the capitalist economy represented by large numbers of petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie must still be permitted for a long period.

"The economic structure of the New China consists of.

"1 State economy—this is the leading element

"2 An agricultural economy developing step by step from an individual to a collectivised economy

"3 An economy of small, independent, industrial and commercial business men and of small and middle private capital

"These make up the entire national economy of the New Democracy."

The Chinese Communist Party is not the only advocate of the reform of the old agrarian system. In fact, all Chinese revolutionary democratic parties advocate it. "The only difference," according to Mao Tze-tung, "is that only we Communists take it particularly seriously—we not only talk about it, but really carry it out." Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang, also advocated it. As early as in 1924, he pointed out that only "land to the tiller" could solve the agrarian problem and achieve a successful revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek, together with his reactionary regime, has entirely betrayed this great principle of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Not only has he surrendered to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and become their tool, but, by means of his State power, he has himself become one of the "big four families" of China's big bourgeoisie.

In the past 20 years, he has been ruthlessly launching a counter-revolutionary war against the peasants and the people. The Chinese Communist Party has been firmly leading the peasants and the people in waging a heroic revolutionary war against the attacks of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, represented by Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary regime, and in carrying out agrarian reform. The 20 years' war in China is, in essence, a war between those who uphold "Land to the tiller" and those who are desperately against it.

In the ten years' war from 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Communist Party resolutely carried out the agrarian reform by confiscating landlords' land and distributing it to the peasants. During the war against Japan, from 1937 to 1945, the Chinese Communist Party, on its own initiative, changed this policy to one of reducing rent and interest. At that time, Japanese imperialism was the main and common enemy of all classes and parties, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to make such a concession in order to establish an anti-Japanese united

front with the Kuomintang and all other people. At the same time, by carrying out the policy of reducing rent and interest and developing production, it was possible to improve the standard of living of the peasants in the Liberated Areas, raise their patriotism, mobilise them to defeat Japan, and enlarge and consolidate the Liberated Areas before Chiang Kai-shek launched his nation-wide reactionary war against the people after Japan's surrender.

When the war against Japan concluded the peasants were no longer satisfied with the policy of reducing rent and interest. They urgently demanded land. In many places, on their own initiative, they distributed the land of reactionary landlords and puppets. The Chinese Communist Party, therefore, made the timely decision to meet their demands by changing the agrarian policy of reducing rent and interest to one of confiscating land of the landlord class and distributing it to the peasants.

In carrying out the agrarian reform in the Liberated Areas during the two years since Japan's surrender, many measures were used. All lands seized by Japanese officials and puppets during the war were confiscated and distributed among the peasants. Lands of avaricious landlords and evil gentry that had been taken away from peasants by illegal means were confiscated. In "settling accounts" with landlords who practised very heavy and unjust exploitation, peasants got back their land. Landlords were also encouraged to sell their land and to develop industry and commerce.

Although 60,000,000 peasants had already got land up to June last year, there were still a number of weaknesses in the agrarian reform. In the main, landlords as a class still existed, they still held more and better land and more property than the peasants. The land and property of rich peasants were still, in principle, untouched. Equal distribution was not yet fully carried out. Peasants had only "turned over half way to a new life."

The timely proclamation of the Agrarian Law has undoubtedly met the urgent demands of the peasants. Its significance can be understood from Mao Tze-tung's recent report when he concluded on the agrarian reform.

"The whole Party must understand that the thorough reform of the agrarian system is the basic task of the present stage of the Chinese revolution. If we can solve the agrarian problem thoroughly and universally, we will have satisfied the basic condition needed for the defeat of all our enemies."

It must be pointed out that thorough reform of the agrarian system is a class struggle. Landlords are cruel and cunning. They never give up their land and properties willingly. They have stubbornly resisted

with arms, and in many other ways. They will certainly continue to do so. Thorough reform, therefore, can only be achieved by mobilising the overwhelming majority of peasants into their struggle, raising their class consciousness and developing their initiative.

In order to build up a big, powerful peasant "army" for agrarian reform, new peasant unions of the broadest mass character are now organised in all parts of the Liberated Areas. In the first place, agricultural labourers and poor peasants are organised in poor peasants' leagues. They are the people most seriously exploited in the rural areas and are, therefore, the firmest in the struggle. They are the backbone and the main force of this "army". Their demands for land and property are, first of all, to be satisfied. Middle peasants are the stable ally of this "army", they are to be firmly united and their interests are not to be injured.

These poor peasants' leagues and new peasant unions are the legal organs for carrying out the agrarian reform, and are actually the rural administrations in the transition period before new local democratic governments are elected. They are empowered to supervise, investigate, and reform all Party, government, military and public organisations, and to examine, criticise, punish, commend and even discharge cadres at all levels. People's courts are established in all liberated areas to try and punish any one who opposes or undermines the agrarian reform or infringes upon the people's democratic rights.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party is reorganising and purifying its ranks. It is resolutely purging all traitors and hostile elements who managed to smuggle themselves into the Party, without this, the thorough reform of the old agrarian system will be impossible. It has already called upon all its members to stand firmly on the side of the peasants, to carry out resolutely the Agrarian Law and all decisions of the poor peasants' leagues and new peasant unions, and to be good servants and guides of the people. It has given its sanction to all poor peasants' leagues and new peasant unions to examine all Party members, propose to expel any one from the Party whom they think necessary, and recommend any one to join the Party whom they think qualified. This is a great event for the Chinese Communist Party, because its recruitment of members is always very strict. It not only shows how democratic the Chinese Communist Party is but also illustrates vividly that it is really a people's party.

No complete statistics of the agrarian reform are yet available. It is estimated that up to the present time at least 100,000,000 peasants have already got their land. More peasants will be freed from the 2,000-year-old system of exploitation as soon as more

territories are liberated. This will go on until the whole criminal system is completely destroyed throughout China.

Such a time is not far off now. Millions of peasants who have won their victories in the agrarian reform are pouring into their own Liberation Army and the militia and auxiliaries, so as to defend their own hard-won lands and to help liberate their brothers and sisters who are still suffering the same tragic, feudal oppression as they did previously. It is this invincible force that has repelled the offensive of the several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, supported by American imperialism, and has itself passed over to the offensive. In the year 1948, this force will create a page of glorious history in agrarian reform as well as in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. For the Eastern peoples in their liberation movement, which, in many respects, is similar to that of China, the rich experiences of China's 20 years' agrarian reform are worth studying.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PLANNING

JACK REVELL

THE PUBLICATION of the Communist Party's *Britain's Plan for Prosperity* provides an opportunity to discuss the wider implications of planning, and at the same time its title gives the theme for this article. Planning for *prosperity* is a conception totally alien to capitalism, the only aim of which is to maximise profits. Capitalism is not even able to plan to solve the present crisis, and the Labour Government, with its fear of drastic action against the capitalist class and its slavish following of the dictates of the F.B.I., is in no better position. As against this we must set the tremendous successes of planning in the U.S.S.R. and the New Democracies. We need to study the results of planning in these countries, not only to learn the various techniques of economic planning which have proved successful, but also to draw the main political lesson, that only a government of the people can plan to solve the problems of our day and to raise the standard of living of the working people. It follows that in this country only a Left Labour Government with the mass support of the people, and particularly of the Labour movement, can plan to solve the crisis and to bring about prosperity. The creative enthusiasm of the people is the main driving force of such a plan, and in order to harness this enthusiasm the Labour movement must formulate demands for better housing, cheap and plentiful consumer goods, the rehabilitation of the

distressed areas, higher wages at the expense of profits, and so on, in such a way that the mass of the people will see that their own aspirations are linked inseparably with the fulfilment of the plan

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels wrote:

"The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie . . . and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

"Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production, by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and provisional, but which in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production

"These measures will, of course, be different in different countries" [Centenary Edition, p 19, my italics, *J R.*]

Economic planning is, then, one of the main battlegrounds on which the working class can fight to gain control of the economic system for itself and to mould it to its own needs

The general outlines of the basic techniques of planning—the strategy of the struggle—are well understood, and they may be summarised under the following headings.

- 1 Nationalisation of the basic or key industries
- 2 Retention of direct controls on materials, investment, prices, foreign trade and consumption (while shortages continue)
- 3 Remoulding of the economic system as a whole to supply the needs of the people.
4. Increasing the efficiency of the private sector of industry for cheap and plentiful production
- 5 Rapid use of the results of scientific research
- 6 Active participation of the people at all levels in the formulation and, above all, the carrying out of the plan

The conception of planning as a battle involves as a corollary that the strategy and tactics of the struggle must be based on a scientific analysis of British capitalism with a view to seeking out its weak points and to concentrating on them.

It was widely accepted that the success of the wartime control of industry by the Government depended to a great extent on the fact that the State was also the customer for over one-half of the industrial product. Here, then, is a key sector, which we may call the wholesale sector, covering all that vast intermediate zone between production and ultimate distribution to the consumer. The actual method of control

of this sector will vary for different industries. In the case of those products the consumer of which is the State itself, a nationalised industry or a local authority—armaments, building materials, school and hospital equipment, mining machinery, etc.—the various Ministries or Boards must obviously act as bulk-buying agencies, and the same procedure could be followed for such items as agricultural and textile machinery. In the case of coal distribution, where the whole purpose will be to cheapen the product to the consumer by securing transport economies, the functions of the National Coal Board could be extended to cover the wholesale distribution of coal to a limited number of dumps throughout the country, leaving the retail distribution to local authorities, which in some cases could use the Co-operatives for the purpose. For consumers' goods the bulk buying of utility goods by the State is the appropriate method. The Co-operatives have a vital part to play in the marketing of agricultural products.

Control of the wholesale sector has some most important implications for planning. In the first place, the State as a main customer for the products of an industry will be able to enforce the economies of specialisation. It will be able to give orders for a certain narrow range of goods to one plant, which will force that plant to concentrate all its resources on those goods and thus to produce them more cheaply. The merchanting organisation in an industry like cotton textiles is one of the main reasons for inefficiency—the short runs of any one fabric mean high prices. In order that this specialisation may be effective it will be necessary drastically to alter the existing patent laws so that any product made under a patent may be manufactured by any firm selected by the Government, a reform of the patent laws will have important repercussions in other sections of the economy, and will have the general effect of loosening capitalist control of industry. Only the State can give sufficiently large and steady orders to industry to make it worthwhile in many cases to take advantage of modern techniques of mass production. Furthermore, control of the wholesale sector will enable the Government to concentrate orders on the most efficient firms, and to increase production quickly by enforcing subcontracting. The control over the design of the product which can be obtained from dominance of the wholesale sector is of particular importance at the present time, when it is necessary to force industry to concentrate on satisfying the needs of the bulk of the people instead of on luxury production, whether for home or foreign consumption. The wholesale sector gives some measure of control not only over the productive process but also over retail distribution. The Czechoslovak Government is now proposing to control the wholesale trade primarily as a means of combating the black market. Very considerable

economies of manpower and cost can be made in this sector by resolute Government action

The co-operative sector is one of the most important in any planned economy, and can assist materially in the carrying out of the plan. We have a great deal to learn from the New Democracies and the U.S.S.R. (where the great extension of co-operative trade and production was an important prelude to the abolition of rationing) on the role of the Co-operatives, but here again the main lesson is the great need for political awareness and mass pressure in the Co-operative movement. The Left Labour Government will need to see the Co-operatives as one of its main allies in the fulfilment of the plan, and to allot to the Co-operative organisations specific responsibilities within the plan. There must be no elimination of Co-operative enterprise merely because it overlaps Government enterprise, rather must there be encouragement for the two to develop side by side, except in those cases where waste would result. The Co-operatives have a very important part to play in bulk buying of consumers' goods and in foreign trade with the Co-operatives abroad. Milk and vegetables are good examples of products which the Co-operatives can handle very efficiently. In addition, there must be every encouragement for marketing and producers' Co-operatives in agriculture and light industry.

The third of the key sectors which we shall examine here is that of foreign trade. The Communist Party has consistently demanded that our trade must increasingly be directed towards those countries with a planned economy, the New Democracies and the U.S.S.R., and towards those countries with whom we can deal on the basis of reciprocal needs, the Colonies and the Dominions. Such an orientation will reinforce the measures proposed above for control of the wholesale sector. The needs of these countries are for the same products which are needed by the country at the present time, capital goods for industrialisation and consumers' goods of the non-luxury types, and concentration on their requirements will still further turn British industry towards supplying the needs of the people and away from luxury production for the rich of all countries. Trade on the basis of reciprocal needs with countries which have a planned economy will compel this country to introduce measures of planning, since delivery of goods can be guaranteed only by the concentration of orders for export by Government agencies, as the recent trade negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia have shown. As more and more countries plan their economies, planned trade will become increasingly a weapon for the international realisation of Socialism. Of particular importance for this country is the fact that capital goods supplied to

other countries can increase the sum total of the resources available : agricultural machinery sent to Yugoslavia and timber-cutting machinery and light rails sent to the U.S.S.R. will increase the amount of wheat and timber available for us

There is not space here to examine three other sectors of great importance—the engineering industry, scientific research and the control of investment. About the first two much has already been written, and it is necessary only to underline their key position. The problem of the control of investment in the private sector could be largely overcome by the proposal in *Britain's Plan for Prosperity* to enforce the lending of undistributed profits (which before the war supplied 83 per cent of industrial investment) to the State.

The last key sector which it is proposed to examine here is the State sector. Any plan must base itself in the first instance on the basic industries of coal, power, transport and iron and steel. Unless these are efficient and working to capacity in a planned way, no amount of control over the private sector can be effective. But we need to oppose the Labour Party's static conception of nationalisation as an end in itself, in our view, nationalisation is of importance in proportion to the degree of control and influence which it affords over the economy as a whole. In the Eastern European countries, where the State sector is large, this fact alone gives the State the effective initiative in economic affairs, but even in the earlier stages of planning in this country a relatively small State sector can afford a great degree of control over the private sector as long as it is used consciously for this end.

Nationalisation is one of those measures " which appear economically insufficient and provisional, but which in the course of the movement outstrip themselves " It follows that the strategy of extending the State sector is of particular importance. It is a commonplace of planning experience that no sooner has one bottleneck been overcome than one or more bottlenecks are found at a further stage of the productive process. The nationalisation of the basic industries of Britain is, in a very real sense, the removal of the first bottlenecks before planning for plenty can begin. In planning for the extension of the State sector we must have a clear forecast of where these bottlenecks are going to occur. For instance, once the bottlenecks in coal and iron and steel have been overcome by the reorganisation made possible as a result of nationalisation, it is to the engineering industry that we must turn our attention. It is obvious that bottlenecks are especially likely to develop in industries under monopolistic control.

Not only must the Government have a clear idea of where the next bottlenecks will occur, but it must already have reached out into that

sector. Control over the engineering industry must be seen as a preliminary to its nationalisation, and must be used in such a way that the State takes over a going concern instead of having to start from scratch in the reorganisation of the industry, as it has had to do in the case of coal and transport. There is another way in which the State can gain some measure of control in a sector which it is not yet prepared to take over, and that is by the establishment of a small State sector in an industry predominantly under private ownership. State competition with private industry can provide a great check on the efficiency of the private firms, a factor of special importance when a large part of production is to Government order. The Royal Ordnance Factories need to be extended as a deliberate part of this process of control over private industry, and, together with the Mobile Labour Force for building, they need to be seen as State reserves for overcoming bottlenecks. Similarly co-operative and local authority initiative must be encouraged. The conception of the Labour Party that an industry must either be nationalised *in toto* or left completely in private hands needs to be fought. The method adopted in Czechoslovakia of classifying firms to be nationalised by size rather than by industry is a useful example, which could be followed in certain cases here. The nationalisation of a few large firms in, say, the building industry could be of very great help in the control of that industry.

In addition, every advantage must be taken of the existing structure of industry to obtain bridgeheads in the private sector. For instance, the vertical integration of the iron and steel industry with engineering affords an opportunity to form a State sector in engineering when iron and steel are being nationalised. The financial integration of British industry must also be utilised in making the weapon of nationalisation as effective as possible. The importance of the nationalisation of the banks in Hungary lay in the financial and policy control over private industry which the State took over with the banks. Although the banks and other financial houses in Britain do not have the same degree of control over industry as on the Continent, they form an important sector, ripe for nationalisation. Even the right to appoint a director or two on the board of a firm as a result of an interlocking directorate must not be despised in the struggle to gain control of the economy.

Although many interesting sides of planning have been left unexamined in this article, it is hoped that enough has been said to show that the fight for planning is an integral part of the class struggle. In the hands of the Labour Government planning has been used to maintain the existing structure of society; in the hands of a Left Labour Government, backed by a mass movement of the people, planning can

be used as a "means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production," of transforming society.

THE "NEW LOOK" IMPERIALISM

An Exposition of Empire C. E. CARRINGTON (Cambridge University Press, 3/6).

At this time of crisis for Britain and the Empire, when a Labour Government under pressure of the independence movement is forced to make political concessions in order to maintain its domination, and when all imperialists from Bevin to Mosley are proposing new forms of exploitation of the African continent as the main hope of preserving the structure of British imperialism, *An Exposition of Empire* presents in moderate English terms Britain's mission to rule. In more exaggerated and mystical language, Rosenberg did the same for the Nazis in his book, *Myth of the Twentieth Century*.

After all that has been said and written about the essential character of imperialism, it might be thought that a modern version of the "white man's burden" is not worth attention, but is there not at the moment of its publication a controversy round the question. "Is Britain imperialist?" And has not the Prime Minister publicly denounced Russian statesmen for saying that Britain subjects other peoples to her political and economic domination?

The first chapter of the book is headed "What is the Empire?", and the last paragraph of it reads, "The benefits conferred by the British commercial practice may be judged by the growth of four great cities of Asia, Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, all of which are cities of refuge. All were neglected sites until neighbouring people flocked there to enjoy the blessings of British rule. Millions of Asiatics appreciated there what British energy had founded and British honour secured."

Superiority of "race" is given as the main reason why it was Britain and not Germany or Portugal that built the greatest empire.

"The British race excelled in sheer vitality . . . rarely has any one nation so patently led the march of progress; never before had any master race imposed itself by the action of individuals who went their way without the least reliance upon government support."

The author, explaining that bankers and governments in the past had a certain amount to say in directing the export of capital to build railways and ports and in securing strategic positions to defend what

had been won, concludes that the desire for new fields of investment was not the efficient cause of empire building, he attributes it to the "force of character" of solitary individuals, such as Gordon, Kitchener and Lawrence

With such an exposition of the origin and development of empire, there is no prospect of coming to grips with the character of the present crisis of empire and the role of the Labour Government. What is the real test of imperialism? Is export of capital still in process? What do the colonial development schemes mean? These are the questions which students of empire will want answered in order to judge the significance of Bevin's references to Africa. There is only one test that counts, that is the degree to which measures initiated by the Labour Government encourage and promote the struggle of the colonial workers and peasants for full national independence, democratic rights and a higher standard of living

Advances there have been in Burma, Ceylon and Malaya, but they have been won by struggle, yielded with resistance, and many strong points yet remain for exercising domination. Above all, the control and exploitation of raw materials remains

Africa is now looked to as the economic base and strategic hinterland of the Western European bloc. The Overseas Development Corporation is the characteristic instrument selected by the Labour Government. Characteristic because it has all the appearance of a project to increase the productive capacity of the colonies in general, but at the same time is endorsed by the imperialists as a scheme which, so far from excluding private enterprise, will "supplement" it, or rather be its handmaiden

Instead of the crisis becoming the occasion for an alliance of the British Labour movement and the colonial people against the imperialists in Britain and United States, the right-wing Labour leaders aim to use the resources of the colonial people to preserve the system of imperialism and build a bloc against the rising forces of Socialism

An Exposition of Empire is not just an old-fashioned throw back, it has, on the contrary, very much of the "new look" as worn by Bevin and Morrison.

BILL CARRITT

COMMUNIST REVIEW

MAY
1948

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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WESTERN UNION

WILLIAM RUST

THE CONCEPT Western Union, or United Europe, as it is more euphemistically described, has now become practical politics on a world plane and is an essential part of the war preparations of the Anglo-American Powers. But it also has an ideological foundation and the propaganda for it is linked with vague, humanistic aspirations calculated to appeal to the Labour and Liberal school of thought.

Even the worst of the warmongers do not disdain to resort to grandiose phrases regarding the role of a Western Union in the reconstruction of Europe as did Churchill in his notorious Zurich speech in September, 1946, when he followed up his Fulton oration with a declaration in favour of a United Europe "to recreate the European fabric—or as much of it as we can—and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in safety and freedom. Can these peoples of Europe rise to the heights of the soul and of the instinct and spirit of man? Let Europe rise! "

Zurich was a logical step after Fulton, for the creation of a Western war bloc in Europe is an essential part of the war preparations against the Soviet Union which Churchill first openly advocated in his Fulton speech. It was a not unexpected logic as imperialist politicians have always sought to build a broad front against the Soviet Union and Communism on the basis of the advocacy of the United States of Europe ever since the Russian Revolution of November, 1917.

The infamous Anglo-French "*cordon sanitaire*" against the young Soviet Republic was finally smashed because of the determined resistance of the Soviet people, the support they enjoyed among the working class of the capitalist countries and the differences between the capitalist Powers. Fundamentally for the same reasons the Hitler attempt to smash the Soviet Union and to establish his New Order in Europe also failed. But driven on by the economic and social forces which they are unable to control, the capitalist class inevitably return to the same vomit. Even at the height of the common struggle against fascism, Churchill was preparing for the new round of the fight against the Soviet Union after the defeat of Hitler had been accomplished. He delayed the opening of the Second Front in the West until the last possible moment and endeavoured to establish the Anglo-American forces in Eastern Europe with a view to holding back the advance of the Red Army.

This was so clear to General Franco that in October, 1944, when

the triumph of the Red Army was clearly assured, he wrote to Churchill making, in effect, proposals for a Western Union, based upon Britain and Spain, in order to deal with the "most serious and dangerous crisis in a shattered Europe." Franco has always sought to insinuate himself into the good offices of the Western Powers and the decision of the American House of Representatives to include Spain in the Marshall Plan, although subsequently reversed, is an indication that the existence of fascism is no barrier to co-operation and that they are fully appreciative of the point made in Franco's letter to Churchill that "Spain is a strategically situated country." In fact, Spain is regarded in Washington as the Southern base of the Western Union.

But it was not until Mr. Marshall made his speech at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, that the advocacy of the Western Union was transferred from the sphere of propaganda to that of *realpolitik*. Not that this was immediately clear. For some time the Marshall Plan held the field as a purely economic proposition applicable to the whole of Europe; an elaborate pretence was maintained that the door was open for the entry of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Only later were the real intentions of the American imperialists openly proclaimed as the formation of a military bloc against the Soviet Union based on turning Western Europe into a colony of American imperialism and using the Ruhr as the war base. So much has been openly proclaimed in Washington and on this side of the Atlantic regarding these war aims, beginning with Byrnes' notorious book, *Speaking Frankly*, that a real war hysteria has been worked up. Washington has even begun talking about the necessity of providing military materials on a Lend-Lease basis to the sixteen Marshall Powers in addition to the economic aid under the European Recovery Programme.

Speaking in the House of Commons on January 22 Bevin made his first official pronouncement in favour of the establishment of Western Union, which would eventually include Italy. This statement was garnished with the usual phrases about the ideals that united the "free nations" of Western Europe. Bevin declared that "our sacrifices in the war, our hatred of injustice and oppression, our Parliamentary democracy, our striving for economic rights and our conception and love of liberty are common among us all."

This statement was the prelude to the signing of the military treaty between Britain, France and the Benelux countries in Brussels on March 17. This treaty provides the military basis of Western Union and will be guaranteed by the United States, although probably not in an open form. Following the signature of the treaty it was authoritatively stated that it can be invoked should an armed attack take

place upon a government or if it is the victim of what is described as "political infiltration." It is also claimed that the treaty, for example, covers the protection of British troops in Greece, and that the signatories would be obliged to send aid in the event of an attack against them. It seems to be a treaty to cover all eventualities: chiefly it is a basis for the military alliance in the West, but it can be used to cover operations elsewhere and, in particular, to give armed support to the reactionary forces in a country where big social changes are taking place. In this connection it is obvious that the signatory Powers have Italy in mind.

To Social Democracy falls the chief task of concealing the real military and economic significance of Western Union and of decorating it with pretty flowers and charming phrases. And it is for this reason that although in fundamental agreement with the Churchill United Europe movement which is holding a conference at the Hague on May 7, they are insisting on the preservation of their own identity and the holding of a separate conference of the Western Socialist Parties in Paris on April 25. There will, however, be a connection between the two conferences in so far as Socialist leaders will be at the Hague in an individual capacity.

A number of Labour M.P.s, with the support of Tories, Liberals and Independents, have sponsored a Parliamentary motion which may be regarded as expressive of their general views on what constitutes a Western Union.

It opens with a declaration that "steps should now be taken in consultation with the other members of the British Commonwealth, to create in Western Europe a political union strong enough to save European democracy and the values of Western civilisation, and a trading area large enough, with the colonial territories, to enable its component parts to achieve economic recovery and stability." From this it goes on to support the Marshall Plan, and proposes the setting up of a Council of Western Europe to "co-ordinate the social, economic and defence policies." Their long-term policy is described as the creation of a democratic federation of Europe.

What in terms of political realities does all this mean?

As long ago as 1915, Lenin warned that the "United States of Europe is either impossible or reactionary under capitalism." Pointing to the fact that the great Powers of Europe possessed vast colonial resources, Lenin declared that:

"A United States of Europe under capitalism is equivalent to an agreement to divide up the colonies. Under capitalism, however, no other basis, no other principle of division is possible except force . . . Division cannot take place except in 'proportion

to strength.' And strength changes in the course of economic development . . . Of course, *temporary* agreements between capitalists and between powers are possible. In this sense the United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between European capitalists, but for what? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing Socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty against Japan and America."

Some of Lenin's historical references in this article are, of course, outdated, but his fundamental truths remain applicable to this day. Thirty-three years after these words were written we are witnessing the establishment of a temporary agreement to suppress Socialism in Europe on the basis of American military and economic domination of the Western Powers. But the Europe of 1948 is not the Europe of 1915. The forces of Socialism are immensely powerful and favourably placed to fight and defeat this temporary agreement of the capitalists. Against the Western Union there stands the power of the Soviet Union, the new democracies of Eastern Europe and the Eastern zone of Germany, which is in a process of being democratised. Within the Western Union are the mighty forces of the Communist Party, which are fighting against American domination, for peace and the realisation of popular democracy.

The motion sponsored by the Labour M.P.s ignores, of course, these realities, but it is not without significance that these apparently woolly-minded persons have a keen sense of realities where military matters are concerned. They actively support the Brussels Treaty and carefully include the proposal that the Council of Western Europe shall co-ordinate "defence policies." Tacitly, these Labour M.P.s accept the principle of American domination in Europe and the loss of sovereignty by the Western nations. Within the "political union strong enough to save European democracy and the values of Western civilisation" they accept fascist Portugal, the Catholic-dominated Government of France and the reactionary Governments of Italy and the Benelux countries.

All the talk about the formation of a trading area large enough "to enable its component parts to achieve economic recovery and stability" is so much deceitful phrasing as a brief examination of the facts will show. Apart from the fact that the terms of the Marshall Plan impose heavy military obligations on the participating Powers, as Britain knows to her cost, the kind of economic aid offered by the United States will be principally in the form of finished goods and agricultural produce, which will probably help the US to export its own unemployment, but will not assist the European countries in the reconstruction of their basic industries. Moreover, alongside this type of trading

relations there is taking place the penetration of American capital into these countries; this is to be observed in many industries.

The fundamental question of the relation between Eastern and Western Europe must also be faced. Obviously, those who support the concept of a Council of Western Europe are proposing the division of Europe into two parts, including the division of Germany. It is not a United Europe, but a Divided Europe that they are advocating. This contradiction they endeavour to surmount by advancing the long-term policy of a democratic federation of Europe with defined powers regarding the "planning of production, trade, power and transport." Admirable phrases for the deception of the innocent, but how can a future democratic federation of Europe begin to plan when the governments constituting the Western Union completely reject the principle of planned production?

At the commencement of the Marshall discussions strong emphasis was laid on the importance of East-West trade, whether or not the countries of Eastern Europe entered into the plan. Now the American Government has accepted an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill definitely aimed at erecting trade barriers in Europe and preventing East-West trade relations. It declares that European countries shall not use American material in the export of goods to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe if such goods are not listed on American export licences to the countries concerned. This decision gives American imperialism a further say in the trade policy of the countries receiving aid and will be used to impede trade within Europe. It is harmful to European interests in general, but more so to the Western countries which are not building planned economies as is the case in the East. By the operation of this decision Western Europe will be deprived of a large part of its grain, coal, fertiliser and timber.

But this may well suit American interests which seek to increase the dependence of Europe on American products and are attempting to enforce a trade boycott of Eastern Europe and have already threatened the cutting off of all supplies for Italy in the event of a Popular Front Government being returned at the General Election.

Far from assisting European recovery, the politics of the Marshall Plan will retard the progress of the countries receiving aid. The main road to recovery for all European countries, both East and West, is through the expansion of the production of capital goods, but to achieve this it is necessary to import from outside Europe far greater quantities of crude steel than was the case before the war. This point is made in the report of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe published recently. The refusal of the U.S. to export crude steel in sufficient quantities to Europe will slow down the entire production programme, the report states. On the other hand, the countries of

Eastern Europe, which are really working to a plan, are making steady progress, and their output of electricity, coal and oil is already much above the 1937 level. The report also states that if the Eastern European countries receive adequate supplies of tractors and agricultural machinery from the West they will be able to fulfil their plans and export considerable quantities of food to the Western Europe, thus relieving its dependence on the United States. And it adds that "trade with the Soviet Union tends to assist the industrialisation of the region, while German trade (in pre-war days) had the effect of retarding it."

The Socialist advocates of Western Union appear to be completely unable to grasp these simple economic facts, they are so blinded by their hatred of the Soviet Union and the new democracies, so fascinated by the power of the United States and so fearful of the growing influence of the Communist Parties in the West, that they have completely subordinated themselves to the war plans of American imperialism. One of the foremost advocates of this pro-American policy is Mr. R. H. Crossman, M.P., who displays a truly incredible facility for the weaving of the most fanciful Socialist phrases around the ugliest aspects of imperialism. His chief political aim is to pretend that acceptance of Marshall aid gives Britain the opportunity to follow an independent Socialist policy in Europe, to create joint planning machinery and to negotiate trade agreements with the Soviet Union. This he calls the creation of a Third Force in the international sphere. He also parades as his final aim an independent and united Europe.

All of this propaganda really amounts to apologetics for the Americans. They are such reasonable people, says Crossman, that they could be persuaded to accept the justice as well as the expediency of an independent Europe and to exclude Western Europe from their defence system. This stuff and nonsense is, of course, daily destroyed by the onward march of events and the brazen unfolding by the Americans themselves of their war plans, including the demand for war bases in Europe. But this does not deter Mr. Crossman. He wallows deeper and deeper in the mire.

A speaker on the Moscow radio has aptly characterised the role of the Socialist Parties of the West as "the European fifth column of American imperialism." There is little to add to this description. The advocates of Western Union are the advocates of the destruction of European independence, of preparations for war and the colonisation of independent nations.

SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

JOHN DAVIES

THE LABOUR ATTACK on the U.S.S.R. and on the Eastern European Republics generally is now concentrating on the ideological question of democracy. The position was stated clearly by Mr. Attlee in an address to the Oxford University Labour Club on February 13, 1948. He put it like this.

“Communism, tried on the Continent in an atmosphere of authoritarianism and brought to flower in the soil of Tsarism, has turned its back on civilisation. Our British Socialism, our Western European Socialism, has its roots in European civilisation, in humanism, in Christianity. It is idle to deny that there is a conflict between two ideologies—the totalitarian ideology and the democratic ideology.”

In an earlier speech on the B.B.C. (January 3), Mr. Attlee had made it clear that the U.S.A. belonged to the “democratic” camp:

“At one end of the scale are the Communist countries; at the other end the United States of America stands for individual liberty in the political sphere and for the maintenance of human rights.”

Here he was clearly followed by Mr. Bevin, who referred to the U.S.A. a week later in the House of Commons as “a young, vigorous, democratic people.”

In these speeches two points are of great importance. One is that the concept of “democracy” is used to attack what everybody knows to be workers’ and peasants’ movements in the East of Europe. The other is that the world is divided, not into Socialist and capitalist countries, but into “democratic” and “non-democratic.” It is obviously time that the Labour movement began to examine what is involved in the idea of democracy and what the word means.

The word democracy comes to us from the Greek. “Demos” means people. Democracy is the rule of the people. Aristocracy is the rule of the nobility. Plutocracy is the rule of the rich.

In the small city states of Greece in which the word democracy arose, all the “people” gathered together in popular assemblies to determine their affairs. They did not elect parliaments. The community

was small enough for them all to join in. Their idea of democracy was rule by the whole people.

It is important to add to this that by "people" they meant "the best people." Those who did the manual work of society, the slaves, were not regarded as people at all, and took no part in the popular assemblies. In the ideal Republic of Plato the unfranchised slave class was pictured as an essential feature of society.

This makes it clear at once that "democracy" is not a static idea fixed once and for all, but something which must change with any fundamental changes in society.

It would be possible to write at great length on the development of democracy in Britain and the changes that have taken place in the meaning of the word. The real roots of English democracy are to be found in the Civil War of the seventeenth century and the struggle for the predominance of the Parliament over the king. But this was not a democracy for everybody. It was a democracy for large land-owners and the rising class of merchants. It took two centuries of political and economic struggle to bring the vote to all adults and get any kind of freedom for the press, for trade unions, for Co-operatives and for women, all of which are integral to the modern idea of democracy.

Similar struggles have taken place in the United States of America, some of them successfully and some not. Two major wars have been involved, one for independence against Great Britain and one for the Union against the slave-owning South. It is out of these struggles that Lincoln's famous definition of democracy as "Government of the people, for the people and by the people" emerged.

Democracy is, as Lincoln clearly saw, the government of the people by themselves in their own interests. This is obviously a very difficult thing in a capitalist society, where the resources of society are privately owned, and where vast resources pour out perpetually a spate of propaganda designed to confuse the minds of the workers and to prevent them extending democracy into the sphere of economics. It is obvious that wherever the workers do this and form a new kind of society, a Socialist society, just because it does express the "will of the people" it will cease to express the will of "the best people," and the forms of democracy will begin to change.

This is to be expected, and it is precisely what has happened in the U.S.S.R. A movement of the people to create a society in which different nations can live together peaceably and own in common the resources of society has produced its own political forms. The objection to the U.S.S.R. does not arise from its political forms. It arises from the fact that it has abolished the private ownership of capital. Those who object to its thorough-going Socialism and the challenge it pro-

duces would get little support if they attacked the U.S.S.R. because it has established social ownership. Another argument has to be found.

It is true that they vote and have elections. This cannot be objected to. The franchise is universal. There can be no objection here. What then? They do not have two parties. Here is a difference from British democracy. Let this, then, be the ground of the objection. Consciously or unconsciously, this is the way the argument has proceeded, to establish the idea that the British two-Party system was the peak of democratic achievement. It had to be pictured as something eternally valid. It is true that Gilbert had written:

"... and every child that's born into this world alive
Is either a little Liberal or else a little Conservative."

Very few Liberal children are now being born. That part of the picture, however, could easily be changed, and a new eternal picture be presented of Conservative—Labour. In America it would have to be Democrat—Republican. Provided there was an *opposition* all would be well.

The actual history of the rise of the two-Party system in England is not a pretty one. During the Civil War, "Cavalier" and "Roundhead" had fought each other. After the Restoration, the real principles which had divided them were forgotten as, under the names of Whig and Tory, they intrigued for place and position. It was possible for Milton's works to be banned by the public hangman with no effective protest being made from either side. The Hydes and the Danbys had no belief in democracy. Even the moderate and aristocratic democrat, Algernon Sidney, had to go to the scaffold in their society. Tory belief in monarchy did not really stretch to Dutch Wilham, Whig tendencies to republicanism could be placated if the king exercised his patronage in the right direction. Was Bolingbroke or Walpole the greater democrat? It is an idle question. Neither would own the word. Wherever they might differ they would agree in opposing any real movement of the people.

It was the Liberal Sidney Low who pointed out (*The Governance of England*) that the result of the Party system and a Party Cabinet was that the Cabinet was not the nominee of either the House of Commons or of the country, but of a portion of the House and a portion of the electorate. So it does not in any full sense represent the people. The Privy Councillor in his oath swears to keep the secrets of the State and not to divulge them to the people, and to preserve the monarchy and its dignities. The Cabinet, in fact, is a secret committee with no secretary, no quorum and no records. That is why in its formative period it was bitterly assailed as the negation of democracy.

The British system of government is really a complex of elements of democracy, monarchy, aristocracy and plutocracy. The last, by means of the control of press and propaganda by the wealthy, although it has no "constitutional" existence, is one of the most powerful elements in the present British scene. The most vaunted part of the whole system, Party government, has only been vaunted to its present stature since it became necessary to find a stick with which to beat the Russians.

As recently as 1904 Low was able to write:

"The Party system is treated as something exceptional and a little discreditable. Men may be willing to die for Party, but they seldom praise it. For two centuries Englishmen, while throwing an incredible amount of ardour and energy into their great faction fight, have systematically condemned it . . . From the great Duke of Marlborough, who towards the darkening close of his career declared that he had no wish in the world except to live in some country where the detested names of Whig and Tory were unknown, to the present day, there has been an unbroken stream of theoretical condemnation. No sentiment is likely to elicit more applause at a public meeting than the statement that, 'this, Mr. Chairman, is not a Party question, and I do not propose to treat it from a Party standpoint.'"

More often than not, if it is to be made effective, the will of the people, which is the essence of democracy, has to find a way to break through despite all the Parties, whether Democrat, Republican, Liberal, Labour or Conservative.

Fundamentally Parties arise to reflect class interests. As a new class comes to dominate the scene, so a new Party may be expected to dominate the scene. When that new class represents the overwhelming majority of the people we necessarily come nearer to democracy than ever before. Lenin, in *State and Revolution*, argued that for this reason a Socialist State would be more democratic than the bourgeois State that preceded it. To Lenin the working class was the real champion of democracy.

Any Parties that exist in a Socialist State will reflect the classes that exist in that State. As classes are either overthrown or cease to exist, the Parties that once represented them will vanish. The same is true of the forms of government. As the present Minister of Food once put it:

"If we change our economic system from capitalism to Socialism we must make a corresponding change in our political

institutions. For our existing political institutions are inseparably associated with our existing economic system." (*Theory and Practice of Socialism.*)

Russia did this. Having decided to become a Socialist country, she abolished a monarchy and an aristocracy and a plutocracy. Since the rich man could no longer run the newspapers, organisations of workers did so. (This is now held to be undemocratic.) Soviets (Councils) sprang up from the soldiers, workers and peasants, and seized power. The peasants took land. The workers occupied the factories. This expression of a people's will received its last political form in the Constitution adopted in 1936. This Constitution itself was only adopted after a nationwide discussion which had caused expressions of approval, disapproval, or suggestions for amendment to be sent in from every part of the country.

Nobody could read this Constitution and deny its democratic character. It makes the franchise universal at the age of eighteen. All Soviets are elected directly. The ballot is secret. A newly-elected Soviet of a Republic or Supreme Soviet elects its Council of Ministers (the executive government) and the Presidium (a body holding the powers of a Presidency in Commission). The Supreme Soviet is composed of two chambers. One is elected on a territorial basis, the other on a basis of nationality. So whereas the Russians have a majority in one chamber they are in a minority in the second chamber. The many non-Russian nationalities cannot therefore be dragooned by the majority. Legal officials, too, are elected.

There are elements here which are obviously more democratic than parts of the British system. All attention is therefore focused in speeches such as Mr. Attlee's on the fact that there is only one Party. To state it so, however, is to misunderstand the development of history. The capitalist-Socialist argument having been settled (as the feudal-capitalist argument was once settled in this country), the only Party to survive the struggles involved, the Communist Party, has become an association for civic leadership, a body of those prepared to give their time not simply to understanding their world, but doing the hard work of transforming that world.

But these are not the only people who may be elected to office. Any citizen may be nominated in any election. Certainly in local and district Soviets the non-Communists often outnumber the Communists. One last objection is made at this point. If there is no *opposition* candidate, how do we know that the candidate elected really represents the people? The answer is, that no candidate may be elected who does not command an absolute majority of the electorate (not simply the votes cast) in his or her constituency. Even then, if he or she turns

out to be unsatisfactory the electorate has the right of recall. In local elections held in the U.S.S.R. in January and February this year, the vote cast against the "bloc of Party and non-Party candidates" ranged from 1.3 to 0.4 per cent. In 84 constituencies the candidates polled less than 50 per cent of the votes and new elections had to take place.

This means, however, that the overwhelming majority of the people are behind the Government, that the Government really represents the will of the people. Thus, of course, is what Hitler found. It was in conflict with the inflexible will of the entire Soviet people that his armies perished. It is the same fact that causes the perturbation today.

If the Soviet Government were not democratic, that is, if it did not represent the unshakeable will of the Soviet people, there would be less excitement in sections of the world press today. It is precisely because it represents so solid a barrier to certain aspirations, which are hardly democratic in their conception, that it is today the victim of the attacks of all the "historic" Parties.

THE CONTROL OF MONOPOLY

JOHN EAST

IN *Let Us Face the Future*, the Labour Party promised "public supervision of monopolies and cartels with the aim of advancing industrial efficiency in the service of the nation. Anti-social, restrictive practices will be prohibited." Nearly three years, however, have passed before the introduction of the Monopoly (Inquiry and Control) Bill.

A monopolist is, literally, a single seller. Under conditions of "perfect" competition, there are many sellers, no single one of which controls a sufficient proportion of the total supply in a particular market to be able to influence significantly the price, and there is freedom to enter the industry. At the other end of the scale, under complete monopoly, there is one seller, and no one else can enter the industry. The monopolist can, therefore, fix the price at the point which suits him best in order to maximise his profits, this power in turn depending largely on the elasticity of demand for his products (i.e., the extent to which a change in price affects demand).

Now, although the bourgeois economists have only recently "discovered" it, there was rarely even a century ago much "perfect competition," and certainly none today; while complete monopoly is very rare. What does exist is increasingly "imperfect competition." In other words, monopoly power is playing an increasingly dominant role. This means that single firms or groups of capitalists are able to

control sufficient of the supply or potential supply of their products to fix output and price as a means of increasing their profits. As Lenin put it:

The transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most important—if not the most important—phenomena of modern capitalist economy . . . Cartels come to an agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment, etc. They divide the market among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced, they fix prices; they divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc. (*Imperialism*, chap. 1.)

The development of a theory of "imperfect competition" is loudly claimed as one of the great developments of "modern" economics. Much precision has been given to the point at which prices will be fixed in order to maximise profits according to whether there are one, two or several sellers; to the supposed reactions of one seller in the light of the actual or expected behaviour of a second; to the assumed conditions of demand, and so on. Unfortunately, as a recent writer has reminded his colleagues, empirical inquiry as to business men's pricing methods has shown that actual behaviour cannot be analysed in terms of the marginal curves drawn for their benefit. The same writer (Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly," *Economic Journal*, September, 1947), after a devastating analysis of the comparative futility of this type of analysis, ending with refreshing recognition of the fundamental importance of Lenin's contribution, points out that "students of modern monopoly theory tend to become enormously worried about the excess capacity of the small oligopolistic shop, while they do not even realise the danger of a clash between the big world oligopolies."

The truth is that modern theory, while it has made an important negative contribution in exposing the complete unreality of the "perfect competition" theory which ruled until recently, and some positive contributions in classifying the types and behaviour of monopoly, has failed completely to get to grips with the real nature of monopoly capitalism.

Monopoly can only be understood as a stage of capitalism and an inevitable historical development of competitive capitalism. For a century, until about 1870, there was an era of free trade, free competition and industrial capitalism. During the next thirty years, until 1900, there was a steady change to protection (in Britain on a limited scale until much later), monopoly, and finance capital. During this period accumulation proceeded apace. There were marked technical developments, both in iron and steel and engineering, where large units became a technical necessity, and in textiles, where the motives were

purely commercial. In the latter part of the preceding hundred years there were certain significant legal changes needed to pave the way for monopoly capitalism. Thus, in 1844, there was a Company Registration Act; in 1855 and 1858, Limited Liability Laws were passed; in 1862 there was a codification of Company Law. All these changes facilitated the development of large companies in place of "one-man" businesses or partnerships.

During these three last decades of the nineteenth century, England's commercial supremacy was challenged: German, American and French monopoly capitalism all developed rapidly. By 1900, the epoch of monopoly capitalism, or imperialism, had begun, with its essential characteristics, monopoly, finance capital, the export of capital, the division of the world among international combines and the completion of the territorial division of the world. These inevitable developments were foreseen by Marx in 1867 (*Capital*, vol. I, pp. 639-645 and 789), but the complete analysis of the "highest stage of capitalism" was not completed by Lenin until 1916, when the nature of the process was clear.

Monopoly grows out of the accumulation of capital. As the accumulation process proceeds, the organic composition of capital, the ratio of constant to variable capital, increases. At the same time there is a growth in the ratio of the fixed capital part of constant capital to that part represented by raw materials. Both these tendencies lead to a rise in the average size of the productive unit, a feature of monopoly. The increase in the size of the productive unit actually comes about in two ways: first, there is the concentration of capital which is a normal accompaniment of accumulation and which leads to an enlarged quantity of capital under a single capitalist's control; secondly, there is the centralisation of capital, the process whereby large capitalists beat small and transfer more and more of an existing mass of capital into fewer and fewer hands. This process was originally facilitated by the development of the credit system and the formation of joint stock companies. Once more the furthering of monopoly was inevitable.

While monopoly in the general sense of the term is the inevitable accompaniment of large-scale industry, and therefore, in its first historical form, is simply the joint stock company, subsequent developments have produced many different forms of monopoly, of monopolistic or semi-monopolistic arrangement. Indeed, the big monopolists make use as a rule of a variety of devices [cf. "The Mechanics of Monopoly," D.H. (*Communist Review*, July 1947) for a study of the cement industry]. No classification can ever be complete, but it is worth while considering some of the main types of monopoly. First there is the Corporation, in which the majority of owners numerically have no control of the conduct of the business. The real controllers

are, however, large owners, who obtain complete control by means of non-voting shares, geared shares for voting purposes and big elaborate holding structures. Second, there is the "gentlemen's agreement," which means an informal, unwritten arrangement between two or more firms to share the market and maintain maximum prices. The capitalist is, of course, a "gentleman" only so long as it pays him to be one. Thirdly, there is the pool and quota system with written agreement to share the market, with penalties for exceeding quotas and compensation for those who fail to sell their quota. These arrangements are common in the textile industry. Fourthly, there is the cartel which adds fixed prices to the pool and quota system and is generally a more formal agreement with serious sanctions behind it. This device developed furthest in Germany and became compulsory in many industries under Hitler. It spread widely over national boundaries—in coal, steel, cement, chemicals and so forth. Fifthly, there is the Fidelity Agreement between manufacturers and distributors, whereby the former give the latter a substantial discount, paid on a deferred basis with a fidelity tie in exchange for an undertaking to buy only from ring manufacturers and, frequently also, to retain minimum resale prices. This device is common throughout industry. Sixthly, there are complete trusts or mergers, where the whole, or a majority, of an industry comes under the sole ownership of a single group, e.g., I.C.I., Unilever, Pilkingtons.

The steady growth of monopoly in all imperialist countries during this century is all too familiar, and especially the rapid development in America and Britain during the Second World War. What are the real effects of monopoly? Undoubtedly the monopolist can, and frequently does, restrict output and thereby raises prices. He can, and frequently does, buy up and suppress inventions and hamper technical development. It would, however, be quite wrong to suppose that it is as simple and mechanical as that; moreover, such a supposition leads straight to the reactionary conclusion that it is both possible and desirable to return to free competition. It is impossible, with modern technique, to carry on the provision of rail transport, the manufacture of iron and steel or heavy chemicals requiring large aggregations of capital, under competitive conditions. Indeed, one of the defects of modern "imperfect competition" is that, paradoxically, there is too much competition and not enough monopoly, so that there is restriction, a failure to realise the full economies of large-scale production or "increasing returns" and a chronic under-utilisation of capacity. More "competition" would make matters worse. Put in another way, it is obvious that costs and prices of steel today are less than fifty years ago, when there was far less monopoly in the industry. Similarly, although large monopoly trusts undoubtedly retard technical progress

as compared with what it would be without the restraint of capitalist relations, a combine like I.C.I. undoubtedly also carries on a great deal of research and fosters technical progress.

It was not for nothing that Lenin called imperialism, or monopoly capitalism, the highest stage of capitalism:

Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialisation of production. In particular the forces of technical invention and improvement become socialised. There is no longer the old type of free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with each other and producing for an unknown market . . . Skilled labour is monopolised, the best engineers are engaged . . . Capitalism in its imperialist stage arrives at the threshold of the most complete socialisation of production. In spite of themselves the capitalists are dragged, as it were, into a new social order, a transitional social order from complete free competition to complete socialisation. Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private property of a few. The general framework of formally recognised free competition remains, but the yoke of a few monopolies on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable. (*Imperialism*, chap. 1.)

The one common feature of every monopoly is that it is a device to increase profits; the first aim of every monopolist is to raise the rate of profit. However this is done, whether by restricting or increasing output, by raising or lowering prices, and whether the extra profit is obtained from other capitalists, from the colonies, or from the workers, is a matter of supreme indifference to the monopolist.

The profitability of monopoly today is there for all to see. At the same time, the colossal waste of monopoly capitalism, high productivity side by side with unemployment or under-utilisation of capacity, the waste of labour and resources in over-inflated selling organisations, the ultimate waste, futility and horror of war, is becoming increasingly apparent. What, then, can be done? What are the minimum steps which are necessary and urgent?

First, compulsory registration of all monopolistic devices, agreements and arrangements. Monopoly must be brought out into the full light of day. Pioneering work in exposing monopoly has been done by the Labour Research Department and, to a lesser extent, P.E.P. But much more is necessary.

Secondly, power must be taken to declare monopolistic agreements or arrangements in restraint of trade illegal, so that they can be prevented by Statutory Order.

Thirdly, price discrimination between customers and price maintenance must be capable of being stopped by Statutory Order

Fourthly, real measures must be established to control prices and profits, including inflated wholesale and retail margins, which allow so much unnecessary selling expenditure and competition by service.

Fifthly, and most important of all, steps must be taken to control or bring under national ownership the big powerful monopolies in steel, chemicals, heavy electrical industry, Vickers, Unilever, etc., which are holding the people to ransom, and which are the real sources of capitalist power.

It is in the light of a Marxist analysis of the real nature of monopoly, and of these minimum essential steps that the Government's Bill must be judged. Undoubtedly the appointment of a Monopoly Commission, to which *prima facie* conditions of monopoly are to be referred for a report as to the fact and whether or not they are in the public interest, will lead to an increase in public knowledge and awareness of the existence and methods of monopoly. On the other hand, the Government is not to be under statutory obligation to publish the report of the Commission, and no power is taken to register monopolistic arrangements.

So far as positive action is concerned, the Government is to be empowered to prevent by Statutory Order specific monopolistic arrangements and such devices as price discrimination, after an adverse report by the Commission. There is ample opportunity for delaying tactics or whitewash. First, the Government decides whether there is a *prima facie* case, and for this purpose the Bill is drawn widely enough. Second, the Commission has to produce an adverse report, and the chances of getting such reports depend very much on the composition of the Commission; the precedent set by the composition of working parties and national boards is not encouraging. Only then can the Government, if it can get an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament, take specific steps to stop monopolistic practices. There are no powers in the Bill to control prices and profits, or to bring under national control or ownership the big monopolies which really count.

The verdict on the Bill must therefore be that it is inadequate, and that such powers as are conferred are hedged round so that they are only likely to be used if there is a determined campaign by the Labour movement. Nevertheless, there have been howls from the Tory and "Liberal" press suggesting that the Bill can have some positive significance. In particular, the Tories are furious at the very proper exclusion of the nationalised industries and the practices of trade unions. On these two points the Government must be compelled to stand its ground.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE BATTLE OF IDEAS

SAM AARONOVITCH

*(Report to National Cultural Conference of the Communist Party,
April 11, 1948)*

THE BATTLE OF IDEAS is the battle of classes as it is fought out in men's consciousness. The scale of this battle is a measure of the deep crisis of capitalism throughout the world. There is no field of human activity where this crisis has not been felt, in science, education, literature, and art. Capitalism, weakened on a world scale, fears a second economic crisis of the capitalist world. It fears the astonishing victories of the organised working class and its allies which have withdrawn one quarter of the world's population from the orbit of imperialism.

The imperialists, with their base in the United States of America, are faced with the fact that they cannot destroy these forces simply by pressing a button. They must drag the *peoples* of the U.S.A., Britain and all Western Europe into war against the peoples of the Soviet Union and the New Democracies.

For America, the centre and mainspring of reaction, this requires the subordination of Britain. The Tories and the right-wing Labour leaders have so far been willing enough collaborators. But they, too, must face the fact that the British people have moved leftwards, and cannot easily be won for war, above all one directed against the Soviet Union. To win the British workers for such a war is now a decisive question for Wall Street and its British agents.

The battle of ideas in Britain is therefore of exceptional importance. It is a class fight against the reactionary capitalists at home. It is no less a national struggle to prevent Britain's subjection by the most powerful section of world capitalism—that of America. To win this battle in Britain means to wreck the plans of the warmongers, to make a great contribution to peace and the forward march of mankind.

Where is this battle of ideas fought? The battle is fought at the point of production in the factories and in the organisations of the Labour movement. It is fought wherever people meet in their leisure and discuss, in the pubs, the working men's clubs, in the parks and sports grounds. It is fought throughout the whole system of education for children and adults. And the battle is waged on a gigantic scale by the capitalists through their control over, and influence on, the radio, the films and in the national and local press.

Like that legendary figure, Proteus, capitalism takes on many shapes in order to escape its fate. None is more brazen than its appearance in the white cloak of pure democracy, defender of the absolute rights of the individual. The aim of the capitalists is to spread the idea of democracy and liberty as abstractions, above the class struggle and the struggle of class parties.

[*Comrade Aaronovitch dealt first with the argument that democracy cannot exist unless there are two or more political parties. He then continued.*]

Democracy and freedom are fine things, but democracy and freedom for whom? The rising bourgeoisie called for democracy and freedom. It enlisted the common people to fight for it—but when the battle had been won, democracy and freedom had become the property *not* of the people, but of the bourgeoisie—freedom for the capitalist to set up, in Marx's words, "naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation." We have in our own history the example of the English Revolution of the 1640s. A well-known Liberal wrote recently:

. . . the first Civil War from 1642 to 1646 was fought in the cause of civil and religious liberty. In Cromwell's words, his men knew what they fought for and loved what they knew. They fought for freedom first, but when afterwards they tried to define what they had striven for, all the difficulties began.

What were those difficulties which that Liberal writer does not begin to understand? They had arisen because capitalist property established by the Revolution had come into conflict with liberty for those who had fought for it. Rainborough, the Levellers' leader, put it well, though perhaps in irony, when he said:

"Sir, I see that it is impossible to have *liberty*, but all *property* must be taken away."

In the bourgeois epoch, the history of the struggle for democracy becomes increasingly the history of the working-class struggle against capitalism. In the course of this struggle, the bourgeoisie has many times been compelled to retreat, to concede and even bestow democratic rights, but whatever the form of State power, it seeks to preserve its content—the rule of the capitalists. The freedom which the bourgeoisie wishes to preserve is freedom for the minority, freedom (as in Britain) for ten per cent of the adult population to own more than ninety per cent of all property. Freedom for a small group of capitalists to own more than 99 per cent of the press. It is to hide this conflict between freedom for the majority and bourgeois freedom

that the capitalists inflate the conceptions, freedom and democracy, into abstractions without real content. Thus the Rt. Hon. Isaac Foot, President of the Liberal Party organisation, states :

"The fact is that everyone who has thought much about it has his own definition. Liberty is like love. No man falls in love precisely the same way as any other. No one personality is just like another, and liberty can never mean exactly the same thing for any two of us in this company today."

It is one of *our* most important tasks to show the *class* character of the struggle for freedom. When guided by Marxism the majority of the people try to make their own history, they are winning their liberty by their conscious understanding of the laws of social development. And by democracy they mean the rule of the working people, the immense majority of the nation, who will end exploitation and thereby secure liberty for the people.

The capitalists are now busy reviving the old shameless gag that Communists and fascists are both totalitarian and therefore both alike. Totalitarianism is generally understood to mean a great degree of State intervention in the life of the nation. We ask : what kind of State is this? In what way does it intervene? In whose interests does it act? The word "totalitarianism" does not tell us. If it did, the capitalists would not use it, since the whole purpose of its use is to confuse and conceal.

In fascist countries the State is the weapon of the monopolists; it intervenes to destroy the organisation and democratic rights built up by the working class and its allies; it instils into the people the doctrine of racial and national superiority. It destroys even certain bourgeois liberties in order to preserve the essential, primary bourgeois freedom—freedom to remain the exploiting class. And in order to conceal in whose interests this is being done, it deifies the State as a super-human, mystical power, embodying the "national will." We should note that in *all* capitalist countries, religious, philosophical and political beliefs are being fostered which substitute for the real community of class interests binding together individual workers, the community of interests of all, irrespective of class. This community is identified with the nation and with the capitalist State.

In a Socialist country like the Soviet Union, the State is the weapon of the working people, the overwhelming majority. It exercises the power which it draws from the people to destroy the inequality of races and nations; to teach a rational and scientific outlook on life and nature. It acts not simply to proclaim such rights and liberties as the right to work, leisure, education and so on, but to ensure that these can be fulfilled. This means it acts in order to build a Socialist economy

as the essential basis of these rights. Marxists have no need to deify the State. In capitalist and preceding societies they see the State as the instrument of class power, the power of an exploiting minority. The task of a Socialist State, however, is to defend the people from exploitation, to crush the exploiting class and to create a Communist society in which such an instrument will be unnecessary. And when that is done and the threat from without has gone, this State, in the words of Engels, will wither away.

We see, then, that the continual reference to Communism and fascism alike as totalitarian is a deliberate attempt to conceal the class character of both. Under the screen of combating totalitarianism, defending democracy, it permits the capitalist powers today to prepare for war *against* democracy and working-class advance.

I come now to the "Middle Way." The realities of life have made millions suspect the capitalist parties and their arguments. But their arguments now reappear under the auspices of right-wing Labour Party leaders as "Social Democracy," "Democratic Socialism," "Socialist Humanism," and so forth. "Neither capitalist exploitation nor Communist violence"—is their theme. "We cannot proceed," writes E. F. M. Durbin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Works, "by the Communist road to a better social order." Therefore they outline a "Middle Way" along which we are to be led by a "Third Force."

The "theories" by which they chart their "Middle Way" are object lessons in eclecticism. Durbin, in his book, *Politics of Democratic Socialism*, takes as his theme "Faith in moderation and search for agreement in the field of politics."

They sneer at theories of exploitation. Douglas Jay, Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, has written:

"Wages are the payment for work, of whatever kind; interest for awaiting the income from consumable capital . . . and profit for bearing risk. If this is true, it will be seen that there is a very serious confusion involved in speaking of 'profit' and 'surplus' . . . For these words imply that . . . 'profits' are somehow a payment for nothing. In fact, however, profit is a payment for risk-bearing in just as real a sense as wages are for work; and risk-bearing is just as necessary as work to the actual production of goods and services."

Here is the theoretical basis for the Government's defence of profits as part of its defence of capitalism.

"This Government," declared Mr. Creech Jones, Colonial Secretary, "is determined that in colonial administration it will be faithful to the ideal set in the past." Here is the justification for shooting ex-Service-

men in the Gold Coast while sending Diplomatic Notes to Eastern Europe.

We see in country after country that this Middle Way—paved with the theories of conciliation, of harmony, of continuity—leads in practice to harmony with the capitalists, to continuity of capitalist policy and the offensive against the working class. It is the "Way" of petit-bourgeois Socialists who hate the thought that it is the "uncultivated" working class which alone can lead humanity forward.

The ideological weaknesses of this "Third Force" are plain. First, they do not or will not see that the only way forward is the way to political power. Second, that the working class, with its allies, is the only force which can grasp political power and use it to advance to a classless society. Third, that the road to power is the road of class struggle and the building of a new State power that will serve the people. All other conceptions of Socialism have shown themselves to mean, as Lenin put it, "Socialism in words, imperialism in deeds."

The deepened crisis of capitalism has led everywhere to a tendency of capitalist classes, in face of the Socialist and working-class advance, to sell the national independence of their countries to the most powerful capitalist nation. Thus, today we are faced with the triple threat of economic, political and cultural subjection by the U.S.A. George Seldes, the American writer, after careful examination of the official data, writes that one thousand men control American policy. We may judge their outlook and that of the Democratic and Republican Parties by their treatment of the American Negroes. The Negro population is twice as large as that of Australia or Switzerland, more than double that of the Union of South Africa. Three-quarters of the Negro population of America is deprived of the right to vote. Jim Crow and the lynch law are the symbols of American democracy. If Negroes are forbidden to marry whites, equality is established by forbidding whites to marry Negroes!

The modern barbarism, sponsored by American capital, is now graced with the title "American way of life." A first component part of this way of life, is the turn to the mystical and supernatural. Assisted by the Legion of Decency, the Cardinal Hayes Literature Committee, the Roman Catholic hierarchy has invaded the cultural field with its cults of faith and medievalism. But they are not the only forces. As an American writer, V. J. Jerome, has noted:

"In detective stories, murder mysteries, comic strips, popular 'science' magazines, pulp magazines, radio programmes, movies, and children's comic magazines and radio hours, violence, kidnapping, horror, rape, murder, are the spiritual fare offered the people."

Here is degradation of human minds on a gigantic scale financed, not unprofitably, by American big business.

The racialism of real life is taught and dramatised. The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People have stated that "In dramatisation and newscasts, Negroes are seldom mentioned, except in the presentation of unfavourable facts out of context."

The "Aryan" fantasies of fascism are reborn in the American myth of Anglo-Saxon superiority. A survey of American magazines by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University showed in the words of a Digest:

(Anglo-Saxon) characters are written as intelligent, industrious, aesthetic, democratic, athletic, practical, frank, lovable . . . the non-Anglo-Saxons were usually pictured as the "villains," domineering, immoral, selfish, unintelligent, cowardly, lazy, sly, cruel, stubborn, non-aesthetic, weak.

Here are all the ideological accompaniments of a policy of aggression at the peoples within and the peoples of other countries. This is the way of life to which the floodgates are being opened in Britain. Our screens are dominated by American products. Everywhere lurid posters inviting us to see "Born to Kill," "Dark Passage," films in which, in Mr. Peter Ustinov's words, "Humphrey Bogart and Alan Ladd kick, punch, garotte, throttle, mangle and mince a battalion of stout men and women every year." In the new films agreement with the U.S.A. new possibilities have been given to the American film magnates to extend their control of the British film industry. At the same time, redundancy sweeps the British studios. What is at stake is whether the Americans will be able to destroy the independent British film industry as they have destroyed that in France.

Better concealed, but no less real, is the threat to our own native writing. Discussing weekly and monthly magazines, the Labour M.P., Mr. Skeffington-Lodge, stated in Parliament:

"Up to eighty per cent of the fiction published in this country is of American origin . . . It constitutes a veritable Niagara of piffle and slush, which hides the true America behind a façade of synthetic sentimentality, cheap cynicism and sex turned on and off like a tap . . ."

If the ruling ideas of America fill us with disgust, we see the contrast presented by the Soviet Union and the New Democracies. Cultural revolutions are under way in all these countries, inspiring and reflecting the changes being made in their economic and political life. In these

countries, economic and political power belongs to the overwhelming majority of the people, to those, in Tito's words, who do the useful work. The bourgeoisie has certainly lost its freedom to exploit or to restore exploitation. All forms of creative work are restored to their position as essential parts of the social and productive life of society, enriching and developing it.

In these countries they do not put the individual into false opposition to society; the State acts to bring about real individual liberty. In every field of Soviet life, for instance, we see the people themselves, in their organisations, through the Communist Party assist its intelligentsia, its writers and artists to eliminate from their work all traces of obscurity and contempt for the people. They ask that their writers shall help the march forward from Socialism to Communism; and since this demands a new kind of man, they ask the "engineers of the human soul" to help create him. This co-operation is the road to true human individuality. Yet in the sunlight of the people's advance, the Attlees, Hayeks, and Raymond Mortimers go about with guttering candles looking for "abstract" freedom!

In every capitalist country the fear of working-class advance leads to punitive attacks on the Communist Parties. This same fear leads the defenders of capitalism increasingly to attack what they have sought for generations to ignore—Marxism. Why is Marxism the open target of attack by reaction? Why is it the basis of advance where the people have triumphed?

First, because Marxism is the science of the working class in its struggle for political power and the building of Socialism. It teaches that the working class must establish its own State power if it is to advance to Socialism. Those who fear this advance attack Marxism.

Secondly, because Marxism is in its very essence scientific and rational. It is the enemy of superstition and racialism. Those who fear science attack Marxism.

Thirdly, Marxism assigns to man the ability to make his own history, the road to full individual freedom is the road of co-operation, to that society where, in Marx's words, "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Therefore, the pessimists and the cynics hate and attack Marxism.

We Communists will rebut these attacks. We point with pride to the achievements of Marxism abroad, and we shall make every effort to advance the theory and practice of scientific Socialism in our own country. But the attack on Marxism concerns not only the Communists.

At a time when capitalist governments begin to muzzle scientists, to divert a large part of our scientific resources to military purposes, to make the fruitful exchange of discoveries impossible, all scientific workers, in whatever field, should grasp the fact that the attack on

Marxism is meant to cover up the attack on scientific ideas, on all progressive work in the social sciences.

No amount of drivel in the popular and learned press can cover up the fact that monopoly capitalism increasingly shows itself an enemy of creative work, unable and unwilling to create the conditions for it. The serious dramatist today can hardly find a stage; screen-time and paper is devoted to sex and crime.

Scientific and creative workers, as well as the mass of the working class, have expected from the Government bold steps towards a cultural revolution. But this has no more happened than the revolution in political power. There have been certain solid advances, which, like the new Entertainment Powers for Local Authorities, have been won by those concerned enough to fight for these powers. J. B. Priestley had reluctantly to report that, "under a Labour Government, the property owner has more power and influence in the theatre than he has ever had before." (*Theatre Outlook*, p. 32.)

There is an indissoluble connection between the decay of capitalism and its treatment of the cultural and scientific needs of the people. That is why increasing numbers of theatre workers, artists, writers and scientists see that the decadence of capitalism is not accidental, but of its essence, and that to fight for the future of their work is, in fact, to fight against capitalism. If they will see in this light the true meaning of the witch-hunt in the Civil Service, the ceaseless red-baiting of the B.B.C., they will recognise that the attacks on Marxism and Communism are fundamentally directed against them too.

In the battle of ideas, we cannot separate the fight against the ideas of reaction and war from the struggle for greater democratic control of, and influence on, the institutions which originate and distribute ideas.

Therefore the Communist Party seeks, and must seek harder, to assist the professional workers to get the tools for the job; to help the Labour movement in its fight for increased opportunities for study and enrichment of leisure; but, as an essential part of all this, to see in what ways the organised working class, the trade unions and the co-operatives can begin to influence the Arts Council, the B.B.C., the machinery of adult education, yes, and the universities.

We welcome the British Theatre Conference, whose progressive resolutions constitute a landmark in the fight of British theatrical workers for a theatre that may truly serve and inspire the people. We welcome the call of the film workers to act in defence of the British film industry. We welcome the protest against the witch-hunt in the Civil Service made by the Executive of the Association of Scientific Workers, who recognise correctly, in their own words, that "if this policy is permitted to continue, further steps along this path will

inevitably follow, affecting workers in all other fields, causing widespread frustration in scientific work . . . ”

In all that we do, we must be aware: First, that in fighting the ideas of reaction and advancing those of Marxism, we fight not only in the interests of the working class, but of all intellectual and professional workers. These are our allies. Secondly, to the degree to which we are successful, we do not simply foil the plans of the warmongers; we also help to win the people for the decisive advance from capitalism.

[Comrade Aaronovitch then stated the main achievements and shortcomings of our organised work and outlined the main tasks. In conclusion, he said:]

Capitalism has been built and maintained on the misery and degradation of millions. It is not only we who say so. Ever since the beginning of the industrial revolution, every bourgeois writer whose name lives today has at one time or other, in his youth, if not in his age, brought this indictment against capitalism. In 1795, watching the progress of the industrial revolution, William Blake expressed the agony it brought to millions:

To cut off the bread from the city,
That the remnant may learn to obey,
That the pride of the heart may fail,
That the lust of the eyes may be quenched,
That the delicate ear in its infancy
May be dull'd and the nostrils clos'd up

And since Blake wrote we have experienced the years of mass unemployment, the means test, and the slaughter of millions in two world wars.

Today, what regard for humanity is to be found in the massive dungheap of popular crime and erotic literature which gets the paper denied to the classics, serious creative work and the textbooks? Cynicism and subjectivism are reborn. The logical positivists replace the analysis of objective reality with an analysis of words. Our way of life is to be found, says T. S. Eliot:

“ . . . not in movement
But abstention from movement . . . ”

Fear of knowledge, fear of science, fear of positive action; the rule of big business which prepares to destroy its enemies with atomic warfare—these are symptoms of a society rotten ripe for change. We must not be on the defensive.

Who, in fact, is for liberty, freedom, democracy, individual rights

and national independence? Is this not *our* fight? And who stands for the rule of an exploiting class, for colonial oppression, for the sale of our national independence to Truman and Marshall? Is it not big business and the right-wing Labour leaders?

Let this conference, then, be a call to the workers in industry and the professions to take the offensive in the fight against the ideas that would hold back the world; in the fight for peaceful development and for a democratic people's culture, that would inherit and extend the great achievements of our country.

"THE IRISH PROBLEM": A REPLY

R. A. STEWART

YOUR CONTRIBUTOR, S. Paul Locke, in his article "The Irish Problem," has presented to your readers, albeit in an interesting manner, a parody of the Irish question, both from the historical standpoint and from that of the practical tasks facing our working-class movement and its allies in the present period. Perhaps his most glaring error is his failure to bring out and underline the responsibility of British imperialism for the partition of our country. No analysis purporting to be Marxist can omit some treatment of the role of the British ruling class and the interconnection of the class struggle in Britain with the national question in Ireland.

The situation in Britain prior to the first imperialist world war, with the rise of the trade union and Labour movement, the apparently radical legislation introduced by the Lloyd George Government, and the danger of a union of the British class struggle with the Irish national struggle, has reduced Tory reaction to a state of rage and fear for the security of their class privileges. Therefore they saw in the dying remnants (including religious sectarianism) of past struggles in Ireland a heaven-sent opportunity which, if organised correctly, would help them to bring down their political opponents and secure the ascendancy of Tory reaction throughout the British Isles. With British imperialism entering its period of decline and facing its greatest struggle in the international field, the Tories, led by Sir Edward Carson (British Solicitor-General from 1900 to 1906) and with the backing of the leadership of the Army and Navy, were only partially successful. However, the country was cut in two and a Tory stronghold established in the North.

Paul Locke's failure to grasp, in the main, British responsibility for partition, results in his wrong presentation of the problem and his

emphasis on basically reactionary twaddle about "religion" and "race." He says nothing about the nature of the Unionist Party and the means of isolating and defeating it; nothing about the Anglo-American imperialist bloc and the drive to war. What a travesty of Marxism! The relative weakness of the Irish Labour movement (due principally to the very existence and the success of the Tories in maintaining their stronghold) and its failure to make rapid progress seems to have warped the thinking of certain comrades.

Before passing to what, in our view, is the Communist approach to the concrete situation facing us today and the tasks arising therefrom, it might be as well to touch on Paul Locke's "only correct" solution for the Irish problem. Listen to this: "The acceptance of the objective of a Socialist Federation of Eire, Britain and Northern Ireland by the progressive forces in Ireland, North and South, would make a dead letter of the Border and the partition issue, and would turn the minds of the people from issues that divide them on religious lines to issues that would divide them on class lines." Not often is so much nonsense contained in so few words. According to this, the Labour Parties write into their constitutions that their object is a Socialist Federation, then, lo and behold, the Border (mark you, a border between two States created in civil war) becomes a "dead letter," "religious issues" disappear and "people divide on class lines." The reader may ask, what about the domination of the Tory Unionist Party and of the Marxist view that State constitutions are formed in class struggles and are the legislative formulations of the stage reached in that struggle? To us, as Comrade Locke must agree, the issue is never one of abstract constitutional principles in an imaginary world, but of concrete class alignment in the real world. Surely no serious-minded Irish worker will agree that this kind of thing is "developing Connolly's Socialist theories and principles into the new era of the division of Ireland"?

The main tasks facing us can be briefly stated, namely, to end partition, that running sore in the body politic, and to keep our country out of the Anglo-American imperialists' Western Bloc. How can these aims be achieved and on what forces are we to rely for their attainment? First, on the great British working-class movement, with its Communist vanguard, the chief gravediggers of British imperialism; secondly, on the anti-partition movements in Britain and Ireland; thirdly, on Eire and its Labour and Republican movements; and lastly, on the Northern Ireland Labour movement. The task of the anti-partition movements in Britain, Eire and Northern Ireland is to raise the question of partition more sharply and lift the agitation to a new level, with the aim of forcing a declaration against partition from the British Government and the withdrawal of British support from the

Tory imperialists. The anti-partition movement in Northern Ireland has a special role in mobilising nationalist opinion in the North to assist in compelling the Dublin Government to make a new and more militant approach to Britain. Partition being the remaining outstanding issue between Britain and Ireland, the wider the struggle for its end, the greater the likelihood of Eire not becoming part of the imperialist Western Bloc.

A word on the recent Eire election may be in place here. As your readers may know, this general election resulted in the defeat of the Fianna Fail Party, led by De Valera, and the creation of a new Government composed of Fine Gael, Labour, Republicans and Farmers. The largest and dominant section in this strange collection—the Fine Gael Party—represents the big capitalists and the Western Bloc. Associated with this Party in the new Government is the independent, James Dillon, rabid reactionary and anti-Soviet propagandist. The weakness in principles and policy of the Irish Labour and Republican movements can be gauged from their participation in a Government of this nature. The fact that partition was not a central issue in the election shows a willingness to co-operate with British foreign policy in support of the imperialist and anti-democratic camp.

The Labour movement cannot solve partition by formulating policies and drafting constitutions which will be acceptable to both Northern Protestants and Catholics, as Northern Protestants and Catholics. On the contrary, the Labour movement has a special task which it alone can perform, namely, to smash the grip of the Unionist Party and break the hold which the capitalist-landlord leadership of this Party has over the mass of the Protestant workers and farmers in Northern Ireland. Most English people, like Locke, do not understand the nature of this Party, with its mass character, its widespread auxiliary organisations such as the Orange Order, the Masons, the British Legion, the clergymen in the Protestant churches, and many other organisations and public bodies; and the tremendous effort yet to be made by the Labour movement in smashing the Unionist Party's control of the Protestant masses through these organisations. The fact must also be borne in mind that although the mass of the Protestants vote Unionist, this does not signify a fully conscious support of reaction, but expresses their desire to maintain the British connection, which placed them in a privileged position in the past.

What line do we adopt to achieve our purpose? Our propaganda is and has been directed to exposing the economic interests represented by the Tories (Unionists)—the essentially ultra-Conservative reactionary content of the Unionist Party. We point out that the Unionists are for union with British imperialism, are agents of the British Tories and violent opponents of the progressive, economic and

social legislation introduced by the Labour Government, and that all their talk about unity with the British people is only a façade or smokescreen to deceive the workers. When the Labour Government was returned, the Brooke Cabinet immediately discussed the whole question of remaining in the United Kingdom, and a campaign was led by McCoy, Unionist M.P., advocating Dominion status for Northern Ireland. This is very far from the "crystallisation and stabilisation" of which Locke writes. The opposite is the actual fact. The imperialists in the North are faced with the problem of finding a line in this period of imperialist crisis. Their problems will increase in difficulty with the sharpening of this crisis and with further progress of the working class in Britain. Locke wishes us to view the *status quo* as being very firmly established. The imperialists are wiser and know the actual position much better. Locke forgets the number of votes cast against the Unionist Party in the last General Election and in the Local Government elections, the agitational work that is being done on the failure of the Tories to tackle the housing problem, on education, on prices and the cost of living, in the trade union and Co-operative movements, and in countless other ways. He forgets all these positive features and wallows in the mire of defeatism and lack of faith in the working class.

Our comrades are firmly treading the true Marxist road—the road of class struggle on the day-to-day issues affecting the lives of the people and the exposure of the contradictions of the Unionist Party; and decisively reject schematic reasoning masquerading as Marxism. We cannot foresee exactly future developments; but one thing is sure: the factors are forming for a great democratic advance in Northern Ireland. The ruling class are still "able to govern," but much less confidently and firmly than they have done at any time since they were set up in their Tory stronghold a quarter of a century ago.

COMMUNIST REVIEW

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The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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IMPERIALIST WAR PLANS CAN BE DEFEATED

J. PAUL

SPEAKING to the Nine-Party Conference last September on the danger of a new world war, Zhdanov said: "The main danger now for the working class is the under-estimation of its own forces and the over-estimation of the forces of the enemy." Since then the Anglo-American imperialists have gone ahead at a tremendous pace in their war preparations. The Western European military alliance has been signed and a permanent Joint Military Committee of the Western Powers has been set up with headquarters in London; preparations for conscription in the U.S.A. have gone ahead; large increases in military expenses, running into thousands of millions of dollars, have been voted by Congress; Western Germany, Iran, Turkey, etc., are being turned into American war bases. More and more the claims that all these are defensive measures are being dropped. The enemy, Soviet Russia, is openly named, and everything is being co-ordinated and prepared for an aggressive war against the country of Socialism.

Are Zhdanov's words still true, or is it already too late to stop the warmongers? Is it still true that

"the forces that work for peace are so considerable, so large, that if these forces are steadfast and resolute in the defence of peace, if they display stamina and firmness, the plans of the aggressors will be *completely defeated*"?

For the development of our peace campaign it is of great importance that there should be no doubts, no hesitation among us that the answer still can be, and must be, emphatically affirmative

Comrade Palme Dutt, in his statement to the Executive on April 10, described the new world situation in the following words:

"Today there is only one war camp. There is a *one-sided* war drive. The single war camp embraces all imperialism, with its contradictions inside that camp."

This statement points to the absence of several imperialist camps opposed to each other, to the polarisation of the imperialist war camp around the U.S.A. But at the same time it contains a warning against the over-estimation of the forces of this camp, against the defeatist view that the contradictions of imperialism have been overcome and that the imperialist camp can now go ahead, united and unrestrained, towards war against the Soviet Union.

What are the contradictions within the imperialist camp?

They are fundamentally the same as have existed ever since imperialism came of age. But there has been a shift in the relative importance of these contradictions, and therefore they no longer appear in the same forms.

Today the fundamental contradiction within the imperialist camp is its dependence on the people. It is not an independent camp, free to carry out any policy it chooses, either in the economic or in the political and military field. For the democratic anti-imperialist forces are not confined within the frontiers of the Soviet Union or the Eastern European countries. The democratic camp extends throughout the capitalist countries, including the centre and bulwark of the imperialist camp, the U.S.A. The ruling class cannot carry out its war plans without solving the problem of how to win the co-operation in, or at least the passive acceptance of, that policy by the people.

In the past the imperialists have relied on two means to overcome this problem, Social Democracy and fascism. The First World War was made possible thanks to the betrayal of the working class by its Social Democratic leadership in Britain, France and Germany; the Second World War, thanks to fascism. It is clear that today, after the victorious war against fascism and the great weakening of Social Democracy in the majority of European countries, these means have become less "reliable"

The American warmongers, in their attempt to whip up war hysteria, and to rally the weaker capitalist countries and their peoples to their policy, try to convince the public and themselves that today, with the existence of the atomic bomb, this problem no longer exists, that today a war can be fought without the peoples, or even against their will. The more sober technicians among them, however, have already found it necessary to warn them of the "dangers" of this sort of wishful thinking. General Eisenhower, giving evidence before the American Senate Armed Services Committee on April 2, declared:

"There is no immediate possibility of inter-continental push-button warfare . . . The whole process of the security programme is to provide manpower."

In other words, a third world war, if it is to be more than a desperate outbreak of folly, needs to be preceded by a solution of the problem of winning the co-operation of the peoples, or at least of silencing their opposition. Before a new world war becomes possible, the democratic front has to be defeated at least in the major capitalist countries, in order to transform them into effective war bases against the Soviet Union, and to provide the manpower for the imperialist camp.

The difficulties of achieving this are already abundantly clear in two countries which have been designed as such bases by American imperialism: Greece and China. And in two other countries, France and Italy, the imperialist camp has not accomplished even the first stage of the problem, the elimination of the Communist Parties as a major political force commanding the support of the majority of the active popular forces.

The opposition of the peoples in the capitalist countries, the difficulties of winning them over to the imperialist camp, and of inducing them to abandon their struggle for democracy and peace—this is the main contradiction within the imperialist camp and the main obstacle to a new war.

This does not mean that the other contradictions of capitalism have disappeared and that there is now a prospect of developing capitalist production without major crises, or of achieving complete harmony among the different capitalist groups and countries. On the contrary, these other contradictions are already powerfully contributing to the dilemma of the imperialist camp. But today they no longer play the same role as in the past, they are no longer independent from the main contradiction, the contradiction between the imperialists and their peoples.

In the U.S.A., in spite of the highest-ever peace-time budget for military expenditure, the economic crisis is developing. Millions of unemployed, reduced standards of living, anti-trade union laws, the attempts to make the working class bear the whole brunt of the crisis, all this is not making it easy to win over the people to the plans of reaction. On the contrary, it is sharpening the class struggle and strengthening the forces which work for democracy and peace. In other capitalist countries this development is even more apparent. In France, Italy, Greece, etc., the ruling classes, unable to offer the people anything but starvation, unemployment, black market and the prospect of crisis, are not in a very favourable position to persuade them to follow their leadership in the crusade against Socialism.

It is equally clear that the rivalries between the different capitalist groups and countries have not disappeared. The Marshall Plan contains tremendous and insoluble contradictions between the giant American trusts and the Marshall-aid countries which are being transformed into colonial markets and dependencies of the U.S.A. Comrade Rust gave us a masterly analysis of this aspect in last month's *Communist Review*.

The difficulty the American capitalists are finding in their efforts to rally other capitalist countries to their camp appear very distinctly in the colonial countries. In most of these countries only a very small minority of landlords, big capitalists and professional hirelings have

joined the imperialist camp. The majority of the national bourgeoisie, whose political and economic development has been deliberately hindered by imperialism, are reluctant to join this camp. They are not necessarily interested to combat the popular forces of their countries, since these forces stand for national independence and economic development.

The reactionary minority governments in these countries are sitting on a powder barrel, and the fact that they have to unmask themselves more and more as the agents of imperialism does not make them more popular, nor even make them feel more secure.

The problem of the colonial and semi-colonial countries is important in two respects. First, because most of these countries have been assigned the role of military bases in the imperialist war plans (the Middle Eastern, Far Eastern, East African countries, etc.). Secondly, because they reveal with particular sharpness the difficulties of the imperialist camp. These peoples who still fight for their elementary democratic and national rights, and who have a long experience of imperialist oppression, clearly demonstrate how broad is the front of popular opposition to the imperialist war camp. And there is no doubt that also in the other capitalist countries, especially the Marshall countries, the struggle for peace will increasingly merge with, and be strengthened by, the struggle for elementary democratic rights and national independence, though, of course, the struggle will take very different forms, according to the conditions and characteristics of each country.

By what means does the imperialist camp attempt to solve its contradictions?

First, by the war drive itself: by the attempt to scare the capitalist countries and their peoples into submission to American imperialism: by giving reaction in these countries and in America itself an *alibi* for the suppression of democracy and for the policy of guns instead of butter.

Secondly, by the hysterical anti-Communist propaganda which is designed to confuse every issue: the warmongers try to make the peoples believe that the next war is inevitable, to make them lose their faith in the struggle for democracy and progress and forget their past experiences and victories in that struggle. They deliberately create the misery, anarchy and cynicism in which new fascist ideas and movements can be bred. That is what makes the war danger a real one. To escape its inevitable doom, the imperialist camp is throwing in all its resources to destroy morally and materially the forces of democracy. There is, therefore, the danger that in their frenzy they may even ignore the warning of their more sober "technicians." This is why the fight of the peoples for peace is an urgent, vital task.

But in spite of this danger, we have every reason to be confident in the victory of the democratic camp in the struggle for peace. The apparent unity and might of the imperialist camp conceals insoluble contradictions. War, destruction, misery, corruption and fascism is all it has to offer. All its plans go against the peoples. The peace-loving peoples of the world are a mighty and growing force. If we succeed in building a solid united front for peace, if we can link the struggle for peace with the struggle for democracy, for reconstruction, for the future all peoples are striving for so eagerly; if we can inspire this front with confidence and give it consistent leadership in this struggle, we shall be an invincible force.

UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS

M.K

WHEN IN June, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations was signed at San Francisco, people felt that a new age of international co-operation was at hand. Their experience of the unity in which the great allies fought through to victory the war against fascism made them long to see that same friendship continue into the years of peace. That was what the United Nations meant to the man in the street in 1945. What does it mean to him today? Today, it means cynicism and despair. The atmosphere in which the statesmen of the world meet is charged with distrust and deadlock. Why has this change come about?

The British capitalist newspapers and the B.B.C. repeatedly state that the whole reason for the poor showing of the United Nations is the wicked obstinacy of Soviet Russia. "Russia says NO" "Russia uses the veto on the Security Council in order to prevent settlement of disputes." "Russia is secretly fomenting aggression." There is no end to the accusations. But the United Nations can succeed only by greater understanding of the motives behind the actions of its members and greater grasp of the dangers which they see in the world today. James Klugmann, in a recent article in *Communist Review*, has clearly shown that actions taken by the Soviet Union are not actuated by "obstinacy," still less by devilish cunning, but by a determination to struggle for the rights of the people, and for the implementation of international agreements duly signed. It would be useful to look at some of the actions of the United States Government, and consider how they are affecting the development of a real United Nations—which, based as it is on the co-operation of the greatest powers in the

world, seems to represent the only hope that ordinary people will live out their lives in peace.

Every move made by the U.S. Government is heralded by an hysterical press as "a move to get tough with Russia," to "get on top of the Reds," to "show that America can atom-bomb the cities of Europe out of existence." But all this frenzy—which never fails to chill the spine of the visitor to the U.S.A. and must be assumed to condition to some extent the minds of the American newspaper-reading public—is conveniently explained away as unofficial, as an example of freedom of the press. Suggestions such as were made, for example, by Vyshinsky in the First Committee of the U.N. Assembly, that official action be taken to curb such propaganda, were rejected by the U.S. representative

Fundamental to the success of the United Nations—pledged to maintain the peace—is the establishment of the peace. But the main peace treaties, between the Allies and Germany and Japan, are not even on the horizon. And the trends are all the other way. From the Potsdam Agreement in 1945 to the breakup of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1947 is a road strewn with broken promises—the undertaking to denazify Germany, and especially the agreement that the Ruhr industrial zone would be prevented from becoming again an industrial base for war production. The only guarantee of the reconstruction for peaceful purposes of the Ruhr area would be full international control. Instead, we have Bizonia, soon to become Trizonia, where the check of real popular forces is absent, and American industrial monopolists, who have defeated the original British purpose of putting the Ruhr coalmines under public control, can put their own sinister policies into effect. Western Germany's economy will become even more dependent on America, who will have a convenient colony and potential war base right in the middle of Europe, and forming part of a grand strategical scheme ranging from Iceland, through Europe, Greece, Turkey, the Near East and the islands of the Pacific. The only possible way of reaching a permanent democratic settlement in Germany would be the establishment of a central democratic government having the confidence of the workers. By preventing the establishment of this, the United States, with Britain her willing assistant, is keeping open a wound which must be healed before the United Nations can grow healthily. There was never any evidence that America wanted the Foreign Ministers' Conference to succeed, and plenty of tolerated publicity to the effect that it must fail. Yet it need not have failed. Mr. Molotov told Mr. Marshall and Mr. Bevin, "You can settle questions with the Soviet Government if you discard attempts to impose decisions upon it." [My italics]

A hold on the potentially useful military base of Korea is being

maintained in a different way. A United Nations Commission has been set up, on American initiative, to consider in what way a free government in Korea can function. A year will be wasted and the matter brought up at next autumn's Assembly at the United Nations. Compare the Soviet proposal to remove all foreign (American and Soviet) troops at once and to allow the Koreans to elect their own government. This would be too dangerous for the Americans, so a longer way round was devised through the majority which they command in the Assembly.

Here is a brief survey of some of Australia's present military projects. It is expanding bases in the Aleutian Islands; it hold a naval base and air bases in Canada, and has bases on 99-year leases in Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland (contrary to the undertaking given during the war that such bases would be given up two years after the end of the war). The journal *Foreign Affairs* enunciated the policy behind this in 1945 and 1946 in such words as, "The U.S. should strive to obtain bases which would allow it to control the Old World," and "U.S. bases in Greenland and Iceland are more important than alliances with U.K. and the Soviet Union." The years 1945 and 1946 came before the events which are supposed to have driven the U.S.A. unwillingly into the position of a critic of the Soviet Union—or, more accurately, of a bomber of the Soviet Union if Mr. Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the U.S. Army, manages to obtain offensive bases on the Central Eurasian land mass, which he recently explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee were essential to America. The U.S. Government spent annually before the war 50 million dollars on scientific research. According to the War Department, nearly 900 million dollars were spent on scientific research for military purposes in 1946. President Truman, in August, 1945, announced that of the 434 military bases acquired by the U.S. in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans and elsewhere during the war, any would be retained by her if necessary for the full defence of US interests. A large number have been retained, in contradiction to the declarations of the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow Conference of 1943, in which the Great Powers abjured any intention of annexing new territory as a result of the war. Negotiations for bases have been carried out in South America, China and the Pacific. Look where you will on the world map; in every quarter there are American bases. "America first" has been the policy of the U.S. Service Departments and the State Department right from the first day of the United Nations' existence. No wonder the Soviet Government looks with some apprehension at American moves.

The Charter of the United Nations itself pledges its signatories to act in certain ways. "All members shall settle their international dis-

putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered." Can it really be claimed that the pouring of military aid to try to bolster up the undemocratically elected Government of Greece—responsible for actions which make even American politicians blush and British democrats thoroughly ashamed—is proceeding in such a manner that international peace and security, to say nothing of justice, are not endangered?

Is the pressing for a commission to be sent from the United Nations to pronounce on the "aggression" of Greece's northern neighbours an act calculated to bring about justice, when all the evidence so far produced would not stand scrutiny in any court of law? A settlement would come in Greece far more quickly without Truman military aid, but the only explanation is that other matters—especially strategic interests of its own—are more important to the U.S. administration than international peace.

Can it be claimed that the refusal to abolish the atom bomb and to destroy all stocks—which would lift such a load of fear from the hearts of all men and women, particularly in vulnerable Britain—is an act calculated to make for peace and trust? The Soviet Government has made it clear that it would participate in a complete system of international control and inspection, once the bombs are destroyed. But America must have bombs; for the dangers of "Communism" (i.e., the provision of decent standards of life for people who have been denied them for generations) are greater to Wall Street than the blessings of peace.

"The organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members." *"All members . . . shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."* One vital obligation assumed by those who signed the Charter was the recognition that the Great Powers have a special responsibility for keeping the peace of the world, and that they *must* move as one on all important matters. The United States (and many other nations and individuals) simply refuse to face up to the implications of this obligation. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council, and she must be treated in good faith. But this is an embarrassment for great imperialist powers. So the United States is the powerful leader of a movement to side-step the provisions in the Charter for unanimity of the Great Powers in the Security Council. The long campaign against the "irresponsible use of the veto"—not, so far as America is concerned, against the veto itself, for the balance of power in the United Nations may one day be different and America may be in the minority—has been followed by the setting up of a "little assembly" to be in permanent session and to be ready to take up any political matter

which may be voted by a majority off the agenda of the Security Council. But facts are facts, and Mr. Marshall cannot by the mere creation of new committees get round the realities of world politics. There is no dodging the essential need for unity. As the Director General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, said in his report to the Assembly, "The indispensable condition for peace is that nations with different social systems and different interests shall strive to live and to work together, side by side, in peace." The only way of dodging this is by going to war.

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has set up two special expert commissions, one for Europe and one for Asia and the Far East. As it is, these commissions provide valuable research teams and expert advisers to governments still grappling with problems of reconstruction and economic betterment for their peoples. What could they not become if they also had the resources which Mr. Marshall has proved the United States to have for disposal? But when the United States decided to get rid of its surplus goods and dollars, did it make use of the already existing machinery, fully competent and expert, as well as thoroughly documented on the needs of European economy? No. New conferences, with the necessary blares of publicity, were set up instead, tying political strings round the European countries who lined up for aid. When Europe needs loans, plant and raw materials for capital reconstruction, the Marshall proposals give her unasked-for goods, tobacco, dried egg, out-of-date liberty ships, and increase British and European dependence on supercapitalist America. Germany, of course, as a rather more suitably-placed potential ally than the others, receives somewhat more favourable treatment in the form of fertilisers, railway wagons, etc. Any kind of aid will depend on the good (i.e., non-Communist and non-Socialist) behaviour of the receiving countries. Is this living up to the aim of the Charter "*to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom*"?

Many idealists today tell us that national sovereignty is out of date, and hail proposals such as the Marshall Plan and ideas such as the effort to bring about majority rule on the Security Council as trends towards the abolition of sovereignty. This would mean something if three-quarters of the world were not actually or potentially dependent on the United States. The renunciation of sovereignty by agreement of equals—which is reflected in the United Nations Charter—is one thing. The renunciation of sovereignty to a powerful imperialist power is another. It is this last danger against which Molotov has warned the nations of Western Europe, and which is a danger to the proper functioning of the United Nations and the establishment of lasting peace.

The way in which the United States and Britain have abused their command of a majority in the United Nations to sabotage the rising democratic movements of the world shows that the United Nations cannot fulfil its true role unless we in Britain end our subservience to American reaction and stand firmly with the popular democracies. That is the central issue for us in the struggle for peace.

KEIR HARDIE

PETER HILL

"AFTER THEIR DEATHS," says Lenin of great revolutionaries, "attempts are made to convert them into harmless icons, to canonise them, so to say, and to surround their *names* with a certain halo for the 'consolation' of the oppressed classes . . . while at the same time emasculating the revolutionary doctrine of its content, vulgarising it and blunting its revolutionary edge."

Lenin's remark applies to all genuine working-class fighters, great and small. the history of the Labour movement is full of examples. Perhaps the most striking (after William Morris) is that of Keir Hardie.

It is true that Keir Hardie lends himself to this sort of "canonisation" rather easily. His great strength and weakness lay in the fact that he represented, better than any other man of his time, the political attitudes of the active workers in the Labour rank and file. His own evolution kept pace with theirs, though he had a gift of instinctive leadership, and a power to inspire, which was his own. When he took a step forward, it was an indication that a great many men in union branches on Clydeside, in woollen mills and chapels of the West Riding, in Trades Councils, mines and gasworks, were just about to take that step themselves. When he vacillated and was vague, it was a reflection of their vagueness and unclarity. Just as they had the "English dislike for theory," which Lenin noted, so had he, and it was therefore easy to blunt the edge of what had, after all, never been a very sharp weapon. Just as they spoke the language, and had the ways of thinking, of the dissenting chapels which had been such important centres of working-class life, so Hardie's Socialism naturally expressed itself in terms of chapel oratory; which did not make his words any less militant, though it sometimes saved him the trouble of thinking clearly. Skimming his articles and speeches, it is easy to see in them nothing but the emotional appeals, and the religious note, which is all Transport House ever dwells on. But when we look at his actions, and even his theory, more closely, we realise how

much distortion there is in all those harmless, half-true, superficially empty, newspaper-obituary phrases which the Attlees and the Brailsfords wrap round him: "fearless and uncompromising," "the gentlest of men," "a poet at heart," "his Socialism an ethical ideal," "an enemy of class war," and so on. Keir Hardie's words are meaningless when divorced from his actions; and these were the actions of a man who fought the class struggle all his life, though not always consistently—a great fighter and an able leader.

Keir Hardie's whole political life was an attempt to put into practice the two great discoveries which British workers made between 1880 and 1914: that all workers, irrespective of craft or pay, form one class whose interests demand the fight against the ruling class; and that the workers' right to a decent life cannot be won without a fundamental change in the social system: class-consciousness and Socialism.

To us these seem elementary statements; but their acceptance marks an immense step in the re-education of British workers (who had forgotten them with the defeat of Chartism) In the heyday of Victorian prosperity there had been a Labour movement, a fighting movement in its way, to which we owe a great deal. But it had consisted of a minority of specially-favoured workers, an "aristocracy of labour." These fought a two-front battle: against capitalists, for their small share of the vast profits, and against the rest of Labour, which was excluded from their top hats, gold watch chains, and savings bank deposits, and might, by demanding them, destroy their privileged minority position. Moreover, the boilermaker who actually employed his labourer, the spinner who did not mind how many piecers went on the industrial scrapheap so long as he stayed where he was—these men felt that they had won their positions not merely by trade union action, but by those virtues of self-help and "free enterprise" which had made their bosses rich. Take Keir Hardie's father, a ship carpenter on Clydeside and in Lanarkshire. If he could not make a decent living; if he had not enough money to send young Keir to school or to apprentice him to a brass-finisher; if there were times when the family had no other income but the boy's 3s 6d. a week as a baker's messenger—why, that probably showed that he was a poor carpenter, and that the 15 per cent of woodworkers who did well, did so because they were the better men. As for the others, it was too bad. It was this acceptance of business values, this narrowness, that Marx and Engels meant when they spoke of the "bourgeois proletariat" in Britain. And, organised or unorganised, the working class was criss-crossed by all kinds of craft, regional, religious, social and political demarcation lines, which kept it disunited, except on rare occasions

The great task of Socialists was to break down these barriers and to make the workers as a whole class conscious. Oddly enough, some of Keir Hardie's most "anti-Marxist" phrases are really roundabout and confused efforts to achieve this. For instance, he would argue:

"The propertyless proletariat . . . is not a class at all. It is the whole community minus only the propertied parasites who prey upon it . . . Capitalism is the product of selfishness . . . But selfishness is not by any means the monopoly of the rich . . . When a collier sweats his haulier, the weaver his piecer, the riveter his holder-up, and so on, it is not a 'class-war,' but an internecine strife between the workers of the same class that has its root in selfishness . . . Socialism makes war upon a system, not a class."

This is very typical of what happened to Hardie when he argued. We can see clearly what he is driving at: there is no need to preach the fight against the bosses, which goes without saying; what we have to do is to preach solidarity between the sections of the workers, i.e., for "reconciliation" and "unselfishness." With his confused and narrow idea of what Marxists meant by "class struggle," he felt that to preach it might well mean preaching sectionalism and jeopardising the creation of that vital movement of *all* workers. Marxists may criticise the vagueness, even when they understand the historical circumstances which led Hardie to talk like that. But it is quite clear that what he is driving at is far nearer to their own aims than to those of the Ramsay MacDonalds and Attlees, who confuse it with their own calls against "class struggle." Hardie is a rebel, though often unclear. They are simply not Socialists in his or our sense.

The Great Depression of British capitalism (1873-95) made many workers, skilled and unskilled, organised and unorganised, see the point of such calls for workers' solidarity and independent labour action. Keir Hardie himself slowly progressed toward this realisation. He had gone down the Lanarkshire mines when he was ten. Like so many other workers' leaders, his first steps in public life were taken as a temperance campaigner and left-wing Liberal. But as the depression deepened, we find him increasingly active as a trade unionist: miners' agent in Lanarkshire in 1879, organiser and strike leader there and in Ayrshire 1880-82, attempting to build and rebuild the weak miners' unions in the West of Scotland. From 1886 we see how the trade union fight led him to the recognition of an independent workers' party. By 1888, when he stood at Mid Lanark against both the old parties, Hardie had realised that the workers' party could not be simply a left wing of the Liberals, but had to fight them. But he was not yet a Socialist. By the middle of 1888 the "Scottish Labour Party" had been founded with Hardie as secretary, and an advanced

reforming programme. By the summer of 1889 he attended the foundation Congress of the Socialist International, on the Marxist side. (There was also a reformist congress.) Thus slowly but surely Hardie, like so many other workers at the time, was feeling his way forward. For the next few years he campaigned single-mindedly for the foundation of a national Independent Labour Party. When it was founded, early in 1893, it was Socialist in all but name. (Marx's son-in-law drew up its programme.) Meanwhile, Hardie himself had become a conscious Socialist, and an increasingly well-known leader of the left wing in the T.U.C. and outside. We need hardly add that he was attacked by the old Liberal trade union leaders as an infiltrator, the representative of a foreign ideology, disloyal to the movement, a mudslinger, etc., etc.

These were the years when Hardie's political beliefs took shape. His subsequent career is soon told. From 1892-95 he had his first spell in Parliament as M.P. for South West Ham. There he made himself unpopular by refusing to play the game and insisting on making scenes about unparliamentary matters such as the unemployed and the fate of Welsh miners killed in pit disasters. He created an uproar by opposing a motion of congratulation to the Royal Family because the House had refused to send official condolences to the families of 200 Welsh miners killed in an accident. But this lone fight in Parliament made him a national figure. Most of the nineties he spent touring the country, speaking, campaigning, and writing in the *Labour Leader*, which was very much his personal organ. (It had grown out of his *The Miner*, started in 1887.) His rugged, dramatic, passionately honest figure became familiar among the active members of the movement. These tours and articles linked together the many almost independent local groups which then made up the Socialist movement. In 1900, he was re-elected to Parliament for Meithyr. In the same year he celebrated his second great triumph, the foundation of the Labour Representation Committee, which became the Labour Party. The next years were filled with the fight against the Boer War, and the struggle to build the Labour Party. In 1906, he came back to Parliament at the head of 20 Labour M.P.s, the acknowledged head of the party. He gave up the leadership the following year, and continued for the rest of his life as a semi-independent, devoting most of his energy to the fight against the coming imperialist war. He had, of course, long been a respected figure in the international Labour movement. When the war came, he opposed it utterly. The failure of international Social Democracy to fight it, the readiness of most of the Labour Party to support it, broke his heart. He died in 1915 among his Welsh miners, aged 59.

It is rather difficult to judge Hardie's career. He was, as we have

seen, not a clear thinker: he followed his hunches, he reached his conclusions by feeling and intuition, not by clear thought. He had obvious limitations—as an organiser and administrator he was rather weak; he was a difficult man to work with, and like some other great platform figures was something of a *prima donna*. Then, again, he was an odd bundle of contradictions, which he did not always bother to reconcile: “He would rather have lost every election than stoop to an unworthy manoeuvre,” says Brailsford of him, full of admiration (meaning that he told I.L.P. voters not to ride to the poll in Tory cars). But the Liberal politicians and the old trade union leaders knew him as a hard bargainer, a down-to-earth political horse-trader when it suited him, even though he often used biblical language to describe what he was doing. “An agitator” was the judgment of some. “A charlatan,” said the unsympathetic Fabians. Both were wrong. Keir Hardie had the stuff of greatness in him, and he had tactical gifts of a very high order. If we are not to be bogged in superficial arguments, however, there is only one way of judging him as a working-class leader. We must ask what the great tasks of the Labour movement in his time were, and how he faced them in practice.

The great task of the years from 1880-1914 was the creation of a class-conscious British workers’ party—hostile to both capitalist parties—under Socialist leadership. But in building such a party, Socialists had to guard against isolating themselves from the masses; for most politically-conscious British workers were far slower than they to break with the Liberal Party, in which they had so long put their faith. Two dangers therefore faced Socialists: sectarianism on the one hand, reformism, opportunism, the return to Liberalism on the other. The right-wing danger was, of course, by far the greater; for with the end of the Great Depression British imperialism was able to renew and to intensify its old technique of corrupting a section of the workers by “special” concessions. Indeed, as we know to our cost, the right wing, MacDonald and his successors, prevailed in the Labour Party’s leadership. Nevertheless, the sectarian danger was real, and those British “Marxists” who fell into it, by interpreting Marxism as a dogma rather than a guide to action, helped the right wingers by leaving them a clear run. Between these two dangers, then, Keir Hardie attempted, instinctively, to pick his way; this accounts for some of his contradictions. Occasionally he slipped on the sectarian side. Far more seriously, he had not a sufficiently clear understanding to realise the danger of reformism and opportunism. Not only did he himself sometimes slip into it in words (though less often in action), but in those fateful years before the First World War he did not see how rapidly and how completely the right wing of the I.L.P., the

MacDonalds and Bruce Glasiers, were selling out to the other side. He gave them the prestige of his support against the left-wing rebels, though his own behaviour in and out of Parliament was that of a rebel himself. But when all criticisms are made, Hardie's leadership of the movement up to, at any rate, 1906, was on the right lines; and of vital importance for its advance. As for his work of agitation and propaganda, of binding together Socialists all over the country into a national movement, its value is incalculable. The Fabians might sneer at him as an agitator and charlatan. But those who know that the strength of Labour lies in the power and awareness of the masses of British workers, not in "gentlemanly" plans and projects, know how much the movement owes to his evangelism and his fighting use of Parliament as a platform for Socialist propaganda.

We may divide Hardie's career into four parts. From 1889 to 1895 his main aim was (rightly) to build up an independent, Socialist-led mass party of the workers, the I.L.P. In the remainder of the nineties his main work was that of consolidating the nucleus of Socialist fighters, and linking it firmly with the broad, as yet non-Socialist, trade union movement. From 1900-06 the building of the Labour Party was his chief aim. From 1906 to the war his main tasks ought to have been the fight against the increasing right-wing hold on Labour and I.L.P., and against the coming war. As we have seen, he neglected the first of these. With this exception—a great one it is true—we may say that Keir Hardie concentrated his fire on the right targets, though we must always remember that his sector of the front—Parliament, the political platform, journalism—was by no means the whole of it.

In the early years of the I.L.P. the main danger lay on the right, and Hardie fought the Liberals and their supporters in the Fabian Society and the reactionary T.U.C. circles good and hard. In those years of militancy, dock and gasworkers' fights, of the textile workers' revolts in Yorkshire, and the great miners' battles, the danger of isolation from the masses was less immediate. But when the militant wave ebbed, and that of imperial prosperity, jingoism, and capitalist counter-attack swept forward (1895-1906) things were not so simple. Hardie's tactics may be summed up as follows: first, to consolidate the core of his independent party against both the old parties; second, to form an alliance, perhaps something even firmer, between the Socialists and the trade unions, threatened by the bosses' counter-attack. Thirdly, however (especially after the outbreak of the Boer War), he dreamed of a broad, united front, embracing all those who, for one reason or another, opposed the imperialists, the most reactionary and dangerous section of the ruling class—i.e., the anti-imperialist section of the Liberals. Such a policy might easily have been one of straightforward opportunism, if it had not been for

Hardie's strong conviction that the Independent Socialist Party must be its basis. As the *I.L.P.* was by no means the clear Socialist party which was essential for such a policy, the danger of opportunism was by no means avoided. Nevertheless, the creation of a Labour Party in which the Socialists as a body were accepted as leaders and partners was an immense step forward. The party bargains which gave Labour 29 seats in 1906 conformed to Engels' idea of "forcing Labour candidates on the Liberals at dagger's point . . . like Keir Hardie" [in 1892, *P.H.*], rather than to the ineffable Ramsay MacDonald's:

"uniting with section after section, not in a bargaining and compromising spirit, which I hate, but in that beautifully natural way which, in human personal experience, comes of love."

There were danger signals—for instance, the increasing influence of MacDonald, whose jealousy of Hardie was intense; but they were no more than signals. But Hardie was incapable of coping with this growing danger. He took the easy road. Just when it was most required, he gave up the leadership of the party—which fell into the hands of the right wing—and continued as a lone rebel. We must admire him for many of his fights after 1906: his attacks on imperialism in India; his militant propaganda for the workers and for Socialism; above all, his unremitting struggle against the coming war, and his stand after its outbreak. And yet—so much more was needed at a time when the militant mass movement was sweeping forward again in waves of revolutionary rank-and-file strikes; and when the Labour Party was becoming more and more an appendage of the Liberals. Hardie vacillated. His hesitation, his failure reflects the immaturity, the unclarity of the British Labour movement as a whole. Like theirs, his heart was in the right place—as he showed by his fighting conduct. But to go beyond the general, if passionate, recognition that this system must be ended; beyond the simple recognition of the need to fight, was beyond him. The lead which British workers needed must henceforth be given by men with a clearer understanding—Marxists, Communists. We know what men like Hardie were driving at, we can put it into words and carry it into practice.

GOOD POLITICS—GOOD BUSINESS

KEN BOLTON

A LONG serial story was due for its next instalment last month. It is the thirty-year-old story of Anglo-Soviet trade, and according to the terms of last year's "coarse grain" agreement it was "to be continued"

by further discussions in May on the extension and more permanent establishment of trade between the two countries. With the intensification of antagonisms between the capitalist, unplanned economies, and the planned Socialist economies of Eastern Europe, the forthcoming attempts to develop trade between a capitalist and Socialist economy take on very wide and far-reaching significance. The establishment of wider trading between Britain and the Soviet Union will serve as an important step in the solution of Britain's economic problems; the refusal of an agreement will mean that the right-wing leaders of the Labour Government are determined to hand over Britain to the United States imperialists and to help forward the war preparations against the Socialist Soviet Union.

It is not surprising that the question of trade with Russia is a problem to which the capitalist world has given much attention, and which has involved it in much argument and conflict, since the establishment of the first Socialist economy. The present conflict is merely a continuation of a struggle that has been going on since the first Soviet trade delegation arrive in this country in May, 1920. All through the following years capitalism, and particularly its political representatives in Britain, could never make up their minds whether trade with Russia would be a good thing or a bad. When the Arcos Raid of 1927, with its termination of diplomatic relations, led to an abandonment of Anglo-Soviet trade, many tears were shed when it became known that the day before this event the Midland Bank had made an arrangement under which exports to the U.S.S.R. would have been financed to the amount of £10,000,000. The chief complaint came from Mr. Lloyd George. "We have quarrelled with that government at a moment when we were negotiating an order of £10,000,000, and an arrangement had been made for credit" (House of Commons, 26.5.27).

The Anglo-Soviet agreement covering war supplies concluded in 1941 was the first big development which did not bring new expressions of conflict and disagreement. But the attempts to return to peace-time trading again brought out the arguments and contradictions of interest. The failure of Britain's mission to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1947, due partly to difficulties over loan terms, but more to the refusal of Britain to give delivery guarantees, brought forth almost universal expressions of regret. Throughout the summer the *Daily Express* and the *Star*, among others, kept up a consistent campaign for the reopening of negotiations. When success did come, in December, 1947, there was a general welcome—for a few weeks. Then the arguments started, opinions were modified, second thoughts were expressed and within three months the Conservative Party had decided that the President of the Board of Trade returned from Moscow with "a bad bargain and a balalaika" (Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, House of Commons, 23.48).

The continued inability of the capitalists to make up their minds *about trade with Russia* has its roots in the cleavage between commercial and political considerations—between the desire for expansion of trade, the search for export markets and raw materials, and the reluctance to do anything that would strengthen Socialist economy. The full history of capitalist trade with Russia also provides striking examples of the competitive struggle between the capitalist countries themselves to corner the benefits of expanding Soviet trade. Thus, in 1925, for instance, the value of British exports and re-exports to Russia was £19,256,929; those of Germany were £12,555,750; and of U.S.A. £14,270,000. Three years later the figures were Britain £4,800,749; Germany £20,168,600, U.S.A. £14,900,000.

Thus the political and economic issues have been fought out between the capitalists themselves, as well as between the capitalist and the progressive forces. Two things are particularly worth noting about this struggle. First, that throughout the conflict which raged between the wars, the Labour Party prided itself that it was the only consistent supporter in Parliament of Anglo-Russia trade extension, using the arguments of the political and commercial benefits to be derived. Secondly, it is a fact that throughout the years, whatever have been the actions of the Government of the day on this question, there has always been an expression, in words, of a desire for extended Anglo-Russian trade. The next few weeks will show how far the recent words of Sir Stafford Cripps were anything more than an attempt to deceive—"I believe the best way of getting friendship with Russia is to have some practical dealings with her on the economic field."

One of the main fears of those in the Conservative Central Office and the American State Department, who will do all they can to prevent agreement in the coming talks, is precisely this: that out of economic will grow political co-operation. They have a further fear, justified from their point of view, that the eastward expansion of Britain's trade will reduce the political and economic stranglehold of the United States—will enable Britain to pursue a policy independent of America. Food from the Soviet Union, in exchange for exported equipment, is likely to be more palatable than food from America, which has so many political strings to impede digestion. The more that comes from the East, the less likely will Britain be to put up with political strings from the West.

It should be noted, however, that if we are to gain the full benefit of extended Soviet trade in the way of less dependence on America, we must not expect that every item received from the Soviet Union will be in addition to the goods already coming from the United States. Food and materials from Russia will have to be regarded as replacing, rather than supplementing, food and materials from America. A case

in point is the oft-repeated assertion that the recent grain agreement will mean "more eggs and bacon on the breakfast table." It may not mean that. What it does make possible is an increased production of food in this country, with a resultant opportunity to lessen our dependence on American food imports. The total food available may remain the same. In short, over a large range of essential goods, the markets of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should be regarded as an alternative source of supply, rather than as an additional source. That may be the case until such time as the U.S.A. has been compelled, by economic events, to remove the political strings, and lower prices, in order to find markets for her surplus production.

The question of prices is a very important one in considering the present conflicts connected with Anglo-Soviet trade. At the time of the failure of the British Trade Mission to Moscow in April, 1947, an attempt was made by the British press to attribute the failure to the high price of wheat demanded by the Soviet Union. This very soon proved to be a complete lie. The facts were that the prices had been agreed at considerably less than the current prices being paid for wheat from Canada and the Argentine. It is worth quoting in full the very significant admission wrung out of the Government by the persistent Tory attacks on the grain agreement in the House of Commons.

"Prices which we paid for Soviet barley, maize and oats were, on a conservative calculation, about half what would have been paid if trading in world markets on a basis of private trade. Prices were considerably below the highest world prices ruling at the present time, including some of the prices paid for grain in certain Commonwealth markets. *I do not know whether the effect of this Russian grain agreement on the Chicago market in bringing prices down is realised.*" (President of the Board of Trade, 2.3.48.)

The desire of the Americans to exclude the Soviet Union as a competitor in the world market can be understood.

Certain other objections to an extension of Anglo-Soviet trade on allegedly economic grounds are emerging as second thoughts from quarters where there was originally unqualified support. There are murmurings in the farming industry, for instance, which really amount to a suggestion that any policy of importing foodstuffs, wherever it comes from, may lead to the flooding of the market with foreign goods, to the detriment and discouragement of full production on British farms. While it is certainly true that British agriculture could make a larger contribution to the feeding problems of the British people, the overproduction fears of the farmers are based on a failure to understand the difference between the present world food-

production position, and that obtaining before the war. Certainly for many years the British people can consume all that British farmers can produce, and still ask for more from abroad.

An argument to which the farming community would be much better advised to direct their attention is that contained in an editorial comment in the "coarse grain" agreement appearing in *The Times* in December, 1947, which may be taken as perhaps the only true exposition of Tory agricultural policy yet given. While welcoming the trade agreement in words, the question is posed as to whether it would not have been a wiser policy to export the machinery, etc., to the Argentine, for instance, for them to produce the food which we can buy back—a yearning for the old days of Britain as the "workshop of the world," using manufactured goods to buy foodstuffs, or drawing food from abroad as interest on investments, while British agriculture rots and goes bankrupt.

Clearly the present trend is towards a general agreement in the capitalist world, with America as the main policy-makers, that for political and economic reasons extended Anglo-Soviet trade is, on balance, not desirable. There can be no doubt that for the common people of the world every political and economic argument points to the fact that a continued refusal to trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is an act of suicide, and can only lead to delays in reconstruction, and, particularly in the Western countries, to a lower standard of living for the mass of the people. Britain's economy cannot function while nearly a quarter of the world is virtually cut off as a source of imports and exports. In this quarter of the world there are to be found the goods and raw materials which we need, payments for which do not raise any dollar problems, and a growing market for our exports. Failure to agree last year cost us five and a half million tons of grain, two million tins of fish, 140,000 tons of timber and possibly some paper. To refuse such supplies again, either at the dictates of American big business or our own ruling-class hatred of Socialism, is to subject the British people, within a very few months, to inevitable hunger, unemployment and economic chaos. There is no better comment on this possibility than that of *The Times* City Editor at the height of the controversy following the Arcos Raid. "In no small part, the abnormal amount of unemployment in this country is to be attributed to the absence of Russia from the economy and comity of the nations . . . The direct trade may not be important, but the indirect trade is just as important to this country as to those immediately concerned" (*The Times*, 23 7 27). Failure to reach agreement on further trade with Russia will make that statement, in a very short time, as relevant and true as it was 20 years ago.

Whatever may be the conflict behind the scenes, capitalism will

show a united front against any extension of Anglo-Soviet trade in the coming months. Only the refusal of the people to tolerate the ignoring of the most obvious solution to Britain's export and import problem will force the Government to get back to Labour Party policy, to a policy of strengthened economic co-operation with Socialism, with the great political and economic benefits which can accrue to the British people.

CHINA'S PEOPLE'S ARMY

RAYMOND WONG

ONE OF THE MAIN characteristics of the Chinese revolution in the last twenty years is that the Chinese people use revolutionary armed force to oppose the counter-revolutionary armed force of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, which represents the interests of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, supported by foreign imperialism, now by American imperialism. The Chinese people are one of the most peace-loving peoples in the world. But the bloodthirsty and tyrannous Chinese rulers who have been ruthlessly suppressing and slaughtering them, though they were unarmed, have forced them to resort to arms in order to defend themselves. The Shanghai *coup d'état* on April 12, 1927, and the Hankow *coup d'état* in July, 1927, taught them a lesson. The revolution was then betrayed and thousands of workers, peasants, Communists and progressive Kuomintang members who helped to bring the Northern Expedition against the Chinese warlords to success were murdered by Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary clique.

It was a tragic lesson—a lesson of blood. But they learned from it. They began to understand that they must have their own army. Referring to this historical event, Mao Tze-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote:

“The Chinese Communists and the Chinese people were not frightened, not conquered and not exterminated. They raised themselves from the ground, wiped off the bloodstains, buried the bodies of their dead comrades and continued to fight.

“They raised aloft the banner of the revolution and launched armed resistance. On a vast territory of China, they organised people's governments, carried out agrarian reform, created the people's army—the Chinese Red Army—preserved and expanded the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people.”

The first Chinese people's army was led by Generals Chu Teh, Ho Lung, and Yeh Ting, which revolted in Nanchang, Kiangsi Province, on August 1, 1927. Since 1928, the Chinese Red Army set up bases in various areas along the Yangtze River and in North-West China. From 1930 to 1934, it developed to 300,000 men and repelled many "Extermination Campaigns" of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary army. In 1935-36, because of the barbarous and powerful enemy attacks and because of the mistakes of "left adventurism" committed by the leadership, the main force of the Red Army in Kiangsi, Hunan-Hupeh and North Szechuan, had to start its world-famous "Long March." After overcoming all difficulties, unparalleled in human history, it finally reached North Shensi, where it linked up with the North-West Red Army. But it shrank to only several tens of thousands of men.

Because of the national crisis which was developing rapidly owing to Japanese aggression, because of the nationwide patriotic movement, because of certain patriotic elements among the Kuomintang, who launched the "Sian Incident" and detained Chiang Kai-shek, and, most important of all, because of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party carried out a new political line—the anti-Japanese United Front—Chiang Kai-shek was forced for a time to stop his civil war policy. National unity was then achieved, and the nationwide anti-Japanese war started in July, 1937, when Japan invaded North China.

The Red Army in North-West China was then reorganised into three divisions as the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. It was 80,000 strong, but the Kuomintang Government only recognised 45,000 men. The guerilla units of the Red Army that still remained along the Yangtze River were reorganised into four detachments, each 3,000 strong, as the New Fourth Army. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army then set off to the North China and Central China fronts respectively to fight the Japanese.

At that time many people looked down upon these two small armies. Chiang Kai-shek and his reactionary clique thought and hoped that they would be destroyed by the powerful Japanese Army. But much to their surprise, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, after advancing to the enemy's rear, recovered vast territories and set up many local democratic governments in North and Central China. Up to 1940, they had already liberated over 50 million people and were themselves over 500,000 strong.

In 1938 and 1939, after the Japanese occupied Canton and Hainan Island, the East River Column of Kwangtung Province and the Haman Independent Column were organised in South China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to resist the Japanese invading army.

Up to March, 1945, these people's armies in North, Central and

South China had fought 115,000 engagements and wiped out 1,360,000 Japanese and puppet troops. They captured 1,028 guns, 7,700 machine-guns and 430,000 small arms from the enemy. They built up 19 Liberated Areas throughout China and liberated 95,500,000 people. They were themselves 910,000 strong and were supported by a people's militia of 2,200,000. In March, 1944, they resisted 64 per cent of the entire Japanese Army invading China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. Therefore, they became the main force in the war of resistance against Japan.

In the eight years' war against Japan, these people's armies had a very hard time. After 1938, they had to fight on two fronts. On one hand they fought against the bulk of the Japanese Army, which adopted the barbarous "Triple Extermination" or "Three All" policy (burn all, kill all and loot all), and against nearly all puppet troops, 60 per cent of which were Kuomintang troops that surrendered to the Japanese; while on the other they had to defend themselves from the continuous attacks of the Kuomintang Army.

In spite of all these difficulties, the people's army grew to 1,200,000 men shortly after Japan's surrender. It was actually the main Chinese force that helped the Allies to defeat Japan.

In less than two years since July, 1946, when Chiang Kai-shek launched his reactionary war against the Liberated Areas, the people's army has grown to 2,000,000 strong. It is supported by a people's militia of 4,000,000, a self-defence corps of over 10,000,000 and by more than 170,000,000 people in the Liberated Areas. It has already wiped out more than 2,000,000 Kuomintang troops, including over 320 Kuomintang generals. It has repelled the offensive of the several million reactionary troops of Chiang Kai-shek, supported by American imperialism, and has itself passed over to the offensive.

After the recent powerful winter offensive of the North-East people's army, only one per cent of Manchuria is still held by Chiang Kai-shek's tottering armies which now face complete and imminent annihilation. A powerful spring offensive has already begun on almost all fronts in North and Central China since March. In this month alone nearly fifty towns, of which many were strongly fortified, were liberated; about 150,000 Kuomintang troops, including quite a number of full brigades and divisions, were wiped out. Big cities like Peiping, Tientsin, Paoting, Kalgan, Taiyuan, Tatung and Sian in North China and Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow, Chengchow, Hsuehchow and Tsinan in Central China are either encircled or threatened. The time for the field forces of the people's Army to cross the Yangtze River to help the local guerillas to liberate South China will not be far off.

"This is a turning point in history," says Mao Tze-Tung. In the

last twenty years, the people's army, though growing gradually, was never as strong as that of the enemy and, strategically speaking, was always on the defensive. The "Long March" in 1935-36 was even a strategic retreat.

But the twenty years of darkness has already gone. It will never come back! The balance of forces between the Chinese people's revolution and Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution, supported by American imperialism, has completely changed. For the first time in twenty years' history the people's army is stronger than that of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary regime, and is on the strategic offensive throughout the country. "This is a great event," says Mao Tze-tung, "because once it has taken place it will inevitably go onwards to nationwide victory."

In front of such a powerful enemy, what makes it possible that this tiny people's army, equipped with a few primitive weapons, can change China's history in the course of twenty years?

This is because it is a *people's* army. General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of this army, says: "Thousands and thousands of troops, thousands and thousands of men who carry guns—who are they? They are the people." All officers and men of this army are common people who join it voluntarily and not by conscription. They organise and arm themselves to defend and serve for the nation and the people's interest against foreign aggression and the oppression of the domestic big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. They understand they are fighting a just war. No matter what difficulties confront them, they always stand firmly with the people and rely upon the people for solution. Hence they always get full support from the people. They are highly politically-conscious and are well disciplined. Their heroism is incomparable. They never allow themselves to be subjugated by the enemy. Even if only one of them remains, this one will continue to fight. It is this class consciousness and revolutionary heroism that has created the "miracle."

This army is under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Communists within the army play a very important role. In every company there is a Party branch. It is the core of the company. It unites the ranks of the whole unit, works as a model and guarantees the fulfilment of every task. To be the vanguard in an attack and to be the last man in a retreat is regarded as the duty of a Communist.

Political work is the "soul" of this army. It aims to raise the political consciousness of the officers and men and to help them develop their initiative and patriotism. It helps to achieve unity between officers and men, between military and political workers, between the army and the democratic governments and between the army and the people. Democracy is greatly encouraged in this army, though the

command is centralised. Through democratic discussion and criticism, not only difference in opinion between officers can be solved satisfactorily, but soldiers can also express their opinion and criticise their officers freely. The bold initiative and ingenuity of officers, and especially of soldiers, both in fighting and training, are thus greatly developed. Very strict discipline is maintained by democratic discussion, by education and persuasion, and by the self-consciousness of officers and men themselves, no flogging or scolding is necessary.

Much time is devoted to political and cultural education. Self-study and joint study are commonly practised. It is everyone's duty to educate himself. Hence this army is also a school.

To disintegrate the enemy troops is an important part of the political work and an important policy. Prisoners of war are well treated. Great success was achieved in the eight years' war of resistance against Japan. Many Japanese and puppet troops were won over through this powerful political work. The Japanese Anti-War League and the Korean Volunteer Army, which had helped a great deal in disintegrating the Japanese and puppet armies and were well known to many people, were actually former soldiers in the Japanese Army. The significance of this policy can be clearly shown in the present war by the fact that the morale of the Kuomintang troops is rapidly deteriorating, the ratio between surrender and casualties of Kuomintang troops is swiftly increasing and that hundreds of thousands of "liberated" troops (former Kuomintang troops) have already joined the people's army. This policy is based upon the fact that the majority of the enemy troops (both Japanese and Kuomintang) are workers and peasants who are also members of the oppressed class but are deceived by their masters; once they understand the truth they can be reformed.

This army is not fighting alone. It is fighting a people's war. Fighting is not its only task. Every soldier is a political propagandist as well as an organiser. Whenever it liberates a place, it gives full democracy to the people. It helps them to organise democratic governments and popular organisations. It helps them "to turn over to a new life" by assisting them to carry out agrarian reform. After winning for the first time in their history their own democratic rights and their land, they surely want to defend them at all costs. Under the leadership of their own democratic governments and organisations, they give their full support to their army in all practical ways. Many of them join the army or local troops, or organise themselves in the militia or self-defence corps; or participate in the auxiliaries. The people's army is divided into a regular field army which undertakes any responsibility in fighting wherever necessary, and local troops which are responsible only for the defence of one to several counties

or attacking the enemy troops in these counties. The militia and self-defence corps are peasants who work on their land on the one hand and defend their own villages on the other. The creation of these three categories of troops has made the people's army extremely powerful and enabled its field forces to attack the enemy where they like without worrying about leaving their rear unguarded.

The maintenance of this army is based upon the following principles. First, it does not want to burden the people. When the situation demands that the army should be expanded (like at present), it carefully calculates that its maintenance does not go beyond the limit that the people can bear. All officers and men, unlike mercenary troops, live a very simple life and receive no wage except a very small allowance. Secondly, the treatment of officers and men is equal. The only difference between officers and men is their responsibility to the movement. Officers should care for their men and should be models for them in bearing hardship. Thirdly, all troops participate in production work, with the aim of attaining self support or partial self support in order to reduce the people's responsibility in supplying them. They also help the people voluntarily in production work. Commanders always take the leading part in production campaigns so as to enable them to be successfully carried out. Fourthly, the supply of equipment comes mainly from the front. In the eight years' war of resistance against Japan, this army was mainly equipped with the trophies captured from the Japanese and puppet troops. The tremendous amount of booty captured in the last 21 months of war against Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary troops have enabled it to become much more powerful than in any previous period. It has now many American-equipped divisions. The following is one of the vivid examples. The number of guns captured by the North-East people's army in its recent three-month winter offensive in Manchuria is 1,225—more than all people's armies captured in a period of 7½ years' fighting against Japan.

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and equipped with Marxism-Leninism, this army, in steeling itself in the last twenty years' war against foreign and domestic enemies, has created a scientific military ideology with correct strategy and tactics. It is the military ideology of Mao Tze-tung. Clearly assessing the superiority of the enemy who controls the State power and the whole country since 1927, and is backed up by foreign imperialism, and the weaknesses of the people's army, Mao Tze-tung foretold in 1936 that the revolutionary war of the Chinese people would be of a protracted nature. But he also foretold that because of the special features of China—a semi-colony, a very large country, the existence of the Chinese Communist Party and the people who already had the experi-

ence of the 1925-27 revolution—the people's army can defeat its enemy and the revolution can be successful.

Through him and the 2,700,000 strong Party he is leading the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is integrated with the actual practical struggles of the Chinese revolution. The scientific people's strategy and a series of tactics have been forged.

Thanks to his ingenious military ideology, the people's army had defeated the powerful Japanese Army and repelled the offensive of Chiang Kai-shek's American-supported troops. It will certainly march triumphantly forward to complete victory in the not very distant future.

IRELAND'S WAY FORWARD

DENIS WALSHÉ

(On behalf of the "Dublin Connolly Group")

ANY REAL SURVEY of the Irish political scene today forces one inevitably to the conclusion that the main condition in Ireland (as all over the world) for the achievement of Socialism is the winning of the battle for peace and democracy. Blatantly ignoring Ireland's democratic traditions and her vital national and economic interests, the reactionary Government of Fianna Fail bartered Eire's sovereignty for American dollars, and so finally disavowed their interest in Ireland's full independence. This betrayal is being completed by Fianna Fail's successors, the Coalition Government of Costello, Norton and McBride. The objective of this policy is obviously to embroil Ireland in the war which the imperialists of America are already planning against the peoples of the Soviet Union and the New Democracies. Thus, what the British imperialists failed to gain by force, the American imperialists have gained by dollar-bribery.

Besides the above, which is the main condition, there are other pre-requisites for the achievement of Socialism in Ireland. The most important of these can be outlined as follows:

- (a) The establishment of a united People's Democratic Republic.
- (b) The emergence of the working people as the leaders of the struggle for national independence.
- (c) An appreciation by all Irish Marxists that all the existing Parties have betrayed the national struggle.
- (d) The acceptance by Irish Marxists that the day-to-day struggles of the Irish people for an improvement of their living standards and

the extension of democracy under the present regimes of Eire and the Six Counties is an integral part of the struggle for national independence.

(e) A realisation that the struggle for peace, democracy and freedom in Ireland is but a part of a worldwide struggle for the same objectives.

The age-long struggle of the Irish people for national independence, culminating in the great 1913 General Strike and the historically vital Easter Week Rising of 1916, indicates the burning desire of the Irish people for a free and unfettered Ireland. The success with which the struggle was renewed in the years 1917-1921 was only marred by the fact that the working class failed not only to win the leadership of the fight on the basis of their class interests, but also to present any vital independent demands of their own. The isolated attempts of the rural and urban working people to give a class character to the national struggle by the seizure of big estates and factories were ruthlessly curbed by the reactionary national leadership.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the struggle, when at its height and nearing a successful conclusion, should have been betrayed by that section of the leadership which represented the commercial element of the native bourgeoisie. Fearful of the growing revolutionary spirit of the people and their widespread sympathy with the struggle of the Russian people to maintain Soviet power, these reactionary leaders agreed to partition the country in order to safeguard their own class interests. Yet this betrayal would not have been possible were it not for the cowardly acquiescence of the Labour Party. On the other hand, an important section of the leadership, headed by Liam Mellows, was becoming increasingly aware that the working class should play the dominant part in the national struggle.

The subsequent establishment of the Free State and Stormont regimes brought about no improvement in the life of the ordinary people. The terribly low standard of life of the people and the severely-restricted civil liberties continued both North and South. The popular struggle for national freedom developed, throwing up a number of leaders who correctly called for the complete mobilisation of the people's forces for the continuation of the struggle for the Republic. This period saw the growth of the revolutionary idea that the Republican movement should abandon the narrow and conspiratorial character which it had up to then assumed and take on instead a mass popular character. But the main leadership, headed by De Valera, wanted the continuation of the narrow and anti-popular forms of the struggle precisely because it made it easy for their intended betrayal of the fight for the Republic. This betrayal took place in 1925, with the formation of the Fianna Fail Party, which predominantly

represented the petit-bourgeoisie and the industrial section of the bourgeoisie. The Coercion Bill of 1927, with the subsequent mass jailings, and the terrible degradation of the people through mass unemployment and the complete lack of adequate social services, characterised this period. This, coupled with the failure of the Labour Party to fight for the people and the popular nature of Fianna Fail's election programme, brought about the latter's victory at the elections of 1932.

At last the Irish bourgeoisie was firmly entrenched. On the other hand, those popular Republican elements who had been so active under the previous government in such organisations as "Saov Eire," were still strong in spirit and numbers, but weak in leadership. The Labour Party, pre-occupied as it was with the purely economic struggle, continued to waver on all major political issues. The formation of the Communist Party in 1934 therefore represented a major development in the life of the Irish working class.

The period which followed was marked by the growth of the Republican Congress, the anti-Blue Shirt movement, the aid-to-Spain organisation and later the unemployed workers' movement, all of which activities were influenced and mostly led by the Communist Party. The effectiveness of the Communist Party's work during this period was, however, seriously hampered by certain mistakes, such as its failure to win any real influence in the trade union movement and to win the leadership of the national struggle.

The neutrality of Eire at the beginning of the Second World War was correctly seen by the Party and the people as a progressive policy. The Party failed, however, to grasp the real significance of the all-important change which came about in the character of the war, and committed the serious mistake of defending the continued neutrality of Eire. The voluntary dissolution of the Party that followed represented a gross mistake shown most clearly in the continuation of neutrality, the lack of leadership in the struggle against the Anti-Trade Union Bill and in the several major strikes which occurred during the war. Another thing which can be attributed to this lack of Communist influence in the country is the continued pro-fascist and anti-Soviet policies of the Government. Further consequences of the lack of Communist leadership in the working-class movement was the split in the Trade Union Congress, and the miserable failure of the trade union leadership to resist the bosses' reduction of the workers' standard of living. The recent General Election, in which all the contesting parties were united in their approval of Marshall aid and their support of Franco Spain, clearly indicated that Irish politics are now totally devoid of any real progressive trends. The universal issue of reaction and war versus democracy and peace was left completely unmentioned.

The logical outcome of this complete lack of any progressive or

independent thought in the whole realm of Irish politics was the formation of the present Coalition Government. This Government, composed of five different parties and led by the ultra-reactionary Fine Gael, includes the Irish Labour Party as well as the breakaway National Labour Party. With a wholly illusionary "Ten-Point Programme" as window dressing, this government has already embarked upon a policy of indiscriminate retrenchment at the expense of the mass of the workers. This will become increasingly evident, particularly in regard to education and certain of the social services. In deference to the interests of the big fuel distributive concerns, the Government has seriously curtailed the production of turf, thus causing widespread unemployment among rural workers. In agriculture, we have seen the same subservience to vested interests, the Government's policy being to extend greatly the cattle-raising industry at the expense of compulsory wheat production. These policies are but an implementation of the Government's main policy of making Ireland increasingly dependent for essential supplies on imperialist America and Britain, a policy which was clearly manifested by Marshall's offer of dollar-aid in return for Eire's sovereignty.

The continued participation of the Labour Party in the Government is inexcusable in the conditions outlined above. These reactionary policies are the complete negation of everything the Labour Party ostensibly stands for. Another point of the Government's policy, slavishly accepted by the Labour and trade union leadership, is the foisting on the workers of the view that present wage-rates, plus eleven shillings, are adequate to meet the increased cost of living.

The Labour movement must therefore be won immediately to the view that only by pursuing a strong, forceful independent policy in defence of the people's demands can Labour survive. The main need of the moment is the growth of a people's movement for peace and national independence. Labour and Republican forces must become the dominant element of this movement. Only around the following basic demands can such a movement be built: (a) The preservation of peace. (b) Diplomatic and trade agreements with the Soviet Union and the New Democracies. (c) Nationalisation of essential industries and the municipalisation of the passenger transport services. (d) Re-introduction on an extended scale of the Excess Profits Tax. (e) Extension and development of social services. (f) Forty-hour week. (g) Trade union unity. (h) The immediate abandonment of the bullock policy and the continuation of the Compulsory Tillage Order. (i) Development and extension of the turf industry along modern scientific lines. (j) The establishment of a People's Democratic Republic.

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COMMUNIST REVIEW

JULY
1948

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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“LET US NOT FACE ANYTHING”

GEORGE MATTHEWS

WHEN Mr. Morrison spoke at the Scarborough Labour Party Conference he was introducing the National Executive Committee's pamphlet, *Production the Bridge to Socialism*. The key phrases of his speech were: "Parliament had done its job . . . and Parliament having done its part, the ball was now passed back to the citizen. . . . Could the gains be held?" The aim of the N.E.C.'s pamphlet is, by a mixture of high-sounding phrases, distortion of some facts, and complete omission of even more, to attempt to deceive the rank-and-file Labour Party member into supporting the policy of capitulation to capitalism which was the essence of Morrison's speech and the whole line of the right-wing leadership at the conference.

It is, therefore, worth examining this pamphlet in some detail. The title itself gives everything away. The road to Socialism is not the class struggle, the conquest of power by the working class, the ending of exploitation. The N.E.C. has discovered an easier road. All we have to do is to work harder. If we work harder, we shall produce more. And that will bring us Socialism. "Between the war-afflicted Britain of today and the glorious Socialist Commonwealth of tomorrow lies a gap. There is only one way to bridge that gap—by higher production" (p. 5)

But the N.E.C. realises that if workers in Britain think that they are still living in a capitalist society, it will be difficult to persuade them that merely working harder will solve all their problems. So the attempt is made to pretend that we have already achieved a "new society." This is the main theme of the Introduction. In this "new society," "democracy in politics" is matched with "Socialism in economics." "Fear is being banished"—both the fear of the "dictator-shadowed men" and the fear of the "victims of unplanned capitalism." To make matters quite clear, the N.E.C. sums up the last three years as follows:

In a frightened world threatened with a terrible choice between big business and the big dictator, Britain's is not just the middle way—it is the only positive way forward to a *new kind of State* [my italics] which is the tolerant servant, not the harsh master, of the individual. Inspired by a sense of high adventure, the new Britain is creating a Socialist democracy which will be the salvation of the world (p. 3)

Here is distortion of facts with a vengeance. The world's workers

were never so confident—but they are presented as terrified. The choice they have to make is between independence or slavery to American big business, between prosperity and capitalist crisis, between peace and war, between Socialism and capitalism—but the N.E.C. describes it as a choice between “big business” and the “big dictator.” and forgets to mention that the Government’s policy has allied Britain with big business in Britain and America and with the fascist dictatorships of Greece, Spain and Portugal against the working class of Europe and the world.

And what are the characteristics of this “new kind of State,” which will be not merely the servant, but the *tolerant* servant (a non-trade-union, non-class-conscious, servant?) of the individual? What does the N.E.C. mean when it talks of the “glorious Socialist Commonwealth of the future”?

Here the high-sounding phrases are brought into play. The “new society” will “guard and improve the people’s standard of life.” It will “ensure jobs for all.” It will “establish greater equality of income and opportunity.” It will “put a floor in the standard of living, below which no one shall fall.” It will uphold “the dignity of man,” whereas “in a political dictatorship, the helpless individual is cruelly trampled on if he sets one foot outside the citadel of orthodoxy” (this must have been written before the Platts-Mills episode).

These are all desirable aims, but they do not form a definition of a Socialist society. In fact, they can only be finally achieved by the establishment of a Socialist society, in which the exploitation of man by man is abolished. Is there anything in the N.E.C.’s conception of “Socialism” which could lead us to believe that by it they mean the ending of the capitalist profit-making system? Not a word. “In a State which allows members of privileged classes to preen themselves upon their superiority to others,” says the pamphlet, “the brotherhood of man is mocked.” But will it be all right if the privileged classes restrain themselves from preening themselves? “Managers” (bosses is such an ugly word) should not regard employees as “worthy to work, but unworthy to think.” But who is to own the workplaces in the N.E.C.’s “Socialist Commonwealth”—the community, or private capitalists? We are not told. “Where the acquisitive desire for profits and material wealth is ruthlessly exploited, man is set against man.” But since this “new kind of State” is a “tolerant servant,” would it overlook this exploitation for profits if it weren’t done quite so ruthlessly?

It is true that “the classless society” is casually mentioned as being necessary to the “achievement of a society in which the dignity of man is recognised.” But since it is nowhere explained what the N.E.C. means by classes, nowhere indicated that a class-struggle is going on, and nowhere pointed out how classes are to be abolished, it is justifi-

liable to assume that an N.E.C. whose members proudly proclaim that their Party "represents all classes" has an idea of a "classless" society and how to achieve it, which is different from that of genuine Socialists. This Introduction, in fact, while it uses the word "Socialism," does not hold out real Socialism even as a long-term aim. It would be too dangerous for the N.E.C. even to pretend that they wanted in the dim and distant future really to abolish capitalist exploitation. For if that was the aim they presented to the rank and file, it would be impossible to reconcile it, even in words, with what is actually happening under a Labour Government.

And when the generalities and noble phrases are left behind, the rest of the pamphlet gets down to brass tacks. "We have to take off our coats in earnest," is its message, and to support its argument it outlines the four objects of increasing production: "Produce Exports for Survival", "Produce for Full Employment", "Produce for Social Services", and "Produce to Keep Prices Down."

"Even before the war," the N.E.C. tells us, "Britain was failing to pay its way with exports. British industrial supremacy faded while Tory Governments nodded." Thus Britain's pre-war position is presented, not as the result of the general crisis of capitalism, and of the crisis of British imperialism within the general crisis, but as the result of the "nodding" of Tory Governments. If only Baldwin and Chamberlain had been awake, instead of dozing, all would have been well! And then comes this remarkable passage: "And in a devastated post-war world the hungry peoples from the battlegrounds of Europe and Asia reached out to the larders of North and South America, *sending up world prices* and exhausting their last dollars in a desperate effort to keep themselves alive." So the rise in U.S. prices was not due to the rapacious monopolists of America. It is the "hungry people" who sent prices up. This whitewashing of Wall Street continues, of course, with a welcome to E.R.P. as "an act of high statesmanship." But "E.R.P. will not increase, it will only maintain, the flow to Britain of goods from the New World, which would otherwise have dried up." Thus we have to "send output mounting. . . . British production can clear the way for the creation of a Western Union which will be a beacon for the freedom-loving peoples of the world. Our first duty to ourselves and to the world is to produce more for export."

Not a word in all this, naturally, about any present or future difficulties in selling our exports. Not a word about the competition we are already meeting from the U.S.A. Not a word about steel in the list of things we need to import. Not a word about the constantly increasing prices of our imports. Not a word about increasing home production, for example, of food, for the *home* market. Not a word

about trade with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Exports in the abstract, without relation to the real world, without relation to the direction into which they are to be guided, are presented as the panacea to solve all our problems.

This is also the theme of the section "Produce for Full Employment." More exports are the key to full employment: "There is one threat—not the old threat of inadequate purchasing power, but the new threat of inadequate production." This when goods are already piling up in the shops because the workers cannot afford them. In "Produce for Social Services" we are given the usual glowing account of the Government's social service legislation, and again told, "More production is the key to the future—more production of exports . . . more production of buildings and equipment, more production of everything." We are *not* told that it is the Government itself which is limiting the production of the new schools, hospitals and health centres which are necessary to real improvements in the social services.

The fourth section, entitled "Produce to Keep Prices Down," would have been better entitled "Produce and Keep Wages Down." It amounts to a restatement of the wage-freezing policy. We are told that the Government is maintaining heavy taxation on profits. We are not told that rent, interest and profits *after tax* rose by £631 millions between 1945 and 1947 (*Labour Research*, May, 1948). We are told that the Cripps "once-for-all levy" means that "the richest people living on unearned income will have to pay a total tax of 28s. for every pound of income, so that they will have to draw on capital to pay the levy," whereas the true picture is that the levy amounts to one-quarter of one per cent on £10,000 of capital, and one and three-quarters per cent on £120,000 of capital. "It is not enough to curtail profits alone," goes on the pamphlet, "indiscriminate wage increases would also threaten the stability of the country." Thus workers must "exercise the utmost restraint in pressing for wage increases," and finally, once more, "to protect ourselves against the dangers of inflation we must produce more."

The diagrams which illustrate the pamphlet are on the same level as the text, only two out of seven attempting to depict real facts and figures. The remainder are of child's primer standard, a typical example being a seesaw with "production" balancing "purchasing power," and forcing prices down. It does not show what happens when production exceeds purchasing power. Of the two which venture on to the dangerous ground of actual figures, one attempts to show how little profit is left to the capitalists, and chops up the "profit of a typical company" so as to show that 56.5 per cent goes in tax. There is no diagram showing that while total interest and profit rose from £2,851 millions in 1945 to £3,242 millions in 1947, the tax paid fell from

£1,162 million to £947 million in the same period (*Labour Research*, May, 1948), and is now considerably less than one-third of interest and profits. The other diagram purports to show the increase in the cost of living since 1945 in various countries. The figure for Britain is given as four per cent, whereas the Treasury index of market prices shows a rise of about 10 per cent in the same period, while even the new cost of living index introduced last year, which everyone knows does not represent the true picture, showed a rise of four per cent in the last six months of 1947 alone. The diagram does not include the Soviet Union, where the purchasing power of the rouble rose by 41 per cent in the first quarter of this year as compared with the same period last year, and real wages rose by 51 per cent.

There is no section in the pamphlet headed "Produce to Maintain Large Armed Forces." Indeed, the expenditure of manpower, money and materials on war preparations is not mentioned once throughout. As in the popular edition of the 1948 *Economic Survey*, the colossal waste and misuse of our existing resources on unproductive military expenditure is deliberately concealed.

Even if a Labour Party member could be found to swallow wholesale the arguments of the pamphlet so far, he would now be entitled to ask, "But how are we to produce more?" It is here, to use Mr. Morrison's phrase, that the "ball is passed back to the citizen." The Government has done its job: now it is up to the individual workers. And so the members of the Labour Party are given eight ways in which to "give personal leadership in the production drive." They include "securing Joint Production Committees"—but there is no hint that the Government should do more about this; "watching for inefficiency"—but there is no mention of the cuts in capital expenditure which will delay the re-equipment of industry, or of the need for more say by the workers in the management of the nationalised industries; moving to "a more essential undermanned industry"—but there is no suggestion that the Government should help by making wages and conditions more attractive; persuading "married women needed in industry to take up paid work"—but nothing about equal pay; "urging a wise restraint in pressing for increases in personal incomes"—in other words, campaigning against wage increases; and fighting "the evil of unofficial strikes."

"Passing the ball to the citizen" seems to resolve itself into passing the buck to the Labour Party members. This pamphlet could well be called "Let Us Not Face Anything"—neither the past, the present, nor the future.

For it is quite certain that this two pennyworth will not only not help us achieve Socialism—it will not even result in increased production. Because it attempts to cover up the responsibility of the Govern-

ment for the present serious position of Britain, it will only increase the doubts about Government policy which millions of thoughtful workers increasingly feel. It is the Government which is responsible for Britain's crisis, for the lack of a national economic plan, for the misuse of our resources on preparations for war, for the tying of Britain to an America facing a future economic slump, for the capitulation to capitalism which has resulted in workers feeling that the more they produce the worse off they are, and the better off the employers become.

Placed beside the policy outlined in the Communist Party *Manifesto* of May 15, the bankruptcy of this pamphlet is glaringly obvious. If the Communist policy was operated, we should indeed see a tremendous rise in Britain's production. The policy of the N.E.C. of the Labour Party will make the crisis worse, strengthen capitalism, and delay the advance to Socialism. It is in the fight for the Communist policy that the mass movement will be built which will solve the crisis and achieve Socialism.

ASPECTS OF SOVIET ECONOMY

ANDREW ROTHSTEIN

THE CHAIRMAN of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R., N. Voznesensky, published a book a few months ago which is of considerable importance for the study of Marxism. Its title, *War Economy of the U.S.S.R. during the Patriotic War*, indicates its value as a source of information about Marxism in practice. Its theoretical significance is that it gives much insight into the political economy of a Socialist form of society and the Socialist mode of production.

In the first aspect, the very wealth and variety of information given in the book makes selection difficult. In the survey of Soviet strength on the eve of war, its figures show that industrial output in 1940 was nearly twelve times that of 1913, and agricultural output 50 per cent more than that year. Can this be detached from the fact that socially-owned industry and trade accounted by 1940 for 100 per cent of production and turnover respectively, and socially-owned agriculture (State or co-operative) for 99.7 per cent of output?

Some of the special sources of strength of Socialist economy were tested in the war years and not found wanting. The great shifting of Soviet productive forces to the East in the second half of 1941 (more than 1,360 works, nearly 500 of them to Western and Central Asia) was only possible because of the public spirit of the Soviet working

class and collective farmers developed in many years of Socialist emulation. This enabled them to bear almost incredible privations, yet raise war output by March, 1942, in unoccupied territory to the pre-war level for the whole U.S.S.R. Entirely new branches of industry in the Urals and the Central Asian Republics, created during the war, have transformed these areas in the economic sense; and there is no question of the factories built up being scrapped or disposed of to private interests. Collective farming in unoccupied areas, based partly, but not entirely, on extensive mechanisation of agriculture, proved its strength by producing more grain, sugar beet and potatoes, cattle and sheep in 1943 and 1944 than before the war—even though many millions of able-bodied men had left the land to fight the Germans or to go into industry. Budget deficits of 18.9 milliard roubles (under 11 per cent of expenditure) in 1942, and 7.3 milliards (under 4 per cent) in 1943—covered by use of reserves and currency emission—were reduced to zero by 1944, and the total volume of currency in circulation increased from 1941 to 1944 only two and a half times. During the First World War Russia's deficit had been 50 per cent of expenditure in the first year, and then progressively 76 per cent, 78 per cent and 85 per cent; with the result that currency in circulation swelled to fourteen times its 1913 volume. Other characteristic facts can be found in a review of Voznesensky's book published by the *Daily Worker* on April 27.

What of the second aspect—the theory of Socialist production? We often hear from apologists of capitalist economy that the theory of Marx is nineteenth-century economics, out of date and exploded long ago. None of them takes the trouble to make a serious study of Soviet economy, or he would discover that here is a vast section of the earth's surface, where nearly 200 million people get their living, run today on Marx's "exploded" theories, and fairly successfully too.

Voznesensky's work provides a number of excellent examples, both in theory and in practice, of the way in which economic laws first explained by Marx operate in the changed circumstances of a Socialist society. No one should be surprised that, in a changed form, some of the economic laws he discovered in capitalist society still operate in the U.S.S.R. He himself wrote that "a Communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary as it emerges from capitalist society"—what Lenin later distinguished as Socialism, the lower stage of Communism—would be "in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges." (*Critique of the Gotha Programme*.)

One such birthmark which Marx mentioned was that "the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions

have been made (for maintaining and extending production, and for the needs of society as a whole)—exactly what he gives to it." That is, "so much labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form." Another birthmark pointed out by Marx was that "labour, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity": yet "one man is superior to another physically or mentally, and so supplies more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer time."

We shall see later how these birthmarks make themselves felt in the economy of the U.S.S.R. But it is worth noting that Engels laid stress on the possibility of laying hold of them and making use of them, once a Socialist system is established. In *Anti-Dühring*, Part III, Chapter 2, he wrote:—

The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in Nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account. . . . And this is quite especially true of the mighty productive forces of the present day. But once their nature is grasped, in the hands of the producers working in association they can be transformed from demoniac masters into willing servants.

Take the process of production itself. In capitalist society the constant striving of the private owners of the means of production to convert the surplus value they appropriate from the worker into capital, i.e., into more means of production which will produce more surplus value, leads to *expanded reproduction*. But this process continually comes into conflict with the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses—the last cause of all real crises: and this conflict constantly retards and interrupts capitalist reproduction. Marx wrote that, if production were relieved of its "capitalist limitations," then—apart from what was required for society's insurance and reserve fund, and for the maintenance of the incapacitated or immature members of society—the total product of society would make possible both an extension of individual consumption by the worker, "required by the full development of his individuality," and "the continuous expansion of reproduction to an extent dictated by social needs." (*Capital*, Vol. III, Chapter 50.)

This in the Soviet Union is called *expanded Socialist reproduction*; and Voznesensky explains (p. 45):

Expanded Socialist reproduction means, first of all, the growth of the total social product; next it means the extension of the functioning means of production (implements of labour and

objects of labour); furthermore, expanded reproduction means the growth of the working class and its wages fund; finally, it means setting aside a certain portion of the social product (profit) for the needs of Socialist accumulation and capital construction.

For most of these items—the national income, as a measure (not complete, but very near) of the total social product: the total productive equipment of the country: the amount of capital investments: the number of wage workers employed—Voznesensky gives figures which show very clearly the tendency in Soviet economy, ever since Socialist planning really began (the adoption of the first Five Year Plan), to “work according to Marx”:

	<i>National Income</i>		<i>Capital Investments</i>		<i>Total Productive Equipment</i>		<i>Wage-earners</i>
	<i>milliards of roubles</i>						
	<i>at 1926-27 prices</i>				<i>at 1945 prices</i>		<i>(millions)</i>
1928	.. 25	..	3.7	..	140	..	10.8
1932	.. 45.5	..	18	..	285	..	22.9
1937	.. 96	..	30	..	564	..	26.9
1940	.. 128	..	43	..	709	..	31.2

An exact index of the wages bill of the Soviet workers is not available in comparable prices: but there is an indication of the speed at which consumption was increasing during the same years. This is the statement in a 1948 volume of the *Soviet Encyclopedia* that retail trade turnover, measured in fixed prices, was 4.6 times as large in 1940 as it was in 1928, i.e., it rose much faster than the number of wage-earners.

Unhampered by internal conflicts and crises, planned in accordance with social needs, Socialist economy has thus been able to continue its reproduction on a larger and larger scale. Voznesensky shows how this was possible even in wartime.

But what of the laws according to which this development has proceeded? Marx gave a hint of this in the paper which Engels in 1894 published as Chapter 49 in Volume III of *Capital*:

After the abolition of the capitalist mode of production, but with social production still in vogue, the determination of value continues to prevail in such a way that the regulation of labour time and the distribution of social labour among the various groups of production, and the keeping of accounts in connection with this, become more essential than ever.

This sounds like that state of society which Marx dealt with in the

Critique of the Gotha Programme—Communist society as it emerges from capitalism, with all its birthmarks, and particularly the one which makes the labour of different individuals still unequal. Such a society exists in the U.S.S.R. And its examination reveals that, apart from the broad personal differences between individuals inherited from the past, there are also important differences in the conditions in which they apply their labour (also a heritage of the past, of course). One hour's work in a highly-mechanised and rationalised State enterprise differs in its results (however skilled the worker) from an hour's work in a factory less up to date and, again, from an hour's work in a co-operative handicraft shop. Nor is an hour's labour on a collective farm, with its co-operative form of property and organisation of labour, equivalent to an hour's labour in a State farm, or in a State factory. These are still differences which prevent Soviet economy, as yet, from measuring labour directly in hours and oblige it to use money as the measure—"reducing the various, heterogeneous forms of social labour to a single abstract labour," as a well-known Soviet economist, K. Ostrovityanov, wrote recently (*Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1948, No. 1). And this at once brings us back to the law of value—that "the value of any article is the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary for its production" (*Capital*, Vol. I, Chapter I). Here we can usefully turn to Voznesensky again (pp. 145-146).

Are there economic laws of production and distribution with which Socialist planning has to reckon? Unquestionably they exist, and must be reckoned with only the knowledge of economic laws makes possible their use in the interests of Socialism. The most elementary law of costs of production and distribution of products is the law of value, transformed in Soviet economy.

In Socialist economy the law of value means the necessity of conducting a monetary, not merely a physical, registration and planning of the costs of production, i.e., of the expenditure of social labour on the production of social output. This is very essential, as Socialism requires the strictest registration and planning of production. So long as differences exist between labour in State enterprises and in collective farms, between skilled and unskilled labour, between intellectual and manual labour: so long as products are distributed according to quantity and quality of labour expended, there exists the necessity to reduce the various species of labour to a single denominator—value, determined by socially-necessary labour.

The value of the output of the social product in the U.S.S.R.,

i.e., of the total product of national economy during a given period, is determined by its costs of production. The real value of the social product is the expenditure of society on its production. In its turn, that expenditure is determined by the quantity of socially-necessary labour expended by the peoples of the U.S.S.R. on producing the total social product.

The State plan in Socialist economy utilises the law of value to achieve the necessary proportions in producing and distributing social labour and the social product—proportions subordinated to the need for reinforcing and developing the Soviet order. The Soviet State determines and assures the observance of definite proportions in the distribution of labour and material resources, in order to reinforce the Socialist system and solve the problems facing the State in the particular period concerned. War economy in the U.S.S.R. radically altered the proportions of peacetime: in the distribution of labour and material resources, a predominant position was taken over by war production and the branches of war economy linked with it. With changes in economic and political objectives, proportions in the distribution of labour and material resources change also.

In the course of his book, Voznesensky gives figures characterising these changes in the allocation of the material resources of the Soviet economic system (p. 65).

Percentage of total social

<i>product used for.</i>	1940	1942	1943
Production	43	43	43
Consumption	42	38	35
Accumulation	11	2	4
Defence (not including personal consumption by armed forces)	4	17	18

This change, of course, expressed itself in concrete form. Changes in the number of able-bodied workers and collective farmers engaged in production brought in their train changes in their total output and its value, in the wages earned by the workers and the net return for their labour secured by the collective farmers (by sales to the State or on their special "collective farm markets" in the towns, or in produce distributed within the collective farm itself). The changes took a cash form, in the shape of changing national income and changing Budget revenue and expenditure.

At this point, the question of prices arises. Voznesensky continues, in the passage just quoted (p. 147):

The law of value operates not only in production, but also in

exchange. Prices in Socialist economy are the monetary expression of the value of the product, i.e., of its costs of production, i.e., in the long run of the expenditure of socially-necessary labour upon it. A worker in Socialist enterprise who buys consumption goods with his wages or other form of monetary income is exchanging a certain quantity of labour expended by him in production for a corresponding quantity of labour embodied in consumption goods.

Of course, the price and the value of each individual commodity do not coincide and cannot coincide; but the sum of prices of all the output of the U.S.S.R. national economy, produced over a given period, cannot but be equal to the costs of production of that output, i.e., to the total social labour

Voznesensky gives more than one illustration of the concrete way this worked in wartime. (Maurice Dobb, in his magnificent new book, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, gives the peacetime background.) Thus he points out that the Soviet State pursued a policy of firm, unchanging retail prices for rationed foodstuffs and articles of prime necessity. Apart from alcoholic liquors and tobacco, such prices remain practically unaltered, and in 1943 were only 0.5 per cent (one two-hundredth) above the pre-war level. But the basis of this policy, in its turn, was a policy of firm *wholesale* prices for industrial goods, in accordance with State wartime plans which ensured that *prices of the means of production should actually fall, compared with the pre-war level*, and should be balanced by a rise in the wholesale price of other manufactured goods. Thus, 1942 wholesale prices for the output of the war industries were at 72 per cent of the pre-war level, the engineering industry at 87 per cent, the other heavy industries at 98 per cent and the light and food-processing industries at 120 per cent (pp. 127-128).

This striking illustration of the great advantage of planned Socialist economy over capitalism is explained by Voznesensky in another passage of high theoretical importance (pp. 121-123):

Socialist society in the U.S.S.R. has its own form of exchange of commodities—Socialist trade, trade without capitalists and speculators. A number of differences in principle distinguish Soviet trade from capitalist trade.

Soviet trade is a form of exchange of commodities, the main and predominant mass of which have been produced in Socialist enterprises. Commodity-money or money-commodity transactions in their great mass represent in Socialist society the exchange of commodities between Socialist enterprises (including those between State enterprises and collective farms), or the form in which the

workers, peasants and intellectuals realise their share of the social product.

A commodity in Socialist society knows no conflict between its value and use-value, so characteristic of commodity-capitalist society, where such conflict is born of private property in the means of production. That conflict in capitalist society is the elementary form of contradiction between the social mode of production and the private form of appropriation, which gives rise to crises.

The price of a commodity in the Socialist society of the U.S.S.R. is founded on its value or costs of production. But the Soviet State itself, in order to strengthen Socialism and raise the living standards of the working people, determines the concrete price of each variety of commodity produced in State enterprise or disposed of in State trade—and consequently also the degree to which the retail price of the commodity departs from its real value.

Consequently in Socialist economy there is no room for the elemental changes of prices characteristic of capitalist industrial cycles, or for the speculative forcing up of prices by capitalist monopolies which is a law, for example, for the United States of America. Disposing of the main mass of commodities and commodity reserves of the country, the Soviet State determines the reduction of State prices, and exercises economic influence in the direction of reduction of prices in co-operative trade, as also in the free collective-farm market.

Much else in the book throws light on such aspects of Soviet economy as the laws of Socialist organisation of labour, the role of money in the U.S.S.R. and the differences between the laws of value in capitalist and Socialist society. But sufficient, perhaps, has been quoted here to suggest what a valuable contribution it has made to Socialist theory.

STATE AND REVOLUTION IN TUDOR AND STUART ENGLAND

*(Contributed on behalf of the 16th-17th century section of the
Historians' Group of the Communist Party.)*

I

THE Political Committee of the Communist Party has decided to celebrate next year the three-hundredth anniversary of the first English Republic, 1649, as an event of major political significance.

Marx and Engels devoted much attention to the English bourgeois revolution, as can be seen from the study of their writings on this subject recently published in *Science and Society* (Winter, 1948). But when Christopher Hill's pioneer essay, *The English Revolution*, appeared in 1940, British Marxists were largely unfamiliar with the view that the bourgeois revolution of 1640-49 was "perhaps the most important event that has yet occurred in English history." The question was raised to a higher theoretical level by the publication, in 1946, of Maurice Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, which, besides drawing attention to often neglected material in writings of Marx and Lenin (such as *Capital*, Vol. III, and *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*), contains invaluable original discussions of the problems involved, based on recent economic research interpreted by Marxist method. Within the last year, Party historians have had discussions on the English bourgeois revolution and the State form which it overthrew (the absolute monarchy which grew up under the Tudors and was destroyed in 1640). The present article, without entering on every question or repeating the story of developments outlined by Hill and Dobb, attempts only to indicate some main general points arising from the discussion which may be of interest not only to teachers and other specialists, but to all Party members.

The discussion revealed unclarities about fundamental questions of historical development which are no less important for the present than for the past. The reformist and gradualist notions still dominant in the British Labour movement are linked up with mistaken ideas about British history, especially about the transition to capitalism and the political victory of the bourgeoisie (for example, Ramsay MacDonald, quoted by Harry Pollitt, Report to Twentieth Party Congress: "In human history, one epoch slides into another, individuals formulate ideas, society gradually assimilates them and gradually the accumulation shows itself in the social structure").

The two main questions at issue in the discussion were: (1) How do we decide what are the class relationships determining the basic character of a given society? and (2) What is a social revolution, and how does it happen?

The first question arose in the concrete form: What were the predominant relations of men in production in England at the beginning of the seventeenth century? Was it a feudal or bourgeois society? Some of the points of method which emerged in thrashing out this question are also relevant to the question: what is a capitalist and what is a Socialist society?—where clarity is so greatly needed today.

The second question arose in the concrete form: what class controlled the State between the accession of the Tudors in 1485 (or of the Yorkists in 1461) and 1640? Did the State serve the bourgeoisie

and combat feudalism, or not? The underlying questions of how we determine the class character of a given State and what is the role of the State in the transition from one social order to another are very topical indeed.

II

On the first question, some comrades contested the picture given by Hill of England, 1640, as a land wherein "the structure of society was still essentially feudal," in the sense that the growth of capitalist relations was still cramped by an overall framework of feudal relations which were upheld and enforced by a feudal State. The discussion of this point necessitated both an examination of the actual facts and also a consideration of what Marxists mean by feudalism, as against the conventional legal-academic usage.

The English feudalism of 1600, based on the exploitation of the free and semi-free peasants and other small commodity producers by a rentier aristocracy, naturally bore a different aspect from that of 1400 where the feudal lords exercised a more brutal and direct control over the life and labour of their serfs. The social order was in an advanced stage of decay, owing to the growth of capitalist relations and to peasant revolt, and its extreme dependence on the central government reflects this decadence. Basically, however, feudal relations still prevailed; power depended on the monopoly of land and the legal rights of the landlord over the direct producer, from whom the tribute exacted still largely reflected the older conditions of labour service with the direct producer in customary possession of the land, rather than those of "economic" rent required by the new capitalist class (Hill, pp 35-36.)

It was also noted that exploitation through *local* power is not a necessary feature of feudal society. There was a high degree of centralisation of power as early as the fourteenth century in England, compared with many other West European countries (wide competence of the royal jurisdiction, with a central bureaucracy, control of the Justices of the Peace, and of wages, etc.). Exploitation of the people by the feudal landlords (together with their merchant and financial hangers-on) was in the England of the early seventeenth century carried on to a very great extent through the central government, especially by means of the monopolies granted by royal favour. Such a lucrative privilege as the Earl of Essex's monopoly of the sweet wine trade raised to a national scale the medieval lord of the manor's right to take toll of all traders operating in his little territory.

In short, the social order was still one which suited the feudalists, much as the imperialist-monopoly capitalism of 1948, whilst differing

in important respects from the capitalism of 1848 (owing, again, to the advanced stage of contradiction between productive forces and social relations) is nevertheless the same social order at bottom, and has not become Socialism or "something else" non-capitalist.

III

What led certain comrades to doubt the feudal nature of English society in the 1600s was some confusion not only about feudalism, but also about capitalism. The ordinary academic view of "the new monarchy" in England has something in common with the mistaken notion of the Soviet historian, the late M. N. Pokrovsky, that there was a special epoch of "merchant capitalism" lying between early feudalism and what he called "industrial capitalism" (the factory system). Marx proved that merchant capital is not a new mode of production, but "the historical form of capital long before capital has subjected production to its control" (*Capital*, vol. III, pp. 384-396). Though he dated the capitalist era from the sixteenth century, treating previous economic and social developments (for example, the abolition of serfdom) as the "prerequisites" for this stage (*Capital*, vol. I, p. 739), he showed that it was only with the changes made by the industrial revolution that the direct producer as a class became completely subordinated to capitalist relations, losing all control over his product and over the means of production.

The long, drawn-out process which converts the decisive body of producers into proletarians is to be traced through transformations in the kind of exploitation; at the lower level of production the direct producer must be in possession of land; later, at the higher level, he must be divorced from it. At one pole we find surplus labour extracted as tribute or tax ("non-economic" rent) paid by direct producers to landowners, at the other, surplus value extracted through wages paid to direct producers by capitalists. In the one case a relation of servitude or personal dependence, in the other a relation of "free" contract. Intermediate stages are tested by questions as to how far the producer is in possession of some or all of his means of production, how far, as a wage labourer, he is solely dependent on wages, how far the products of his labour go direct into a consumption fund (his own or his master's), how far he controls their exchange, etc., etc. In sixteenth and seventeenth century England, despite the increasing grip of merchant capital on production (reflected in the differentiation inside the gilds and among the peasantry) the decisive labour force remained in possession of their means of production and the mobility of labour was discouraged (Elizabethan Poor Law, Statute of Artificers, Act of Settlement).

In the economic transition of the sixteenth century the dominant

tendency was for already-established merchants to turn towards production, financing and exploiting domestic handicraft production in the suburbs of towns or in the villages outside the reach of urban guild regulations. Thereby a section of the merchant class broke away (at least partially) from that landowner-merchant alliance which had been developing since the fourteenth century and involved powerfully conservative elements; and the interests of this section came to be associated with the growth of industry.

At the same time there was a growing tendency for more well-to-do craftsmen, accumulating capital and taking to trade, to organise production on a capitalist basis by employing poorer craftsmen to work for them (what Marx called "the really revolutionary way": *Capital*, vol. III, p. 393; Dobb, 120-4, 134-8). This tendency came to a head at the beginning of the seventeenth century in the rise of a democratic movement among the craft element inside many of the big London Livery Companies (or guilds); a movement that was evidently an important lever in the bourgeois revolution. While some of the merchants were becoming capitalists, therefore, organising domestic industry and a few "manufactories," others, especially those who monopolised foreign trade, were hand in glove with the feudalists to soak the capitalist sector through "controls" like Alderman Cockayne's disastrous project for the cloth business Lucy Hutchinson describes the groups around the King which, together, made up the feudal ruling class of the England of Charles I: "the needy courtiers, the proud, encroaching priests, the thievish projectors, the lewd nobility and gentry." All these thrust their hands deep into the pockets of the whole people, from the capitalists, urban and rural, down to the humblest peasant, and by their extortions and privileges held back the full development of capitalism. A large, wealthy capitalist class had arisen, both in industry and in agriculture, a section of the gentry and yeomanry having gone over to capitalist methods; running their small estates as units organised for commodity production by wage-labour. But the capitalists found themselves mulcted and penalised in various ways, and the expansion of their way of life obstructed by the feudal elements in control of the State.

IV

In examining the way in which the feudalists exploited the rest of the community we were brought from a consideration of the structure of society to a consideration of the State. Not only did the State serve directly as a means of transferring surplus product to the feudalists, it also, through the monopolies, etc., protected and upheld feudal privilege and inequality against capitalist encroachments, as

well as against popular revolts. For instance, the Statute of Artificers (1563) was an attempt to freeze the *status quo* by restricting the mobility and free recruitment of labour, regardless of the interests of expanding capitalism. This is typical of the way in which the absolutist State worked. It is wrong to see in the struggles between the monarch and certain groups of nobles, or in Henry VIII's dissolution of the monasteries and assumption of control over the Church, a fight of the monarchy "against feudalism." The King was the biggest feudal landowner, his revenue and the "prerogatives" which safeguarded it were based on feudal rights: revenue from crown-lands and from feudal courts (such as the Court of Wards), customs and excise, purveyance for the armed forces, etc. (Customs dues were like feudal tolls in that they were imposed on exports and imports primarily to produce revenue for the King.)

The fact that the Tudors' revenue was collected and administered more efficiently than the Lancastrians' had been did not alter its feudal character. All that the monarch aimed to do in relation to the minor feudalists was to establish his ascendancy over them as fully as possible and make them closely dependent upon him. The period sees a *concentration* of feudal property and power in the hands of the monarchy, with a corresponding transition of the feudalists from local semi-sovereigns to courtiers—a transition to which in the early stages they resigned themselves very unwillingly. (This process of concentration has a certain limited analogy with the growth of the great trusts and of State capitalism in our time.)

The new sources of land and wealth, the greater unification and internal order which the absolute monarchy brought about, were more favourable than previous conditions for the growth of capitalist production. In our own age the concentration of capitalist production has prepared the basis for Socialism and created better conditions for struggle to overthrow the capitalist order; the form of State power, however, still harmonises with the interests of monopoly capital and imperialism. The Tudor and early Stuart State was essentially an executive institution of the feudal class more highly organised than ever before. In the second half of the sixteenth century there was as yet no serious conflict of interest between the rising bourgeoisie and the Crown, which needed their economic strength in the fight for national existence against the reactionary power of Spain: this is shown in the new national pride and the rich flowering of music, drama and poetry under "Good Queen Bess"; but before the end of Elizabeth's reign the bourgeoisie were outgrowing this relation. In the Stuart period, in order to create conditions for free and full development of their own social order, they had to seize State power. This meant destroying the organs of absolutism (Star Chamber, High Commission)

AND STUART ENGLAND

and the personification of the old regime in Charles I. The executive and organs of force were subordinated to the control of the "Commons House of Parliament." Parliament was an institution dating from feudal times, but it represented mainly the landed class, and in England, where capitalism had grown up largely in the countryside, many of the gentry had capitalist interests in industry or agriculture. The English bourgeoisie represented in Parliament was able to smash the absolute monarchy before the latter could build a great apparatus of bureaucracy and militarism like that in France—an apparatus which Laud and Strafford consciously strove to reproduce in England.

Only after the revolution of 1640-49 does the State in England begin to be subordinated to the capitalists. This revolution was something qualitatively different from such changes within the feudal framework as had occurred in 1461, 1485, 1529, and so on, though these had in some ways improved conditions for capitalist development. The revolution of 1640 replaced the rule of one class by another. This was the answer to our second question. The change accomplished can be seen in the abolition of crown monopolies and feudal tenures, in the Navigation Act, the fight to wrest world trade from the Dutch, the development of the navy, the forward colonial policy (Ireland, Jamaica), the establishment of the Bank of England (1693), and in fiscal policy, taxes falling on production replaced by taxes falling on consumption, and a consistent protectionist system which has the effect, in Marx's words, of "manufacturing manufacturers."

From fear of the militant and democratic petty bourgeoisie the English capitalists did not carry through the complete transformation of the political structure heralded by our first republic, the monarchy was revived in 1660, and retained "under new management" in 1689, after James II had been punished for failing to appreciate that a revolution had occurred. Now, however, the feudal-absolutist monarchy had given place to the constitutional monarchy, and the State was at the service of the new landlord-capitalist alliance, though the defeat of the revolutionary-democratic forces, and the preservation of feudal elements through the continued dominance of merchant over industrial capital, prolonged for 140 years the rule of an oligarchy.

V

In the course of the discussion, two main trends of non-Marxist thought revealed themselves. On the one hand was economic determinism, which sees "politics" more or less automatically adjusting itself to "economics," identifies the State with society, underestimates the role of man's conscious struggle and smooths out the course of history into an evolutionary process where social revolutions, if such

they can be called, happen gradually and spontaneously without people being aware of them, all under the relentless drive of "economic forces." On the other hand, was the trend of ignoring the ultimate economic basis of social relations. The first school of thought forgets the *dialectical* aspect of dialectical materialism, the second forgets that it is dialectical *materialism*. It is the relationship between men in production, the presence or absence of exploitation of some by others, and the means by which exploitation is achieved, that provides the clue to the basic structure of any society. The change from one mode of production to another, involving the substitution of one predominant type of production relations for another, takes place through class struggle, in which the exploiting class of the old order fights hard with all the means at its command (including State power) to retard the change and retain economic ascendancy.

The English Revolution of 1640-1649 fulfilled the function of every bourgeois revolution: it swept away the main barriers to capitalist development. It produced remarkable creative developments in science, philosophy and the arts. the Royal Society and Newton, Hobbes and Locke, Milton, Bunyan, Defoe, Vanburgh and Wren. It made possible the agrarian and industrial revolution. The England born in 1649, for all its bourgeois limitations, had a most powerful influence in world history: it showed the way to the American revolution of 1776 and with it to the great French Revolution of 1789. The forces in the New Model Army and the Leveller movement that were defeated in our revolution constituted the most vigorous and self-confident assertion of popular democracy ever known in the world up to that time, and not seen again until the uprising of the common people in France in 1789-94. With Winstanley and the Diggers, a Communist theory was for the first time associated with the democratic movement.

During the long reign of capitalism the bourgeoisie has come more and more to deny its revolutionary past; a century ago the *Communist Manifesto* showed that only the working class can complete the conquest of freedom begun by the bourgeoisie in its prime. Today only the working people can worthily celebrate the tercentenary of the revolution since they only can carry that revolution through to its end in Socialism. In this celebration, led by Communists, the nation can learn a lesson in democracy and dictatorship. To understand what happened in 1649 is to understand better what is happening in Eastern Europe today.

WILLIAM MORRIS

LIONEL MUNBY

IN A RECENT Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Commons William Gallacher spoke of our country's history: "The Communist ideology was there in the writings, speeches and poems of the great artist and poet, William Morris, long before there was a Soviet Russia. This has been the home of revolutionary ideas and of revolutionary struggles." It is a significant aspect of the battle of ideas taking place in our time that the Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, in closing the debate, should have bothered to answer: "I was amazed at the effrontery of the Hon Member for West Fife . . . William Morris was the last man in the world who would ever have bowed to any Marxian authority."

Who was William Morris? He was the outstanding artistic figure of nineteenth-century England, a man of the all-round Renaissance mould. He was a painter, a craftsman of many skills, an architect, essayist, novelist and poet. As much as any other individual he is responsible for the reaction from the cluttered living rooms of the Victorian middle class and from the crowded pages of Victorian books. In 1892 he was offered and contemptuously refused the Poet Laureateship.

William Morris was born in 1834 and died in 1896. He lived through the period in which fully-developed competitive capitalism changed into its opposite, monopoly. In 1877, when Morris was 43, a major depression hit the "workshop of the world", by the time Morris was 50 the British ruling class had become anxiously aware of foreign competition; monopoly forms were appearing. At this period in his life, Morris, learning from political experience and from profound study, penetrated to the fundamental class alignments and the class division exposed by Marx and Engels.

How did Morris, educated at Marlborough and Oxford, inheritor of considerable capital from his broker father, become a Socialist and a Marxist? When he left Oxford, it was as one of the pre-Raphaelite brotherhood; in 1861 he founded a firm of decorators and launched a crusade to change public taste. Between 1867 and 1870 he wrote his first major poems, *The Life and Death of Jason* and *The Earthly Paradise*. In these early works Morris, like many other artistic Victorians, sought to escape from the smug sentimentality and the ugliness of his own time back into the Middle Ages, to a period before the competitive individualism of the bourgeoisie had transformed the

world. But Morris knew what he was doing: in *The Earthly Paradise* he called himself "the idle singer of an empty day"; he begins the poem:

*Forget six counties overhung with smoke,
Forget the snorting steam and piston stroke,
Forget the spreading of the hideous town . . .*

The greatness of William Morris lies in his development from this position into a fully-fledged scientific Socialist understanding. He was a man who had to fight, and he turned to the saga literature of Iceland as an expression of this mood. *Sigurd the Volsung*, one of England's few great epic poems, was the result. To Morris, as to other intellectuals who have followed in the path he trod, life itself was struggle, and the logic of struggle led to Communism.

In 1877 he became an active member of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, for the rest of his life Morris was active as a public lecturer and controversialist on artistic themes. In 1876 he had joined the newly-founded Eastern Question Association. This body exposed Turkish atrocities in the Balkans and sought to prevent Disraeli leading England to war with Russia in defence of Turkey. William Morris soon penetrated the mask of the professional Liberal politicians with their constitutional objections to leading the demonstrations demanded by the workers. He left the Association, and in 1880 the Liberal Party

Morris's idea at a turning point in England's history and in his own development are revealed in a manifesto he drafted for the Association. It is headed: "To the working men of England," and opens with a protest against the threatening war and against the warmongers on the Stock Exchange, in the clubs and in the "Tory rump." It continues.

Working men of England, one word of warning yet. I doubt if you know the bitterness of hatred against freedom and progress that lies at the hearts of a certain part of the richer classes in this country . . . do but hear them talking among themselves. . . . These men cannot speak of your order, of its aims, of its leaders, without a sneer or an insult: these men, if they had the power . . . could deliver you bound hand and foot for ever to irresponsible capital. Fellow citizens . . . cast aside sloth and cry out against an unjust war, and urge us of the middle classes to do no less.

No wonder that in 1883 Morris joined Hyndman's Democratic Federation of Radical Workingmen's Clubs and that at the turn of the year he and Hyndman jointly published *Principles of Socialism*. In 1894 Morris explained how he became a Socialist:

"To sum up then the study of history and the love and practice of art forced me into a hatred of the civilisation which, if things were to stop as they are, would turn history into inconsequent nonsense and make art a collection of the curiosities of the past, which would have no serious relation to the life of the present. But the consciousness of revolution stirring amidst our hateful modern society prevented me, luckier than many others of artistic perceptions, from crystallising into a mere railer against 'progress' on the one hand, and on the other from wasting time and energy in any of the numerous schemes by which the quasi-artistic of the middle classes hope to make art grow when it has no longer any root, and thus I became a practical Socialist."

What Morris thought a practical Socialist should be, he soon showed. In December, 1884, he led a majority of the S.D.F. Council to oppose Hyndman's personal domination of the movement and to resist the S.D.F.'s sectarian exclusiveness towards the wider working-class movement. This group seceded in January, 1885, and founded the Socialist League. Its leaders included, besides Morris, Bellert Bax, Edward Aveling, Eleanor Marx Aveling, J. L. Mahon, Sam Mainwaring (of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers) and Andreas Sheu. Morris was editor of the League's paper, *Commonweal*, treasurer, and an active propagandist and literature seller; he was arrested for one of his open-air speeches. In the *Commonweal*, between 1885 and 1890, appeared most of Morris's best-known Socialist writings. In 1890 he left the Socialist League, which had fallen into the hands of anarchists, and founded a propaganda society at his home, the Hammersmith Socialist Society. In 1891 he had a serious illness from which he never fully recovered. Yet in the last six years of his life he began his great Kelmscott Press, which pioneered the changed appearance of our printed books, and he continued to write poems and prose romances. Until his death he appeared on Socialist platforms to urge unity, whenever he could do so without surrendering his revolutionary principles. In 1895, at Stepniak's grave, a speaker claimed that the Russian had become more moderate in old age; Morris at the graveside burst out: "This is a lie to suggest that Stepniak had ceased to be a revolutionary. He died as he had lived, a revolutionary to the end." It might have been Morris's own epitaph, a year later he was dead and the scribblers were at work.

Morris, contrary to what is generally believed of him, was a Marxist who made himself thoroughly acquainted with the works of Marx then available. In particular, he studied *Capital*, whose economic theory he found difficult to master, as have many others; that he did master it is clear from much of his writing. He once stated significantly: "I

thoroughly enjoyed the historical part of *Capital*." *A Dream of John Ball* is a novel with the theme: "If the folk be enthralled, what remedy save that they be free? and if they have tried many roads towards freedom, and found that they led no-whither, then shall they try yet another"; "the Fellowship of men shall endure, however many tribulations it may have to wear through." *All for the Cause*, one of the Chants for Socialists, reiterates this idea:

*He that dies shall not die lonely, many an one hath gone before,
He that lives shall bear no burden heavier than the life they bore . .
Named and nameless all live in us, one and all they lead us yet
Every pain to count for nothing, every sorrow to forget . . .
There midst the world new-built shall our earthly deeds abide,
Though our names be all forgotten, and the tale of how we died*

In *Serving My Time*, Harry Pollitt writes of "following the gleam":

There is not half enough of this type of propaganda today. We have all become so hard and practical that we are ashamed of painting the vision splendid—of showing glimpses of the promised land. It is missing from our speeches, our Press and our pamphlets, and if one dares to talk about the "gleam," one is in danger of being accused of sentimentalism. Yet I am convinced it was this kind of verbal inspiration that gave birth to the indestructible urge, which helped the pioneers of the movement to keep fight, fight, fighting for freedom, when it was by no means as easy as it is today.

Morris's understanding of the world in which he lived and his efforts to inspire others are best seen in the pamphlet, *Communism*, and in his famous romance, *News from Nowhere*. *Communism* opens: "The great mass of what most non-Socialists at least consider at present to be Socialism, seems to me nothing more than a *machinery* of Socialism." There is "a great gain" in reforms to the existing society, but "the ultimate good of it, the amount of progressive force that might be in such things would, I think, depend on *how* such reforms were done." There is a doubt "whether the Society of Inequality might not accept the quasi-Socialist machinery above mentioned, and work it for the purpose of upholding that society in a somewhat shorn condition, maybe, but a safe one." The whole value of reforms depends on their effectiveness in "drawing (the mass of the workmen) into Socialism, so that they may at last find themselves to be face to face with false society, themselves the only possible elements of true society." "Such measures, with all that goes towards getting them carried, will train them into organisation and administration." There follows an

exposure of the wastefulness of capitalist society contrasted with the productivity of Communist society, in both its stages of development. Morris refuses to specify "the machinery by which a communistic society is to be carried on . . . time will teach us what new machinery may be necessary to the new life." The pamphlet ends with an appeal for unity amongst Socialists: "Let us . . . be at peace amongst ourselves, that we may the better make war upon the monopolist."

News from Nowhere has been called the crowning glory of English Utopias, because here the poet and the Marxist merge into one. It is a fictional picture of the higher stage of Socialist society, Communism, in which Morris offers an answer to the problem often set Socialists: what incentive to labour could there be in Communist society? Morris found the answer in his belief, taken in part from John Ruskin, in the natural creativeness of man. This leads to the picture of a revival of the crafts, which so strikes the reader; the picture may be exaggerated, but the revival of carpet making, wood carving and wood painting in the Soviet Union since 1917 suggests that Morris may be less "Utopian," even in this respect, than some critics have thought. Morris wisely avoided being sidetracked by his own mechanical inventiveness, as was H. G. Wells, when he came to a factory he did not visit it; on the Thames he met "force barges".

"I understood pretty well that these 'force vehicles' had taken the place of our old steam-power carrying; but I took good care not to ask any questions about them, as I knew well enough both that I should never be able to understand how they were worked, and that in attempting to do so I should betray myself."

Morris clearly understood that the new society had harnessed new forces: when explaining how town and countryside were merged, his guide says: "Of course, the great change in the use of mechanical force made this an easy matter"; earlier, when talking about a factory, the same guide says. "Why should people collect together to use power, when they can have it at the places where they live, or hard by, any two or three of them; or any one for the matter of that?"

The core of *News from Nowhere* is Chapter XVII, "How the Change Came," which presumably Mr. Attlee never read:

Did the change, the "revolution" it used to be called, come peacefully? . . . It was war from beginning to end. . . . Do you mean actual fighting with weapons . . . or the strikes and lockouts and starvation of which we have heard? . . . Both, both.

This was necessary because:

That machinery of life for the use of people who didn't know

what they wanted of it, and which was known as State Socialism, was partly put in motion, though in a very piecemeal way. But it did not work smoothly; it was, of course, resisted at every turn by the capitalists; and no wonder, for it tended more and more to upset the commercial system I have told you of, without providing anything really effective in its place. The result was growing confusion, great suffering amongst the working classes, and, as a consequence, great discontent. For a long time matters went on like this. The power of the upper classes had lessened, as their command over wealth lessened.

The Gordian knot could only be cut by the workmen, who "had at last learned how to combine after a long period of mistakes and disasters." The struggle for power led to fighting, because the capitalists created "bands of young men" to assist them, the "Friends of Order", it was vain.

It is impossible to read this part of *News from Nowhere* and to believe that Morris had not submitted his intelligence and his creative genius to the transforming power of Marxism. He accepted this "authority"; he was too much of a craftsman to separate theory from practice. In spite of all disillusionments he devoted his time, his energy and ability, his money and, in fact, his life to "the cause." He was only 62 when he died, and his death was certainly hurried by his endless travelling and speaking in all weathers.

TRANSPORT HOUSE ADOPTS THE "COMMUNIST MANIFESTO"

Communist Manifesto. Socialist Landmark: a new appreciation written for the Labour Party by Harold J. Laski (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 3s. 6d.)

The title of this remarkable publication does not deceive. It really is a completely new "appreciation", in fact, no one but the Labour Party and Professor Laski could have perpetrated it. The reader is first presented with a "Foreword by the Labour Party," in which "the Labour Party acknowledges its indebtedness to Marx and Engels as two of the men who have been the inspiration of the whole working-class movement." More than that, the Labour Party is at one with Marx and Engels on "the detailed programme they put forward." This is "proved" conclusively by:

"Abolition of private property in land has long been a demand

of the Labour movement. A heavy progressive income tax is being enforced by the present Labour Government as a means of achieving social justice. We have gone far towards abolition of the right of inheritance by our heavy death duties. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State is partially attained in the Bank of England Act and other measures. We have largely nationalised the means of communication while extending public ownership of the factories and instruments of production. We have declared the equal obligation of all to work. We are engaged in redressing the balance between town and country, between industry and agriculture. Finally, we have largely established free education for all children in publicly-owned schools. Who, remembering that these were demands of the *Manifesto*, can doubt our common inspiration? "

Who, indeed, remembering that these were not "demands of the *Manifesto*," but "despotic inroads on the rights of property" to be carried out by the revolutionary proletariat "organised as the ruling class," can doubt that the Labour Party is here performing a typical trick on the reader? A heavy progressive income tax, for example, has no particular connection with the Labour Party; Liberal and Tory Governments in turn have gradually stepped up the rates, not at all "as a means of achieving social justice," but simply in order to maintain an imperialist State and to pay interest on enormous war loans—interest paid to the capitalist class. And as to the part played by the present Labour Government—it has declared that it is impossible to soak the rich any more, and has increased indirect taxation, mainly borne by the working class, by £325 millions a year since it took office. It is true that it has increased death duties; but any suggestion that it has thereby "gone far towards abolition of the right of inheritance" is belied by the steadily increasing volume of unearned income. The most comical of the claims is that "we have declared the equal obligation of all to work." With great blowing of trumpets, the Labour Government has roped in a couple of dozen minor spivs, it has in no way touched the capitalist class, and its latest announcement is that as a result of its policy the number of unemployed workers will rise to 450,000! Taken all in all, the claim of "common inspiration" with the *Manifesto* is nothing but an impudent deception.

The reader is then handed over to the tender mercies of Professor Laski, who is described as "the foremost English authority on the subject," and whose present work is described as "scholarly." We shall see what "scholarly" means as applied by the Labour Party to such an "authority."

Laski's formal homage to Marx and Engels is accompanied by the usual patronising comments: Marx had "a passion for leadership," Engels was "facile rather than profound." As for the *Manifesto* itself, the "scholarly" Laski tells us in one paragraph that its purpose is "the definition of a doctrine which . . . was intended to supersede all competing theories," and in the very next paragraph (p. 32) that "the originality of the *Manifesto* does not lie in any single doctrine that it enunciates." Only a "scholar" can reconcile these two statements. What Laski is doing is to assert that Marxism was nothing new; as he puts it—"a number of the doctrines which lie at the heart of classical Marxism had already been set out with clarity and with vigour" in "an immense body of literature, not all of it Socialist." In other words, Marx and Engels were good fellows, but—lacking in originality.

A point that evidently caused Laski some worry in presentation is why the *Manifesto* was called Communist. On page 39 he explains that there were two reasons for it: (1) "It emphasises the relation of their work to the Communist League"; (2) "It serves to mark their own sense of profound separation from the 'true' Socialists in Germany". On page 77 he raises the question again, adding the explanations that "It was possibly the outcome of a recollection of the Paris Commune in the French Revolution," and also "It was possibly a desire to distinguish the ideas for which they stood from Socialist doctrines which they were criticising so severely." So the "scholarly" Laski thinks of every possible explanation except that given by Engels himself, which would be distinctly inconvenient to include in a Labour Party publication. Engels says, in the 1888 Introduction:

"When it was written, we could not have called it a *Socialist* manifesto. By Socialists, in 1847, were understood, on the one hand, the adherents of the various Utopian systems . . . on the other hand, the most multifarious social quacks, who by all manner of tinkering professed to redress, without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances . . . Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of a total social change, called itself Communist"

So "there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take." Is it strange that Laski finds it necessary to invent four other reasons in order to avoid quoting the real one?

However, the question of the Communists forming their own party troubles Laski even more. He raises it no less than seven times, quoting and re-quoting "The Communists do not form a separate party

opposed to other working-class parties," and re-stating it in his own words. Evidently he feels it is the point on which everything depends. Needless to say, the "scholarly" Laski, while quoting that sentence, does not even refer to the title of the *Manifesto* itself: *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Nor does he explain such other sentences as "The Communists are distinguished from *the other* working class parties . . ." or "The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all *the other* proletarian parties . . ." which, together with the title, indicate that Marx and Engels thought of the Communists as a party. The stress in the sentence quoted by Laski is undoubtedly on the fact that the Communist Party is not "opposed to other working class parties." It is immediately followed by "They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole." It is a warning against sectarianism, an instruction to work with other working class parties, which is repeated in section IV in relation to "The various existing opposition parties." In fact, what Marx and Engels worked for was the building of working-class parties, such as actually emerged in Germany and France in 1875 and 1880, based on the class struggle and aiming at the complete transformation of society. It was only when Social Democratic leaders led their parties into collaboration with imperialism that it became necessary to form separate Communist Parties.

The same "scholarly" approach appears in Laski's treatment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He labours hard to show that "neither for Marx nor for Engels was it the antithesis of democracy; for them, its antithesis was the 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie' . . . it is obvious from Engels' identification of the Paris Commune with proletarian dictatorship that he regards it as based on the support of the majority." And so Laski builds up to "it seems to me inescapable that Marx and Engels did not conceive the dictatorship of the proletariat to mean the dictatorship of the Communist Party over the rest of the community." It seems to me inescapable that Laski could have saved himself the trouble of all these arguments, which he directs against Lenin, if he had carried his "scholarly" investigations to the works of Lenin and Stalin, who repeatedly point out that the dictatorship of the proletariat is democracy for ninety per cent of the people, "democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the rich folk"; it is "a special form of class alliance" between the proletariat and the non-proletarian strata of toilers; the Party provides leadership, but the dictatorship is exercised by "a flexible and relatively wide and very powerful proletarian apparatus" (passages from Lenin, quoted by Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*). But Laski, like other Labour leaders, cannot exist without the Tories, and

he therefore solemnly claims that Marx could not "have envisaged" the exclusion of "all other parties from the right to share in, and influence over, the exercise of power." For Laski and the Labour leaders: no democracy without the Tory Party—which becomes, with Chuter Ede and Morrison, no democracy without Mosley! But it takes some "scholar" to justify this from the *Communist Manifesto*!

The State is another of Laski's troubles. He quotes the "breaking" of the machinery of the capitalist State. He then asks: what did they mean? He answers: "The organs of government were to be genuinely democratised;" "The defence forces, the police and the civil service were to have no special privileges, and no special place in the new regime." What "scholarly" blurring of the *essence* of Marxist thought! Not a mention of the *class* nature of the proletarian State; just "pure democracy."

When Laski turns to Lenin he is just funny. Lenin, we are told, wrote *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* "less because of any sense that metaphysical differences were necessarily differences on the plane of party action, but because, when he wrote it, he was at all costs concerned to defeat and to discredit Bogdanov." Just jealousy, in short. Nothing to do with the philosophy of Marxism, as the unscholarly reader might have thought. And, says Laski, all this has led up to the point at which the Russian Politbureau is regarded as "the guardian of universal truth," and "no one can claim to be a Socialist unless he accepts the line." And so Laski passes on to re-tell the Labour Party tale of Communists dictated to from Moscow, of the British Party's "encouragement of sabotage in the factories" in the early stage of the war, of "the grave issues created by the ethical behaviour of Communist Parties outside Russia after 1917." What behaviour? "Passion for conspiracy . . . willingness to use lying and treachery to discredit an opponent . . . complete dishonesty in the presentation of facts . . . hysterical invective." Of course, he adds: "It would be painful, and it is probably unnecessary, to document this indictment." Just another example of "scholarship," like his assertion that the German Communists "almost down to the very advent of Hitler to power, were ready to believe that his government was the necessary prelude to victory."

It has only been possible to take a few examples of the Professor's "scholarly" method; every page has its gem. Certainly he undertook a difficult task: to reconcile the *Communist Manifesto* with the policy of Transport House. At least it can be said that no one could have done such a dirty job better than Laski.

EMILE BURNS.

COMMUNIST REVIEW

AUGUST
1948

THE COMMUNIST REVIEW, a monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, resumed publication in March, 1946. Its aim is to combine the treatment of current political issues with the examination of more fundamental questions of Marxist theory, and in particular to enable Communists to make their contribution to Marxist theory in relation to British conditions and British experience.

The Editorial Board will welcome suggestions for articles and for questions to be answered. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Emile Burns, 16 King Street, London, W.C.2.

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YUGOSLAVIA

HARRY POLITT

ALTHOUGH the publication of the resolution of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties came as a great surprise to the membership of all Communist Parties and to political circles in general, it had been clear for some time that the Diplomatic Correspondents of such newspapers as *The Times* and the *Observer* had been paying special attention to Yugoslavia and were not ill-informed about certain developments in that country upon which the Information Bureau's resolution now turns the spotlight.

The last four leading articles in the Information Bureau's journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, were all preparing the way for what has now taken place in connection with the policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. These dealt with:

1. The ideological weapon of the Communist Party—Marxism-Leninism.
2. Strengthen the militant alliance of workers and peasants.
3. The Communist Party, the vanguard detachment of the working people.
4. Self-criticism—the keen weapon of the Communist and Workers' Parties.

The resolution that has been published is an exceptionally serious one and only an exceptionally serious internal situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which all efforts had failed to deal with satisfactorily, made its publication inevitable. Some comrades think that this was the wrong moment to publish such a resolution, because of the serious character of the general international situation, but we believe the dominant factor which made publication imperative at the time it took place was the knowledge that a Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was to take place on July 21. It was, therefore, essential that the Party membership in Yugoslavia should be made as much aware as possible of what the Information Bureau thought about the position, and an opportunity provided to respond to the appeal which has been addressed to the Party membership.

But the publication of this resolution also reveals two very important factors to which due note must be given. First, the strong international position of the anti-imperialist camp; second, the belief that there are inside the Communist Party of Yugoslavia forces who will themselves try and change the existing situation and leadership in their Party.

We can be sure that every effort was made by the leaders of the Information Bureau to reach a solution through comradely discussion and self-criticism, and the refusal of the Yugoslav comrades to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau and defend their position almost puts them out of court at once. It is especially striking because the Yugoslav comrades have not hesitated to direct the sharpest criticism against the policies of other Parties in the Information Bureau.

The resolution undoubtedly reflects the principal political content of the letters which had previously been sent to the Yugoslav Party by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this connection, we must remember the vast experience of the Soviet Union in all the questions which they have brought so sharply to the attention of the Yugoslav comrades. Not only that; any consideration of the names of the leaders of the other Communist Parties who signed the resolution, reveals names that have been honoured in international Communist circles since 1920, names whose owners have self-sacrificing records in the struggle for Communism that stamp them as comrades who do not lightly come to decisions, when they do, we can be sure those decisions are based on sound political reasons which are not only in the present and future interests of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but have lessons for all Communist Parties.

The resolution takes up the following important points:

1. Deviations from Marxism-Leninism.
2. The attitude towards the Soviet Union
3. Problems of the transition to Socialism
4. The role of a Communist Party.
5. Party organisation.
6. The Communist Party and United Front tactics
7. Criticism and self-criticism.
8. Nationalism and internationalism.

Each of these issues forms the subject of many separate articles, but all of them have special importance to the British Communist Party. The resolution is, of course, only dealing with these issues from the angle of the particular situation which exists at the moment in Yugoslavia, and it is a political education to read how the questions are both posed and then answered.

These answers should be carefully studied by every member of our own Communist Party, especially so in relation to problems connected with the transition towards Socialism. It would be a profound mistake to believe we are not yet concerned with this question. We are directly concerned with it, precisely because of the betrayal of Socialist principles which is being carried out by the Labour Government in the name of Socialism.

Read the *Daily Herald*, the *Tribune*, the *New Statesman and Nation* and all Labour Party publications; they never tire of trying to deceive the workers into believing that we are living under Socialism in Britain, that democratic Socialism has already triumphed in Britain, that the Labour Government is now engaged in carrying through a Socialist policy.

Such claims can only result in a cruel deception of the masses. Furthermore, they encourage illusions for which the working class may yet have to pay very dearly. There is nothing in common with Socialism in what the Labour Government is doing. A real Socialist policy does not lead towards a new economic slump, alliances with the aggressive imperialist power of the United States, and the deterioration of our relations with what is as yet the only completely Socialist country in the world, the Soviet Union, and the new democracies, whose policies are leading towards Socialism. A Socialist policy does not lead to developments which could result in a third world war if the peace forces were not strong enough to stop this mad course.

A policy can only lead towards Socialism when, at every stage in the fight against capitalism, it is weakening that system, when each event results in a stronger and more united working-class movement as a whole, when no aspect of such a policy receives the support of the class enemy, as the foreign policy of the Labour Government receives the fulsome support of the Tory Party. This is the Party which each day of the dockers' strike was urging the Government to take the most drastic measures, and whose pressure finally secured the declaration of a state of emergency, not against the officials of the Docks Board responsible for the strike, but against the workers who had voted Labour at the last General Election, and who will do so again because of their class understanding, which is stronger and more high principled than that of the right-wing Labour leaders.

It is not only for the members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to study again Lenin's words on certain aspects of the struggle to establish Socialism, but for all honest workers in our own Labour movement.

The transition from capitalism to Communism represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has terminated, the exploiters will inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this *hope* will be converted into *attempts* at restoration. And after their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters . . . will throw themselves with tenfold energy, with furious passion and hatred grown a hundredfold, into the battle for the recovery of their lost "paradise." (Lenin: *Selected Works*, vol. VII, pp. 140-141.)

Have not these words meaning for the whole Labour movement in Britain? They have only to be read to show at once that they have

a very urgent meaning for us Communists in particular, so that we may rouse the working class to a new understanding, both of the falsity of the Socialist pretensions of the Labour Government on the one hand, and the need to be on guard against the Tory Party, the representatives of big business on the other hand

The class struggle increases in intensity as the workers make steps forward towards Socialism. It demands greater vigilance, greater unity, greater fights, and an ever-present determination not to underestimate the class enemy at any single moment of the class struggle. This ceaseless struggle against capitalism can only be carried through by a revolutionary class, the working class, but this class without its Communist Party cannot be really organised and led to conduct the struggle successfully. This is what we have to grasp here in Britain as well as in Yugoslavia, and again we have the great experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to guide us in that understanding of the true significance of this point, for in the *Short History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* we read:

Marx and Engels taught that the industrial proletariat is the most revolutionary and therefore the most advanced class in capitalist society, and that only a class like the proletariat could rally around itself all the forces discontented with capitalism and lead them in the storming of capitalism

Yet as the Information Bureau's resolution brilliantly brings out, a revolutionary class by itself is not enough, it must have its Communist Party as its leading and directing force. This, to my mind, is one of the most important sections of the resolution. Again it has serious lessons for us, because of the slow growth of the Communist Party in Britain, and because the role of the Communist Party is not yet sufficiently understood. If it were, our own members would be far more eager to win new members for the Party, would end all sectarian attitudes towards this all-important and decisive question.

We remember so clearly the natural feelings of elation when, at the General Election in 1945, the Tory Party suffered such a decisive defeat, the many illusions that were then fostered, not only about the imminence of Socialism in Britain, but the fact that Labour's great victory "proved" that a Communist Party was not necessary in the "peculiar" political situation of this country.

At that time we were inundated with gratuitous advice to liquidate the Communist Party. We were firm in our rejection of such "advice," and time has proved who was right. Suppose there were no Communist Party in Britain today: what an easy time the right-wing Labour leaders in the Labour Party and trade unions would have! How much

easier for them to push through their policy of wage freezing which almost every trade union annual conference has turned down! How much easier to have embraced more of the policy of the Federation of British Industries than has been possible because of the opposition of the masses! How much more subservient Britain would have been towards the United States! How much more reactionary would its foreign policy have been, for let there be no doubt that even this Government has to pay regard to opinions expressed by the ordinary people; and those opinions are chiefly formed and organised by the activity and influence of the Communist Party

That is why the role of the Communist Party has again to be discussed in our own ranks, and why the most determined efforts have to be made to strengthen the Communist Party in Britain. A popular united front movement is not enough. The periodic revolts of "Left" Members of Parliament are not enough. The winning of allies to fight alongside you for a working-class policy is not enough. At the heart and core of every genuine and serious movement of the Left there must be the Communist Party playing its leading role. This is not pleasant medicine for those who think they can do without us, that we know nothing about tactics, or how to manoeuvre, or that their intrigues and tactics are far superior to the mass activity of the Communists. Where in Britain today is the mass organised opposition to the policy of the Labour Government? It is unorganised, spasmodic and thereby loses all its potential effect.

We Communists must let it be known that while we are willing to work with all who wish to fight the reactionary policies of the Labour Government, there can be no effective Left in the Labour movement unless the Communist Party is playing a leading role in that movement. We Communists must also understand that this is not mere boasting or self-praise: it is born out of bitter historical experience. Let me again refer to the point Lenin made when he was writing about the Communist Party and its relations to the mass organisations of the workers and peasants. It was written long ago and was directed particularly towards the situation at that time existing in Tsarist Russia, but when it is read, you will find it has also in our conditions today a special application that must be seriously taken into consideration:

We are the Party of a class, and therefore *almost the entire class* (and in times of war, in the period of civil war, *the entire class*) should act under the leadership of our Party, should adhere to our Party as closely as possible. But it would be Manilovism and "khvostism" (i.e., complacency and "tailing behind" reality) to think that at any time under capitalism the entire class, or almost the entire class, would be able to rise to this level of

consciousness and activity of its vanguard, of its Social Democratic (i.e., Communist) Party.

No sensible Social Democrat (i.e., Communist) has ever yet doubted that under capitalism even the trade union organisations—which are more primitive and more comprehensible to the undeveloped strata—are unable to embrace the entire, or almost the entire working class. *To forget the distinction between the vanguard and the whole of the masses which gravitate towards it, to forget the constant duty of the vanguard to raise ever wider strata to this most advanced level, means merely to deceive oneself, to shut one's eyes to the immensity of our task, and to narrow down these tasks.* (Lenin: *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, p. 86.)

We are now asking every member of our own Party to take heed of that part of the quotation which we have put in italics, for if any Communist Party in the world has immense tasks, it is ours, and the sooner we all refresh our memories about the role of our own Party in Britain, the better, for then we will not regard building the Communist Party as the concern of a few enthusiastic members, but as the vital concern of every one of us, for without it we shall never storm the citadel of capitalism, a task that is being made even more difficult by the policy of the Labour Government.

We have not the space to deal with the other important issues raised by the resolution dealing with Yugoslavia which have very special significance for us also; to read this resolution with our eye only on Yugoslavia would be a grave political mistake and a refusal to face the issue of self-criticism, but other comrades will be dealing with them in future issues of the *Communist Review*.

We must, however, conclude on this note. Reaction is undoubtedly delighted at the turn events have taken, and the strongest justification of the resolution and its sharp condemnation of the leading comrades of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been the immediate reaction of the Governments of the United States and Britain. Ever since the end of the war, the U.S.A. has refused to release the Yugoslav gold that was sent there for safe-keeping during the fight against the Nazis. Two days after publication of the Information Bureau's resolution, the press informed us that the U.S. Government was now willing to discuss the transfer of the Yugoslav gold. The Labour Government which had been endlessly discussing a trade agreement with Yugoslavia (indeed, negotiations had broken down), at once expressed its readiness to resume such negotiations. These facts speak for themselves.

But let us address a word to comrades who may think it is a great pity such political differences have had to be brought into the open

Let me recall a remark of Lenin after the famous 1903 Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party in London, where the split between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks took place; someone had written a letter to Lenin regretting that such outspoken criticism of one comrade by another had been made. Lenin replied—and what a magnificent reply it is, a moral for all of us with our traditional sense of British diplomacy and hypocrisy weighing on us

I cannot help remembering a conversation of mine at that Congress with one of the "Centre" delegates "What a depressing atmosphere prevails at our Congress!" he complained to me. "All this fierce fighting, this agitation one against the other, these sharp polemics, this uncomradely attitude." "What a fine thing our Congress is!" I replied to him: "Opportunities for open fighting. Opinions expressed. Tendencies revealed. Groups defined. Forward! That's what I like! That's life! It is something different from the endless, wearying intellectual discussions, which finish, not because people have solved the problem, but simply because they have got tired of talking."

It is a great thing that in a Communist Party it does not matter how important you think you may be, or what position you occupy; when you refuse to discuss your mistakes, when you think you are above being corrected after the most painstaking efforts have been made, you get exactly the same treatment as the lad at the bench. This is real democracy. This is not a case of "when Joe turns, we all turn," as our enemies allege, and as certain weak elements in our own ranks sometimes say. It is the case of a Communist having a correct attitude towards political mistakes. How well Lenin put this question, too. Just read it for yourself:

The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the Party and of how it fulfils *in practice* its obligations towards its *class* and towards the *toiling masses*. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the conditions which gave rise to it, to study attentively the means of correcting it—these are the signs of a serious party; this means the performance of its duties, this means educating and training the *class*, and then the *masses*. (Lenin: *Left-Wing Communism*, chap. 7.)

Suppose the workers in Britain during the General Strike in 1926 could have been informed of the character of the discussions inside the General Council? One thing is certain—the General Strike would never have been betrayed.

Suppose the workers had been informed of the conditions that Wall Street had insisted upon when the Labour Government in 1931 applied for a financial loan—that it would be granted on condition there was a reduction in unemployment benefit of 10 per cent, and a Means Test applied! MacDonald would never have been allowed to carry through his betrayal.

If the people now knew all the real facts—which are being deliberately suppressed by the Labour Government—about the conditions and consequences of Marshall Aid, it would not have had the easy passage it did in the House of Commons in July.

We urge every reader of the *Communist Review* to study time and again the Information Bureau's resolution on Yugoslavia. It is a political education. Do not apologise for it. Go into the attack. For time has proved that in the history of Communist Parties every serious political controversy has in the last analysis strengthened not only the Party against which it was directed, but every other Communist Party in the world.

THE HEALTH CENTRE AND ITS RELATION TO GENERAL MEDICAL PRACTICE

THE introduction of the health centre, which the passage of the National Health Act foreshadows, represents something new in British medicine. It has yet to be decided what the precise function of the health centre is to be. Because the health centre is essentially something new, it is necessary to consider the trends already at work in the development of medical practice in this country, so that by showing how it has grown and developed during the past years we may be better able to define the exact nature of the revolutionary change which has to be faced.

One must begin by referring back to earlier periods in the development of British medicine. The advance of knowledge at the time of the Renaissance had great influence on the practice of medicine. In place of the authority of Galen, supported by the Church, the minds of independent men observed the facts and based their views upon them. William Harvey made his brilliant investigation of the circulation of the blood, and proved by experiment that the blood moved in a circle back to the heart (1628). But medicine was a trade or business to the many who earned their livelihood by following its call, and

many remedies based on little more than medieval superstition continued to be used. In such an atmosphere, it was not easy for the methods of observation and experiment to gain a sure footing, and many of the leading physicians indulged in a good deal of theorising, which had no relation to the facts and merely replaced the authority of Galen by the chaos of individual whims and fancies. Thomas Sydenham (1627-1689) had no patience with such useless speculation, and was one of the earliest physicians to urge upon his pupils the importance of learning clinical medicine at the bedside. Thus the method of clinical observation was introduced into medical practice.

The careful recording of symptoms was the earliest method employed, and the inspection of the patient with the eyes and palpation with the hand. The search for knowledge of human disease led to the development of many new methods to assist the diagnosis of illness. Two of them, which were decisive for the further advance of clinical medicine, were the method of percussion of the chest, introduced by Leopold Auenbrugger (1761), and the invention of the stethoscope by René Laennec (1818). It became possible to listen to the heart and lungs by the method of auscultation, and more accurate diagnosis of diseases of the chest was developed. With each new advance, and with each great pioneer who expounded the principles of observation and experiment, medieval superstition began to decline, and the general body of practitioners began to employ the newer methods which were taught by the masters.

In recent years the development of methods useful in clinical diagnosis has taken place rapidly. The discovery of X-rays by Roentgen, early this century, has been outstanding in importance. The radiology of the skeleton for fractures and the radiology of the chest are routine procedures. Investigation of the blood or urine, or other body fluids by the methods of clinical pathology is essential in many cases. Thus, today, the method of observation in clinical medicine, so strongly favoured by Thomas Sydenham, involves a knowledge and use of complex methods and the support of an organised team of assistants, each trained in a special technical field.

While these developments in the technique of diagnosis were taking place, the man who was to use them—the doctor—was experiencing changes in his status and in the degree of knowledge he was expected to possess.

Gradually the method of observation as the basis of diagnosis permeated the ranks of the profession, and replaced both the sheer guesswork of the medieval practitioner and the method of scholarly speculation employed by the ordinary physician of the Renaissance period. Since the early days, the profession had developed into two separate groups—the physicians and the surgeons. In the

early nineteenth century, a man who practised as a general practitioner had usually studied and qualified to enter the ranks of one of these groups. The Medical Act of 1886 made it compulsory for all doctors to qualify as physicians and surgeons, and thus the ordinary doctor was expected to have a comprehensive knowledge of the whole field. He passed out from the teaching schools armed with the latest teachings of medicine and surgery, a stethoscope, and a scalpel, and with little more to aid him, he made his way, selling his skill to those who asked his assistance. He worked in isolation from his fellow practitioners, and developed an essentially personal relationship with his patients. In emergency, he depended entirely on his own sound judgment, and he developed, therefore, into a man of independent character and independent tastes.

The conditions of work and the method of remuneration by the payment of fees for services rendered led to the development of a medical practice centred round the doctor's house. In an economic sense, it differed little from the business of an ordinary tradesman. In the course of time, therefore, a doctor built up a personal connection which had a saleable value, known as the "goodwill." As medical knowledge has developed, the complexity and expense of equipment needed has increased, so that today the sale of goodwill often conceals the special value of well-constructed premises, stocks of drugs and valuable equipment.

The methods of diagnosis have changed, but the doctors are still held back from using them by the economic relations which they built up in an earlier period. They cannot afford to buy all the plant and equipment and employ the assistants they need in order to give their patients the most up-to-date service. In fact, it would be uneconomic for them to do so, as no single doctor working alone needs the full-time service of an X-ray plant and a clinical laboratory, together with the assistants needed to man these units. Such a unit could most usefully serve a group of eight or more doctors, and as it could most easily be housed in a single building, we are faced with an inescapable fact that what we need for the future is a health centre, serving a number of doctors, as a primary necessity for correct medical practice. Faced with this revolution in the technique of diagnosis, we have to find the means for making it possible for the ordinary doctor to utilise the new methods now available.

As in diagnosis, so in treatment, changes and development occur continually. Until a good deal had been found out about the nature of disease, treatment was necessarily empirical, or else based on some speculative theory which had little relation to the real facts. The empirical method had led to some useful discoveries. Foxglove tea was known to be of value in dropsy by the people of many districts.

William Withering (1741-1779) investigated this story and found it to be true. The value of digitalis for the treatment of heart disease became established. The surgeons similarly increased their skill as experience accumulated, but no astounding advances were possible until the introduction of anaesthesia in 1846 and the discovery of the antiseptic technique introduced by Lister in 1867, and based on the discoveries in the field of bacteriology made known to the world by Louis Pasteur.

Thus a great leap forward was taken. A hundred years ago, the great skill of the men of surgery was of little value to mankind. Limited on all sides by the forces of nature, their legendary manual dexterity could only be applied to a few isolated cases. Then anaesthesia destroyed pain, but another spectre haunted them. As their hands became bolder, and their knives went deeper, bacteria followed them. Sepsis destroyed more lives than surgery could save. Lister's antiseptic technique applied to surgery proved to be the answer. These lifted surgery on to a new plane, and opened up a vast field of work, the full exploration of which is still incomplete. But this development has altered the character of the surgeon. He is dependent upon an efficient hospital organisation and the assistance of a team of doctors, nurses and others who make his work possible. The principle of co-operation and teamwork is an essential basis of modern surgery.

The development of easily applied local anaesthetics makes it unnecessary to inflict pain upon a patient, even for minor surgical procedures. If a patient has a cut in the skin, he will ask his general practitioner to stitch it for him. A clean needle and silkworm gut are all that are necessary, and if the skin is healthy no sepsis will occur. But this method does not conform to the highest standards of surgical asepsis and sometimes cuts go septic. Local anaesthesia, sterile surgical technique, and the careful removal of debris from the wound are desirable. This can most satisfactorily be achieved in a minor operating theatre with a nurse to assist. It would be uneconomic to provide such a theatre for every general practitioner, and so it can best be provided in a health centre, where a group of doctors can work together. Thus in treatment a more complicated organisation is necessary than a general practitioner working alone can hope to possess. To apply fully many of the new advances in this field requires the existence of a health centre at the service of the doctor and his patient.

Conditions of work at such a health centre will alter the character of medical practice in the direction of increased co-operation. When a general practitioner is faced with a problem beyond his immediate knowledge or skill, he may ask a colleague to assist him, and this help,

readily given, will not only benefit the patient, but assist the doctor to gain more skill in the practice of his profession. If general practitioners are to co-operate fully, they should work together in a group or team and, where possible, they should work together in the same building. When full co-operation has been achieved in all branches of medical practice, it will be possible to reintegrate the whole medical profession on a new level. The present divisions within the profession have developed with the growth of medical science within the framework of a competitive, individualistic system. They can be resolved within the framework of a co-operative system, which itself can only be achieved when facilities are created for co-operative methods of work.

The instrument of this new co-operation in general medical practice must be the health centre.

The fully equipped health centre must be a place where the full range of diagnostic equipment is available, and where there is the full range of equipment for all forms of treatment, which can reasonably come within the province of the general practitioner. A group of general practitioners will work there as a team, and consultant specialists will visit from time to time, to see the patients or to supervise certain special aspects of the work. The remainder of the staff will include dentists, nurses, pharmacists, medical auxiliaries, such as physiotherapists and opticians, laboratory technicians, social workers and office workers.

In planning the building, we must bear in mind that the primary aim is to bring the full range of modern equipment to the general practitioner. Once this has been admitted, we shall often have to be content with more modest requirements, owing to building and other shortages. Even so, the most limited form of temporary health centre will be of the utmost value, because of the stimulus it will give towards co-operation. In addition to the facilities provided in the building, the health centre must be developed into the pivot of the whole domiciliary services. From it, not only the doctors, but the district nurses, midwives, and health visitors should go out to see their patients. Co-operation and teamwork should be developed between all sections of the health workers. Each health centre should be linked with a hospital. The local authorities will build and control the health centres, and thus the preventive medical services, organised by the Medical Officer of Health, can be integrated with the domiciliary medical services. The possibilities opened up by these new conditions of practice, even on a limited scale, are enormous.

Thus the essential point in the advancement of the character of general practice today is the development of the health centre. It is a necessary revolution in the technique of general practice, made so by

the advances in the field of general science, which have already been applied to medicine.

Modern Science has already decided that the doctor must work in a new way. He needs facilities to X-ray his patients, a well-equipped clinical laboratory to do the simpler tests of clinical pathology, a minor operating theatre for correct aseptic treatment of minor surgical cases and so on. It is not possible for the individual general practitioner to own this complex modern equipment. The community should provide it in the health centre, and the doctors will then use it together. This new arrangement will constitute the driving force towards co-operation in modern medicine, which resides in the type of equipment it is necessary for the modern doctor to use.

The practical problems involved in building the health centres still have to be faced. On January 14, 1948, the Minister of Health issued the now notorious Circular 3/48. In it he declared that there will not be any general provision of health centres "for some time to come," and local authorities are excused the necessity of submitting proposals for the building of health centres. The effects of this decision on the future development of general practice will be enormous. If health centres are to be restricted to a few urgent cases, as the Minister has advised, then over 95 per cent of the general practitioners will continue to practice from privately owned premises, even after the abolition of the buying and selling of goodwill. They will also own *all* equipment which they may have, and be financially responsible for the provision of secretarial or other ancillary staff required to improve the service they offer. Health centres established under the National Health Act would be owned by the local authorities, and their standard and their management would, in part, be subject to local public opinion. Staff would be employed directly by the local authorities, with the exception of doctors and dentists, who would be indirectly engaged through the Executive Councils. If the local authorities are not allowed to establish health centres, the doctors will have to carry on as they are. Those who are disheartened by this situation will not risk the expense to themselves of increasing the services they provide. But the best general practitioners are those who plough back their profits to purchase new equipment and build up their practice as a more efficient medical service. Many of the younger men are not content to carry on in the old way. They are trained to practise medicine by modern methods, and they demand great changes. Already several types of experiment in group practice have been made. Often this has involved centralised surgeries, ancillary staff employed jointly by the group, a definite off-duty rota, guaranteed holidays, and many other amenities of civilised life denied to the older practitioners of the past epoch. This reorganisation within the profession is being pressed forward in spite of the

difficulties. As new and more expensive equipment for the treatment of patients is devised, and as funds are collected for its purchase by groups of doctors working together, a new type of capital value in medical practice will be created. When a doctor retires, his share in the premises and equipment and, in fact, his share in the whole business enterprise, will have to be sold to a successor at the market rate. Furthermore, just as the buying and selling of goodwill has always concealed the value of the other elements which make up a practice, so in the future the buying and selling of premises and equipment will conceal, in some degree, the value of the goodwill. It is perfectly obvious that a doctor who is buying a share in a partnership will be more ready to do so if there is a large list of patients available alongside the material objects he is purchasing. He is bound to be influenced by the income he will inherit. In addition, as the complexity of organisation and the value of equipment used in general practice increases, the size of the value directly attributable to the goodwill, which can be concealed behind the value of the premises and equipment, will increase. Thus, in spite of the clauses in the Act which limit the sale and purchase of doctors' houses to a figure within the market rate for houses in general, the conditions which will be created in general practice will rapidly make these clauses obsolete and inoperable. If the Minister endeavours to use these clauses and penalises doctors for selling premises above the market rate for residences, it will necessarily operate most heavily against those doctors who have done their best to give good service to their patients by spending money improving their premises, and thus increasing their capital value as medical premises, while their value as living accommodation might at the same time be declining, in part, because of the improvements. Under the conditions which the Minister proposes should be allowed to develop in general practice, these clauses, if applied literally, can only operate to restrict the development of an adequate medical service for the people. The decision to allow doctors' houses to be sold by public auction suggests that a method of by-passing these clauses has already been worked out. When it is realised that £66 million of public money is to be spent to pay for the existing capital value in medical practice, it seems a little ironic that conditions should now be created which will allow the whole process to begin all over again.

In July, the domiciliary medical services took a great step forward. For the first time, a comprehensive health service is available to all members of the community, including the children. This, however, does not improve the service available, but merely makes existing services available to all. The introduction of the health centre was to have been the main feature, making the service available better in quality. In any public campaigning for the fulfilment or extension of

the National Health Act in order to benefit further the health of the people, the question of the immediate establishment of health centres assumes a central place. The Minister has said in the House that he "encourages the local authorities to put up their plans" and in Circular 3/48 he states that he does not mean "entirely to rule out of consideration proposals which the local health authority regard as particularly urgent, or conversions which they may find to be practicable without the need for delay."

With these points in mind, it may well prove possible to develop considerable public pressure for health centres in each locality. An issue of this kind can be made extremely popular, and play a big part in aiding to develop the mass movement of the people, especially among housewives, for a health service of the highest possible standard. Every local authority, without exception, should be able to set up a few temporary health centres in reconditioned buildings or old army huts. Such health centres would bring together a small team of general practitioners and other health workers with better facilities than are usually possible today. The clinics of the services provided by the local authorities should take place at these temporary health centres, wherever possible, in order to draw these two parts of the health service together. In many areas, the local authorities already have centres where a number of different clinics take place, and with a little adaptation arrangements could be made to take a number of general practitioners into these health centres.

Even before health centres are put up, a great deal can be done to improve the domiciliary medical services. Every town should have a central office for leaving messages. Urgent calls could be dealt with immediately, and if the patient's doctor is not at home, the central agency could contact another doctor who is available. Another much-needed reform is to organise a rota for night-work, days off, and annual holidays. A lot more needs to be done to help doctors and other health workers to keep up to date.

It has been suggested that an organisation should be created for those members of the public specially interested in health questions, the purpose being to ensure the full development of the Health Act by maintaining consumer pressure in every locality.

In the development of this work, we need increasingly to tackle the problem of winning support for this policy among the health workers. Beyond the most elementary level, the political demands we need to put forward can only be correctly ascertained with the help and advice of trained health workers. Every district and borough committee should find ways of using the knowledge of these members, but an important question that still remains to be tackled is how to win support among these traditionally conservative people. The typical

health worker understands very little about politics, but he is in the main a trained mind with a straightforward outlook towards the things he understands. By developing a policy on health questions which is practical and realistic, and campaigning around such a policy, we can draw the attention of many health workers.

The campaign in the localities for improvements in the domiciliary medical services will naturally be based upon the organised movement – the Trades Councils, trade unions, Co-operative Guilds and political parties. Every kind of organised group, especially women's groups, should be drawn in. Such a movement cannot develop, however, unless the health workers' organisations are brought into a prominent place in it, and the aims and aspirations of these vital workers are considered. Trade union organisation is weak among health workers, but where trade union branches exist, these will be of great assistance. Branches of the professional organisations should not be overlooked, and even local divisions of the B.M.A. may prove of great assistance, in spite of the reactionary propaganda that has emanated from Tavistock House. Many doctors are anxious to see an early start with health centres. Work initiated and carried through along these lines will reap its full reward.

GEORGE JULIAN HARNEY

J BROWN

THE reputation of George Julian Harney has suffered more than that of most Chartist leaders from reformist historians. G. D. H. Cole, in *The Common People*, describes him as "a young man who dreamed of pikes and saw himself as the English Marat." Gammage, *History of the Chartist Movement*, finds it impossible to speak in terms of unqualified approbation of him, and goes on to disparage his oratory and role in the movement. The epithet of "hip-hip hoorah" Harney, which was used by Marx and Engels to show his rather indiscriminate enthusiasm for all types of revolutionaries, has stuck to him, while their appreciation of his earlier work has often been forgotten. Yet, in June 1850, Harney published the first English translation of the *Communist Manifesto* in his journal, *The Red Republican*, with the editorial comment that it was the most revolutionary document ever published. The contribution of a man who could make such an apt judgment seems to need some revaluation.

The son of a sailor, Harney was educated at the Royal Naval School, Greenwich, until he was fourteen. He even went to sea, but soon

abandoned that career in order to work for Henry Hetherington, the publisher of the *Poor Man's Guardian* and other illegal journals. Here he first came into contact with Bronterre O'Brien and from him acquired an enthusiasm for, and some understanding of, European revolutionary movements, particularly the great French Revolution of 1789. He became, too, from this time onwards, an indefatigable champion of the working-class press. He served three sentences for selling unstamped papers before he was twenty, and was one of the earliest of a long line of Labour stalwarts who have realised that in order to make freedom of the press a reality and not just freedom from censorship, the press must be owned and written by members of the working class. He was associated with O'Brien's *London Mercury*, and with the *London Democrat*, was editor of the *Northern Star* from 1843-50, and founder of the *Democratic Review* and the *Red Republican*, 1850, afterwards called *The Friend of the People*.

Although Harney was only in his early twenties at the time, he was recognised as a leader of the left-wing London Radicals from the beginning of the Chartist movement. He and other members of the East London Democratic Association joined the London Working Men's Association in 1837. He was speedily thrown out, however, for engaging in a public dispute with O'Connell, the Irish leader who, as a Radical M.P., had worked with the London Working Men's Association in drawing up the programme that formed the basis of the People's Charter. The matter over which they quarrelled is significant, for O'Connell had celebrated the occasion of the trial of the Glasgow cotton spinners for treason in 1837 by delivering a violent attack on trade unionism in Parliament. For Harney there was no possibility of compromise or fair words with middle-class leaders. He changed the name of the East London Association to the London Democratic Association and carried on a militant campaign for the People's Charter among the dockers, the Irish labourers and the weavers of Spitalfields. His aim, unlike that of the L.W.M.A., was to create a mass movement, and his followers had more in common with the oppressed factory workers of the North than the skilled artisans who followed Lovett.

Although he took as his programme the Chartist points, he stressed the need for a social change: "Unless the People's Charter is followed by measures to equalise the condition of all, the producing classes will still be oppressed and the country will probably be involved in the most disastrous calamities." He knew the value of education, but thought that it would be fatal to rely on methods of slow persuasion—"what our enemies will not give us out of respect for justice, they are not going to yield us as a result of moral suasion." A deep distrust of the role of the middle classes runs through the pages of the *London*

Democrat. "Whatever the middle classes have ever taken into hand has turned out, to the people's cost, to be delusive and fraudulent therefore, as the producing classes intend to regenerate their country, they must rely on themselves and on themselves alone."

As the L.W.M.A. remained the official organ of the London workers, Harney represented three provincial towns, Derby, Norwich and Newcastle at the Convention, 1839. In his speeches, as he stumped the country, he had told the people that they would never get their flitch of bacon restored until there was, as of old, a musket in every cottage. At the Convention his words were no less fiery and were largely responsible for the resignation of the Birmingham delegates. In some ways he was a realist. He criticised the ulterior measures which it was proposed should be taken if the Petition failed. The working class could not organise a run on the banks, he argued, for it had no savings, if they abstained from using excisable goods they would only add to their own miseries. He thought that it was impossible to organise a National Holiday without envisaging the use of force. If it were held, the workers would run out of provisions in the second week, for they never had enough money to procure a week's provisions beforehand. If they were not to fail through hunger, they would have to take food by force, so why not arm the people and prepare for insurrection? This is strong stuff, but preferable to Attwood's mealy-mouthed and unrealistic championship of the sacred month, for him a sort of moral exercise. Harney elaborated his own ulterior measures. If Parliament were dissolved before the Petition was presented, the Chartists were to nominate and return their own candidates and to escort them with "a body of sansculottes some thousands strong" to London and there encamp on Hampstead Heath. Where Harney was a romantic was in his belief that the English working class at that time, especially in London, was strong or homogeneous enough to win their rights by a display of force. He may even have realised this, for he took no part in the national plan for insurrection, if plan there really was.

Harney was not among the Chartists who were arrested at the Bull Ring in Birmingham, but he was taken after a speech, mild for him, delivered in the course of a tour in the North. The Grand Jury threw out a Bill against him and he went on with his work as a propagandist first in Scotland, where he married, then in Sheffield. Here we find him making a speech at the grave of Samuel Holberry, a young Chartist who had died in prison. It is moving and significant. "Our task is not to weep; we must leave tears to women; our task is to act, to labour with heart and soul for the destruction of the horrible system under which Holberry has perished." He recognised the ancestors of the Chartist movement. "... With the Tells and Tylers

of the earth the name of Holberry will be associated and venerated."

The chief contribution of Harney in the early days of the Chartist movement was his recognition of the necessity of a social programme for Chartism, the necessity of founding a mass movement, and his grasp of the deep class cleavage that made persuasion unlikely to succeed. His achievement in the later days was to bring the movement into close and vital connection with the revolutionary struggles of the Continent and to pave the way for the First International. The Democratic Association had always had a close relationship with the foreign refugees living in London, and the *Northern Star* had a regular page on "Foreign Intelligence." In 1843, Harney met Frederick Engels, who came over from Bradford to Leeds to visit him. He described Engels later as a tall handsome young man remarkable for his charm and genial conversation. In the same year the *Northern Star* moved to London, and the English and foreign democrats met frequently to celebrate with speeches some revolutionary occasion. From a dinner to celebrate the founding of the first French Republic, which Engels reported in the *Rheinische Jahrbücher*, sprang the Society of the Fraternal Democrats. Harney was the secretary of the English section and the inspirer of the whole society. The Fraternal Democrats did not set themselves up as a new party—in England they did not wish to rival the Chartists; they never had any elaborate rules, though they gradually worked out a simple organisation which was probably the model for the First International. Nevertheless, Harney made their views explicit in a remarkable declaration of 1846: "We renounce, repudiate, and condemn all political hereditary inequalities and distinctions of caste; we declare that the earth with all its natural production is the common property of all, we declare that the present state of society which permits idlers and schemers to monopolise the fruits of the earth and the production of industry, and impels the working class to labour for inadequate rewards . . . is essentially unjust." The part played by national prejudice in dividing the working class is recognised. The society repudiated the word foreigner, no matter to whom applied. In a speech made to the German Workers' Club in London, Harney made his views on the problem of nationalism clearer. It is seen as a stage in the development of an oppressed people. "Nationality has in other times been necessary; it saved mankind from universal and irredeemable slavery. In our day, too, the invoking of the spirit of nationality in some countries is indispensable to rekindle life. . . . In other countries, such as France and England, there is no need to rekindle national feelings; on the contrary, the efforts of the good men in both countries should be directed to the abolition of the remaining prejudices which a barbarous cultivation of the spirit of nationality in days gone by called into existence." From

this point of view he attacked the foreign policy of Palmerston, both at the hustings and in his papers. The principle of protecting citizens wherever they go is good, he says, but Lord Palmerston never protects the democrats; abroad he supports only the sham reformers. The positive side of Harney's views on nationality is that he realised the common interests of men of all nations. "Working men of all nations are not your grievances, your wrongs, the same? . . . We may differ as to the means . . . but the great end—the veritable emancipation of the human race—must be the one aim and end of all." As Harney spoke thus in 1846, it is not surprising that he saw the *Communist Manifesto* as an expression of revolutionary ideas after his own heart. Harney met Marx in November, 1847, when he came over from Brussels and addressed the Fraternal Democrats. The German workers' organisation and the Fraternal Democrats agreed to work in the closest collaboration, and intended to organise an international working men's congress for the next year as a counterblast to the Free Trade Conference. This never met because of the tremendous crisis that struck Europe in 1848.

Harney saw the reviving Chartist movement as part of the European revolution. In articles in the *Northern Star* and in his own papers, he kept the English working class informed and conscious of the proletarian movement throughout Europe. The English Chartists and the Fraternal Democrats sent an address to the people of Paris when the Revolution was at its height. It was taken to the Provisional Government by Harney and Ernest Jones in person. It was Harney who presented it "handsomely bound and adorned with the Tricolor."

There is no need to recount here the smashing of the revolutions of 1848 or the failure of the English Chartists. While the members of the Chartist executive were taking the petition to the House of Commons in a cab, Harney remained behind to address an Irish demonstration on Kennington Common. Through the years of disillusionment and difference that followed, Harney preserved his faith in international revolution and social change. In 1850, after many differences, he broke with O'Connor over this very question of supporting foreign revolutionary movements. It was then that he started the *Red Republican*, which in June published the *Communist Manifesto*. Marx and Engels at first gave him their confidence, for they realised that sometimes he had to compromise to avoid arrest and the suppression of his papers. Harney and the Fraternal Democrats were sound enough in their opposition to the foreign reaction, to Haynau and Napoleon III, but they seem to have absorbed some of the unrealities of the foreign refugees, especially the French, and a group among the Germans. In 1851, the Communist League split; Marx and Engels regarded the party of Schapper and Willich as Utopian, deluding the masses that

the success of the Communist revolution lay round the corner. After an analysis of the economic crisis of 1847, they had come to the conclusion that it had been one of the main driving forces behind the revolutions of 1848, and that they were not likely to recur until another production crisis threatened. They proclaimed that Harney was keeping up friendly relations with both sides and blamed his vanity and his exuberant support of all revolutionaries, however diverse their opinions. In truth, Harney seemed to be becoming more and more unrealistic and quarrelled with both Bronterre O'Brien and Ernest Jones. He was not of the temperament to bide his time. He bought the *Northern Star*, but failed to make it pay, he tried again with the *Vanguard*, but again it failed, 1853. It was probably this series of failures that led him to abandon English politics and spend the next years of his life, first in Jersey, where Engels met him in 1857, and then in the United States. In 1889 he sent his greetings to the Dockers' Strike. In 1897 Marx's son-in-law, Edward Aveling, went to interview him at his home in Richmond, Surrey, and described him as "a straggler of 1848."

Harney certainly had his weaknesses. He overestimated the class consciousness and homogeneity of the working class in 1848; he had a tendency to talk about the use of force, rather than to organise it. His failure to make or understand any analysis of the economic structure of capitalism made him a prey to the idea that success was imminent; it left him with no criterion by which to criticise unsound policies. But a hundred years after 1848 he seems a great figure, one who was a champion of the working-class press, who saw the class conflict so clearly that he knew it was Utopian to expect victory without struggle, and who was, above all, an exponent of the solidarity of the European working class.

TOWARDS WORKING-CLASS UNITY IN EASTERN EUROPE

JAMES KLUGMANN

FROM the earliest days of the working-class movement, its best and most militant representatives have fought for the establishment of a single united party of the working class. For long years now the struggle has been carried on in many countries to heal the split in the Labour movement, to drive out from it the representatives of capitalism and the influence of capitalist ideology and to forge unity on the basis of Marxism.

In Eastern Europe, during the last six months, important successes have been won along this path. On February 21-23, a Unity Congress of the Communist and Socialist Parties was held in Bucharest, Rumania, and the United Rumanian Workers' Party established with 800,000 members. On June 12, the Unity Congress opened at Budapest of the Hungarian Communist and Social Democratic Parties, and the Hungarian Workers' Party was formed with over one million members. On June 27, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party merged with the Czechoslovak Communist Party to form the United Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with two and a half million members. In Poland, finally, in the words of Comrade Gomulka, General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, a new stage has been reached on the road to unity, the stage of concrete preparation for organic unity, and when the United Party is eventually formed it will have over one and a half million members. Thus almost six million Communists and Socialists have achieved, or are on the point of, unity in these four countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. In the words of the joint declaration of the two Parties of Czechoslovakia on merger day, June 27: "The dreams of the first sons and daughters of the working class have come true."

We need attentively to study these important political developments, and to understand under what conditions organic unity was finally achieved, on what basis and with what perspectives of struggle these new United Parties were established, and what lessons their realisation holds for us.

Some comrades ask why, on the favourable soil of People's Democracy, unity was not achieved earlier. Why was there a relatively long time-lag between the establishment of United Front agreements on unity of action between the two Parties and their merger into a single Party? The answer to this question is that it is not sufficient for the majority of the leadership of the two Parties to accept the need for unity. It is not sufficient to adopt unity by a majority vote at the Party Congresses. A deep understanding of the need for unity has to be forged by a period of joint struggle at *all* levels on concrete issues. Organic unity cannot be achieved until the Social Democratic Party has purged itself of its right-wing elements and particularly those in its leadership. Finally, organic unity can only be established on the basis of ideological unity between the two Parties, and that can only mean on the basis of the full acceptance of Marxist-Leninist theory. The merging of Parties on any other basis would be a step backwards.

In Rumania, for instance, the split in the ranks of the workers dates from 1920. Whilst after 1924 the Rumanian Communist Party carried out its work in conditions of deepest terror and illegality, the Social Democratic leaders led their Party into co-operation with the

reactionary regime. War and the Nazi occupation, the inspiration of Communist-led resistance, the example of the Soviet Union, made the workers begin to understand the need for working-class unity. In May, 1944, the two Parties formed a United Front to struggle against the Antonescu regime. After the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship, the workers' United Front became the driving force of the National Democratic Front and later of the bloc of democratic Parties. Yet the formation of the United Front did *not* mean that reaction, home or foreign, had given up the idea of using the Social Democratic Party. On the contrary! The right-wing Socialist leader, Petrescu, entered into a secret anti-Communist agreement with the leaders of the "historic" Parties, Liberal and Agrarian, Maniu and Bratianu. The right-wing Socialist leaders did their best to turn the Socialist Party back on the old anti-unity, anti-Soviet road. The Social Democratic Party found itself at the crossroads—its choice either to return to the old path of co-operation with the capitalists and landlords, or to follow the new path of co-operation with the Communist Party. There followed a period of bitter internal struggle. In March, 1946, Petrescu was expelled from the Social Democratic Party, and attempts to transform the Party into a so-called "independent" Party, a Rumanian third force, collapsed. Reaction now concentrated its effort on winning positions *inside* the Social Democratic Party.

But, meanwhile, ever closer relations of joint struggle developed between the rank and file of the two Parties. In October, 1947, in spite of the efforts of the "fraternal" delegates from Britain, France and Austria, a draft manifesto calling for the formation of a United Rumanian Workers' Party was approved by the two Executive Committees. In January, 1948, joint meetings were held at all levels to elect delegates to the Unity Congress, and on February 21 the Congress opened. Speaking at the Congress, Gheorgiu-Dej, who was elected General Secretary of the new Party, declared:

"Working-class unity is the outcome of a long process. . . . That is why the present Congress was preceded by a long period of ideological exploratory work, comradesly *rapprochement* and joint activities by the Communists and Social Democrats"

This "long process" was followed also in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. There was the same awakening of the need for unity in the course of the war and Nazi occupation. There was the same effort of home and foreign reaction to turn the Social Democrats away from unity, and when that failed to take up positions for disruption inside the Socialist Party, there was the same bitter fight against the right wing waged within the Social Democratic Party, the same outside

intervention of British and French right-wing Labour leaders, the same growing consciousness of the workers of both Parties of the need for unity arising in joint efforts to fight reaction and build up popular democracy, and the same development towards ideological clarity arising from joint work on the one hand and joint study and discussion of theoretical problems on the other. In Czechoslovakia, at the Brno Congress of November, 1947, the right wing was temporarily victorious, but the mass movement of the February days quickly educated the Socialist workers in the need for unity. No sooner had the critical days of February passed than the removal of the right-wing leaders was carried through, rapidly followed by preparations for a merger. On June 27, the Congress of the United Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held, at which unity was achieved on the ideological basis of Marxist-Leninism and on the organisational basis of the Communist Party, which was by far the stronger and more experienced of the two Parties.

From these experiences, two points need to be developed. First, that unity was not achieved by *mechanical fusion*; secondly, that the joint struggles carried on in the period of united front, together with the discussions between the two Parties at all levels initiated by the Communists led to that *ideological* unity, that acceptance of Marxism-Leninism, without which organic unity could not be a step forward.

Describing the co-operation of the leadership and rank and file of the two Parties, Zambrowski, Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, explains how day-to-day experience of active Party members under conditions of People's Democracy acted as a school for unity and for Marxism:

" . . . The creative concrete part which they [members of the two Parties, J.K.] played in the implementation of the land reform was a daily practical lesson in the significance of the worker-peasant alliance . . . the setting of factories in operation, their nationalisation and development, the Parties' attitude to the trade unions and the movement of output competitions was also one long object lesson "

Thus it was correct to avoid mechanical fusion. Premature fusion would have been harmful. In May, 1945, for example, when the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and National Socialists approached the Communist Party with a proposal that they should form a united Party, this was rejected. In the words of Rudolf Slansky, General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in a speech at Prague on April 18, 1948:

"We were right in doing so, because this would have been an ill-co-ordinated organisation with divergent aims, instead of an organic and ideological unity . . . Such a Party would have been hampered in its activities and could never have played the part the Communist Party played when it resolutely led the people to victory over reaction."

Fusion of the two Parties has taken place in Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and is being prepared in Poland on the basis of acceptance of Marxist-Leninist theory. The roads to Socialism may materially differ in the different countries, but there is only one Socialist theory by which the determination of these roads may be guided.

"There are not two Socialist ideals, one for the Polish Workers' Party and one for the Polish Socialist Party, one for the East and one for the West. There is only one Socialism, neither Polish nor Russian, nor English nor Scandinavian, but common to the international working class—Marxist Socialism." (Gomulka, General Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, March 1948)

In the period following the war, and especially since the Unity of Action Agreement of October, 1946, the Polish working-class movement provides a striking example of how ideological unity can be won on the basis of the double process of joint action at all levels and common theoretical study and discussion between the two Parties.

In 1945, for example, a theory was put forward by a number of right wingers inside the Polish Socialist Party that the Socialists should act as mediators between the Workers' Party and the Peasant Party of Mikołajczyk—a Polish version of the "third force" known as the theory of the golden mean. As a result of their experience in the building of people's democracy and of Mikołajczyk's attempts to wreck it, and of their joint discussions with their comrades of the Polish Workers' Party, this theory was shattered, and in June 1947, the National Council of the Socialist Party gave a clear lead that the way forward lay in unity on the *left* and that "the enemy is only on the right"

In 1946-47, there was a strong divergence between the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party on State trading, in which the Socialists opposed the opening of State stores. The problem was whether the State in a people's democracy ought, or ought not, to engage in trade. The attitude of the Workers' Party was that a network of State stores would to a large extent prevent the private trading sector from appropriating too large a part of the national income, would aid the struggle against profiteering and rocketing prices, and help to maintain prices at levels fixed by the State. State trading was

not meant to replace co-operative sales societies, but it was considered that co-operative stores would develop *more* successfully and efficiently if a network of State stores *also* existed. The Marxist solution was put into practice; the subsequent popularity and success of the State stores and their growing influence on prices in the free market, together with the theoretical explanations of the comrades of the Workers' Party, finally convinced the Socialist workers of their role in the new society. One more ideological barrier to organic unity was removed.

Among the principal problems discussed within and between the Parties in the process of the merger were the leading role of the working class in the period of transition to Socialism and the development of class differences within the peasantry following the land reforms.

In the course of resistance to the Axis and after the defeat of fascism, profound changes took place in Eastern Europe. The peoples expropriated the property of the big capitalists and landlords, the principal means of production passed into the hands of the State, the land became the property of the peasants, and the main reactionary forces of these countries—the big capitalists and landlords who had sold out to the Axis to preserve their class privileges—were removed from power. Power passed into the hands of the people. But in the process of the transition to Socialism the class struggles grow more, and not less, bitter.

The Hungarian Workers' Party realises that the struggle between the forces of people's democracy striving towards Socialism and reactionary forces trying to re-establish the capitalist system cannot be considered finally settled until the economic and political liquidation of capitalist elements has been completed and as long as help can be given to internal reaction by the forces of external reaction. (From the programme of the Hungarian Workers' Party, adopted at the Unity Congress)

Moreover, the land reforms in the new democracies have brought into being millions of new peasant homesteads which have promoted small-scale production; and the increased well-being of the bulk of the peasantry, as Lenin has shown, is accompanied by a growth of the kulak element. If the peasantry is to be relied upon to play its role in the Socialist reorganisation of society, this can only be achieved under the leadership of the working class.

This problem has been deeply discussed in the new united Parties and in the process of their formation. The policy resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party, held in Bucharest on June 10-11, stressing the need for self-criticism and of guarding against complacency, stated:

Every Party member must clearly realise that the struggle takes place, not only in the towns, but also in the country, and that there are big differences of class within the peasantry. The interests of the working peasantry cannot be upheld except by struggle fought in alliance with the working class and under its leadership, a struggle against capitalist exploitation, for the restraint of capitalist elements in the countryside and the strengthening of the positions of people's democracy

As long as the interests of the working class are represented by two Parties, as long as different ideological trends exist in its ranks, the working class cannot display its full strength. Organic unity of the two Parties represents a strength which is *more* than the simple arithmetical sum of the strength of the two former Parties. It enables the working class to exert its full force, and to play a leading role in the period of transition of popular democracy to Socialism, guiding the peasantry on the road to a Socialist agriculture.

In the course of preparing the merger of the two working-class Parties, it was natural that among the most essential questions on which agreement had to be reached were the role, methods of work and forms of organisation of the new united Party. In a number of discussions in Hungary and Rumania, special critical attention has been paid to studying the relation of the Workers' Party to the wide popular fronts that exist, or are coming into existence. In Bulgaria, the same problem has been under discussion in the Workers' Party. The importance has been stressed again and again of studying the role of the Workers' Parties in the light of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin and the experiences of the C.P.S.U. (B.).

Farkas, speaking at the Unity Congress of the Hungarian Workers' Party, criticised those in the Party who considered that in view of the transformation of the Hungarian National Independence Front into a powerful mass organisation of several million members, the Workers' Party should move into the background. He declared:

"They want to advance the Front to the detriment of the Party. Those who want to hide the face of the Party and to carry out its activities in a secret fashion are, in reality, erecting a wall between the Party and the masses and are deviating from the teachings of Lenin and Stalin about a proletarian Party."

Chervenkov, General Secretary of the Bulgarian Workers' Party, has treated the same problem in a recent article (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, June 15), showing how the fact that the Fatherland Front has been transformed into a single popular mass organisa-

tion does *not* mean the setting up of a single Party, or the lessening of the role of the Workers' Party:

. . . The Party will not be in a subordinate position in the Front in the sense of restricting its leading role or of becoming dissolved in the Front . . . Nor will the Party identify itself with the Front, since the Party, as the vanguard of the working people, stands above the Fatherland Front, its programme goes beyond the programme of the Front, and its leading role is absolutely essential for the further progress and fruitful work of the Front

Discussion has also centred on the organisational character of the new Parties. Two dangers stand out; on the one hand, that the Party by its inflated size, through lack of care in recruitment, inattention to Marxist education, should lose its vanguard character; and that, in the midst of class society, with class struggles and consequently Party responsibilities for leadership increasing, the frontier between the Workers' Party and the working class should, in practice, be knocked down.

Rakosi has commented on this danger in Hungary, where the Communist Party had over 800,000 members and the United Workers' Party over one million.

"Our Party is not only made up of the vanguard detachment of the working class, but also includes the absolute majority of industrial workers. . . We failed to take full account of the danger that a quantitative increase can lead to a deterioration of quality . . . Forty years ago, Lenin warned against being 'scattered,' against widely extending the title of member of the Party, against the disorganising idea of confusing the class with the Party"

At the same time, discussions have stressed again and again the equal danger of allowing the Party to become a secret conspiratorial group, not appearing openly before the people with its own programme, bereft of inner Party democracy, and without consistent criticism and self-criticism at all levels. Gomulka writes:

The force of a Party lies in the compactness of its ranks, the united political conceptions of its members born from a correct ideology. The force of a united Party must be greater than the sum total of the forces which the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party taken together have at their disposal. If as a result of the fusion of the P.W.P. and the P.S.P. into one Party there were to arise factions in this Party, it would certainly

be better not to unite the Parties together. The united Party must be based on the principles of democratic centralism, within which there is a basis for differences of opinion, but no factions are allowed. Once it has been discussed and approved, a Party decision is binding on all its organisations and members.

Why is it that united Parties have been achieved in Eastern Europe, whilst in the West the working class remains divided? Whilst the development of unity of action of the working class during the war and immediately following was a very powerful factor in the realisation of the peoples' democracies of East and South-East Europe, the new democracies, in their turn, provided fertile soil for developing still further working-class unity, from unity of action to organic unity.

Bourgeois ideologists, including the right-wing Social Democrats and "Democratic Socialists," usually start from the presumption that "true" democracy (as in America, Great Britain, France, Greece) consists of a number of different Parties representing different opinions. In the popular democracies, they declare, opinions are crushed by dictatorial methods, and, therefore, on this basis, single working-class Parties are set up.

This is a radically false theory aimed at the maintenance of bourgeois rule. Different Parties may hold different opinions; it is not, however, the different opinions that form the different Parties, but the different Parties represent *different class interests*, express the class interests within capitalist society. The existence of two or more Socialist or Labour Parties is not a proof of the progressive nature of bourgeois democracy, but a proof that under bourgeois democracy, where the State machine is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, capitalist ideology can more easily influence the working class and working people; and capitalism, through its agents in the Labour movement, can divert the workers from the defence of their *own* class interests. Division of the working class into two Parties proves that capitalism, capitalist ideology, still influences a section of the workers. Gomulka writes:

The division of the working-class movement into two ideologically and politically divided streams is a sign of the pressure and influence of bourgeois capitalist ideology on the working class.

In the popular democracies the big capitalists and landowners have been deprived of their power. Whilst class struggles become more intense as the new regimes move forward to Socialism, it becomes more and more difficult for the capitalists to maintain their influence inside the working-class movement, especially as the working class, leading factor in the new democracies, becomes more and more con-

sconscious of its power, and benefits more and more from the new regimes.

Their influence on the working class becomes uprooted. The right-wing elements inside the Labour movement of the new democracies base themselves more and more on foreign imperialism, in the last analysis mainly on U.S. and British imperialism, through the medium of the right-wing Social Democrats and, above all, Transport House. As the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie in the Labour movement is progressively destroyed, under Communist leadership and initiative, the ideological unity of the working class develops on the basis of Socialist theory, Marxism-Leninism. In bitter class battles the right-wing Social Democrats are chased out of the Labour movement to take their place in London and Washington.

What lessons can we in this country draw from a study of the development of organic unity of the working class in Eastern Europe?

1. In the light of the achievement of United Workers' Parties in a number of countries and of the discussions that have preceded them, and of the criticism and self-criticism exercised in discussing the role and nature of the working-class Parties, the development of class struggles in the countryside, and the leading role of the working class in the whole period of transition to Socialism, we need to deepen our study of new democracy, correct our illusions and mistakes, and study the principles involved.

2. In this respect it is especially important in connection with the statement of the Communist Information Bureau on the situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party, to study and re-study the teachings of Lenin and Stalin on the role and character of the Party and the nature of the class struggles in the period of transition to Socialism, to study experiences of the C.P.S.U.(B) and, above all, the *Short History of the C.P.S.U.(B)*.

3. We can learn from the whole development of working-class unity in Eastern Europe that unity will never come on a plate, that it has to be forged from below in joint mass struggles against capitalism.

4. We can learn the leading role of the Communist Party, the importance of Marxist theory, and the importance of criticism and self-criticism at every level.

5. Finally, in view of the fact that the remnants of reaction in Eastern Europe base themselves more and more on foreign reaction, above all on British and American imperialism, we can understand more clearly the international importance of successfully developing our work in this country.



USSR



HOKKAIDO



VLADIVOSTOK

SEA OF JAPAN



TOKYO

OSAKA

NAGOYA

KOBE

OSAKA

HIROSHIMA

SHIKOKU



KYUSHU

JAPAN

PREFACE

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL D. R. REES-WILLIAMS, T.D., M.P.

The East is in the throes of a renaissance. The spirit of nationalism, quickened by the war, has spread like a flame from Cairo to Shanghai. Countries occupied by the Japanese invader are struggling to regain their feet, grappling at the same time with political and economic problems. Unfortunately in the United Kingdom little attention has been, or is being, paid to these events so many thousands of miles away.

Among all the unknown factors in the Far East, the position of Japan is perhaps the greatest. To what extent is her economy to be built up once more, what political parties are to emerge, for how long is control of Japanese life to be maintained and by whom? The forthcoming peace-conference will decide many of these matters for good or ill. Wisely the Australian Government has invited to Canberra representatives from the British Commonwealth of Nations in order that an united Commonwealth policy may be achieved. Everyone who is not content to be a blind play-thing of fate blown about by the winds of chance must want to know the background to the problem, the answers to which will be provided, we hope, at Canberra. The decisions taken there and at the peace conference will affect domestic life and trade not only in the Far East but in this country and in the U.S.A. These decisions will, in fact, determine to a large extent the standard of living for decades to come in Croydon, Bootle, Brecon, Stranraer, Inverkillin and many other towns and villages in Britain.

For some time past it has been extraordinarily difficult even for Members of Parliament, who have access to material not readily obtainable by the general public, to know what is happening in Japan. There is a military occupation and facts and figures are not easily available. This pamphlet supplies the deficiency. It provides the facts in readable form and within a narrow compass. I hope that it will have a wide distribution and congratulate those who have prepared it upon their initiative.

*This is the second pamphlet in a series on Asia.
The first dealt with INDO-CHINA and is
obtainable from The Union of Democratic Control,
34, Victoria Street, London, S.W.1. Price 1/-.*

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN AND THE IMPORTANCE OF BRITISH POLICY

THE problem of Japan is now officially recognised as important. On May 16th, 1947, Mr. Bevin, in the Debate on Foreign Affairs, made the following statement as to British policy :—

" . . . I hope it may be possible to conclude an early peace treaty with Japan. The first step is to reach Allied agreement on the basis for the treaty. The efforts of the Government will be directed towards that end. We shall, of course, keep in close touch with the Commonwealth Governments in this matter. Australia and Canada particularly are very keenly interested in the peace treaty with Japan. As regards the textile trade, an enactment on labour conditions was recently made in Japan, incorporating a wage plan and enforcing wage standards for the textile industry. This fair wage clause also covers the conditions of child labour, and will mean that children below the age of 15 will be withheld from the industry. That, I think, is a very important law so far as Japan is concerned and it will certainly have an effect. I have also arranged to send a Labour attaché to Tokio in order that we may be advised on the steps that have been taken . . . "

(*Hansard*. May 16, 1947. Col. 1969-70.)

Last October Sir Stafford Cripps made a statement on the importance of establishing the foundations of economic and political democracy in Japan. He referred to the Far Eastern Commission in Washington on which " His Majesty's Government are represented . . . and have a full voice in all discussions which take place in it ". He described the dislocation of Japanese industry by bombing, the loss of overseas assets and Empire and the subsequent acute difficulties of Japan's economy and then gave the following outline of the future :—

" Japan must be left," he said, " after the peace settlement in such a position that she can become and remain internationally solvent ; otherwise, she will require permanent foreign support in the form of direct subsidies. It is highly improbable that any nation will be prepared to contribute continuously to Japan's support in this way and His Majesty's Government for their part, having regard to our own foreign exchange difficulties and the urgent need for us to become solvent ourselves, could not contemplate undertaking to share in such a burden. To balance her payments, Japan must export, and, after the severe curtailment which will be imposed, for security reasons, on her heavy industries, she will have to concentrate her efforts on her lighter industries, including textiles. This conclusion is inescapable if Japan is to become self-supporting. While, as I have said, we hope that Japan's economic recovery will be accompanied by the achievement of better labour standards and elimination of the artificial subsidization of exports, we cannot afford to stifle Japanese competition in export markets by means which would merely impose on us a corresponding, if not greater, burden."

(*Hansard*, Oct 28, 1946.)

Unfortunately, public opinion in this country has not been alive to developments in the Far East. Yet they are of great importance to international trade and indeed to world peace. The amount devoted to Far Eastern affairs in our newspapers and periodicals is inadequate.

The amount of research done into the problems of the Far East and of the Pacific in this country cannot be compared with the work done in the United States. The result is the lack of an interested, let alone an informed, public opinion and a feeling after the Japanese surrender that the Japanese were better left to the Americans, who had taken over the administration and occupation of the country. It was very quickly forgotten that the Americans were only the caretakers of the Allied Nations, carrying out the policy laid down originally at Potsdam and amplified later on in the discussions of the Foreign Ministers in London, and that all the Allies share ultimate responsibility for what happens in Japan. Nor can we carry out our responsibilities by remaining interested onlookers.

The problems of Japan are far less remote than they appear at first sight. This is true for several reasons.

(1) There was—and still is—a lot of loose talk about another war in the Pacific, and problems are regarded from the point of view of strategy rather than from the needs of the peoples of Asia and of the peace of the world. It is obviously not to British interests to remain completely passive when world peace is at stake.

(2) We must not forget that the peoples of Asia regard the fate of Japan with the greatest interest. They know that in many ways, Japan is a test case. She is at the mercy of the Western powers. They know that Japan is, amongst all the countries of Asia, the only country where industrialisation has reached anything similar to Western proportions. They know that in Japan the question of land reform, of industrial development, of fair wage levels, of fair international trading facilities, can be tried out as in a laboratory. The peoples of Asia will therefore be more inclined to judge our attitude to Japan strictly on its merits; if they approve of it, then a good deal of misunderstanding and suspicion of the West will disappear. A truly democratic regime with Allied support in Japan will show that Britain is a progressive country prepared to substitute co-operation on equal terms for the imperialist policy of past governments.

(3) It would be most unfortunate, if Britain forgets that she, as one of the United Nations, has her share of responsibility for fulfilling the pledge to raise the standard of living all over the world and of developing democracy and self-government in the areas under her control. It would be equally unfortunate if the real needs of the Japanese people were to be forgotten, or—even worse—if the Japanese people should become a plaything of power politics between Russia and America. Britain can—and must see to it—that the case of Japan in defeat is not treated as if it was a case of Japan before the next war. On the contrary, if we can help to settle the problems of Japan, of Korea and China, we shall help to make that war less likely.

(4) In spite of her industrial development, Japan lacks a well developed Labour Movement, and the interests of the Peasantry are still in need of better representation at the Centre. There is a crying need for a development of co-operative societies. In all these matters

Japan can learn a good deal from us. If the Government are sending out expert Trade Union organisers to help the people of Malay and Burma to start a Trade Union movement of their own—then it is difficult to see why the advice and help of British Labour could not help the Japanese people in rebuilding their war-shattered country in a peaceful and progressive way. One important step has been taken; the Delegation of the World Federation of Trade Unions has established useful contacts with the Japanese Trade Unions with a view to their eventual membership. For the same reason, an International Co-operative Delegation to Japan is highly desirable.

(5) Japanese exports may affect our own home industries. It is therefore important to look at the further development of Japan in the light of world requirements. On the other hand, raising of the standard of living, increasing the purchasing power of the Japanese people and improving wages and working conditions, would help to do away with the—often over-rated—danger from “unfair and cheap” Japanese export competition. But a permanent improvement in this field is bound up with the political and economic development of Japan along the right lines. In other words, it is vitally important, not only in the interests of other Asiatic countries, but in the interest of preventing the resurgence of Japanese aggression, that the economic development of Japan should have the safeguards of political democracy. And it is our task as a World power to help in this process.

(6) The Government have given a lead in this matter. The public must no longer remain ignorant even of the most elementary facts and problems concerning Japan and concerning Allied policy to Japan. It is for that reason that this short summary of some of the problems involved has been compiled and it is followed by a brief history of events during the first year of Allied occupation.

CHAPTER II

ALLIED POLICY IN JAPAN

The surrender of the Japanese armed forces was signed on the United States ship “Missouri” in Tokyo Bay on September 2nd, 1945. Four days later, the President of the United States, in a Directive to General MacArthur, said: “in the event of any differences of opinion among the Allied Powers, the policies of the United States will govern”. Thus, from the beginning of the occupation, the Americans assumed ultimate responsibility. This was not necessarily accepted by other Powers which had also played a considerable part in the defeat of Japan. Thus, for instance, at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London during September, 1945, Mr. Molotov suggested a 4 Power Allied Council. Mr. Bevin largely under Australasian pressure, suggested a Commission on which members would have authority proportional to their part in Japan’s

defeat. America finally conceded the idea of a Commission but it cannot be said that any other power has played an important role in post-war Japan.

Immediately following the surrender, General MacArthur was given a series of directives. No. 1 provided for the surrender and disarmament of all Japanese forces wherever located; No. 2 established occupation forces in designated areas and set controls over the disarmament and demobilisation of the Japanese armed forces. Orders soon followed establishing Sections dealing with Economic and Scientific problems; with Information and Education; with Natural Resources; with Public Health and Welfare; with Legal matters; with Civil Communications; and finally, on April 18th, 1946, a Diplomatic Section was added, bringing the total to 14.

On October 2nd, 1945, S.C.A.P. (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) was set up in Tokyo. The Japanese governmental machinery was kept intact and all directives and memoranda issued by S.C.A.P. were transmitted to it through the Central Liaison Office, a Japanese agency. On local and prefectural levels, the Eighth Army carries out supervisory functions under the direction of S.C.A.P. The Official policy—that is official American policy—was published on September 23rd, 1945, under the title "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan".

As far as the military occupation is concerned that is the personal responsibility of General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander. The problem of the machinery for implementing policy in other matters was one which led to a great deal of discussion in the Autumn of 1945. The Allies wanted their full share of responsibility. On the other hand, British and American policy was aimed at preventing the U.S.S.R. from penetrating that part of the world. Finally, it was agreed by Britain and the United States that the only way to exclude the U.S.S.R. was to exclude Great Britain also, and to spread the idea that America desired a virtual monopoly in an area which had been their theatre of war. Thus, when the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was set up the Allies were accepted only in an advisory capacity. The Americans then invited both the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R. to send small occupying forces as a token of their responsibility.

The British Commonwealth agreed. The U.S.S.R., considering the invitation a diplomatic gesture, turned down the suggestion, but announced that they would send military observers to their Embassy in Tokyo instead. This gave them all the contacts they wanted in Japan—it is estimated there are about 800 military observers—and it avoided the invidious position in which the British Commonwealth troops have often been placed in having to accept orders from American officers, thus losing face with the Japanese.

Machinery for the control of Japan was finally established by the Moscow Agreement of December 27th, 1945. This consisted of a Far Eastern Commission, composed of the representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India and the Phillippine Commonwealth; and an Allied Council for Japan, the membership of which consists of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) who shall be Chairman and United States member, a U.S.S.R. member, a Chinese member,

and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India.

The Far Eastern Commission which met for the first time in February, 1946, sits in Washington, and can deal with any but military or territorial problems. It has so far been concerned with the question of reparations, but it has not yet published any Report. The Allied Council for Japan, which met for the first time in April, 1946, holds meetings in public every fortnight in Tokyo.

The Allied Council has been completely dominated by the United States and General MacArthur has made it abundantly clear that he regards it as mainly of nuisance value. It has so far made little difference to the general trend of the American directives which go from the State Department through the War Department to General MacArthur and then through S.C.A.P. to the Liaison Department with the Japanese Government, which receives it some considerable time afterwards.

It is often forgotten that the occupation is an Allied responsibility. General MacArthur's responsibility is theoretically to the Allied Governments, not merely to the American Chiefs of Staff who largely dominate the State Department in Washington. His headquarters is staffed almost entirely by Americans, many of them very anti-British in outlook. Thus, as far as the Japanese people are concerned, it is not surprising that they regard the Allied Council as an instrument of American policy rather than that of Allied occupation as originally planned.

At the same time, and in spite of these frustrations on the part of non-American members of the Allied Council, it must be admitted that the occupation of Japan has been carried out with far greater efficiency than that of Germany. In Japan control has been in the hands of a single man with undivided purpose. Moreover the Japanese have been co-operative because they have been given a considerable amount of self-government.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN DURING THE OCCUPATION

After years of suppression of all opposition to the regime, of all freedom of speech and thought, the Japanese people were politically ignorant with a very vague idea of the meaning of democracy. At the close of the war the political scene was dominated entirely by the Greater Japan Political Association, a party which was formed along characteristically totalitarian lines and which included 377 out of the 466 members of the House of Representatives when Japan surrendered in August, 1945. The pre-war political parties had long since ceased to function. The old leaders who were not in jail had been absorbed in the G.J.P.A. New leaders had not yet emerged.

General MacArthur lost no time in removing the restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, whilst all people confined to prison on political grounds were released, and the secret police and allied agencies abolished. A Purge Directive of January 4th, 1946, carried out by the Japanese Government under S C A P supervision eliminated 186,000 people from the scene in the early days of political development, and gave an opportunity for the emergence of many new political workers.

In the first month of occupation, groups formed round political leaders and all politicians hastened to declare their democratic leanings. Party lines were blurred, parties merged and disappeared. But by December 18th, when the Diet dissolved, there were four main parties, which set to work immediately on their election campaign. First of all there was the PROGRESSIVE PARTY, a coalition of the two pre-war parties, the Minseito (Machida Group) and the Seiyukai (Nakajima Group). These two parties, representing different interests rather than principles, had already lost their identity in the pre-war totalitarian state into which Japan had developed. They formed the Patriotic Diet Members' Society which in turn formed the nucleus of the Greater Japan Political Association. The members of the PROGRESSIVE Party were drawn mainly from these circles. Secondly, the LIBERAL PARTY which is distinguishable from the Progressive Party more along lines of personalities than of policy. This Party developed out of the National Administration Investigation Society which was led by Hatoyama (a sort of Japanese Stresemann). It was an anti-Tojo group within the Diet and its members originally were made up of right-wing elements of the dissolved Social Mass Party and the Kuhara group of the Seiyukai. Thirdly, the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY which was the first to organise after the surrender and which at once produced a programme for land reform and revision of the Constitution. It is now split along lines similar to those of the western Social Democratic Parties. The October Conference of the Social Democrat Party signified a victory for the right-wing group, which has grown ever since its representatives in the Diet voted for a united front excluding Communist Party members. The Secretary-General of the Party is now Suetiro Nishio, a former factory worker from Osaka who has been a member of the Diet five times, and is now, in addition to his political post, Vice-President of the right-wing Trade Union movement—Sodomei Federation. Fourthly, THE COMMUNIST PARTY which was suppressed in the early nineteen-twenties. It alone called for the abolition of the Emperor and it opposed the new Constitution.

The General Election was held on April 10th, 1946, when 26,000,000 (twenty-six million) voters chose a new House of Representatives, the lower house of the Diet. Nearly three-fourths of the qualified voters (72.1 per cent.) went to the polls, a high percentage considering the time and circumstances. Contrary to previous expectations women turned out in large numbers. The conduct of the election was in the hands of the Japanese Government. Occupation Forces carefully observed campaign and election procedure throughout the country but refrained scrupulously from any kind of interference. No disorder

was reported on election day and the number of irregularities was negligible. It has been described as the most honest election in Japan's history.

No party secured a majority in the new Diet. The Liberals emerged as the strongest single party, followed by the Progressives and the Social Democrats. Small blocs from the Co-operative and Communist parties with many representatives from minor groups and independent members, including 38 women, completed the make-up of the Diet. The bulk of its members had not served in any previous Diet, owing to the purge of January 4th, 1946.

Final election figures were as follows:—

Liberals	140
Progressives	93
Social Democrats	92
Co-operatives	16
Communists	5
Minor Parties	38
Independents	78

As no party commanded a majority in the Diet, negotiations between party leaders were necessary to form a Cabinet which would enjoy the Diet's confidence. They were conducted openly and to the accompaniment of a running fire of critical comment from the press and the public.

On May 3rd, after frequent and interminable conferences, the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties announced that they had reached an agreement on the outstanding questions of the Constitution and the food problem. An attempt was made to secure endorsement of this programme by the Co-operative and Communist Parties. Finally, on May 16th, after a good deal of political manoeuvre, the Yoshida Cabinet was formed.

The Cabinet represented the more conservative forces still active in Japanese political life. It was generally assumed that this was the kind of Government General MacArthur wanted and that it suited the general line of American policy. This was certainly indicated in a statement made in October by Mr George Atcheson, American member of the Allied Council to the effect that "Japanese aims have become virtually identified with American aims". Mr. MacMahon Ball, (representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India) showed his position clearly when he declared that he would not associate himself "with such expressions of cordiality and confidence toward the present Japanese Government".

A similar warning as to the danger of supporting the Yoshida Government appeared at that time in responsible American Journals such as the Foreign Policy Bulletin. The following is an example:

"the United States, in effect, has placed itself in the position of supporting a strong Japanese Right-Wing out of fear of a very weak Japanese Left-wing. If followed to its logical conclusion, this policy would lead ultimately to a powerful resurgence of the Japanese Right, completely cutting the ground from under any middle elements desiring to move in a progressive evolutionary direction.

These elements are weak, but they can grow if the United States will show by its actions that, even though it may make use of right-wing politicians, it has no basic confidence in them and will not protect them against their opponents. Our attitude should be one of encouraging popular demands for a new type of Japanese leadership and welcoming into positions of authority progressive Japanese officials, wherever they exist or develop. The policy of dealing with the present Japanese regime almost as if it were a full-fledged government merely crystallizes a political situation which ought to be kept as fluid as possible.

(Laurence Rosinger, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Nov. 1st, 1946.)

It is probably inevitable for political developments in Japan to reflect those in the United States as long as occupation lasts. Japanese political leaders, especially those of the older generation, have found their docility a great asset both in regaining power under American control and in resisting the growing demands of younger and more radically-minded people.

At the same time, the Yoshida Government became more and more unpopular, and it is doubtful whether it could have survived without American influence. In February, 1947, General MacArthur intimated his wishes for a general election and the Yoshida Cabinet fixed a number of dates for the election of heads of cities, towns and villages, for the House of Representatives and for the House of Councillors.

General MacArthur informed the Japanese of the results which he hoped to see from the elections. His spokesman warned Japanese representatives at a specially arranged press conference of the dangers of the new totalitarianism. The United States, the spokesman informed his audience, abhorred the destruction of democracy in one country after another by the establishment of one-party control. "It is this anti-democratic, purely political, ruthlessly aggressive Communism that America will fight anywhere in the world as it had to fight Nazism, Fascism, and Tojo's Japanism."

April 1947 was a month of elections. Neither local nor national elections excited a great deal of enthusiasm and the poll showed an average of only about 60 per cent of the electorate. The polling was supervised by allied troops throughout the country and six representatives of the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan and six members of the Chinese mission observed the course of the elections working in conjunction with United States representatives. The overall result of the elections was a swing to the moderate left. The Social Democrats secured the highest number of seats. Their election programme advocated State control over coal, iron, steel and fertilizer industries preparatory to State ownership; increased co-operation between industrial workers on the one hand and farmers and fishermen on the other in order to secure more reasonable wages and regular supplies; a year's moratorium on interest from war bonds and the imposition of high rates of taxation on the "new yen" classes; and a further maximum limit on the issue of notes by the Bank of Japan. This policy of moderate socialism won 143 seats in the House of Representatives. They were followed by the Liberals who had 133, the Democrats who had 126 and the Communists who had 4. In the House of Councillors, the Social Democrats were also the biggest Party.

At the same time, they were not in a position to form a Socialist Government and again Japan has a Coalition Cabinet. It is headed by the sixty-year old Socialist, Katayama, who will try to maintain a precarious balance of power with the right rather than with the left-wing.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS

Japan's social and political system had been such that all power was concentrated in the all-powerful triumvirate of the Emperor, the Zaibatsu and the Military. Unless the power of this triumvirate were broken, there was no chance for the growth of democracy.

Two important documents, the Bill of Rights and the new Constitution, provide the administrative framework of a democratic regime. They go some way towards giving effect to the Potsdam Declaration of August, 1945, which stated that "the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people".

The Bill of Rights

The Bill of Rights, drawn up by General MacArthur's Staff and announced by S.C.A.P. in September, 1945, ordered the Japanese Government to release political prisoners and gave directives as to what it should do to "remove restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties and discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion". The carrying out of this directive led to the release of 507 political prisoners and put an end to the surveillance of 2,000 others. Many of these were experienced political workers and their release undoubtedly contributed to the unexpectedly rapid growth of political activity described in the last Chapter.

The Bill of Rights directed the Japanese Government to abolish its secret police and to dissolve all ultra-nationalistic secret and other societies which were an integral part of Japan's militaristic system. The Greater Japan Political Association—the most important of them—thus disappeared from Japan's political life, and so too did the terroristic Black Dragon Society, the Student Youth Corps and the Religious Bureau in the Ministry of Education. The Government was ordered to cease all financial assistance to State Shintoism and the Imperial Institution which had hitherto been considered as above all human criticism was now openly discussed. The press, radio, cinema and theatre were given freedom of expression. Thus, the Bill of Rights, published in the early days of occupation, set a democratic model before a bewildered nation which had been conquered for the first time in its history.

The Constitution

The second important document is the new Constitution. Only a month after the surrender, General MacArthur gave a directive to the Japanese Cabinet to initiate measures for the "liberalisation" of the Constitution. Prince Konoye was appointed by the Emperor to form what was known as the "Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee". The Japanese people were given the impression by their newspapers that the initiative had been taken by Hirohito. Political parties drafted suggestions and it seemed for a time as if the Japanese would produce their own Constitution. But in February, 1946, the problem of constitutional reform was taken over by the Government Section of the Supreme Commander's Headquarters, and it was the Chief of the Section, an American Brigadier named General Courtney Whitney, and his staff who drew up a Constitution and handed it to the Prime Minister, Shidehara, three weeks later. The only two points which the American drafting committee were given were the following :—

1 The Emperor was to be stripped of his divinity and was to remain as a mere symbol. Sovereignty was to be vested in the people.

2 Japan was to renounce war for all time and to forsake permanently the right to establish armed forces

The Japanese leaders did not relish the American draft, but under threat that unless they accepted it, S.C.A.P. would present it to the Japanese people over the heads of the Government, Prime Minister Shidehara set his name to it, and the newspapers were forbidden to say that it had been written in English and then translated into Japanese. The document reads very unlike a Japanese production; many of the phrases and sentiments are far more reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson than of Prince Ito.

The draft Constitution was finally issued on 6th March, 1946. General MacArthur, in announcing his personal approval stated —

"This instrument has been drafted after painstaking investigation and frequent conferences between members of the Japanese Government and this headquarters following my initial direction to the Cabinet five months ago."

The Constitution was then discussed by the Diet Committee, but although many proposals were forthcoming, the document as drafted by the Americans was accepted with only a few minor modifications. The Japanese were in a complacent mood which suited the conditions of American occupation; the real feelings of many Japanese are probably much more accurately summarised by a remark in the *Christian Science Monitor* which described it as "a bright bauble handed the Diet by American officials. It has no real roots in Japan's life or thought. It is unlikely to outlast a relatively brief occupation."

The new Constitution in General MacArthur's own words, "places sovereignty squarely in the hands of the people. It establishes governmental authority with the predominant power vested in an elected legislature, as representative of the people, but with an adequate check upon that power, as well as upon the power of the executive and the

judiciary, to insure that no branch of government may become autocratic or arbitrary in the administration of affairs of state". The Constitution reduces the power of the Emperor, making him "the symbol of the state and the unity of the people, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people".

The Emperor's powers are strictly limited. In fact, he is authorized to perform "only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution", and a list of those functions is defined in Articles 6 and 7. Further, although he appoints the Prime Minister, it is only the formality of appointment "as designated by the Diet". And all other functions are subject to the advice and the approval of the Cabinet. And as far as the Cabinet itself is concerned, "the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians". In itself this is an important change, since the military have dominated Japanese Cabinets for the past ten years.

Another clause deals with the demilitarisation of Japanese life. It renounces war "as a means of settling disputes. The maintenance of land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be authorised". This sounds very much like the Kellogg Pact, an expression of simple American goodwill with no hint as to its implementation.

One of the most far-reaching changes written into the Constitution is the popular election of local assemblies, the supervision of elections by local committees and the introduction of the right of the electorate to a referendum and recall of elected officials. This is the first time in the nation's history that the Japanese people have had the right to elect public officials, and as the *Times* stated editorially, 23rd September, 1946:—"The change is not only important from the opportunity it offers for popular training in the management of local affairs, but is likely to provide a solid foundation for the success of democratic institutions at a higher level".

The Constitution was formally put into effect on May 3rd in a ceremony before the Imperial Palace. But the first General Election had already been held in accordance with the Constitution and as we have already seen, representatives ranking from the House of Councillors to members of village assemblies were elected. These show the trend of Japanese political feeling, in so far as the people of an occupied country express their own views rather than those which are thought to be acceptable to the occupying power. This is particularly the case in a country which has no democratic traditions, and it might reasonably be urged that American military administration and control are not a fertile soil for the seed of a democratic regime. Further, although the Constitution is an excellent document on paper, there is a danger, as the *New York Herald Tribune* editorially points out, "that the conservative officials who still are dominant in Japan will try to interpret the Constitution so that their nation still will be ruled by men like themselves. . . . If the directives are not carried out, then men who still think in thirteenth-century terms will continue to hold vast powers in Japan. Under such conditions no Constitution, no matter how carefully contrived, would produce democracy".

Dissolution of the Zaibatsu

The third significant step towards a democratic regime is the proposed dissolution of the ZAIBATSU, the great industrial and banking combines which not only exercised control over most of Japan's trade and industry, but became an integral part of her war machine.

These combines were controlled by a small number of business families. The top holding companies of the older concerns were usually controlled by a single family or by several closely related families. Unity of control among the more complex family groups was assured by a code of family rules: e.g., control of the Misui holding company rested with the heads of eleven official families sitting as a family council. Members of this family were required to obtain approval from the council before engaging in business or making investments of their own account. The council had authority to set up a common reserve fund for each member of the house, to fix each member's budget of expenditure and to control succession, marriage, adoption, divorce and the establishment of separate families.

Together these great combines pervaded and controlled the economic life of Japan. In key industries their influence was particularly strong; 15 of these concerns produced 51 per cent. of the total Japanese coal production, 69 per cent. of the aluminium and 88 per cent. of the steam engines—to mention just a few of their activities. In Finance, the Zaibatsu had 57 per cent. of the assets and 71 per cent. of the loans and advances of all Japanese ordinary banks. Their savings banks had 99 per cent. of all savings-bank assets.

After the Surrender, in view of the Allied Powers' declared intention to dissolve the combines, a considerable number of the executive heads of the larger combines resigned their official positions. In October, 1945, after conferences between representatives of the larger Zaibatsu enterprises and certain occupation authorities, a voluntary dissolution plan was submitted by the YASUDA combine on behalf of itself, and of Mitsui, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi. The plan was approved by the Supreme Commander and at his request a mission from the State and War Departments of the U.S.A. visited Japan to examine the Zaibatsu problem.

The head of this Mission, Professor Corwin Edwards, made three proposals: first, a quarterly quota for the sale of Zaibatsu securities and property to the general public; second, inheritance control which would compel the Zaibatsu proprietors to break down family holdings by distributing wealth, at the same time taxing it in the process of transfer; and, third, the ending of a system whereby one operating company could hold investments in another. Professor Edwards believed that it would be impossible to liquidate the Zaibatsu wealth unless capital were created to buy them out. His idea was that this should be done through taxation which would transfer economic power to the Government which in turn would spend money in such a way as to redistribute wealth. These proposals were too revolutionary for S.C.A.P. whose own report was adopted. This involved the transference of power into Government bonds, on the grounds that it was undesirable to break up the Zaibatsu without providing suitable compensation.

This method leaves the Zaibatsu in a position to re-establish themselves when once Allied control is relaxed.

Certain steps have now been taken to dissolve the Zaibatsu through the Holding Company Liquidation Commission. By the end of January, 1947, this Commission had designated 65 Japanese holding companies for dissolution. Answering a question put to him by Col. David Rees-Williams, Mr. Hector McNeil stated :—

" It (the Holding Company Liquidation Commission) has taken over most of the securities of the five principal companies to the value of over two thousand million yen. The assets of the designated companies are to be offered for sale in due course, but that stage has not yet been reached. The Commission's present plans are to prevent any single person or firm from buying more than 1 per cent. of the assets sold of any company. Sales will not be permitted to 'purged' individuals, nor to members of the money-chique families nor their appointees' ".

(Hansard, January 27th, 1947. Col. 589.)

Thus the machinery for ending the power of the Zaibatsu has already been established. Plans for the substitution of a different and democratic economic structure are still unformulated. The Potsdam Declaration stated that " Japan shall be permitted such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would permit her to re-arm for war. She shall be allowed access to raw materials and eventual participation in world trade ". The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy stated the responsibility of the Supreme Commander for carrying out a policy designed to " favour a programme for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry ". Neither declaration formulated any positive policy as to the kind of economic structure which was envisaged for post-war Japan. It may be a relatively easy piece of administrative work to destroy the past economy; what is important is that post-war Japanese economy should be reconstituted on a peaceful and more democratic basis so that the economic power of the nation cannot again be used for war purposes.

Land Reform

The fourth direction in which, under American occupation, some democratic advances have been made concerns land reform. The power of the landlord class is being undermined by a programme of agrarian reform. Before the occupation about 31 per cent. owned all the land they cultivated; about 42 per cent. owned some of it and about 27 per cent. owned none of the land they worked. Their rents often absorbed over half the value of their crops and their tenancy rights were often guaranteed only by oral agreements.

The Allied Council for Japan ordered the Japanese Government to submit, on or before March 15th, 1946, a programme of rural land reform which would contain plans for :—

- (a) Transfer of landownership from absentee landowners to land operators.

- (b) Provisions for purchase of farm lands from non-operating owners at equitable rates
- (c) Provision for tenant purchase of land at annual instalments, commensurate with tenant income.
- (d) Provisions for reasonable protection of former tenants against reversion to tenancy status

The Japanese Government's programme, formulated in response to this Allied Council order, was considered quite unsatisfactory, and important modifications were made as the result of counter-proposals made by Mr. McMahon Ball, representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India on the Allied Council. The Japanese Diet on October 11th, 1946, passed the Law for the establishment of Owner Farmers by which tenant-farmers will come into possession of at least 60 per cent of the land in Japan.

The character of the land reform will depend largely on how it is administered, but it can be said that under pressure of the Allied Council in Tokyo, steps have been taken which should make for a more equitable distribution of the land and Japan's agricultural resources.

Development of Trade Unions

Trade Unions have never been allowed to take any deep roots in the industrial society of Japan. They were suppressed in the early 'twenties, and were beginning to develop again on a considerable scale in the early 'thirties. But in the 'thirties, when the country was being mobilised on a totalitarian basis for the world war, the trade unions, like all other democratic organisations, were again suppressed.

To-day American trade unionists are trying to impose Trade Unions on the American model. The Charter of the C I O has been translated into Japanese and is put forward as the trade unionist's text book. This followed the abrogation in October 1945 of repressive laws which had hitherto prevented the formation of Labour organisations and collective bargaining. The Labour Front organisations which had eight million members were dissolved.

By December, 1945, the first trade union was formed and trade unions were given legal status. To-day, the major organisation—there are two—the Congress of Industrial Organisations—claims to have 1,600,000 members of whom the majority are railway workers. The others are mainly to be found among the seamen, miners, printers and electrical workers.

During the second half of 1946 the steady move to the right in American policy was reflected in the Yoshida Government. But the Trade Unions moved in the opposite direction and have now reached a point where their slogans are political and aimed mainly at getting rid of Yoshida. When strikes began last August General MacArthur informed the Japanese Government that "strikes, walkouts or other stoppages which are inimical to the objectives of the military occupation are prohibited", and his directive added: "In the event that the desired results cannot be obtained without the use of police, a prompt report

thereof will be rendered to the Supreme Commander". This was taken to mean that American occupation troops might be called in to break a strike, and suggests that American methods of strike-breaking as well as of trade union organisation will be employed in Japan.

But the real test of strength happened in the first months of 1947. The Yoshida Cabinet, more and more unpopular with the people, and reduced to being the mouth-piece of American policy, had tried to strengthen itself by a re-shuffle at the end of January. The labour movement had carried on an active campaign for wage increases, for a change in the government's economic policies and for the overthrow of Yoshida. A joint Committee of Japanese Unions called for a strike of 2½ million workers on 1st February. The Yoshida Cabinet offered several concessions whilst the American authorities in a series of private conferences tried to persuade the trade union leaders to call off the strike. When these efforts failed, and a crowd of demonstrators marched to Yoshida's residence to demand his resignation, General MacArthur personally intervened. On 31st January, he called the Union leaders to S.C.A.P. Headquarters and the text of an order by him was announced. In it General MacArthur stated that he would not "permit the use of so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Japan", and expressed his view that the proposed strike was the work of a minority which "might well plunge the great masses into a disaster not unlike that produced in the immediate past by the minority which led Japan into the destruction of war".

In these circumstances, the strike was called off, but General MacArthur's policy towards the Trade Unions had been very clearly demonstrated. As long as the military occupation of Japan continues, the Trade Union movement would seem unlikely to risk an "all-out" challenge to American power. But that it has become an important part of the proposed democratisation of Japan, there is no doubt.

To sum up this chapter, under American occupation, the basis has been built for a more democratic Japan than that which existed before the war. The Bill of Rights, the Constitution, the partial overthrow of the Zaibatsu, Land Reform and the restricted development of the Trade Union Movement are all steps that are necessary for the development of a democracy. How real they are, and only the Japanese people can give them reality, will not be known until the period of American occupation comes to an end.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF JAPAN

Allied, primarily American, occupation has drawn up an outline of democratic procedure on an American model. A Bill of Rights, drafted by General MacArthur's Staff; a Constitution, drawn up in General MacArthur's Headquarters; and a Trade Union Organisation, which is

based on the Textbooks of the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L.,—these do not themselves create a democratic state, either on Asiatic, European or even American standards. Until the occupation forces are withdrawn, it will be impossible to judge how far the Japanese people themselves will build on the present framework or change its outline.

In the meantime, the future of Japan is now being determined to a considerable degree by the application of the economic clauses of the Potsdam Agreement and the United States Post-Surrender Policy for Japan and by the relations between the Big Powers which regard her once more as a leading nation in the Far East.

Let us first of all consider the economic future of Japan. It was laid down at Potsdam that :

"Japan shall be permitted such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which permit her to re-arm for war. She shall be allowed access to raw materials and eventual participation in world trade."

"As soon as the above objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government, the occupying forces shall be withdrawn."

The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan was an elaboration of Potsdam. Part IV dealt with economic problems, and, after outlining Economic Demilitarisation, it stated :—

"Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

"The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs that serve the following purposes :

- "(a) To avoid ac
- (b) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.
- (c) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments.
- (d) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

"In this connection, the Japanese authorities be permitted to establish and administer c including essential national public services, finance, banking and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation."

The problems of Reparations and of International Trade and Financial Relations were thus described in the same Document :—

"Reparations for Japanese aggressions shall be made :—(a) Through the transfer —as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside the territories to be retained by Japan. (b) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign

exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization."

"Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports."

"Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs."

When this policy was formulated, in the summer of 1945, Japan had not yet surrendered, the economic disintegration and political disunity of China was not yet fully appreciated, and the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the British Commonwealth of Nations were working together with the common objective of defeating Japan. The attitude of America towards Japan—and it was America which had the major responsibility of the Pacific campaign—was summed up in such expressions common in Tokyo as "We'll make Japan one big farm", or "We'll remove every piece of machinery in the country". To-day the mood has changed, and to quote a correspondent in Tokyo¹: "The foundation is now being laid for Japan's emergence as the major manufacturing and exporting nation of Asia". Whilst the Allied representatives on the Allied Council find no common basis of political agreement, and the Allied Representatives on the Far Eastern Commission have not yet succeeded in drawing up a Report on Reparations, Officials of S.C.A.P. find it necessary to deal with the situation by giving their own interpretation to the Potsdam Agreement. They increasingly declare that industries, at first set aside for reparations, are essential to maintain the minimum standard of living guaranteed by the terms of the surrender.

Until there is Allied agreement on such problems as those of reparations, their amount, type and destination, the economic future of Japan is mainly incalculable. Although the Far Eastern Commission in Washington drew up a programme of the Industrial equipment to be removed from Japan on the basis of a Report by Mr. Edward Pauley, not one single plant has yet been taken away. Those who drew up the programme, and certainly Mr. Pauley himself, assumed that some compromise would be found on the highly complex and technical question of Japan's de-industrialisation, whilst due consideration would be given to the victims of her aggression.

The main difficulty lies in inter-allied relations. The American member of the Far Eastern Commission has pressed for a Japanese Reparations Conference. All countries have agreed, with the exception of the U.S.S.R., which will only take part in such a conference if it is assured that the question of what machinery and equipment the Russians moved from Manchuria will not be discussed. The Russians maintain that this was "war booty"; the Allies will not accept this contention.

¹ *Manchester Guardian* article "Japanese textiles encouraged" (Nov. 8, 1946)

In the absence of agreement Americans have taken the initiative and invited the ten nations on the Far Eastern Commission to break the deadlock by helping the State Department to prepare a directive to General MacArthur on how to divide Japanese reparations.

The deadlock continued until the beginning of April when the United States ordered the first reparations to be taken from Japanese industrial plants and sent to those countries which had suffered from the war. By this decision which overrode objections by other members of the Reparations Commission, iron, steel, machine tools, aviation equipment, chemicals and other industrial material were ordered to be distributed in the following proportion:—to China, 14 per cent; to the Philippines, 5 per cent, to the Netherlands for Indonesia, 5 per cent, and to Britain for Burma, Malaya and colonial possessions in the Far East, 9 per cent.

But before these suggestions could be carried out, the Far Eastern Commission published on May 20th the general principles to be followed in taking and distributing reparations from Japan. These laid down that reparations shall be exacted "through the transfer of such existing Japanese capital equipment and facilities of such Japanese goods as exist or may in future be produced", that they shall be "in such a form as would not endanger the fulfilment of the programme of the demilitarisation of Japan and which would not prejudice defraying of the cost of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living". The shares of the particular countries, it was suggested, should be determined "on a broad political basis, taking into due account the scope of the material and human destruction suffered by each claimant country as a result of the preparations and the execution of Japanese aggression, and each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat of Japan". These are the general directives which General MacArthur will lay down to the new Japanese Government. If they are carried out, they may make an important contribution to the development of a far better balanced Asiatic economy than that which existed before the war. One reason for this is that most countries in Asia, China included, were economic appendages of the industrialised West.

But the problem of reparations is only one part of the wider problem of Asiatic economy in general and that of Japan in particular. One thing is certain: America has swiftly developed her expansionist tendencies, notably her monopolistic desires in the Far East. American business interests have carefully blueprinted Japan's economy. The War Department handles imports, whilst exports are shipped to the United States by the U.S. Commercial Corporation, acting on recommendations from General MacArthur approved by the U.S. Government. General trade policy is the responsibility of the Far Eastern Commission, but so far the development of Japanese industry in the post-war world has been with the United States. And it was not until April, 1947 that the avenues of foreign trade were opened by the decision of the economic and scientific section of Allied Headquarters to invite 400 allied business men to Japan to further private or semi-private trade with the country before a peace treaty is signed. The Board of Trade is already working on a list of 40 representatives of British business interests to proceed in due course to Japan.

In pre-war Japan textiles were a major industry, in post-war Japan it is the industry most likely to develop since it is not forbidden because of any military potential. In the case of the cotton industry, raw cotton is supplied by the United States for manufacture in Japan (Before the war, 50 per cent of the raw cotton came from India.) By the end of September, 1946,¹ America had shipped 650,000 bales of raw cotton to Japan compared with about 1,000,000 bales imported from all sources in 1938. In September, 1946, the production of cotton piece goods amounted to 35,000,000 square yards compared with an average monthly production in 1938 of about 250,000,000 square yards. Theoretically, any member of the United Nations can apply for permission to trade with Japan, but at the end of last year the United States had supplied practically all Japan's imports, and purchased 67 per cent of her exports. As to the remaining markets for her exports, these too are under American supervision. Last autumn, two foreign purchasing missions visited Japan, one representing Singapore, the Malayan Union and Hongkong, the other Australia. Mr R. Fleming, chief of the Allied Headquarters Foreign Trade Mission in Tokyo, said that the United States Commercial Company would handle sales. Washington would give final approval on trade proposals. In December, the sale was reported of 150,000,000 yards of Japanese-manufactured textiles and several million pounds of yarn—the latter having been woven from raw cotton imported from the United States—to countries in South-East Asia. The deal, valued at £10,000,000, was negotiated between the United States Commercial Company and the Governments of the Philippines, Hongkong, Malaya, French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Two other deals of importance were arranged this spring, the first one was the sale of 64,000,000 linear yards of cotton fabrics to the United Kingdom and a further 76,000,000 linear yards to Turkey, Burma and other British areas.

American plans for Japan's silk industry are on an equally ambitious scale. They are encouraged of course by the economic breakdown in China which in the middle of the World War was regarded as likely to take Japan's place in the silk industry of the post-war world. Developments in wool trade have also taken place. Australia has now arranged to sell to Supreme H.Q., acting on behalf of Japan, 120,000 bales of Burry top-making wool, valued at £3,000,000. Japanese factories will manufacture wool goods and sell them throughout Asia.

To sum up, under American supervision, Japan is rapidly recovering her industrial and economic strength. As a Chinese economist recently remarked, Japan is still a "strong power pushing ahead towards reconversion, while China, chiefly because of the civil war, is engaged in a desperate struggle to avert economic collapse. Japan's aggressive industrial structure is still intact."

This rapid recovery of Japan combined with the slow deterioration of China's economy is the central feature of the post-war Pacific pattern. America's decision to withdraw from China must be seen against this

¹ See Note "The future of the Japanese Textile industry" in *The World Today* (Chatham House Review) December 1946.

background China, in American eyes, may have a long period ahead of civil war and disintegration. All that can be squeezed out of the country has already been squeezed in the Sino-American Treaty of December, 1946. But the conditions of a civil war do not encourage American exports nor do they invite the attention of American financiers. Japan may well offer an attractive alternative to American interests, and, like Germany in the West, quickly change in public opinion from a race of criminals and sub-humans to a nation of skilful workers and busy shoppers.

How this new situation in the Far East will develop, it is much too early to forecast. But it should be pointed out that Japan, like Germany, is a point of conflict between the Allied Powers, and skilful Japanese reactionaries, cheated of victory, spread the idea that they have everything in common with their American rulers, especially in the maintenance of the present regime and in the need for its mobilisation against the Soviet Union. Like their German counterparts they play on the anti-Communist feelings of the occupying powers and show their willingness, often their anxiety, to be treated as an ally in the war they regard as inevitable. If, these people argue, America is to counterbalance Soviet power in the Pacific, Japan is the most likely "bridgehead" and the more so since China is weakened by civil war.

Judging from recent statements, General MacArthur's view of the future of Japan does not run counter to this line of thought. The interview he gave to the entire group of foreign correspondents on 17th March, 1947, can be regarded as an introduction to the Far East Peace Conference which he is now anxious to hold as soon as possible. He divided the occupation into three sections: Military, political and economic. He described his military occupation as having been brilliantly successful, Japan had been demilitarized and her people to-day "understood perhaps better than any other country in the world, that war did not pay." He seemed equally satisfied with his political results. The people had abandoned mythological feudal conceptions, the foundations of democracy had been well and truly laid and would be followed "by the spread of Christianity, to which democracy is a second." But when he came to the economic situation in Japan, General MacArthur painted a very gloomy picture. "War is being still waged as bitterly against Japan as when the guns were being fired; the punishment now is even more bitter, the strangulation stronger. Not even the atom bomb is as deadly as economic strangulation, the atom bomb kills by thousands, economic strangulation by millions." And then he made the surprising remark that Japan had been cut off from Korea, Formosa and Manchuria, as if Japan had been the victim of Chinese aggression. He concluded with an impassioned demand for the transference of trade responsibility from Supreme Allied Command to private traders and for the early resumption of Japan's trade with the world.

General MacArthur's special pleading for a "soft peace" for Japan reflects the new emphasis in American Pacific policy. During the war, and for a time in the post-war period, it was assumed that China would be the leading power, and certainly the most profitable market in the Far East. This has not happened and the present political disunity and

economic disintegration would seem to make it unlikely in the foreseeable future. In spite of America's financial and military assistance, China cannot be regarded as an asset in the calculations of Wall Street and the State Department. Japan, when free from a military occupation which is both costly and invidious, seems a more profitable ally. We may be sure that American business is taking advantage of that occupation to prepare the way for an alliance with Japanese business men when American troops are withdrawn. Thus Japan, which less than two years ago was "a nation of yellow bastards" in American eyes, becomes a nation of poor Christian democrats, a nation which must be assisted economically and treated as a strategic outpost. This fits only too easily into President Truman's picture of an American world.

It is essential that British public opinion should not again make the mistake it made in 1931 when it underestimated the significance of events in the Far East. Preparations for war in the Pacific are on a far greater scale than those of which Japanese strategists dreamed when they planned the attack on Pearl Harbour. To-day, the United States, the only country in the world strong enough to fight a war, claims the former Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific as strategic bases whilst allowing the inhabitants the advantages of United Nations trusteeship, claims the right to maintain a naval base in the Philippines whilst proclaiming the independence of the country, and has kept in power in China a Government which has little more than colonial status. Into this atomic puzzle Japan easily fits into place as the military satellite of the United States—the role that China seemed destined to play.

Thus the future of Japan is one of the most important problems in the post-war world. The problem of Germany has been allowed to overshadow its significance as European affairs have always taken precedence over those of Asia in the minds of the British public. But the area of greatest tension to-day is in the Pacific, it is there that the richest prizes for economic development will be sought after and it is there that the Soviet-American clash may develop if the present trends are not reversed.

Britain will shortly have a chance to play a more active role in the Far East. The British Government will soon be called on to send its representatives to the Far East Conference. The struggle will almost certainly develop as we have seen on the issue of reparations where disagreement between the U.S.S.R., China and the U.S.A. is acute. The future of Japanese trade and the wages of the Japanese must arise. Only too easily Japan may once again become, under American guidance and with the aid of American capital, the centre of an industry which, on the basis of sweated labour, depresses the standard of living throughout the Far East and the world as a whole. We shall help to avoid this situation and to reduce the danger of Japanese aggression if we press for:—

- (1) The encouragement of the conditions of a democratic regime.
- (2) A progressive Labour, Trade Union and Co-operative Movement based on Japanese traditions but able to take advantage of the experience of the West.

- (3) The elimination of the control of the Zaibatsu
- (4) The re-integration of Japanese trade in world economy
- (5) Co-operation with the progressive forces in China since the revival of a united and prosperous China is essential for the prosperity of the Pacific as a whole

These are the directions in which we should seek to influence policy in Japan. Whether or not Japan again becomes a menace depends on whether the clash between Soviet and American policy continues. In that case, Japan becomes not a "bridge" but a "springboard." "The British Government", stated the *Manchester Guardian* editorially,¹ "may not have as much influence as its powerful allies, but by exerting that influence wisely now both in Japan and throughout the Far East, it may be able to prevent that fatal hardening of policies which is doing so much to destroy Europe."

¹ May, 28th, 1947

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FINLAND UNMASKED

By
OTTO KUUSINEN



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FINLAND UNMASKED

By O. KUUSINEN

(Foreword by **IVOR MONTAGU**)

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FINLAND UNMASKED

by OTTO
KUUSINEN

Reprinted from
“War and The Working Class,”
MOSCOW

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INTRODUCTION

IT is terribly important for democrats in Britain, just because so many of them were stampeded into making a mistake about Finland in 1939-40, not to go ahead and make another one now.

It is terribly important for them to understand the *truth* about Finland, that underlies the deceptive façade.

Here is a country whose territory is being used to bomb and torpedo the convoys from Britain and the U.S.A., taking essential goods through to Russia to help save all those values that mean anything to all the civilised people in the world.

Everyone realises that if the people who rule Finland had their way, and achieved the object into winning which they threw all their country's resources, Hitler would be victorious and might would descend, horror and corruption and slavery engulf all our families.

And yet just because—in 1939-40—propaganda succeeded in taking in a lot of people and making them believe that Finland was somehow a peace-loving little democracy and deserving of sympathy, these same people now try to find excuses for shutting their eyes to what they really cannot help seeing very plainly.

And like suckers they try to invent all kinds of complicated fictions to account for the (supposedly) accidental presence of Finland on the side of wrong against right.

That is why this book by Otto Kuusinen is so terribly important. Otto Kuusinen knows what he is talking about. He is himself a Finn. And he is a very responsible person. He is Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (that is, equivalent to President) of the Karelo-Finnish Socialist Soviet Republic, one of the sixteen constituent Republics of the U.S.S.R. He is also a Deputy-Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., that is, one of the Vice-Presidents of the entire Soviet Union. The four chapters of this little book of his were serialised in August, September and October, by the Moscow Trade Union journal *War and the Working Class*.

Did you know that though there is a Parliament in Finland every opposition deputy has either been killed or put in prison?

Did you know that, when the ban was lifted for a few weeks in 1940, a Finnish Society of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union obtained in three months more than twice as many members as the largest Finnish political party?

Did you know that the ties of Finland's rulers with Hitler did not begin with June 22, 1941, but are of very long standing?

Did you know that the leaders of Finland's "Social Democratic" Party and "trade unions" maintain their position as a result of the government in which they participate jailing and torturing all the opposition in their party and unions?

Did you know that Finland received its freedom from Socialist Soviet Russia without firing a shot, but that Finnish soil has since been used—with the help of Finland's rulers—for five invasions of Russia in twenty-five years ?

Did you know that Finnish "democracy" itself is founded on Finland's rulers having called in German troops to help them exterminate 30,000 men and women of the Finnish working class.

When you know and bear in mind these facts, that will help you to understand that the association of present-day Finland with Hitler-Germany is not at all accidental, that its democratic-sounding names and propaganda are not all they wish to seem.

Finland represents a serious problem. Finland is a nation, and as such must be free. The Finns are a people, and as such must be happy and prosperous—just like Germany and the Germans.

But a generation of falsehood has built up in Finland very many Finns who are no less dangerous to mankind and civilisation—not only to the Soviet Union—than the fanatics of the Hitler Youth. Somehow they must be tackled ; somehow Finnish democracy must be made not fake but real ; somehow Finland must become a good neighbour, and the Finns who shared in Hitler's aggression must be put out of harm's way as thoroughly as his other puppet satellites. That is the problem.

Blinking our eyes to the facts of it won't help. Studying Kuusinen's book will.

IVOR MONTAGU.

1.—THE SOURCES OF FINLAND'S ANTI-SOVIET POLICY

THERE is no other country which has for a quarter of a century so consistently and stubbornly pursued an anti-Soviet policy as Finland.

There has been many a change in the general orientation of Finland's foreign policy, but throughout all these changes Finland's ruling clique has ever been drawn—like a compass needle turning to the north—into the embrace of those States and governments which at each given period occupied a position of hostility to the U.S.S.R.

What explains this persistency of Finland's ruling circles in their hostility to the Soviet Union? It is not enough to call this a manifestation of chauvinism. Undeniably the ruling, wealthy circles of Finland are tainted with chauvinism, but their chauvinism is a phenomenon requiring special explanation.

The Finnish chauvinists have always proclaimed themselves representatives of old Finnish Nationalism, preaching an "hereditary" national hatred for all Russians. "Russia is the age-old enemy of Finland," they say. But this is false, demagogic phrasing.

As a matter of historical fact they do not hate all Russians. Finland's ruling circles get along very well with Russian White Guards and White émigrés. They established "collaboration" with these latter immediately following the October Revolution in 1917 and have harmoniously co-operated with them ever since.

The nationalist demagoguery directed against "all Russians" was needed by Finland's rulers to inject with their anti-Soviet chauvinism wider circles of the population, fanning the mistrust of Russians inherited from the period of Russian oppression. And to a certain extent this scheme of the Finnish chauvinists has been successful. In the autumn of 1939, at the start of the three months' hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union, considerable sections of Finland's population fell a prey to chauvinistic poison: not only business owners and landowners, rich peasants and officials, but also a certain section of the working people.

The principal advocate and most active disseminator of this chauvinism has, however, always been the reactionary leadership of the Finnish bourgeoisie, the ruling wealthy circles, together with their agents, these latter including the apparatus and Press of both bourgeois and Social Democratic parties, the Protective Guard (Schutzkorps), the officer corps, etc.

Characteristic of Finnish chauvinism is the fact that its advocates belong precisely to those circles of the Finnish bourgeoisie which, in the period of Tsarist oppression, were distinguished not by nationalism but by betrayal of the national interests. Precisely those Finnish

politicians (the so-called *Suometarians*) who sold the interests of their people to Tsarism, who, more than any others, kowtowed before the Russian Governors-General, changed their uniform after the October Revolution, and began to appear in the role of the most ostentatious "patriots." The costume of extreme Finnish Nationalism was donned by Mannerheim and a number of other Tsarist officers who, though born in Finland, had even forgotten the Finnish language, having served their entire lives in Russia as most loyal servants of Tsarism. After the October Revolution cut short their careers in Russia, they moved to Finland to become Finnish chauvinists.

Clearly a chauvinism born as a result of transformations so rapid is chauvinism of a special kind. Let us examine the origins of this chauvinism.

Finland's wealthy ruling circle is a numerically small clique of bitter oppressors of the workers, a reactionary group that would never have been able to retain power without support from without and an emergency apparatus of violence within the country.

Under the Tsardom the leadership of the Finnish bourgeoisie ruled with the support of the bayonets of Russian Tsarism. Tsarism in its policy of repression of the Finnish people similarly relied on the most reactionary section of the Finnish bourgeoisie. The two maintained mutual collaboration with a view to keeping enslaved the Finnish popular masses. There was, it is true, friction between them, but this concerned only questions of secondary importance. In the matter of suppressing the class-struggle of the proletariat and popular manifestations in Finland, Tsarism and the Finnish wealthy ruling circles always acted as one. There were actually instances in which wealthy Finns demanded of Tsarism greater repressions against the Finnish popular masses. I remember, for example, the political General Strike of November, 1905. On that occasion the reactionary leadership of the bourgeoisie in Helsinki officially implored the Tsarist Governor-General to send Russian troops to deal with the unarmed Finnish Red Guard. The Tsar's satrap did not then dare to take the step requested, for at that moment the Tsar himself was in great fear of the powerful revolutionary moves of the Russian working class. But in most cases Tsarism generously gave the Finnish wealthy ruling caste all the support it needed in its struggle against the working people of Finland.

When, therefore, Tsarism fell under the impact of the February Revolution in 1917, Finland's reactionary bourgeoisie was gripped by "fear of isolation." It had no troops at its disposal. The Schutzkorps detachments were few and small at that time, and so hateful to the working people that the reactionary rulers of the country had to organise them in secret. Under the influence of events in Russia, Finland's working class was rapidly becoming imbued with the revolutionary spirit. The Finnish Parliament, the *Seim*, did not afford a sufficiently reliable political bulwark for

reaction. All the bourgeois parties taken together had only half the seats in Parliament, even slightly less at that moment; the Social Democratic group in the *Seim*, despite the fact that its majority consisted of Right-wing opportunists, was in such a state as the result of the activities of the Left-wing deputies and the pressure of revolutionary workers from below that the reactionary bourgeoisie could not rely upon it.

The reliable support it needed, the Finnish wealthy ruling caste decided, it could obtain from the Russian Provisional Government. As early as that period a part of the Finnish Nationalists had already established connections with Germany in search of a new support from without, but until this search produced results, the ruling wealthy clique clung desperately to Kerensky's Provisional Government.

In the light of these facts can be appreciated the significance of the conflict which broke out in the Finnish *Seim* during the spring and summer of 1917. With Lenin's approval we, Left workers' deputies, fought for the right of the Finnish people to self-determination. The reactionary bourgeois parties stubbornly insisted on the preservation of the traditional suzerainty of the Russian Monarchy over Finland. When we finally succeeded in winning a majority vote in Parliament in favour of a Bill abolishing this traditional suzerainty, the Finnish reactionaries appealed to the Kerensky Government and succeeded in getting the Finnish Parliament dissolved. They were afraid of independence for Finland, they were afraid that with the overlordship of Russia they might lose their own last support.

But Kerensky's Provisional Government fell on November 7, 1917. The people of Finland welcomed the success of the October Revolution as a happy and joyful event. But the reactionary bourgeoisie regarded it as a frightful calamity. It was quite obvious that the victory of the Socialist Revolution in Russia opened for the Finnish people the possibility of an independent free existence and a happy voluntary comradeship with the Russian people. It is of course well known that the Bolshevik Party has always asserted the right of nations to self-determination. Immediately after the October Revolution, as representative of the Soviet Government, Peoples' Commissar for National Affairs Stalin, attending the Congress of the Finnish Social Democratic Party in Finland, proclaimed the full freedom of organising their own life for the Finnish as well as all the other peoples of the former Russian State; voluntary and honest union of the Finnish people with the Russian people; no guardianship, no surveillance from above over the Finnish people. Such were guiding principles of the policy of the Council of Peoples' Commissars. Thus there could be no doubt whatever as to the readiness of the Soviet Government to grant Finland the full right of self-determination. But this, it was only too plain, was the reverse of soothing to the ruling clique of the Finnish bourgeoisie; the latter was afraid of independence for Finland without the outside support necessary to safeguard its reactionary rule.

Accordingly the leaders of the Finnish wealthy ruling caste hastened to appeal to the Government of Imperial Germany, seeking in German imperialism a new master for Finland and the outside support for themselves in the struggle against the working people. Svinhufvud, head of the reactionary Government, sent an ex-Senator to Germany with the following instructions: "Make arrangements for the Germans to come here or we shall not be able to cope with the situation."

The German Government readily assumed the role of imperialist guardian of Finland, but nevertheless advised the Finnish rulers to request the Soviet Government to grant Finnish independence. Accordingly, in reply to a request by the Finnish Government, on December 31, 1917, the Soviet Government adopted a decree, signed by Lenin and Stalin, granting full independence to Finland. And in "appreciation" of this magnanimity on the part of the Soviet Government, Finland's ruling clique at once began openly to manifest its hostility towards the Soviet people, joining in the counter-revolutionary intrigues of the Russian White Guards against the Soviet power.

It might have been supposed that common sense would have suggested to the gentlemen of independent Finland to refrain from intervention in the affairs of their great neighbour. But this did not happen. Afraid that the power of the Workers' and Peasants' Movement in Finland might rapidly grow under conditions of bourgeois democracy, the Finnish reactionaries regarded the victory of Workers' and Peasants' power in Russia as a "dangerous example" to the working people of Finland, and hence they regarded it as in their interests to struggle for the restoration of the power of the oppressors in the neighbouring country.

No longer hoping to retain power with the methods of bourgeois democracy, in January, 1918, the reactionary Svinhufvud Government hastily prepared a counter-revolutionary uprising in the country. In reply to this, the Finnish working class firmly resolved not to surrender without a battle, came out together with the poor peasantry in a revolutionary struggle for power. For three months a Workers' Government held all Southern Finland, and only with the troops of the German Kaiser did the counter-revolutionary government succeed at the cost of severe battles in defeating our Red Guard and satiating its lust for blood in an unprecedented mass terror.

As is well known, the Finnish White Guard ruling caste conducted this counter-revolutionary war against the workers and peasants of Finland under cover of the slogan "Finland's War of Liberation from Russian Oppression." But since Russian oppression had been abolished by the October Revolution in the previous year, and at the end of 1917 the Soviet Government had solemnly recognised Finland's independence, Finland obviously had no reason to fight in the following year for its "Liberation from the Russian Yoke." This completely fictitious slogan directed against the Russian people and the Russian

State was necessary to the reactionary rulers of Finland to deceive the Finnish peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie. But at the same time as it served as a demagogic slogan, it also expressed the bellicose hostility of the Finnish White Guards towards the Soviet Government.

For during February and March, Mannerheim openly called upon the Finnish White Guard Army, that he headed, to start a campaign against Petrograd and for the conquest of Soviet Karelia. Two Finnish White Guard expeditions, led by a Captain Utlorius, were actually dispatched to Soviet Karelia in March, 1918, but they were smashed before getting there by Finnish Red Guard detachments with the aid of the local population. For a campaign against Leningrad, Mannerheim was not strong enough; it is true that in autumn the same year Finnish Protective Guard gangs did invade the Leningrad Region via Esthonia, but they were routed there.

Thus already during the first year of the independent existence of the Finnish State, the country's administration emerged as a bitter enemy of the Soviet Union. Its aggressive anti-Soviet chauvinism was, from the very outset, the expression of a frantic desire, by whatever means, to bring about the elimination of Soviet power from the great neighbouring country.

This insane desire of Finland's ruling clique proceeded from its morbid and panic-inspired fear lest the example of the Soviet Union encouraged the struggle of the working people of Finland for their liberation from the yoke of the wealthy ruling class. The chauvinism of Finland's rulers has always been, and remains to this day, a manifestation of the anti-Soviet fury of a counter-revolutionary gang in mortal fear of its people and constantly concerned with the preservation of its power over the masses of the people oppressed and exploited by it. There lies the primary source of the anti-Soviet chauvinism of Finland's ruling clique. A terroristic regime in home policy and anti-Soviet aggression in foreign policy—these are not two policies, but merely two aspects of one and the same policy of the counter-revolutionary ruling circles.

A second source of the anti-Soviet policy of Finland's ruling caste lies in its greedy desire to lay its hands on the natural wealth of Soviet Karelia, and above all on the tremendous Soviet Karelian forest land. This tempting wealth, alas, lies on the other side of the border, whence not even a single log may be removed. What therefore was to be done? The ruling circles decided on the fitting out of an "unofficial" expedition. The Government pretended ignorance of it. Its organisation and finance was undertaken by the big Helsinki banks and the prominent representatives of the timber industry of Eastern Finland constituted into a so-called Karelian Committee—the unofficial leadership of the expedition. The majority of the *Schutzkorps* was drawn into the expedition, and the armaments included guns supplied from Army stores. The command was undertaken by officers of the Finnish Army with Major von Herzen at their head.

This expedition began in the spring of 1919 and was routed by the end of June in the same year. The following year (October 14, 1920) the Finnish Government signed a Peace Treaty between Finland and the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics, but simultaneously throughout Finland volunteers began to be recruited for a new campaign against Soviet Karelia. After thorough preparation in November, 1921, numerically strong and well-armed detachments of the new expedition began their march against Karelia, only to be smashed two or three months later by units of the Red Army. An heroic detachment of Finnish skiers under Toivo Antikainen, detailed by the Red Army Command to penetrate deep into the enemy rear, smashed up the G.H.Q. of the Finnish White Guard invaders in the village of Kinasjervi in the course of a sweeping surprise raid.

The people of Soviet Karelia did not allow the natural wealth of their country to slip from their hands. Even prior to the predatory campaigns of the Finnish White Guards the Karelo-Finnish people, who had received under the Soviet system full freedom of economic and cultural development, turned a deaf ear to the nationalist appeals of Finland's rulers, who assumed the role of "Liberators of their Tribal Brethren." But only in the course of the brigand campaigns did the Karelo-Finnish people learn the full extent of the rapacious character of their Finnish White Guard self-styled "Liberators."

The culture was forced temporarily to postpone the attempts to carry out its aggressive plans, but it did not abandon the plans themselves.

These are the sources of the anti-Soviet chauvinism of Finland's rulers. From its very inception it has been in essence a chauvinism of the Fascist variety.

2—HOW FINLAND WAS HITCHED TO THE WAR CHARIOT OF GERMAN IMPERIALISM

THE hitching of Finland to the war chariot of German imperialism was a lengthy affair, prepared over a number of years by linking Finland with Germany economically and politically.

Ever since the inception of the Finnish State, Finland's rulers boycotted the development of trade with the Soviet Union, although the interests of Finland's national economy clearly demanded extensive trade relations with the U.S.S.R., in the framework of normal good neighbourly relations. The Soviet Union could undoubtedly have purchased at least two-thirds of Finland's exports and sold to Finland on favourable terms no less than four-fifths of all the imported goods she required. It is quite obvious that trade relations with the Soviet Union on such a scale could have been of the utmost importance for the development of Finland's national economy. But Finland's wealthy ruling caste did not follow this course, for it would have involved some corresponding benefit to the Soviet Union. Persisting in its anti-

Soviet position, it prepared to boycott the development of trade in general with the U.S.S.R., and as a result, year in and year out, this trade remained at the insignificant level of no more than 2 to 3 per cent. of Finland's foreign trade total. The earlier economic developments of the Soviet Union was, of course, able to proceed without trade with the Finnish capitalists, but the boycott cost Finland dear.

The Finnish ruling magnates sought compensation for the loss of the Russian market primarily in Germany. With what result? Firstly, the Germans demanded as payment for military aid to the Finnish counter-revolutionaries Finland's economic and political subordination to Imperialist Germany. In 1918 they agreed to send German troops to serve as executioners in Finland only after an enslaving "Trade and Peace Treaty" had been signed on behalf of Finland in Berlin. Even a Conservative bourgeois historian such as Schuebergson could not do other than estimate this Treaty as an act of blackmail that "made Finland politically and economically dependent upon Germany." Only the defeat of German imperialism in the World War half a year later delivered Finland from this enslaving agreement.

Secondly, the search for a market for Finnish exports in Germany in the subsequent period proved futile. Instead of increasing, Finland's exports to Germany declined with the pre-war period. Instead, Finland was flooded with German commodities, chiefly of types unnecessary for the development of Finland's national economy. For example, in 1929 imports from Germany comprised 38 per cent. of Finland's import total, while her exports to Germany comprised not more than 14 per cent. of her export total. This added to the difficulties in the way of the development of industry in Finland. The machine-building industry especially suffered from German competition and the total lack of foreign markets for its product. With difficulty Finland found purchasers for timber, paper and cellulose in remote countries, including the U.S.A., but naturally the U.S.A. did not buy Finnish machinery.

Thus Finland in the main became a market for Germany. Matters reached such a ridiculous stage that Finland, in need of grain and not wishing to buy grain from the Soviet Union, purchased from Germany grain that had been exported from the Soviet Union, paying the German middlemen an extra 80 *pfennigs* per kilogram (510 marks a ton), and, of course, permitted the Finnish merchants to reap abundant profits on top of that at the expense of the Finnish consumers. This was a typical economic expression of the dull-witted anti-Soviet bitterness of the Finnish wealthy ruling caste.

The German Fascist movement was widely popularised in Finland, especially among the Schutzkorps members, the students, and the rural bourgeoisie, and soon a special Hitlerite agency, the so-called "Lappo Movement," was organised there. In June, 1930, the Lappo, the Schutzkorps, and the police began joint raids on the Left-wing Labour Movement under the slogan "The Destruction of Communism." The Fascist gangsters smashed newspaper print shops and the premises

of workers' organisations, kidnapped hundreds of the most active workers of the Socialist Movement and trade union officials, beat and brutally humiliated them, murdered many of them, and took many others of them to Finland's eastern frontier, expelling them into Soviet territory. The Left deputies in Parliament—the members of the Socialist Workers' and Poor Peasants' Parliamentary Group—were arrested and sentenced to many years' imprisonment. The Fascists succeeded in rounding up many members of the outlawed Communist Party as well; but the majority of their victims were leading members of the legal Labour Movement—Left Socialists, supporters of or workers for the United Front.

In connection with the bandit actions of the Fascists, the Government disbanded all the old trade union organisations of Finland. This, directly, was the principal aim of the ruling reactionary big business circles. Having achieved this in circumstances of nation-wide Fascist terror, they could immediately effect a drastic cut in wages in all branches of industry. In the majority of branches of industry wages dropped by 30 per cent., and in some by even 60. Hundreds of millions of marks were pocketed by the wealthy Finnish ruling caste, with the aid of Fascist terror, in this way in 1930.

Subsequently, in 1932, the Lappo Fascists tried to seize power. But the "rebellion" they staged was liquidated by the Government without a single shot being fired. This demonstrated the fact that the Finnish Fascists were strong only when acting on the instructions of the wealthy ruling clique, and that when acting without its sanction they were quite powerless.

After this, the Fascist Lappo group was renamed the I.K.L. Party ("The Patriotic People's Movement") and began to participate in Parliamentary elections, at first together with the Coalition Party and later independently. Both within and without the *Seim* the I.K.L. Party conducted undermining activities directed against all surviving Parliamentary rights and demanding the establishment of total Fascist dictatorship. The I.K.L. Party never concealed its political kinship with German Fascism. Of course, the "Fifth Column" of German Fascism in Finland is more widespread than the I.K.L. Party. But the I.K.L. serves as a direct party agency of the Hitlerites in Finland. It not only conducted consistent propaganda for the programmatic principles of German Fascism, it not only imitated the methods of violence practised by the Hitlerites, but also in the field of foreign policy it did its utmost to serve German imperialism in the latter's aim of drawing Finland into the military adventures prepared by Hitler to conquer world dominion for Germany.

It is hardly necessary to explain that the I.K.L. conducted an exceedingly bitter campaign against the Soviet Union. It openly advocated the seizure of U.S.S.R. territory ("up to the Urals," even "up to the Yenisei") for a "Greater Finland."

Throughout the period 1933-1939 Finland's ruling circles made use of the Fascist I.K.L. Party as a political and military battering

ram, but refrained from yielding it the reins of government as they did not fully understand its political position. In home policy the wealthy reactionary ruling circles pursued a course of further Fascistisation of the regime, but they no longer needed the drastic change called for by the Fascist adventurers of the I.K.L. In foreign policy, following Hitler's advent to power in Germany, they steered a course of close collaboration with the Hitlerite Government, but did not refuse a similar collaboration with the then governments of Britain and France, for they did not desire to rely on Germany alone as the agents of Hitler, as the I.K.L. Party demanded.

The main party of Finland's wealthy reactionary rulers was the Coalition Party, headed by the thorough-going reactionaries Svinhufvud, Walden, Linkomies, Paasikivi, and others, who as far back as 1918 had helped the German imperialists to shed the blood of Finland's working people. Despite the fact that the Coalition Party never received extensive support in any election, it invariably played the leading role in Parliament and the Government, using for the purpose the whole network of influential sympathisers that it possessed in other Government parties.

There came a time, however, when the Fascist brigandage, and the obvious desire of President Svinhufvud and his henchmen in the Government (especially the then Premier Kivimäki, now Finland's envoy in Berlin) to take Finland along the Fascist road, evoked indignation among wide masses of the working people. These masses were in any case dissatisfied with the miserable wages, the tremendous unemployment, and the ruinous policy of the wealthy ruling circles regarding the peasantry. Added to this there was the uneasiness of the people evoked by the bellicose aggressiveness of Fascist Germany in Central Europe and the close relations of Finland's rulers with the Hitlerite imperialists.

Recovering from the Fascist blow it had received in 1930, the underground Communist Party of Finland regained mass influence by its struggle against Fascism and the encroachments of the capitalists. Appealing to the working-class masses, under the slogan of "The United Proletarian Front," to join the Social Democratic trade unions (the only trade unions legally allowed to exist in the country), the Communist Party achieved the transformation of the majority of local trade union branches into organs of economic class struggle, which frequently organised strikes despite the bans of the Social Democratic apparatus. Within the ranks of the Social Democratic Party a Left Wing was formed (Mauri Rymy and others), which, favouring a United Front of the working class, fought against the reactionary clique of Tanner. Under the slogan, "The People's United Front against Fascism," the Communist Party organised a number of successful campaigns which met with a wide response from the masses, for example, the campaign in defence of political prisoners and against the death sentence.

The anti-Fascist sentiments among wide masses of the working people resulted in temporary vacillations even in the ranks of such

governmental parties as the Agrarian Union and the Progressive Party. At the Presidential elections of 1930 those who supported the re-election of Svinhufvud as President were left in a minority. This was the only case when even the agents of the Coalition Party in the ranks of the other governmental parties, fearing to lose their mass influence, refused to follow the dictates of the Coalition Party. Another nominee of the wealthy reactionary ruling caste, Kallio, of the Agrarian Union, was elected. As a result of the differences that had arisen on this question the Coalition Party was for the moment no longer able to continue speeding, as it had been doing, along the Fascist road. But the change of President effected by the elections made no difference at all to Finland's war-mongering foreign policy.

The Communists and other anti-Fascists repeatedly warned the people of the imperialist aspirations of Fascist Germany and of the danger of war as a result of the machinations behind the scenes on the part of militarists and the I.K.L. Party with the German Fascists, and urged a change in foreign policy in the direction of restoring sincere and friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But this had no effect upon the Government. It was once again confirmed that, regardless of the personal composition of the Government, the bellicose foreign policy of big-business Finland remained ever the same hostile anti-Soviet policy.

The Social Democratic henchmen of the wealthy ruling circles represented the matter hypocritically in their statements, as though the Finnish Government's policy differed radically from the open anti-Soviet policy proclaimed by the I.K.L. They insisted that no one in Finland save a few "irresponsible persons," various individual "crazy adventurers" entirely devoid of influence, supported a policy of hostility and war against the Soviet Union, and that among "responsible circles" in Finland no one approved such anti-Soviet hostility or ever thought of anything but peaceful and good neighbourly relations with the land of the Soviets. This was a deliberate lie. The respective policies of both "responsible" and "irresponsible" circles in Finland towards the Soviet Union were equally hostile and equally aggressive. The only difference consisted in the fact that the "responsible" ones did not shout their desire for an anti-Soviet war out loud but energetically pursued practical preparations for it instead.

Thus, to this end, the General Staff of the Finnish Army developed intensive activity in close contact with representatives of the German General Staff and other foreign "specialists." Especially noteworthy were the frequent visits to Helsinki in 1937 of all sorts of emissaries of Hitler Germany. Whenever any Finn publicly expressed apprehensions regarding the unrestricted meddling of German spies in the affairs of the Finnish Army, one Coalition Party newspaper forthrightly countered: "We have no military secrets from the Germans."

The military preparations of the Finnish General Staff were not confined to strengthening the armaments of the Finnish Army and

the development of the country's war industry. For example, *ten times more aerodromes were built in Finland than were required for the Finnish Air Force* (and these included forty large aerodromes constructed chiefly along the Soviet border). Contrary to the existing international convention for the demilitarisation of the Aaland Islands, construction was secretly begun there in preparation of a base for German submarines and aircraft. Strategic highways and railways leading to the Soviet frontier were built in Eastern Finland. And, above all, hundreds of fortifications of the strongest type were built on the Karelian Isthmus under the guidance of German and other foreign specialists, with design thereby to create a springboard for a sudden attack on Leningrad. In the summer of 1939 the Chief of the German Army General Staff, General Halder, visited Finland to inspect this 'Mannerheim Line.' By the autumn of 1939 Finland, and the Karelian Isthmus primarily, had been converted into a perfect military arena for an attack on the Soviet Union.

In their military plans, Finland's rulers had calculated particularly on an attack by Germany, and not by Germany alone, against the U.S.S.R. They had anticipated a joint anti-Soviet war carried out by Germany, Poland and a number of other States with the support or even participation of the British and French Governments.

Especially after the Munich deal between Hitler, Chamberlain, and Daladier (in the autumn of 1938) did Finland's rulers believe that exactly that kind of war was on the way, and they made energetic preparations to take part in it. But in the autumn of 1939 matters took a different course. Germany attacked Poland, and war began between Germany on one side and Britain and France on the other.

The situation in which a great European War had thus arisen was pregnant with dangers for the U.S.S.R. as well, and the Soviet Government could not but pay attention to strengthening the security of its European frontiers. Especially unfavourable, of course, in this respect were matters in regard to the security of Leningrad, within a score of miles of which hostile authorities obsessed by anti-Soviet chauvinism had built a base for an attack by the imperialists on the city of Lennin. In view of this, the Soviet Government proposed to Finland an adjustment of the frontier on the Karelian isthmus with a more than ample territorial compensation at a different place. The Finnish Government, however, disinclined to make any departure from its consistently hostile attitude, rejected this proposal, broke off negotiations, actually set the country on a war footing, and brazenly provoked war.

That Winter War is, of course, still fresh in everyone's mind. Despite the strength of the numerous Finnish ferro-concrete fortifications in the Karelian Isthmus, units of the Red Army crushed the so-called "Mannerheim Line" in a comparatively brief space of time and dealt a decisive defeat to the Finnish Army. This outcome of the war was not that which Finland's rulers had expected, and it obliged them hastily to ask the Soviet Government for peace. The results of the conflict were the reverse of that which Finland's rulers had so often

attempted to achieve by force of arms—instead of the incorporation of Soviet Karelia in White Guard Finland, it resulted in the liberation of Finnish Karelia from the rule of the wealthy Finnish dominating clique and its incorporation in Soviet Karelia, which was thereupon transformed into the Karelo-Finnish Socialist Soviet Republic.

In some instances a severe lesson of this kind might perhaps have brought an enemy to his senses. But the Finnish Government, it turned out, only became more fixed in its insanity. It assumed an outward guise of loyalty, it professed the intention ever to preserve friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In the Peace Treaty also it solemnly pledged itself to refrain from any attack upon the Soviet Union and to take no part in any coalition hostile to the U.S.S.R. But the ink with which the representatives of the Finnish Government signed this Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940, had hardly had time to dry when it began a behind-the-scenes search for some back door of entry into an imperialist coalition for an anti-Soviet war.

During the 1939-40 war the Finnish Government had succeeded in paralysing every form of opposition on the part of conscientious workers who regarded the anti-Soviet war as criminal and hoped for a victory of the Red Army. The Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party called on the people to rise against their criminal government, and an insurrectionary "People's Government of Finland" with a democratic programme of action was set up in Eastern Finland. It is today even more clear than it was then that tremendous calamities would have been spared the Finnish people had they at that time supported the programme of action of our "People's Government." But by ruthless terror and deafening chauvinist cries Finland's rulers, together with their Social Democratic assistants, succeeded in nipping the developing anti-war movement in the country in the bud and in isolating its supporters.

But immediately following the end of the war, as soon as the Government terror temporarily even slightly slackened, the lutherto muffled voice of large sections of the working masses was raised in condemnation of the Government of war and against anti-Soviet chauvinism. The Society for Peace and Friendship with the U.S.S.R. founded in the spring, 1940, developed within the space of two or three months into a huge mass organisation, which by autumn of that year already had 50 to 60,000 members compared with the mere 25,000 counted by the Social Democratic Party, the largest Party in the country. The newspaper issued by the Society, the *Kansan Sanomat* obtained 27,000 subscribers, compared with the circulation of the central organ of the Social Democratic Party, which within the same period dropped from 25,000 to 9,000. The Society and its paper conducted an active campaign for a sincere policy of peace and the establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. And around the same issue a new split took place within Finnish Social Democracy; not only the Left Wing, whose leaders had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party even before the war, but also the

former Centre deputies of the Party (Vijk Rajsanen and others) began a frank struggle against the Social Chauvinist leadership clique with Minister Tanner at its head.

In August and September, 1940, the Finnish Government, having mobilised its entire police force, launched an attack on the Society for Peace and Friendship with the U.S.S.R., smashed its organisations and restored throughout the country the savage war-time terror. The wealthy ruling caste felt that it had once again found support outside the country and so at once it showed its teeth again at the mass movement of opposition. This backing, moreover, was once again found in German imperialism. During the winter war of Finland against the U.S.S.R., Fascist-Germany's hands had been tied, and she did not risk interference. But as soon as Hitler had succeeded in smashing France in the summer of 1940, he joined at once in a plot with Finland's rulers. As subsequently revealed, this was a plot for military attack on the U.S.S.R.

As far back as autumn, 1940, the shipment of German troops to Finland began, and in the months that followed a number of German divisions complete with tanks, aircraft, artillery and other arms concentrated on Finnish territory. At the same time, in the winter of 1940-41, the recruitment began in Finland of "reliable" cut-throats for dispatch to Germany and formation there into so-called "Finnish battalions" for inclusion in the ranks of the German Army in the latter's offensive against the U.S.S.R. It is now known that the Finnish Government, deeming it necessary for diplomatic reasons at the time to organise the recruitment and dispatch of these persons in strict secrecy, set up a special body in Helsinki with a signboard on its office "Ratas Engineering Agency." Through this agency more than 10,000 *Schutzkorps* members or similar individuals were recruited in different parts of Finland and sent to Germany during spring 1941. (During the war the Red Army encountered and defeated part of the *Schutzkorps* battalions on the Central Front and part in the Caucasus.)

All these preparations for a joint war by Germany and Finland against the U.S.S.R. were taking place at a time when the German and Finnish Governments were publicly making assurance of their absolute fidelity to the agreements each had concluded with the Soviet Union. Both in the event revealed themselves as equally treacherous. But in hypocritical double-dealing the Finnish accomplices of Hitler before long broke even the records set up by the Führer himself. When these secret war preparations were followed by the joint attack on the U.S.S.R., Hitler on launching the offensive (June 22, 1941) especially emphasised that the operations were conducted jointly with the Finnish Army. The Finnish Government, which most plainly refrained from denying Hitler's statement, but pretended that it had not heard it, began to assert that Finland had not attacked the U.S.S.R. but, on the contrary, the U.S.S.R. had attacked Finland. Since this lie is being circulated by the Finnish Government to this day, it is in place to recall here the following generally known facts :

In the first place, long prior to Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the Finnish rulers carried out a general mobilisation of all reservists up to the age of 42, and a mobilisation of motor transport, horses, etc., dispatching numerous troops eastward to the Soviet border.

Secondly, several days prior to the war against the U.S.S.R., the Finnish Government carried out mass arrests throughout the country of all friends of the Soviet Union and active figures in the Labour Movement known to the police as opponents of an anti-Soviet war.

Thirdly, on June 17, 18 and 19, German ships arrived from Germany and hastily unloaded war supplies, including artillery, in Helsinki.

Fourthly, as early as June 20 and 21, German troops hitherto stationed in Finland at a certain distance from the Soviet border were brought up nearer to the frontier ready for the attack on the Soviet Union.

Fifthly, during the night of June 21 and 22, German military authorities and the Finnish police, together raided the Soviet Consulate in Petsamo, looted it and took its personnel to Kirkenes.

Sixthly, that same night an attempt was made by a large group of planes to raid Kronstadt from Finnish territory. On June 23 planes taking off from Finnish territory again attempted to bomb Kronstadt, one plane was shot down and four German officers on board taken prisoner. At once thereafter German and Finnish infantry units launched an offensive at a number of points on the Finnish frontier, embarking upon an invasion of the U.S.S.R.

All these indisputable facts completely expose the falsehoods of the Finnish Government when it endeavours to cover up the vile crime it perpetrated in attacking the U.S.S.R. together with the Fascists.

In his speech of November 19, 1941, Hitler, boastfully enumerating the measures he had taken in advance to transform the countries bordering the U.S.S.R. into armed jumping-off grounds for his attack on the Soviet Union, again repeated that Finland had declared its readiness to come out on the side of Germany prior to June 22. Listening to this declaration by Hitler, the Finnish Government once again became deaf, admitting by its eloquent silence the fact that during the second half of 1940 and the first half of 1941 it had completely lined up with German Fascism as a subordinate but energetic associate in its imperialist war gamble.

This implied a complete switch of Finland's foreign policy to the position of the home-grown Fascists the "Quislings" of the I.K.L. Party. During the earlier period (1933-39) as we have seen those who pressed for Finland to orientate itself only on Germany and subordinate itself entirely to Hitler's will had been only the direct agents of German Fascism then called "irresponsibles" and "crazy adventurers." But now it was the "responsible" Government of Finland which having vainly tried to embark on two boats simultaneously, the German and the Anglo-French, plunged headlong into Hitler's pirate ship; prostrated itself before him and sold the independence of its country.

This gambler's leap was made during Hitler's war for world domination. This means that Finland's rulers must have been perfectly aware that, hitching their country to Hitler's war chariot, they were thereby involving Finland in a clash not only with the Soviet Union but with all freedom-loving countries; including Britain and the U.S.A.

The adventurist nature of such a leap was obvious. Yet upon this adventure they embarked. Plunging into war by the side of Hitler the Finnish White Guard blackguards dreamed not only of territorial conquests, they dreamed also of the "destruction of Bolshevism," the destruction of the Soviet State, no more and no less. In telling this to the Swedes they explained it as motivated by desire for the "security of Finland," that is, the security of their reactionary power in Finland. The Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* wrote about it as follows: "The principle thesis of Finland" (i.e. of her ruling clique) "is well known; Finland, it is claimed, cannot solve the problem of her 'security' unless the Soviet Union suffers catastrophe."

This "main thesis" of Finland's rulers recalls at once to mind the imbecility of those German Fascists whom Stalin, in his report on the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., compared to the obstinate bureaucrat depicted by Shchedrin who decided to "Shut America up again." Only the obstinate Finnish rulers are still more afraid of the "dangerous example" constituted by the existence of a State whose people are free, and hence they went to war to "Shut the Soviet Union up again." They imagined and believed that tomorrow or the day after the Soviet Union might be "shut up" or, as the Finnish newspaper *Ugala* screamed at the start of the war: "the Soviet Union will be crushed and annihilated."

Thus the leadership of the Finnish State was plunged into Hitler's gamble by the same motive that characterized its anti-Soviet chauvinism from the very beginning; lust for conquest, hatred of the people, and the counter-revolutionary fury of its ruling clique.

3.—HITLERITE FINLAND

(1) German Masters—Finnish Flunkys

THE fact that there are considerable numbers of German troops stationed in Finland is in itself sufficient evidence that the Germans are today masters of the country. Is there then no difference between the Fascist position of Finland and that of the countries occupied by Hitler Germany? The answer to this question must be that there is a difference, though not a very vital one.

Like the German-occupied countries, Finland has been deprived of her independence. But she is not only in a position of subjection to Germany, she is also subservient to her. Finland is a vassal of Hitler Germany, aiding her—above all—by fighting and acting as her confederate in pursuit of interests which are those of Hitler Germany though of no advantage to the Finnish people.

For the part now being played by the rulers of Finland is a new role, a development of the old. Finland's rulers are now no more than the flunkies of the German masters of Finland. The Finnish people are being starved no less than the people of the occupied countries. Germany has plundered Finland no less thoroughly than she has the occupied countries—but all this has been accomplished through the agency of the Finnish authorities.

The working people of Finland are being brutally exploited and oppressed in the interests of the German imperialists. Thousands of Finns are being arrested, tortured and killed at the German bidding. But all this is being carried out directly by the Finnish authorities.

And these instruments of the German oppression of Finland are not newcomers, upstarts only now invested with powers for the purpose like the German-appointed gendarmes in Norway, Holland, and Belgium. No, in Finland the function of Quisling has been undertaken by the old rulers, the clique that has ruled the country continuously for a quarter of a century or more.

Having sold Finland to Hitler Germany and assumed the function of flunkies to Hitler, the Finnish rulers at once singled themselves out from all his agents in the various countries by an unparalleled, unsurpassable hypocrisy. They do not tell their people, as Quisling does in Norway, for example, that they must submit to the will of the Germans, although to no less a degree than Quisling they force the people to obey their German masters. They keep reiterating, as ever, that Finland is an entirely "independent nation," and they represent themselves as some sort of "patriots," claiming to be "championing" Finland's independence. In general they pretend to notice no encroachments whatsoever on Finland's independence by Germany.

When the Germans plunder Finland, extorting material without the least ceremony, the Finnish rulers call this "economic collaboration" between Finland and Germany, and the Finnish President expresses to Germany his "appreciation of Germany's aid."

When the Germans require Finland to join the so-called "anti-Comintern bloc," or demand Gestapo control over the functioning of the Finnish Secret Service, or when Berlin simply decides on the suitability of one or other Finnish gentleman for the post of Finnish Prime Minister, then from Helsinki comes ever one and the same servile reply: "Yes, sir." This is called "political collaboration."

And when Hitler insists on more and more consignments of cannon fodder, then the flunkies of the Government of Finland beat their breasts and proclaim that in this matter they are first among all Germany's vassals, in other words, that in proportion to the population they have now sent more man-power to the war than any other vassal country. This is called "military collaboration" with Germany.

In actual fact, the German masters have among all their flunkies none more obsequious than the rulers of Finland.

Finland is not the only country which has a military alliance with Hitler Germany. What is characteristic is that the Finnish Government is the only ally of Hitler which attempts to deny and "explain"

its military and political alliance with Hitler. It is true that not everywhere or always do the Finnish rulers deny that they are fighting together with Hitler Germany or for an identical war aim. When Hitler visited Finland in the summer of 1942, for example, and on a number of other occasions, the Finnish rulers made open parade of assurances of loyalty to Hitler Germany in prosecution of the common war. Cabinet Minister Tanner, in the course of his war-time visits to Berlin and Vienna, solemnly proclaimed that: "Finland would wage together with Germany and other friendly Powers" (*i.e.*, Italy, Hungary, and Rumania) "the war for European culture" (*i.e.*, Hitler's New Order in Europe) "until victory is won." But no sooner had Tanner returned to Finland than, in obedience to a diplomatic prompting, he switched the tune to "Finland is not fighting on either side in this war of the Great Powers."

Thus for the Finnish rulers the "truth" appears to vary according to the locality where their speeches happen to be made. It also appears to depend upon the situation at the fronts. When the German forces are advancing, every Finnish Government spokesman clamours about "the war to a victorious finish by Germany's side." When, on the contrary, the German forces are retreating and suffering defeats, then some Cabinet Minister, or even the Finnish President himself, comes out with an explanation that, "while in a certain sense Finland is, it is true, a belligerent nation, yet, more strictly speaking, Finland is actually all but neutral. . . ."

This hypocrisy is one of the basic laws governing the conduct of the present rulers of Finland. They have not the slightest intention of breaking their guilty connections with Hitler Germany—but they are anxious to disguise them. Why? Is it because they are ashamed? Are they worried by traces of a twinge of conscience? No, they are not actuated by ethical considerations; their consciences do not function. The explanation is quite different. They are afraid that things may not turn out as they expected. They are afraid that their alliance with Hitler may result in their complete isolation, in both home and foreign policy.

Inside Finland no one disputes the existence of the German alliance. No one in Finland takes seriously the official diplomatic versions that there is no such thing as a military alliance with Fascist Germany. The people have eyes and they see. They realise that, in the view of all civilised countries, the alliance with Hitler disgraces Finland, and that it endangers and prejudices Finland's future.

There is no doubt at all that the Finnish people would like to shake off the hold of Fascist Germany. The Finnish rulers, knowing this, try to persuade them that "military considerations" require that Finland engage at least in a temporary collaboration with Hitler Germany. "For us," they claim with characteristic distortion, "the present war is a sequel to the Winter War of 1940. At that time Finland could not cope with the task confronting her because she was obliged to fight with only her own forces. Today things are

different. Today we are being helped by Germany with all her military strength. How could we dare refuse such vital and necessary aid. It is not we who are helping Germany, but Germany that is helping Finland." This is the kind of demagoguery with which they try to dupe the Finnish people, representing the situation not as though Finland were in the clutches of the German imperialists and furnishing cannon fodder to Hitler but as though, on the contrary, Hitler's bandits had come north like so many knights-errant hastening to shed their blood to rescue Finland, the damsel in distress, from fearful peril.

Internationally also Finland's rulers fear that they may find themselves completely isolated. The peoples of all the German-occupied countries turn away in disgust from Hitler's Finnish accomplices. Britain has declared war on Finland. In Sweden public opinion is beginning to turn against the war of conquest being waged both by Germany and her Finnish confederate. In the U.S.A., the Government has closed all the Finnish consulates and cut short the subversive activities of the Finnish "Information Bureau" in New York.

It is because of these unmistakable signs of increasing isolation that the Finnish Government cannot afford openly and without equivocation to admit that Finland has been harnessed by it to the war chariot of German imperialism and is fighting for Hitler's dictatorship in Europe. The line of reasoning followed by the Finnish Cabinet is that, since no one can tell how the war will end, it would be taking an unnecessary risk to provoke public opinion in the democratic countries by frank avowal of the alliance with Hitler, particularly with that public opinion hostile to them as it now is.

The wealthy Finnish ruling circles still have friends and patrons among the most reactionary circles of the bourgeois democratic countries. The Finnish Government also has paid agents in these countries with the job of influencing local public opinion. And the apologists of both these sorts are severely handicapped in their efforts by the fact that Finland's complicity in Hitler's predatory war is plain to all, and almost as generally abhorred. It is to help these agents that the Finnish Government declares that it is "not fighting on either side in this war of the Great Powers." But murder will out, and so will the roar of cannon. And since the newspapers of the democratic countries have nothing but derision for the broad claim that Finland is "not participating in Hitler's war," the rulers of Finland have had to cast about for some way of making their alibi more plausible.

Hence, a new explanation of their position is now being circulated by their agents in the bourgeois democratic countries. "We are not fighting for Hitler's New Order in Europe," this version runs. "Finland is not a German vassal as Rumania and Hungary are, as Italy was. This war we are fighting is a private war of our own

against the U.S.S.R. Germany's entirely separate war against the U.S.S.R. began at the same time, and this pure coincidence is what has led, don't you see, to our temporary and coincidental collaboration with Hitler Germany."

This subterfuge, of course, is not believed abroad any more than its cruder predecessors. But the Finnish Government hopes that some more gullible foreigners, even though not crediting such explanations, may accept them at some future date as a sign of Finland's "good will" and readiness to repudiate its conspiracy with the Germans.

In Finland itself, of course, every child understands that all this talk about a "private war of our own" is only intended to throw dust in the eyes of the simpletons abroad. And some of Hitler's Finnish stooges, abandoning all diplomatic scruples, quite cheerfully declare outright, as, for example, the *Ajan Suunta* recently, that "Any separate Finnish war is out of the question." While Hitler himself, who obtains no advantage from the diplomatic sophistry so clung to by the Finnish rulers, has time and again spiked their guns by declaring that, long before Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R., the Finnish Government had pledged itself to take the field on his side. Yet even in the face of these repeated statements, the Finnish Government's agents and apologists in the democratic countries keep right on insisting that Finland is fighting on no side but her own and that, if she be at the moment fighting by the side of Germany, this is purely coincidental and quite temporary.

The U.S. State Department called the bluff of the Helsinki gentry by proposing in October, 1941, that the Finnish Government cease pursuing hostilities against the U.S.S.R., and thus prove its desire to discontinue a foreign policy which, as the U.S. Government made clear in its memorandum, must inevitably entail complete subjection of Finland to Hitler Germany. The Finnish Government at first endeavoured to evade making an answer, but later was obliged to admit—indirectly—that its connection with Hitler and his war was, after all, by no means accidental or temporary.

As time has gone on the Finnish Government has exposed itself more and more palpably in the eyes of the American public. This is evident from numerous instances, including not only editorial comment in the American Press but also statements made by influential U.S. public figures.

For example, when it became known in the U.S.A. that the Finnish Government was employing the slave labour of Poles recruited by the Hitlerites, the American paper *P.M.* wrote that this voluntary participation of Finland in Hitler's enslavement of the European peoples exposed Helsinki's denial of a union between Finland and the Fascist axis as nothing but a swindle. Finland was shown up in the guise of a hypocrite, not only a participant in Hitler's blood-thirsty war but a receiver of stolen goods. While yet at the same time, as the paper noted, unscrupulously assuring the world that it

slipped into its present company only accidentally and against its will, *P.M.* called openly on the Finnish people to overthrow their pro-Fascist Government and replace it by a government prepared to secure them peace.

Thus, we see, the swindlers in power in Finland are finding it difficult any longer to deceive the American public. In Sweden they are now finding their job nearly as hard. Lately many Swedes who supported Finland's anti-Soviet war policy up to only a couple of years ago have changed their view. Even such a public figure as Professor Andreas Lindblom, who during the war of 1939-40 headed the notorious Finnish Relief Committee, has recently frankly condemned the war of conquest being waged by Finland against the U.S.S.R., and, yet more, has acknowledged that the Finnish Government was also in the wrong during the earlier conflict, the Winter War against the U.S.S.R.

All this goes to show how hard it is becoming for the swindlers of Finland to lead public opinion up the garden these days.

(ii) Democracy—Hitler Style

IN Finland, the German Fascists did not need to stamp out democracy themselves, as they had to in so many occupied countries. The Finnish Government saw to it for them. The main part of the job of depriving the Finnish people of all democratic rights had been effected long before the war, particularly during the years of the White Terror in 1918-1930 and during the winter of 1939-1940.

Actually, throughout the last quarter of a century, Finland has had no system of democracy comparable even to the conservative order existing in, for example, Sweden, Britain or America. Apologists for the Finnish Government may object that Finland has a Parliament. It is true that Finland has an institution that goes by the name of Parliament (the *Seim*). But, in the first place, this Parliament is maintained by the domination of the *Schutzkorps*.

Secondly anyone who campaigns for a candidate other than those of the six Government parties—which include the Hitlerite I.K.L. Party—anyone who collects signatures for the nomination of any other candidate, or who even gives his own signature for the purpose, is liable to arrest.

Thirdly, it is only on paper that a member of the Finnish Parliament enjoys the right to his own opinion and immunity from arrest. In actual fact, every opposition member elected to the Finnish Parliament during the past quarter of a century—excepting, of course, only the Fascists—has subsequently been arrested and imprisoned. Two members of the Constitutional Committee of Parliament were kidnapped by the Fascist thugs at a meeting of the Committee. When the crime was dealt with, it was the kidnapped members, not the kidnappers, who were confined in prison.

And lastly, this so-called Parliament is not permitted to discuss the major issues facing the country, such as, in particular, the war and peace. It was only from Hitler's speech of June 22, 1941 that the members of the Finnish Parliament learned that they were to take part in the present war. And, in the autumn of 1941, the "anti-Comintern bloc" in the autumn of 1941, the Parliament of it only after the pact had been signed in Berlin.

Legislation involving new taxation is still submitted to the Government for endorsement, but even in this matter the functions of Parliament have been so completely reduced to a formality that many members—as indicated by complaints on the subject in the Finnish Press—refuse to attend the sessions. Thus, the Finnish Parliament has almost attained the condition to which the German Reichstag has been reduced under Hitler, which circumstance scarcely entitles it to be called a Parliamentary move.

The last vestiges of civil liberty, freedom of the Press, freedom of association and right of assembly have been stamped out in Finland, and to-day this applies not only to the labouring population but to the ranks of the bourgeoisie as well. A tyrannical terror reigns in the country.

Details very rarely emerge from the torture chambers of the Finnish prisons. According to official statistics the number of prisoners in 1942 was 40 per cent. above "normal." Yet the officially announced number of prisoners in 1941 was 17,300, while in normal years it had been approximately 6,000. The proportion of political prisoners is not specified. In March this year, a Stockholm newspaper wrote that many things happen in Finland of which the Finnish general public is not aware. Persons have been left under "preventive arrest" as penalty for their Socialist convictions for over 2½ years, and are still held. If they were tried at all, this took place *in camera*. The death penalty, abolished a hundred years ago, has been reintroduced for political as well as criminal offences. The fact was published that a Communist M.P. was executed a year ago. Other such cases are known, but the Press neither desires nor would be allowed to speak of them.

The treatment of political prisoners in the prisons is brutal in the extreme, for the jailers are their political opponents. Arns Pekurinen, a famous Finnish Pacifist, was secretly removed from the prison in which he had been confined since the start of the Winter War of 1939-40, and soon after his wife was notified that he had been "killed at the front." Swedish newspapers have described the starvation conditions under which Finnish political prisoners are confined. Many have died of under-nourishment. The survivors are terribly emaciated, but none the less obliged to do heavy labours. Many are so hungry that they seize opportunities to eat discarded garbage.

Finnish jailers and police have in the past been notorious for their barbarous treatment of political prisoners, but since the Gestapo took

over the supervision of police and prison administration in Finland, the tortures to which political prisoners are subjected have become still more diabolical. Information in my possession, for example, shows that one political prisoner confined in Rönkä prison was so viciously manhandled as to be unconscious for two days. Another political prisoner was shot through the head; the jailers "explained" this was an "accident." According to statements published in the Swedish Press, Dr. Naari Vuemier, prominent Finnish Socialist leader, has been subjected to such ill-treatment and tortures in prison that last year he attempted to commit suicide. In 1940 Dr. Vuemier was Chairman of the Society for Peace and Friendship between Finland and the U.S.S.R. For this he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Now, apparently, characteristic Fascist methods are being used in the attempt to get rid of him for good.

About three hundred leading members of the Society for Peace and Friendship with the U.S.S.R., confined in the Kaduola Concentration Camp when the war started, were thereupon removed and taken to the front, "to dance in the meadows," as the Fascist officers in charge of their escorts took great delight in telling them. Twenty-five of the more prominent Labour and Trade Union leaders amongst them were singled out on the way, led off, and killed by the roadside. Some of those who actually reached the front succeeded in coming to the Soviet lines. The fate of the rest is unknown.

Such is the barbarous face of present-day "democracy" in Finland. If we gaze not upon the mask, but at what that mask conceals, we can readily perceive that such a brand of democracy is found neither unsafe nor incongruous by the German Fascists.

In general, as we know, the German Fascists proclaim the principle of the abolition of democracy and of its replacement everywhere by their authoritarian and terrorist regime. But the German Fascists, naturally, raise no objection to the brand of democracy that obtains in Finland. The *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, a leading publication of the Hitlerite State, made exactly this point recently, when it wrote: "The example of Finland shows that there can exist quite practically community of fortune between leading authoritarian States and small democratic countries." The Fascists are in no wise disconcerted by the fact that Finland, their sister-in-arms, is a land of "genuine democracy."

In what particular this "genuine democracy" after the Finnish model differs in substance from a Fascist regime, no one can specify. For it differs not in substance, but in outward appearance only. The sole difference is that the wealthy Finnish reactionary rulers still endeavour to cover the nakedness of this terrorist dictatorship with tag-ends of old democratic draperies. Should the war end successfully for them, of course, they would be able to shed even these wretched rags, which include "Parliament" and the "Finnish Social Democratic Party." But this they can only do if Fascist Germany emerges the

victor in the war, and since this prospect no longer exists, the ragged tag-ends will be mobilised to play their part if the designs of the wealthy Fascist ruling caste do not miscarry.

As regards the Finnish Social Democratic leaders their political position is adequately characterised by their participation in the Finnish Fascist organisation "The Union of Brothers-in-Arms," as well as by the formal pact executed between the Social Democratic Party and the *Schutzkorps*.

There are two features particularly characteristic of the Social Democratic leaders of Finland, one is their political duplicity. On any question you care to examine you will find that between their words and their deeds there lies a yawning gulf.

These men co-operated with the Fascists, the *Schutzkorps*, the police and the Secret Service in brutally strangling the last vestiges of independence of the Finnish working class. But in their May Day 1942 manifesto they declared: "The working class desires to champion independence, liberty and democratic social order."

These men shared in selling to Hitler the independence, liberty and democratic rights of the Finnish people. In the manifesto they state: "We cannot allow these possessions of such vital importance to our people to be bought or sold."

These men—Tanner and his associates—shared in throwing into prison even those deputies of their own Party who did not choose to join with them in their intrigues for the abolition of democracy in Finland. And in the same manifesto they have the effrontery to proclaim: "An end must be put to intrigues against the democratic way of Government."

These are only brief examples of this unparalleled duplicity.

The other particulars characteristic, in respect to which, again, they have broken all records, is their servility towards Fascists in general and Hitler in particular.

If they were not masters of this art, the Social Democratic leaders would not be occupying ministerial positions in the Finnish Cabinet conducting the present war. That is obvious and incontrovertible. *It is not, after all, accidental, that the Finnish Social Democratic Party is the only Social Democratic Party in the world that participates in a government of Hitler's gendarmes, openly supports Hitler's war of conquest, and hence works to secure the victory of the sworn enemy of the liberty of all nations.*

This circumstance is sufficiently indicative, not only of the quality of the Finnish Social Democratic Party at the present stage in its history, but of the festering ulcer into which "Finnish democracy" in general has now developed. For the Hitlerised Social Democratic Party in Finland is part and parcel of the Hitlerised "democracy" that now prevails there.

4.—THE FINNISH GAMBLERS' DOOM

ALL the war plans of the Finnish rulers were based on the illusions of an anticipated victory of Hitler Germany over the peoples of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and other freedom-loving countries. In the course of the war, however, these illusions have been shattered one after the other.

In August and September, 1941, the hopes of the Finnish ruling circles soared. The *Helsinki Sanomat*, a Government organ, wrote: "The last remnants of the Soviet forces are now threatened with encirclement and annihilation." Another Government organ, the *Uusi Suomi* declared: "One thing is certain, that the war will end before the onset of winter," and the chief commentator of the Finnish radio stated (September, 1941): "The final score with the Russians will be settled in the immediate future."

But in December, 1941, after the first powerful counter-blows of the Red Army, the tone of the Helsinki spokesmen became for a time decidedly more subdued. Even Mannerheim had no better consolation to offer his troops than "If we hold out until spring we shall win through."

In the spring and summer of 1942 a new wave of illusions engulfed Helsinki, this time concerning the anticipated irresistibility of the Germans on the southern front. Every report of a temporary success by the German Army emanating from Berlin acquired an added boastfulness in the course of its journey through the ether to Helsinki and was splashed in big type in the Finnish Press. According to these newspapers by September Stalingrad had already been finally captured by the Germans, the Soviet Union had already been deprived of the Caucasus oil, and so forth. "As far as human reason can judge," wrote the military correspondent of the *Helsinki Sanomat* on September 15, 1942, "the last hour of the Bolsheviks has already struck." Blinded by the boastings of the Germans and their own illusions, Hitler's Helsinki flunkies forgot all they knew of the striking force of the Red Army, the power of which they had learned previously in the course of the winter battles of 1940.

It may well be imagined that when the bubble of these ill-founded illusions suddenly burst several weeks later, the effect was more than stunning. In the phrase of one observer, when the Red Army took the offensive in the Stalingrad area, it was as though all the main government buildings in Helsinki had been shaken by an earthquake. The usual truculent barking of President Ryti over the Finnish radio changed all at once to a pusillanimous whine: "Today Finland is living through a period of hardship and suffering. But we had no other choice. The logic of fate governs the course of events." And again: "Surprises in the further course of the war are not excluded. The tremendous events now taking place will affect Finland also. The fortunes of war may betray us." It took Mr. Ryti a whole month to get over his fright and even then he did not recover entirely.

The Government, alarmed at Finland's growing isolation in the foreign political arena, set about dispatching one Finnish Cabinet Minister after another to Sweden to deny, in interviews and speeches, the "Greater Finland" plans of the Government.

At the same time the Finnish Press started a discussion on the question of the possibility of Finland withdrawing from the war. It at once became clear, however, that this was merely an attempt to hoodwink the Finnish people and foreign observers, and that there was not the slightest sincere intention of putting an end to Finland's participation in Hitler's war of conquest. The idea of the rulers of Finland was simply to wave the white flag a little, in order to stave off the people's growing discontent with the war and to furnish their apologists in Britain and the U.S.A. with something to make use of, in the case of Germany's defeat, to diminish the blame resting on the Finnish Government for its collaboration in Hitler's war.

How far the Finnish rulers were ready to go in their collaboration in Hitler's bloody shambles may be judged from the following circumstance: In the spring of 1943 the pitiable remnants of the Finnish battalions routed in the North Caucasus while fighting there in collaboration with the German Army got back to Finland. Out of more than 10,000 picked butchers of the Finnish S.S.—only 300 returned, and these were probably first-class long-distance runners. They were accorded a triumphant welcome at Tampere. But it turned out that the so-called heroes were themselves fed up with war, or at least with the war on the eastern front. They were urged to go back to Germany when their leave was finished. But thus most of them refused to be persuaded to do. Meanwhile Hitler, as the Swedish Press reported, was imperatively demanding that the Finnish Government replace the Finnish battalions which had disappeared from the southern front, that it furnish the same quantity of cannon-fodder as before. Did the Finnish Government refuse? Certainly not. It was decided on a new draft of volunteers for the Berlin butchers' mincing machine—and was ready, if the volunteers could not be found in Finland, to dispatch the necessary number of Finnish heads by force, in chains if need be, to the German slaughter-house.

The most recent reorganisation of the Finnish Government is an even more patent proof of the absence of any intention on the part of Finland's rulers to change their course in the Fascist war.

Rangell's place as Premier was taken by Linkomies, the head of the Coalition Party. Even among the other political bosses of the Finnish wealthy ruling caste, Linkomies has always been outstanding as an extreme chauvinist and particularly rabid reactionary. He invariably protected the toughs of the Lappo which gave rise to the I.K.L. Party, and behind the scenes directed their deeds of violence along the lines desired by the wealthy ruling caste. He has always been one of Hitler's most trusted Finnish cronies and is one of those most responsible for instigating Finland's part in the war. The change in Prime Minister thus simply meant that a small Fascist has been replaced by

a big Fascist. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witting, the German agent, who had too obviously compromised himself as such, was replaced by Ramsay, the craftier diplomat of the two. The job assigned to him is to continue the same game but open up his cards less. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was handed to the arch-reactionary Ehnrooth, for a long time Secretary of the Finnish Employers' Association and subsequently active plotter of anti-Soviet intrigues at the League of Nations. Walden, paper king of Finland, was retained as War Minister, and Tanner, who also enjoys Hitler's unchanging confidence, was left as Finance Minister.

It is hardly necessary to say that Berlin was pleased with this kind of reorganisation of the Finnish Government, and the rulers of Finland, Hitler's flunkies, who in December and January had been frightened and crestfallen, once more began to crow. But this time it was with a lessened bravado, for now it was without confidence in victory. All their efforts are now directed towards trying to relieve themselves of the responsibilities for their crimes, preserve power in their own hands, and keep some part at least of the Soviet territory they have seized. To this end they continue to fight as an auxiliary of Hitler Germany, while at the same time making every possible effort to deceive public opinion in the U.S.A., Great Britain, and Sweden.

There appear to be internal dissensions in Finland between the two largest Government parties : the Agrarian Alliance, which incites against the workers, and the Social Democratic Party, which incites against the peasants. This much is at least clear : both the one and the other dissentient desire to divert the growing dissatisfaction of the masses from its most dangerous objective, that is, from becoming directed against the wealthy ruling circles and their Government.

Not only is unity among the people beyond the power of the present Government to achieve but, as we have illustrated, the groups comprising the Government are obliged to destroy whatever national unity there is, for it is bound to become directed against the Government. It is precisely the unity of the people that they fear.

The adherents of the Finnish Government exemplify also more serious differences of opinion than the above. Regarding these differences of opinion the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* wrote : " Everyone who knows the situation in Finland will agree that the relations between the adherents of the programme calling for the conquest of Greater Karelia and those who favour a prudent defensive are strained, and may easily become more strained." This Swedish paper in speaking of the adherents of the so-called " prudent " defensive appears to be thinking primarily of certain circles of the Finnish-Swedish Party, who are constantly being intimidated by the threats of the Hitlerite I.K.L. Party. On November 29, 1942, for example, the *Ajan Suunta* wrote : " The Swedish-Jewish Press issues the orders, and the Finnish Swedes at once obey. It may be taken for granted that they are collaborating with certain outside interests in matters relating to the present war and with the design of weakening

Russia's enemy, Finland, by means of the help of those outside interests." This is the sort of insolence with which Hitler's Finnish agents are accustomed to browbeat the Swedish opposition into silence.

In addition to the Swedes there are persons among the Government parties who understand clearly enough the dangerous and adventurist nature of the Government's course in continuing the Fascist war but do nothing to deflect that course. Political cowardice characterises the entire "opposition" in the camp of the Government parties. When, for example, in February, 1943, the powers of the President expired, only twenty-three of the electors objected to the re-election of Ryti, the Hitlerite lackey, and even then they did not dare vote against his re-election but merely abstained. This so-called "opposition" is afraid of its own shadow. True, it is afraid of the consequences of the military adventure undertaken by the Ryti-Linkomies Mannerheim clique. But it is even more afraid of attempts to hinder these Hitler agents in the pursuit of their adventure, for what it fears most of all is the breakdown of the internal front, that is, its own united front with the ruling clique. This "opposition" does not even dream of seeking the support of the popular masses so as to launch a serious struggle against the criminal policy of the Government, for it itself fears the people and therefore shuns any step that could possibly encourage the growth of the existing dissatisfaction among the Finnish people and also their activity.

In May, 1943, the Social Democratic trade union leaders came out similarly with a special "loyal opposition" platform of their own. But that is no genuine opposition. It is merely a swindle. Concern at the growing indignation of the working masses against the war and the Hitlerite policy of the Government obliges the trade union leadership to resort to verbal repudiation of this policy in an endeavour to cover up its actual collaboration with the authorities in carrying out this policy. It acted in this matter completely on the instructions of the Government, particularly of Tanner, who had sold out completely to Hitler and the wealthy Finnish Fascist clique or as a certain Swedish paper put it more politely, "who has devoted himself to the cause of the war policy and its camouflaging."

The internal demoralisation of the Finnish ruling clique is bound to grow. But at the same time it is plain that Fascist rule in Finland will not collapse as a result of its own internal discord or the economic difficulties confronting it. It is rotten and decomposing but it will not collapse unless it is overthrown. It is only by decisive struggle that the Finnish people can save themselves from the plague of Hitlerism.

For two years and more now Finland has been fighting as the auxiliary of Fascist Germany, fighting for the establishment of Hitlerite tyranny over the peoples of Europe. In the course of these two years the relationship of forces between the belligerent sides has changed to such an extent that today the inevitability of the ultimate collapse of the robber war of the Hitlerites and their associates is

already plain. The heroism of the Red Army and the strategic genius of its Supreme Command have foiled the predatory plans of those who embarked on the invasion of the U.S.S.R. and the day is not far off when the Soviet Union, together with the other freedom-loving countries, will utterly crush these most vicious enemies of mankind.

In the autumn of 1941, when the Finnish Government signed in Berlin the pact affirming Finland's adherence to the so-called "anti-Comintern bloc," the Finnish Press commented that Finland had become the hub of the Axis. There is now no longer any question about whether this hub will hold out. The only question is how long the whole Axis will hold out. And every sensible person in the world knows that the answer is. "Not long."

One year later, in the autumn of 1942, one of the Hitlerite Finnish papers wrote that, so long as the leaders of Finland maintained their collaboration with Germany, there would be nothing to fear. They have maintained that collaboration. But, as we have seen, a host of grave trials and worries have descended upon them. Their whole policy is bankrupt. They shall answer for their crimes with their heads.

Finland's participation in Hitler's robber war is the greatest misfortune that has ever befallen the Finnish people and the greatest disgrace in their history. Let us hope that the Finnish people will presently find the requisite strength and courage to rid themselves of this disgrace, incurred by the anti-Soviet war, by a decisive struggle to overthrow the power of the criminal agents of Hitler Fascism. It is a question of the Finnish people's honour.

And this brings us to the main question, namely, that the vital interests of the Finnish people themselves no less than those of the Soviet people require a secure guarantee that never again shall there be a repetition of Finland's treacherous attack on Soviet territory, so that in time to come the Finnish people shall be able to dwell not in enmity but in peaceful collaboration with the great Soviet people.

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GORDON SCHAFFER

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INTRODUCTION

As one of many thousand workers dependent for a livelihood on the Press, I am very glad to have the opportunity of writing an introduction to this pamphlet. To the members of the National Union of Journalists who have endorsed the demand for a Royal Commission on the Press, the question is not one of politics but of bread and butter.

Let me set out what has happened in Fleet Street since I took my first job there in 1928. The old *Daily Graphic* was the first daily paper to disappear. Next victim was the *Westminster Gazette*. The *Daily Chronicle* followed.

I remember ringing the News Editor of the *Daily Chronicle* from the Press Association a few hours before his paper died. Fleet Street was alive with rumours but the men whose livelihood depended on the *Daily Chronicle* had been told nothing. All through that afternoon they went on preparing their paper for the press. But the edition never came out. Financial discussions carried out in secret were able to throw thousands of men and women out of their jobs.

In the Sunday paper field, the *Sunday News* and the *Referee* have disappeared. The Central News Agency which employed a considerable staff at home in the provinces and abroad has also disappeared. In the Law Courts the services of the Press Association and the Exchange Telegraph Company have amalgamated, not only creating unemployment but leaving the operation of free reporting of the Courts of Law to a single organisation.

In the Provinces the same story can be repeated. Newspaper Lords have fought battles for circulation, have concluded deals among themselves, and the victims have always been the men and women dependent on the newspaper industry.

This is the human side, but wider questions are involved. A freedom of the Press, which is no more than the freedom of rich men to own newspapers, is a danger to and not a bulwark of democracy.

This pamphlet tells you who are the rich men dominating the majority of the newspapers on which the people depend for their understanding of the world during these difficult and complex years. The facts given should be studied by all sections of the working class movement.

GORDON SCHAFFER

The Millionaire Press

- "We must maintain the fullest freedom of discussion in this country. There is no legal remedy for the doctoring of news. All we can do is to make sure that everybody understands just how the Press is organised, whom the papers belong to, the financial relations between different papers and what interest they represent."*

In these words Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney-General, stated clearly the central feature of the need for an enquiry into the control of the Press.

Throughout the last thirty years attention has repeatedly been drawn to the growing power of the big Press trusts. The two main effects of the complex financial operations by which these have been built up are:

1. The concentration of an ever-growing proportion of the country's newspapers in the hands of a few big owners, who, though in some fields they are fiercely competitive, tend in others to divide their markets in the interest of maximum profit, and

2. The steady reduction in the number of individual papers (though not in their circulation), due to the steady process of incorporation and amalgamation carried out by the chain proprietors—again for the purpose of the most profitable operation.*

These tendencies, dangerous at any time, are of particular concern to the Labour movement today. The Labour Government, elected with a clear mandate, stands confronted with, in the main, a bitterly hostile Press tightly organised both nationally and locally, which reflects not the interest and the aspirations of the British people or of any considerable section of it, but purely those of large-scale capitalism.

THE JOURNALISTS SPEAK

The matter has been brought to a head, on both a national and an international scale, by resolutions passed by the journalists themselves. The first, passed by the National Delegate Meeting of the National Union of Journalists in April, 1946, urged that the Government should appoint a Royal Commission on the Press of Great Britain, and that the Commission should inquire specifically into:

- (i) The ownership, control and financing of national and provincial newspapers, news agencies and periodicals.
- (ii) The extent to which the growth of powerful chains of newspapers is creating a monopoly of newspaper ownership.
- (iii) The ability of independent national and local newspapers and periodicals to withstand increased competition from syndicate companies.
- (iv) The influence of financial and advertising interests on the presentation and suppression of news.
- (v) The distortion and suppression of essential facts in home and foreign news.

* "With some years of experience as editor of a daily newspaper in a very large provincial city, I am well aware of certain undesirable aspects of the group or "chain" system of ownership, such as the subordination of the editorial to the managerial (i.e., commercial) status, the standardised service of leading articles and political commentaries to all the group's newspapers from a central source, the directorial instructions as to the news "slants," the lack of genuine local roots involved in multiple proprietorship and the interplay of group finance with its tendency towards amalgamation."—Letter from "An Ex-Editor." *The Times* (30.7.46).

The same principle was raised on an international plane at the recent International Congress of Journalists at Copenhagen, representing journalists of twenty-one countries, in the following resolution:—

"This congress recognises that Press freedom can never be fully assured while newspapers, newsagencies and broadcasting systems are solely in the hands of individuals or private monopolies with no responsibility to the people, and it recalls that freedom of the printed word has been used in the past not for the benefit of humanity but against it, and therefore recommends the appropriate departments of the United Nations and of the W.F.T.U. to consider an international investigation on this question. . . ."

The submission of the N.U.J.'s resolution and the Government's statement that they were considering the advisability of such an enquiry, has let loose a hysterical storm of denunciation from the leaders of the "big" Press. While claiming that they have nothing to fear from an enquiry, they denounce the suggestion as a dictatorial attack on the freedom of the Press by the Labour Government, affecting to ignore that the initiative in fact comes from their own working journalists.

Such an attitude will deceive nobody. If the big newspaper trusts have nothing to hide, there is no reason why they should not welcome an enquiry. Their frenzied opposition suggests that they fear the political exposure that would result from it.

THE GROUPS

The main groups that make up the "big" Press in Britain differ very considerably in their history and structure. First in the field was what is still known for convenience as the **Harmsworth group**.

As it stands today, the group consists of four main companies. First comes ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LTD. This concern owns the *Daily Mail*, *Overseas Daily Mail*, *Evening News* and *Sunday Dispatch*; all shares of the Cheltenham Newspaper Co. Ltd. (*Gloucestershire Echo*, *Cheltenham Chronicle*), Gloucester Newspapers Ltd. (*Citizen*, *Gloucester Journal*), Staffordshire Sentinel Newspapers Ltd. (*Stoke-on-Trent Evening Sentinel*, *Staffs Weekly Sentinel*) and has a direct controlling interest (51 per cent) in Hull and Grimsby Newspapers, Ltd. (*Hull Daily Mail*, *Grimsby Daily Telegraph*, *Sports Mail*, *Hull and Yorkshire Times*, *Hull and Lincoln Times* and *Saturday Telegraph*), Swansea Press Ltd. (*South Wales Daily Post*, *Herald of Wales*) and Derby Daily Telegraph Ltd. (*Derby Evening Telegraph* and *Express*) and an interest in the *Leicester Evening Mail** and the *Bristol Evening World* and *Evening Post*.

The company also controls Empire Paper Mills Ltd., and owns† (out of 1,713,305 issued) 800,526 shares in Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co., Ltd.

2. **DAILY MAIL AND GENERAL TRUST LTD.** This is primarily a holding company, which holds more than a third (4,318,000 shares) of the deferred capital of Associated Newspapers. It also owns one-half of the preference and one-fifth of the ordinary capital of Bristol United Press, Ltd.

3. **DAILY MIRROR NEWSPAPERS LTD.**, owns Pictorial Newspaper Co. Ltd. (*Daily Mirror*), controls Lincolnshire Publishing Co. Ltd. (*Lincolnshire Echo*), and has large holdings in Albert E. Reed & Co., Ltd. (*Paper*

* The *Leicester Evening Mail* is published by Midland Newspapers Ltd. Control was acquired from Associated Newspapers Ltd. by a company called News Holdings Ltd., which was formed for the purpose in 1939. Majority control (60 per cent) of the latter company is held by F. Hewitt (1927) Ltd., publishers of the *Leicester Mercury*. The remaining 40 per cent is held by Associated Newspapers Ltd.

† All figures from last available share lists.

Mills), Anglo-Canadian Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd., Daily Mail and General Trust Ltd. (168,145 ordinary shares), Associated Newspapers Ltd. (116,544 deferred shares), and Sunday Pictorial Newspapers, Ltd.

4. SUNDAY PICTORIAL NEWSPAPERS LTD., in turn have a large holding in Anglo-Canadian Pulp and Paper Ltd., in Associated Newspapers Ltd. (152,796 deferred shares), and Daily Mail and General Trust (148,500 ordinary shares).

The Western Morning News (Plymouth), with its associated papers, is controlled by another branch of the Harmsworth family.*

THE BIRTH OF A COMBINE

The growth of this financial octopus (shown in diagrammatic form on page 7) with its maze of holding and subsidiary companies and interlocking directorates, would fill a book on its own. There is space here only for a brief outline. The Harmsworth brothers (the late Lord Northcliffe and the first Lord Rothermere) first established themselves with *Answers* in 1888, and by 1896 founded Harmsworth Brothers Ltd., to take care of their large and growing group of popular periodicals. (This concern became the Amalgamated Press Ltd., and remained a Harmsworth property until 1926, when it passed to the Berry group.)

Meanwhile they had entered the newspaper field with the purchase of the *Evening News* in 1894 and the foundation of the *Daily Mail*, the prototype of the "New Journalism," in 1896.

In 1905 Associated Newspapers Ltd. was founded to take over these two papers with a capital of £1,600,000 (£500,000 in £1 Preference, £600,000 in £1 ordinary and £500,000 in 5/- deferred shares, only the last class having full voting rights).

From its early days the company prospered and from 1913-20 the lowest dividend on the deferred shares was 12 per cent. In the 'twenties a series of capitalised bonus issues was made on the deferred shares as follows:

September, 1920	50 per cent
October, 1922	32 " "
April, 1923	.	.	25 " "
October, 1923	.	.	20 " "
June, 1927	50 " "

Even after this enormous watering of the capital, which now amounted to £3,350,000, dividends were maintained at 40 per cent p.a. on these shares from 1927 to 1931. Meanwhile similar bonus issues were being made by the Daily Mail Trust, and to a lesser degree by Daily Mirror Newspapers and Sunday Pictorial Newspapers.

In its early days the group (headed by the first Lord Rothermere after Northcliffe's death in 1922) had shown little interest in the provinces. Expansion had been limited to the main Newspapers and paper interests (apart from Lord Northcliffe's short-lived venture in the control of *The Times* and a brief interest in the early twenties in both the *Express* group and the *Daily Sketch* and *Sunday Herald*).

* The Western Morning News Ltd. is controlled by Consolidated Press Ltd. (Chairman, Sir Harold Harmsworth), all the ordinary shares of which are owned between members of the family and the executors of Sir R. L. Harmsworth. Sir Harold Harmsworth is also chairman of Western Morning News Co. The group also controls, through a series of subsidiaries, the *Cornish Evening News*, *Cornish Guardian*, *Western Times*, *Tiverton Gazette*, *Wellington Weekly News*, etc.

THE PROVINCIAL BATTLEFIELD

In February, 1928, however, the invasion of the Provinces began in earnest with the incorporation of a new subsidiary company, Northcliffe Newspapers Ltd., with a capital of 2,500,000 shares of £1, 2/- called. Of these, 500,000 were held by Lord Rothermere himself and 1,000,000 between Associated Newspapers and Daily Mirror Newspapers, the remaining million being under option to Lord Rothermere and the same two companies. In addition there were no less than £3,000,000 in debentures which were in their turn guaranteed by Associated Newspapers and Daily Mirror Newspapers.

Lord Rothermere, in announcing the new flotation, said: "It would be entirely wrong to regard the aim of the Northcliffe Newspapers, Ltd., as being the creation of any sort of monopoly of the provincial evening Press. . . . Sir William Berry and his brother will be the first to admit the undesirability of any form of Press monopoly and to welcome experienced and powerful competition in the industry to which they have devoted their energies."

In pursuit of these lofty aims, the company infiltrated, with success, into Gloucestershire, Staffordshire, South Wales and Hull. In Bristol and Newcastle, however, the new *Evening Worlds* ran into strong opposition from the well-established Berry properties, and after a ruinous circulation war between the two groups an armistice was signed. According to the *Stock Exchange Gazette* of February 5th, 1932, "An agreement has been signed by Allied Northern Newspapers, Ltd., and Northcliffe Newspapers, Ltd., whereby competition between their companies in respect of their provincial newspapers will be eliminated."


The principal effects of the agreements were that the Harmsworths abandoned Newcastle and agreed not to start their projected newspapers in Cardiff, Sheffield and Aberdeen. In compensation the Berry interests retired from Bristol leaving the *Evening World* in possession,* and the Harmsworths took over the *Derby Daily Express* which they merged with the *Derby Daily Telegraph* to form the *Derby Evening Telegraph and Express*.

Finally (December 22, 1932) Northcliffe Newspapers Ltd., was wound up and its remaining provincial properties passed to the parent company (Associated Newspapers Ltd.). To finance the purchase the company issued £1,500,000 ten-year notes and a further 2,061,350 5/- deferred shares, of which the Daily Mail Trust took 1,500,000 at 18/-. and Daily Mirror Newspapers 561,350 at 20/-. (Total cash £1,911,350.)

THE HARMSWORTH GROUP TODAY

There is not space here to deal in the same detail with the history and financial ramifications of the other members of the Harmsworth group. They are, however, of great complexity. In the last fifteen years there has been a loosening of the ties that bind the group together, and the *Daily Mirror* and *Sunday Pictorial* have acquired a relative degree of freedom, which is strongly reflected in the editorial columns. Their large holdings in Associated Newspapers and the Daily Mail Trust, however, together with their directorial connections, stamp them as still belonging to the same stable.

* Further circulation troubles followed at Bristol, when the independently owned *Bristol Evening Post* was established in 1932 by local interests. Eventually in 1936, the two papers were brought under Harmsworth control (Bristol United Press Ltd.) with guarantees (through local directors) to safeguard the continued existence of the *Post* and its independence in editorial policy. In 1939, there was a capital change involving the creation of preference shares, over 90 per cent of which went to Associated Newspapers and the Daily Mail Trust. In return, these two companies surrendered their majority holding of the ordinary capital, leaving 60 per cent in the hands of Bristol Evening Post Ltd.



Where the real financial control of the group lies is harder to discover than in the case of any of the other big groups. The last available share lists (1941) indicate that the present Lord Rothermere had only comparatively small direct holdings in Associated Newspapers Ltd. and Daily Mail and General Trust Ltd., of both of which companies he is chairman.* The shares of the latter are fairly widely spread, but with large blocks in the hands of insurance companies, investment trusts and nominees (nominee holdings are also prominent in the share lists of the other companies but are in no case large enough in themselves to carry majority control). Lord Rothermere, in addition to being chairman of the above two companies, is chairman of British Movietone News, and on the board of Gaumont British Picture Corporation Ltd. He is also a director of Anglo-Canadian Pulp and Paper Mills and Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co.

The Vice-Chairman of Associated Newspapers, K. A. Layton-Bennet, holds eighteen other directorships, including several investment trusts, and insurance, hotel, rubber and other companies. On the board of the holding company (Daily Mail and General Trust) the smell of rubber is stronger. Sir Samuel Hardman Lever (Vice Chairman) is a director of three companies of the Dunlop group. With him on this board is F. A. Szarvasy, who is also connected with the Dunlop group, investment trusts and banking. In addition the latter is deeply involved in South Wales, being Chairman of the vast Amalgamated Anthracite Collieries Ltd., which controls 80 per cent of Welsh anthracite output.

Directorial connections with the outlying companies (Daily Mirror and Sunday Pictorial) are maintained by F. A. McWhirter, managing director of Associated Newspapers, who sits on both boards, which in turn are strongly interlocked under the same chairman (H. G. Bartholomew). The circle is completed by A. S. Fuller, who is a director both of the Daily Mirror and the Daily Mail and General Trust.

The above short account of the formation of the Harmsworth group illustrates some typical features of the last twenty years. These may be summarised as follows:

1. Vast capitalisation (largely self-created by means of the issue of share bonuses, etc.).
2. High proportion of Debenture debt to share capital
3. Under pressure of (1) and (2) continual urge to expansion in the interest of greater profit, leading to
4. Continual tendency to rationalisation (amalgamation of papers serving a given market).

These four factors are to be found in varying degree throughout the newspaper and printing industries, though the big newspaper groups themselves vary widely. (See table on page 19).

THE KEMSLEY AND CAMROSE GROUPS

The second great Press combine and greatest rival to the Harmsworth group was generally known as the Berry group, from its rise in the early twenties until its splitting into three separate groups under Lords Camrose, Kemsley and Iliffe in 1937.

* It is impossible to get up-to-date information about holdings in the larger companies, as their share lists have not been filed at Somerset House since 1941-42. The extent of Lord Rothermere's present holdings in these companies is therefore obscure. Mr. Randolph Churchill, writing in the *Irish Times*, recently referred to rumours that Lord Rothermere did in fact control the *Daily Mirror* at the time of the General Election. Lord Rothermere has admitted to a substantial holding, but has stated that he did not know whether this was the largest or not.

The key company in the development of the group, now known as Kemsley Newspapers Ltd., having changed its name (June 26, 1943) from Allied Newspapers Ltd., was founded in 1924.

The following publications are owned directly or otherwise. The diagram on page 20 shows the principal companies:

Daily Dispatch, Daily Graphic, Evening Chronicle, Sunday Times, Sunday Chronicle and Sunday Referee, Sunday Empire News, Sunday Graphic; Aberdeen Press & Journal, Evening Express; Newcastle Journal and North Mail, Evening Chronicle, Sunday Sun; Middlesbrough Evening Gazette; Western Mail & South Wales News, South Wales Echo & Evening Express; Glasgow Daily Record, Evening News, and Sunday Mail; Sheffield Telegraph & Independent; Star; Weekly Telegraph; Yorkshire Evening Press; Northern Daily Telegraph (Blackburn), Stockport Express.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

The second main group is that of Lord Camrose, whose daily newspaper interests are more restricted, being confined to the *Daily Telegraph* of which he is proprietor* and editor-in-chief.

The *Daily Telegraph* was purchased by the group in 1927, from the family of Lord Burnham. In 1930, its price was reduced to a penny. A spectacular increase in circulation followed and the paper soon became the chief mouth-piece of the official Tory Party line. Shortly after the partition of the Berry interests in 1937 the *Telegraph* absorbed its main competitor, the *Morning Post*, which was owned by a group of prominent Conservatives headed by the late Duke of Northumberland.

Lord Camrose is also Chairman of the vast Amalgamated Press (authorised capital £6,200,000)† publishers of over a hundred and fifty weeklies, monthlies and annuals, ranging from *Comic Cuts* to *World Digest*. The company, among other subsidiaries, has a direct controlling interest in Imperial Paper Mills Ltd. (Gravesend), and owns about 75 per cent of the ordinary shares of Kelly's Directories Ltd.

This last company passed under the control of Lord Iliffe when the original Berry group split up in 1937. However, control reverted to Amalgamated Press on his "retirement" in 1939.‡ The company which publishes directories, etc., owns all shares of Associated Iliffe Press, among other subsidiaries. (See diagram on page 20).

•

THE FINANCIAL TIMES

In July, 1945, Lord Camrose sold his controlling interest in the *Financial Times*, one of the earliest of his newspaper properties. The price paid (which was also offered to the minority shareholders) of 41/3 per £1 share was

* In the last available share list (1941) Lord Camrose held 33,940 out of a total of 40,000 ordinary shares. A large block of the Preference shares, amounting to over 40 per cent, was held by Control Nominees Ltd. The bulk of the remainder was held by members of the Berry and Iliffe families.

† Lord Camrose's personal holdings of 107,500 ordinary shares (1941) were dwarfed by a block of 754,290 held by Control Nominees Ltd.; "Lady Buckland [widow of the late Lord Buckland, the eldest Berry brother] and others" held 123,600.

‡ Lord Iliffe retained his interest in Coventry Newspapers Ltd., publishers of the *Midland Daily Telegraph* which became the *Coventry Evening Telegraph* in 1942. In 1944, he emerged further from his retirement in control of a new company, Birmingham Post and Mail Ltd., which was formed to acquire the *Birmingham Post, Birmingham Mail, Birmingham Weekly Post* and the Journal Printing Office for a total of £2,250,000 cash.

remarkable, as the ordinary dividend of 10 per cent for 1944 was the first for seven years. The purchasers were the Financial News Ltd., which owns a 50 per cent interest in the Economist, all shares of the Investors Chronicle Ltd., all shares of the *Practitioner*, and a substantial interest in Moody's Economist Services. The Financial Times owns the St. Clement's Press. The two financial dailies were amalgamated under the name of The Financial Times.

The chairman of this group, of which Mr. Brendan Bracken, M.P., is a director, is Major General G. P. Dawney, of Dawney Day & Co., the City finance house. The group is closely connected with Eyre & Spottiswoode (publishers)* through Major J. S. Crothwaite-Eyre and Colonel O. E. Crothwaite-Eyre (M.P. for New Forest and Christchurch).

THE INVASION FROM WALES

The Berrys started as the financial heirs of Lord Rhondda in South Wales coal and iron and the eldest brother, Seymour Berry, the late Lord Buckland, remained in charge of these interests until his death. Their first ventures in the national newspaper field were Graphic Publications Ltd. (1920), the *Sunday Times* and the *Financial Times*.

Their career of expansion really began with Allied Newspapers Ltd., which was formed in 1924 to acquire the bulk of the newspapers previously owned by E. Hulton & Co. (*Daily Dispatch*, *Evening Chronicle*, *Sporting Chronicle*, *Sunday Chronicle* and *Empire News*). Of the London Hulton properties, the *Daily Sketch* and *Sunday Herald* went to Associated Newspapers Ltd. and the *Evening Standard* to the London Express Newspapers (51 per cent) and Associated Newspapers (49 per cent).

The following year, Allied Northern Newspapers Ltd., a subsidiary, acquired all the Newcastle† and Glasgow papers mentioned above—and in 1928 both the Aberdeen papers which as Sir William Berry (later Lord Camrose) proudly pointed out at the Annual Meeting were "the only newspapers published in Aberdeen and the surrounding territory."

Meanwhile the whole of the ordinary shares of the *Daily Sketch* and *Sunday Herald* Ltd. had been acquired from the Harmsworth group. (January 1, 1927). It is worth noting that the latter had purchased these from Hultons in 1923 for £1,300,000. At the time of its transfer to the Berrys the debenture debt was given as £1,554,402 against a paid up capital of £100,000 and goodwill copyrights, property, etc., valued at £1,377,328. Expansion has continued steadily since, the latest recruits to the stable being the *Yorkshire Evening Press* and the *Northern Daily Telegraph*, which were acquired in 1945 together with two weeklies at Stockport and York.‡

* In June of this year, the Financial Times Ltd. announced that it was co-operating with George Newnes Ltd. and C. Arthur Pearson Ltd. in the development of W. Speight and Sons Ltd., rotary letterpress printers, which firm had been purchased from Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd.

† Control of Northern Counties Conservative Newspapers Ltd., the original publishers of the *Newcastle Journal*, was not acquired until 1937, when a group headed by Samuel Story (see Portsmouth and Sunderland Newspapers), who had the controlling interest, was bought out by Allied Northern. In 1939, the *Journal* was amalgamated with the *North Mail* and *Daily Chronicle* to form the *Newcastle Journal* and *North Mail*. Northern Counties Conservative Newspapers Ltd. still exists as a subsidiary of Allied Northern, though its function is obscure.

‡ In 1933 there was a reshuffle of holdings inside the group whereby some of the companies controlled by Allied Northern Newspapers Ltd. reverted to the control of the parent company. See diagram on page 20.

FAMILY FINANCE

The Berry family appear to make no secret of the extent of their holdings in their companies. In 1941 we find the following holdings listed:—

Kemsley Newspapers Ltd	£1 Ordinary Shares
Hon. W. N. Berry	50,000
Hon. G. L. Berry	60,000
Lord Kemsley	389,858
Lord Kemsley and others	50,000
Kemsley Estates Co	102,831

together with several smaller blocks in the names of other members of the family. These are enough to give effective, though not a majority, control as the issued ordinary capital is 2,500,000.*

Apart from Lord Kemsley (Chairman) three of the remaining nine directors are members of his family, the rest being representatives of the subsidiary companies. None of the directors holds any significant directorships outside the group.

THE WESTERN MAIL

The Western Mail and Echo Ltd, though a comparatively small company (Capital £160,310) is interesting not only in being the foundations of the Berry Newspaper interests but as the only firm in which the two groups now meet. Furthermore, its principal paper (*Western Mail and Echo*) has the distinction of being even more virulently reactionary in its editorial policy than any of the others in the Kemsley-Camrose empires, having been, since the days of Lord Rhondda, the voice of the big South Wales coal and iron interests.

Lords Kemsley and Camrose, with Sir Robert Webber are life directors, the board being completed by the Hon. G. L. Berry and F. E. Webber. The capital structure is curious as there are three classes of ordinary shares. The principal holders are:

(1946)	8,200 of £10	4,600 of 1/-	82,200 of 1/- "C"
Allied Northern Newspapers	564	287	41,000
Lord Camrose	500		
Lord Kemsley	500		
Hon. G. L. Berry	500		
Control Nominees	3264	2618	41,500
Exors of Sir Elmsley Carr	1561	1056	
Sir Robert Webber	575	39	

THE RUGGED INDIVIDUALISTS

London Express Newspapers Ltd., the main Beaverbrook company, contrasts sharply with the two preceding groups. Although at one time the company had close connections with the Harmsworth group (in 1925 the Daily Mail Trust had a 49 per cent interest in all three of the Beaverbrook London papers), it now appears to be completely independent.

Lord Beaverbrook, the effective head of the group is the self-proclaimed and vocal champion of the small shopkeeper and the one-man business as against the combines. His own business experience provides a sharp contrast with these professions. In his own words (*Sunday Express*, 6.11.27): "*I have a wide knowledge of Trusts. The first one I founded was the Canada Cement*

* There are some large blocks of shares held by Nominees, for example, Lloyds Bank (Law Courts Branch) Nominees Ltd., 59,850. The preference shares are widely distributed, but Refuge Assurance Co. Ltd., hold 73,700 of the 62½ per cent preference.

Corporation—brought into being just eighteen years ago. . . . I was not concerned with the consumer one way or another. My interests were twofold: the first was to make money and the second was to sell the public a sound security which would enhance and not diminish my rising reputation as a merchant banker who could be trusted to keep faith with his clients. I succeeded in both these aims."

The structure of the present group is simple. London Express Newspapers owns the *Daily Express*, all issued capital of the *Sunday Express* and all the Ordinary and 99 per cent of the Preference shares of the *Evening Standard*. Development has been concentrated on the three main papers (with spectacular results in the case of the *Daily Express*) and so far the only evidence of provincial expansion appears to be the control of the (Glasgow) *Evening Citizen*, in which George Outram & Co. Ltd., publishers of the *Glasgow Herald* and *Evening Times and Bulletin*, are also interested.

The company is highly profitable and has a remarkably consistent dividend record. Lord Beaverbrook himself is no longer a director but is represented on the Board by his son, the Hon. Max Aitken, Conservative M.P. for Holborn. The other members of the Board are mostly Editors and Managers of these papers.

In 1940 the capital was increased by means of a 200 per cent share bonus in the form of two "A" shares for each ordinary share held. These "A" shares do not carry voting rights which are thus concentrated in the 408,000 ordinary shares issued. Of these (in 1941), 136,507 were held by Lord Beaverbrook and 154,210 by Control Nominees Ltd.

There are signs, however, that this tidy isolationism will not last much longer and that Lord Beaverbrook intends to follow the example of the Harmsworth groups in their assault on the provinces. The report in the *Financial Times* (22.7.46) that "*Lord Beaverbrook has bought a site in Birmingham in order to stir up some healthy competition for the evening newspapers in that opulent city*" has a familiar ring. It is also rumoured that the group intends to start an evening paper in Manchester, thus challenging the Kemsley empire at its heart.

THE LIBERAL GROUPS

Provincial Newspapers Ltd., though of minor importance today, has an interesting history, being the last survivor of the great group formed by the Inveresk paper interests in the twenties, under William Harrison. Starting with the Inveresk Paper Co., Harrison secured control of a great chain of paper mills. To secure a permanent market for these mills the group then acquired Illustrated Newspapers Ltd. (publishers of a number of "class" illustrated weeklies—*Tatler*, *Sphere*, etc.).

In 1928, expansion began in earnest when the group acquired from the Liberal Party fund and Sir Thomas Catto (for £1,142,500) control of the Daily Chronicle Investment Corporation (controlling *Daily Chronicle* and *Sunday News*) and United Newspapers Ltd. (*Edinburgh Evening News* and *Yorkshire Evening News*). Having acquired the Lancashire papers of George Toulmin & Sons Ltd., and a 49 per cent interest in Hull and Grimsby Newspapers Ltd. (see Harmsworth group), all the provincial interests were fused in the present company in 1928.

The collapse of Harrison's empire began the following year. Heavy borrowing from the bank had been necessary to finance the Chronicle purchase. The Inveresk Co. was compelled to guarantee the borrowings of the subsidiaries and finally, after Bank loans had risen to £1,154,954 and the companies' investments valued at £6,231,236 had been pledged to the banks as security, Harrison was removed from the chairmanship and H. C. Binder nominated by the banks as financial adviser.

In 1930 the *Daily Chronicle* was taken over by the *Daily News* to form

the *News Chronicle*, and the following year the *Sunday News* was absorbed by the *Sunday Graphic* (Kemsley). United Newspapers Ltd had a part holding in the *News Chronicle* until this was sold to the Daily News Ltd. in 1936, and finally Illustrated Newspapers Ltd. was sold in 1937 to a group headed by Lord Southwood (late Chairman of Odhams).

Today the group controls four evening papers (*Edinburgh Evening News*, *Lancashire Daily Post* (Preston), *Northampton Chronicle and Echo* and *Yorkshire Evening News*), their local sporting papers, and the following weeklies: *Blackburn Times*, *Burnley Express and News*, *Doncaster Gazette*, *Northampton Independent*, *Northampton Mercury and Herald*, *Preston Guardian* and a chain of eight South London weeklies, in addition to the minority holding in Hull and Grimsby Newspapers Ltd., mentioned above.

Chairman of the Board is Sir Herbert Grottrian, who is also chairman of the holding company (United Newspapers Ltd.). Sir Herbert is chairman of Argus Press Ltd. and its holding company, Argus Press Holdings Ltd., in which he has a large interest. The press, which prints the *Observer* and which used to print both the *Morning Post* and the *Financial News* before their respective amalgamations, has a number of subsidiaries. The most interesting of these is Nuneaton Newspapers Ltd., which publishes the *Nuneaton Observer* and controls, through a further subsidiary, Illustrated Publications Ltd., the weekly *Cavalcade*. Inveresk interests are represented by B. H. Binder, who is connected with a number of South American railways and British breweries, rubber, insurance, property and investment trusts, and by Sir Harry Brittain, Tory M.P. for Acton 1918-29, one of the founders of the Anti-Socialist Union and Hon. President of the Friends of Italy, 1936-39.

In 1943 United Newspapers Ltd. held approximately 50 per cent of the ordinary capital and 33 per cent of the second preference shares. The remainder of the ordinary shares was held between General Investors and Trustees Ltd. (40 per cent) and three members of the Grottrian family, who also held large blocks of the preference capital.*

FURTHER LIBERAL PROVINCIALS

Westminster Press Provincial Newspapers Ltd. is what remains of another group of Liberal tendencies which has abandoned its London interests. Originally known as the Starmer Group, it owned the *Westminster Gazette* (amalgamated with the *Daily News* in 1927) and retained an interest in the *News Chronicle* until 1936, when, as in the case of the "Provincial" group, it was bought out by the Daily News Ltd. The company owns four mornings, nine evenings and one Sunday paper in addition to over twenty weeklies.

First registered as a public company in 1938, Westminster Press Provincial owns all shares of: Barrow News and Mail Ltd. (*North Western Evening Mail*), Bedfordshire Standard Ltd., Birmingham Gazette Ltd. (*Birmingham Gazette*, *Evening Dispatch*, *Sunday Mercury*), Bradford and District Newspaper Co. Ltd. (*Yorkshire Observer*, *Telegraph and Argus*), City & Town Builders Ltd., Darlington & Stockton Times Newspaper Co. Ltd., Wm. Dressers & Sons Ltd.

Durham County Association & General Printing Co. Ltd., Lincolnshire

* On September 6, 1946, however, the *Financial Times* reported that United Newspapers had increased its holding in the operating company to 90 per cent of the ordinary capital by the acquisition of a further 397,500 shares. In exchange the vendors received an allotment of 1,590,000 five shilling ordinary shares in United Newspapers Ltd. As the previous issued ordinary capital of the latter firm was in 1,543,760 shares, this allotment from the unissued capital would appear to give the vendors effective control of the whole group.

General Investors and Trustees is a City Investment Trust whose Chairman, W. C. Cripps, is also Chairman of Lothbury Assets and Land Ltd. and is on the board of the West London and Provincial Electric and General Trust.

Newspaper Ltd., North of England Newspaper Co. Ltd. (*Northern Echo* (Darlington), *Northern Dispatch*), Oxford Times Ltd. (*Oxford Mail*), Stamford Mercury Ltd., Skevne Printing Co. (1937) Ltd., A Smith, Son & Co. Ltd., Swindon Press Ltd (*Evening Advertiser*), Westmorland Gazette Ltd., Wiltshire Gazette Ltd., and has a direct controlling interest in: Bedfordshire Times Publishing Co. Ltd., Lincolnshire Guardian Printing Publishing Co., Northern Press Ltd. (*Shields Evening News*, *Shields Gazette*), Nottingham Journal Ltd. (*Journal*, *Evening News*).

The group has always been closely identified with the Rowntree (cocoa) and Pearson (contracting and electrical) interests. The present Chairman is J. B. Morell, J.P., who is also Chairman of Loxley Bros. Ltd., printers, which controls a number of printing subsidiaries. Linking the board to the Pearson (Cowdray) interests is Lady Denman, D.B.E., a director of S. Pearson & Son Ltd., now a private company. Beryl, Viscountess Cowdray, a director until last year, has now left the board. Another director is A. S. Rowntree,* and a number of the Rowntree family are represented on the share lists, though not with large holdings. The two largest holdings are listed as The Cowdray Trust Ltd., which holds over 46 per cent of both the Ordinary and the Preference Shares and Whitehall Securities Corporation Ltd. (another Cowdray Company), which holds approximately 43 per cent and 32 per cent respectively.†

NEWS CHRONICLE AND STAR

In 1936 the Daily News Ltd. achieved complete control of the News Chronicle Ltd. by buying out the United Newspapers (Inveresk) and the Westminster (Rowntree-Pearson) interests for £582,000. The Daily News Ltd. also controls the *Star* Newspaper Co. Ltd., but has no further newspaper interests.

Control is clearly in the hands of the Cadbury (cocoa) family, members of which, in the last available share list, held a total of 1,697,500 out of an issued total of 1,935,000 2/- ordinary shares, in addition to substantial preference holdings.

ODHAMS PRESS LTD.

This concern is primarily a huge printing firm and the chief rival to the Amalgamated Press in the periodical field. Through a number of subsidiaries it publishes a string of weeklies (*John Bull*, *Punch*, etc.) and trade papers and other miscellaneous publications as diverse as *Sporting Life*, *Debrett* and the *Feathered World*.

Its main newspaper interest is the publication of the *Daily Herald*, referred to on page 16.

The copyright and goodwill of *The People* is owned by the M.L. Publishing and Copyright Co., all ordinary shares of which are owned in turn by another company, Odhams Properties Ltd., which possesses a licence to publish. Odhams Press, in fact, publishes *The People* under a sub-licence from Odhams Properties Ltd.

A. G. Cousins, Chairman of Odhams Press Ltd., since the death of Lord Southwood, is managing director of Investment Registry Ltd., a city issuing

* A. S. Rowntree and J. B. Morell together control the Nation Proprietary Co., which holds a large block of shares in the *New Statesman* and *Nation* Publishing Co. A. S. Rowntree is a director of the latter company and has a controlling interest in the *Contemporary Review*.

† Whitehall Securities Corporation (a private company controlling a large number of electricity supply companies) has also large interests in Greece, where it controls the Société Générale Hellenique, a holding company which operates the Athens-Piræus Electricity Company.

house. Another connection with City finance is through J. S. Ruttle, who is on the board of the Gresham Trust Ltd., and is also Managing Director of Madame Tussauds and on the board of a number of hotel companies

SMALLER GROUPS

Of a number of smaller provincial groups, one of the most interesting is Portsmouth and Sunderland Newspapers Ltd. generally known as the Storey group. This owns the following properties: (Portsmouth) *Evening News* and *Southern Daily Mail*, *Football Mail*, *Hampshire Telegraph and Post*, *Shipping Mail*; (Sunderland) *Sunderland Echo and Shipping Gazette*, *Football Echo*; (West Hartlepool) *Northern Daily Mail*, *Football Mail*.

Control is firmly in the hands of Samuel Storey, Tory M.P. for Sunderland until 1945, a former president of the Newspaper Society, and who, until 1937, controlled the *Newcastle Journal*. In 1941, "S. Storey and others" owned over 50 per cent of the ordinary and 33 per cent of the preference shares of this highly profitable company.

Another small group, based on Dundee, is formed by D. C. Thompson & Co. Ltd., and J. Leng & Co. Ltd. Though their main interest is in their periodicals, which include the *Weekly News*, which has a large circulation in Scotland and the North, they own the *Courier and Advertiser* and *Evening Telegraph and Post* of Dundee, and the *Sunday Post* (Glasgow).

There are also a number of periodical groupings without any newspaper connections. Two worthy of mention are the Newnes-Pearson group (*Tu-bits*, *Country Life*, *Strand Magazine*, etc.) and Hulton Press Ltd (*Picture Post*, *Leader*, *Lilliput*, *Housewife*, etc.), which claims a total circulation of over two million for its three weeklies and three monthlies.

THE "INDEPENDENTS"

Today the only national papers independent of the above combines are two dailies—*The Times* and the *Daily Worker*—and three Sundays—*The Observer*, *Reynolds News* and the *News of the World*.

Both *The Times* and the *Observer* are closely associated with the Astor family.* *The Times* has as proprietors Col. the Hon. J. J. Astor (Chairman of both the Holding and the publishing company) and Mr. J. Walter (deputy chairman), who is a descendant of the original owners. Col. Astor is, among other interests, on the Board of Barclay's Bank, the Great Western Railway, Hambros Bank and the Phoenix Assurance Co. Control of the ordinary shares of the holding company, however, has been regulated (since the death of Lord Northcliffe) by a board of trustees consisting of the Lord Chief Justice, the Warden of All Souls, Oxford, the President of the Royal Society, the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the Governor of the Bank of England.

* The control of *The Times* and the *Observer* is but one facet of the Astor family's successful invasion of British public life, which started with the naturalisation in 1899 of the Anglo-American financier William Waldorf Astor, later (1917) first Viscount. The family fortune had been built up in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, first in the fur trade and then in New York real estate. On the first Viscount's death in 1919, his American fortune alone was estimated at £22,000,000. By the middle thirties, besides Lord Astor in the House of Lords, the family held three seats in the Commons (Lady Astor, the Hon. J. J. Astor, and the Hon. W. W. Astor) and a daughter of Lord Astor's was married to another M.P. (Lord Willoughby de Eresby). Throughout the late thirties, the influence of the family and the "Cliveden" set, named after Lord Astor's country house, on the Chamberlain Government became well known.

Since the resignation of Lady Astor and the Hon. J. J. Astor, and the defeat of the Hon. W. W. Astor in the last election, the family is now directly represented in the House of Commons only by Captain Michael Astor, M.P. for Surrey (Eastern).

The *Observer* is the property of Col. Astor's elder brother, Lord Astor, and is the main mouthpiece of the Astor interests.

The *News of the World*, after the death of Lord Riddell, passed to a group headed by Sir Emsley Carr, who also had a large interest in the *Western Mail* and was a director of George Newnes Ltd. Since his recent death there are no figures available from which control can be deduced.

There also remains a large number of independent provincial papers though, as we have seen, their number tends to shrink yearly. These range in importance from dailies of national reputation (*Manchester Guardian*, *Yorkshire Post*, *Scotsman*, *Glasgow Herald*) to obscure local weeklies with a circulation of a few thousand.

In fact, the word "independent" has little meaning as applied to many of these papers; the *News of the World*, with an authorised capital (£2,500,000) larger than that of some of the groups and a circulation of over four million, has clearly little in common with, for instance, the *Tillicoultry Times* or the *Widnes Weekly News*.

Most of the smaller papers are run by small family businesses, frequently closely associated with the principal business interest of their town of origin and publishing several small weekly papers and sometimes a local evening paper. When a morning paper is added to these, local big business connections are usually more strongly in evidence. For examples, the *Yorkshire Post* published by Yorkshire Conservative Newspapers Ltd., has always been closely associated with the Beckett (Westminster) banking, and big West Riding industrial interests, the *Glasgow Herald* with Clydeside industry and banking, etc.

THE LABOUR PRESS

Labour is represented nationally by the *Daily Herald*, *Daily Worker* and *Reynolds News*. These are unique in that, in differing degrees, control is vested in their readers, in part directly in the case of the *Daily Worker*, through the Co-operative movement in the case of *Reynolds News*, and through the T.U.C. in the case of the *Daily Herald*.

The *Daily Herald* (1929) Ltd. is a company formed as a subsidiary of Odhams Press Ltd. (see p. 14) to take over the publication of the *Daily Herald*. Odhams Press Ltd. own 51 per cent of the shares, thus holding a technical majority control. However, it was laid down at the formation of the company that policy control should lie with the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, who hold the remaining 49 per cent of the shares. In fact the policy in industrial matters is that of the General Council, and in general political matters, that of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party.

Four of the nine directors are appointed by the General Council of the T.U.C., and four by Odhams Press Ltd., with the chairman of Odhams presiding.

Reynolds News was purchased by the Co-operative movement in 1929 from Lord Dalziel for £150,000. It is owned, together with other co-operative publications, by the Co-operative Press Ltd., which is registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act and whose membership consists of several hundred Co-operative societies. The board of directors is elected annually by a meeting of representatives of the member societies and in turn elects its own chairman. The board is divided into sub-committees which deal with the interests of the society in London, Glasgow, and Manchester. A daily paper under the same auspices is expected to appear when the paper control is lifted.

The *Daily Worker* represents a further application of the Co-operative principle to newspaper ownership. The People's Press Printing Society was

registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act in June, 1945, and acquired the *Daily Worker*, which was founded in 1930 as the organ of the Communist Party, on January 1, 1946. Shares are held by over 18,000 individuals and 500 organisations (mostly Trade Union branches and executives and Co-operative societies). Holdings by individuals or organisations other than co-operative societies are limited to £200, and control is by the election of the management committee by the society's members.

Any summary of the Labour press would be incomplete without a mention of the various Labour and co-operative weeklies and monthly periodicals which flourish in a large number of localities. The *Birmingham Town Crier*, *Labour's Northern Voice*, *Forward* (Glasgow), the *Leeds Weekly Citizen*, and the *Scottish Co-operator* are among the best known. Labour opinion is even more weakly represented in the Provincial than in the national newspaper field, and these enterprising papers help to fill the gap. There is a clear need for local Labour evening papers. When they are established it may well be on the foundation laid by the local weeklies and monthlies.

INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE

It is clear that the mere fact of the "independence" of a newspaper may mean anything or nothing. A Tory newspaper representing big industrial interests remains a Tory newspaper and, as such, hostile to the Labour movement and the Labour Government, whether it stands on its own or whether it is part of one of the big chains.

The proposed Royal Commission could, if appointed, delve beneath the morass of holding and nominee companies to elicit those details concerning their control which are at present unobtainable, pending action on the Cohen Committee's report on the reform of Company Law.

This, however, is only a small part of the problem. In addition to the question of direct control as a factor in moulding the character of the Press there is the equally important problem of advertising pressure. During the war years this had tended to drop out of sight with the enormous reduction of advertising space, and revenue, which has been forced upon the Press by rationing of newsprint.

In 1938 it was estimated that advertising revenue made up more than half the income of most of the national dailies, and further that, out of the estimated total of £85,000,000 spent on advertising in a normal year, £35,000,000 went to the newspapers. The effect of this was well understood before the war. Not only can the vast sum of money be used to influence papers in the direction desired by the advertisers, who in general represent the same class of large scale capitalists as the newspaper owners (so that there is not usually any vital conflict of interest) but its withdrawal is the most effective sanction that can be used against a paper that takes an independent line.

NEWSPAPER COSTS

These two pressures, proprietorial and advertising, link up with the greatest obstacle to the building up of a really representative Press in this country, that of the enormous cost of establishing a new paper. Even before the war, it was estimated that it was necessary to spend a minimum of two million pounds in setting up a new national daily and that most of that sum would have to go not on capital goods (plant, etc.), but in building up goodwill. That this is not necessarily true is shown by the example of the *Daily Worker*, but the estimate was based on the usual 16-20 page size of the bulk of the pre-war national Press, and included allowances for elaborate canvassing and advertising campaigns. With these reservations the figure was probably correct, though it would undoubtedly be higher

today. It is said that this sum had to be spent by Odhams on the *Daily Herald* before it began to show a profit.

Up to now the public has demanded big 16-24 page papers, which have to depend largely on advertising and to lean upon high finance for their existence. Fortunately, there is plenty of evidence that the people are less and less influenced by the political bias of the big Press. The results of the General Election and the failure of the Press scares launched against the Labour Government in the last year, are proof of that. At the same time the need for a Press which is more in line with the advance of Socialism is urgent.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

What are the remedies? An interesting suggestion was put forward in the P.E.P. Report on the Press (1938), to the effect that the plant and equipment of the newspapers could be owned by a public trust and let out on contract to organisations who wished to own newspapers. The trust would take no part in the running of the papers, but might advance money to new groups until they were established. In the event of a group failing, its plant could be let to a new group or taken over by an expanding one. Such a plan might have its defects, but should certainly make it easier to start new papers. Some form of control aimed at the elimination of distortion and misrepresentation in news columns and undue advertising influences has been widely discussed, but would clearly be very difficult to operate without restricting freedom of comment.

The only suggestion for reform from the newspapers themselves so far has come, oddly, from Mr. John Gordon, editor of the *Sunday Express* and one of Lord Beaverbrook's chief lieutenants, who told the Institute of Journalists as long ago as June 4, 1945:

"If I were ruler of a country I would make it law that no one owner or editor should control more than one newspaper."

An admirable sentiment, though Mr. Gordon appears to have changed his views in the meantime. It is worth pointing out, however, that the circulation of the *Daily Express*, the chief Beaverbrook organ, is approximately half as great again as the estimated pre-war total circulation of all the provincial morning Press—chain and "independent."

THE FUTURE

We may expect that in the future the chain Press will endeavour to continue its expansion by the same methods as it has used in the last twenty years. The expression: "a free and independent Press" comes to have less and less meaning yearly. Large scale development has been virtually halted during the war but when the supply of newsprint improves the stage will be set for an all-out battle among the big groups for circulation and advertising revenue, supported by all the resources of sensationalism, scares, stunts, and high pressure canvassing which characterised the pre-war years.

The Labour movement has its answer. Not the least of the tasks which it must face today is that of building up a vital democratic Socialist Press which will represent the people of Britain rather than the Rothermeres, Kemsleys and Beaverbrooks and their big business associates. The coming circulation battle will be the test, and it is in an all-out drive for the support of their own papers that the working class can hit the Press Lords hardest. That the people should know what are the interests that control the papers they read is but the first step in the campaign. •


SOME WARTIME PROFITS

A remarkable feature of the war years is the spectacular increase in the profits of many newspaper companies, despite the loss of advertising revenue. This is more than offset by the savings due to smaller papers and the abandonment of canvassing and other expensive weapons in the circulation war. The figures for some of the principal companies are set out in the table below.

COMPANY	Authorised Capital £000	Debentures outstanding £000	TRADING PROFITS (£000)							
			39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46
Associated Newspapers Ltd	4100	740	44 ^c	401	469	535	567	623	352a	359a
Daily Mail & General Trust Ltd	4000	—	191b	206b	252b	282b	304b	339b	352b	—
Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd	2200	179	301	291	154	193	97a	97a	113a	168a
Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd	2000	—	156	176	184	168	223	127a	125a	159a
Kemsley Newspapers Ltd	9250	3112	870	938	997	1054	1114	1503	1539	—
Amalgamated Press, Ltd	6200	1314 } 898 }	488c	503c	594c	750c	973c	1001c	1002c	1237c
Kelly's Directories, Ltd	1150	1216	204	124	44	184	269	318	328	—
London Express Newspapers Ltd	2725	—	137c	299c	175c	175c	174c	168c	169c	—
United Newspapers, Ltd	2000	—	40	24	34	34	34	44	41	—
Provincial Newspapers, Ltd	3600	—	159	189	266	287	280	311	318	—
Wimborner Press Provincial Newspapers, Ltd	1000	412	92	112	105	98	95	103	76a	—
Odhams Press Ltd	2125	1434	379	492	618	772	872	1042	1148	—
News of the World, Ltd	2500	—	465	545	535	667	196c	210c	207c	—
Portsmouth & Sunderland Newspapers, Ltd	610	—	110	97	97	100	106	127	158	166
George Outram & Co Ltd	900	—	77	85	96	105	103	103	112	—
Birmingham Post & Mail, Ltd	1750	500	—	—	—	—	95d	102d	256	—
Liverpool Daily Post & Echo, Ltd	900	—	185	228	287	289	277	288	290	333

a. After deduction of income tax. (Associated Newspapers 1945 figure is equivalent to 660 on old basis. Daily Mirror 1946 figure is equivalent to 488) b. Total income c. Net Profit. d. Six months

The Labour Research Department is a body financed and controlled by affiliated Trade Unions and organisations of the Labour Movement to provide a fact-finding service. It publishes a monthly "Labour Research" (4d., 5d. post free). Write for full particulars to L.R.D., 45 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, W.C.2 (Holborn 4079) September, 1946.



GREECE: 'THE FACTS'

by Leslie J. Solley, M.P.



Leslie J. Solley is Labour M.P. for the Thurrock Division of Essex, which constituency includes Tilbury and Grays. A Barrister by profession, he took a Science Degree at the University of London before deciding on Law. He has done research work in atomic physics. A Member of the Labour Party for over twenty years (he is forty years of age), he has always taken a deep interest in foreign affairs, and is the Honorary Treasurer of the League for Democracy in Greece.

STOP PRESS

(April 3, 1946)

The Greek elections were held on March 31. The British newspaper correspondents, with a single exception, stayed near Athens on polling day. The remaining one, Peter Burchett, of the *Daily Express*, was in Salonica. He wrote "Since yesterday evening there have been a wave of arrests of EAM supporters, many others fleeing into the mountains to avoid what they believe to be a reign of terror for the Leftists in the next few days."

I repeat, this is the only evidence of a British correspondent who was well outside the Athens area on polling day. As to those who remained in Athens, three of them attempted to discredit EAM's allegations of terror by all reporting the same story of how they interviewed two young men at Eleusis, not far from Athens, who said they had been beaten up. The marks on their bodies were so slight as to make the allegation appear ridiculous. This same story was told, with minor variations, by the correspondents of the *Daily Mail*, *Daily Herald* and *Daily Telegraph*, who apparently did their election day reporting together. It was then quoted in the leading article of the *Manchester Guardian*.

Only the *Daily Worker* and the *Daily Mirror* referred to the fact that Manganas, leader of the Kalamata revolt described in Chapter 10 of this pamphlet, was still at liberty on polling day and involved in two more murders of democrats on that day.

Owing to the fact that some 500,000 of the 2,211,000 names on the electoral register were of non-existent persons, the Government had promised, right up to the eve of the poll, that voters' fingers would be marked with indelible ink to prevent them returning and voting a second or third time in the name of non-existent voters. On the eve of poll this sole precaution against such fraudulent voting was abandoned.

Despite the above evidence of terror, fraudulent voting and the fact that the Monarchists threatened civil servants with the loss of their jobs if they abstained, it has been officially recognised that barely 50 per cent. of the electorate went to the polls. This contrasts sharply with other liberated European countries where the percentage of polling in recent elections was as follows: Austria, 80 per cent.; Bulgaria, 98 per cent.; Finland, 80 per cent., and France, 85 per cent.

It must also be borne in mind that the British and Greek authorities were particularly concerned to achieve a high poll in order to discredit the Democratic Centre and EAM for their policy of abstention. Actually, in the circumstances existing in Greece, the official admission that 50 per cent. abstained is remarkable, and as Premier Sofoulis said on April 2, "represents the people's protest against the way in which the elections were held."

The new Government will presumably be formed by the Populists, the Monarchist party of Greece. Of a 50 per cent. poll they just received over half the votes. They thus can claim to represent just over a quarter of the voters of Greece. As the women were not allowed to vote, the Populists have received the votes of just over one-eighth of the Greek adult population. These are the people who will now rule Greece.

We in Britain bear a grave responsibility for this situation

1. INTRODUCTION.

The Greek tragedy moves rapidly to a climax. As I write these lines, this 27th day of March, 1946, talk of Civil War is in the air.

The *New Statesman* ten days ago declared that, with the Left not taking part in the elections, these can under present conditions have no other possible results than a Right-Wing Dictatorship or Civil War. And yet Mr. Bevin still insists that elections should be held. Indeed, the *New Statesman* is constrained to say of Mr. Bevin's policy that he is no longer thinking of democracy or even preventing Fascism, but only of strengthening the forces of the Right in his battle against pro-Soviet elements.

What is the truth about Greece? What are the facts? These are the sort of questions posed by a perplexed public, disturbed at the criticisms of the Government's foreign policy from well-informed quarters which would normally be expected to be friendly to the Government. It is in an attempt to supply a factual background to the present situation in Greece, in order that these and similar questions may be satisfactorily answered that I have written this pamphlet.

There are books in plenty which deal with the geography of Greece, its history from classical times to the end of the Balkan Wars, and its political history from 1914 to the time of the German invasion. There are many books which provide an adequate picture of the daily life of the Greek people before the events with which this pamphlet deals, and there are many sources of information about the pre-war economic structure of Greece. I have, therefore, in this pamphlet decided to deal only with those matters essentially of a political character which are necessary for an understanding of the present situation in Greece, and which are not dealt with adequately or at all in any works available to the general public.

The information I give to the reader is largely based upon a careful analysis of official and newspaper reports from Greece of every variety of political hue. I have also made use of the information which I have gathered from talks with some of my Parliamentary colleagues who have visited Greece, and from talks which I have had with all manner of Greek politicians, including the recent EAM Delegation to this country. I have sifted and analysed the evidence and have attempted to put forward a viewpoint which is reasonably objective. If I have a bias, I will confess at once that it is against Fascism in any of its forms and in any of its implications !

2. WHY ARE WE IN GREECE ?

Indeed, why are we in Greece ? There is a diversity of opinion upon this point. What was the official explanation given when our troops landed in Greece in October, 1944 ? According to the minutes of the conference that drew up the Caserta Agreement, on the basis of which we moved into Greece, even at that stage there was a dispute between the spokesmen of the National Resistance Forces and the British Authorities as to the ambit of the duties to be undertaken by the British Forces. General Scobie put forward his aim as the restoration of law and order in Greece, so that the reconstruction of the country would be undertaken under the guidance of the Greek Government during the time when relief measures were put in operation. But the Resistance Representative presented the thesis that the restoration of "law and order" was a purely internal affair coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Greek Government.

The view of the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Greece was restated by Mr. Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on December 21st, 1944, in the following words. "Our aim is to maintain law and order and establish a Greek Government broadly representative of all opinion in Greece including EAM." (EAM is the National Resistance Movement.) On the other hand, the attitude of the Labour Party was expressed at the December 1944 Conference in the following declaration : "This Conference . . . calls upon the British Government to take all necessary steps to facilitate an armistice without delay and to secure the resumption of conversations between all sections of the people who have resisted the Fascist and Nazi invaders, with a view to the establishment of a provisional national Government which would proceed to a full and fair election."

I will only comment upon the above statements of policy by saying that, while the Greek Resistance Movement from the very first did not admit the right of British troops to "restore law and order," this being a policy emanating entirely from ourselves and Greek Right-Wing circles, both the British Government of the time and the Labour Party recognised the importance and necessity of the part which the Resistance Movement had to play in the governing of Greece.

3. BRITON FIGHTS GREEK.

The tragic events of December, 1944, when British guns were levelled against Greeks who had fought for the allied cause, were not completely unexpected by those who had studied the Churchillian policy of supporting the Right in the hope that the Left would be prevented from gaining power. The reactionary Papandreou, then

Prime Minister, had made no secret of his belief that British tanks would facilitate his plan of fighting the National Liberation Front and their troops.

The immediate and outward cause that led to the December fighting was Papandreou's attempt to disarm the Resistance Movement, without the corresponding disarming of the Right-Wing Mountain Brigade and Sacred Battalion, hotbeds of Fascism. An unarmed demonstration in Athens, which protested at the disbanding of the Resistance Movement in these circumstances, was fired on by the police. As *The Times* newspaper said in its issue of December 5th, this dastardly attack took place "before any breach of the peace was committed . . . maintaining that fire for a considerable length of time against the demonstrators." General Scobie, following his instructions from Mr. Churchill, supported Papandreou. The EAM representatives in the Government resigned and a general strike was declared. General Scobie issued an ultimatum, and that was followed by fighting between British troops and Greeks. The British Authorities were somewhat surprised to discover that the Greek resisters were not so easy a prey as had been thought. Churchill and Eden hastened to Athens and the Regency was established. It was at Varkiza that "peace" was officially declared on February 12th, 1945. The following provisions of the agreement, having regard to subsequent events, are of great significance.

- (a) "The free expression of the political opinions of citizens, repealing any existing illiberal law."
- (b) "Amnesty is granted for political offences committed from December 3rd, 1944, up to the signing of this Agreement."
- (c) "The Government will proceed, through committees or councils, to be established by a special law, to the purging of the staffs of the state, municipal, community and other Government agencies, and of institutions under state control" on the basis of competence, character, morals or "collaboration with the enemy or service as a tool of the dictatorship."
- (d) "The purge of the Security Battalions, the Gendarmerie and the city police."

(Quoted in the *White Book of EAM*, published by the Greek-American Council, August, 1945.)

It is no exaggeration to say—and it is indeed in complete conformity with the facts—that not one of these provisions has been carried out. No better testimony, in this regard, could be had than the statement of John Sofianopoulos, former Greek Foreign Minister, and original leader of the Greek delegation to the United Nations in London, which was reported in the *News Chronicle* of February 4th of this year :

"I avail myself of the opportunity to observe that, as I have said to British officials in London, we cannot speak about

the possibility of free and genuine elections unless a wide amnesty is granted. This was not granted by the most inefficient law which the government issued, aimed at 'decongestion of the prisons.' Secondly, terrorism by responsible organisations and by State organs must cease. This terrorism was manifested in recent events at Kalamata. Thirdly, the State machine must be purged of all the Fascist and reactionary elements which remain at their posts, although they are remnants both of the dictatorship and enemy occupation."

It is little to be wondered at that, when these allegations were quoted by M. Vyshinsky at the Security Council, Mr. Ernest Bevin made no reference to them in his reply.

While it is beyond argument that the terms of the Varkiza Agreement have not been fulfilled, it is interesting to observe that no suggestion has been made from any responsible quarter that the Left have not strictly observed their obligations under the Agreement. In the light of these facts, and those that I refer to hereafter, it is not surprising that EAM should have declared that, unless a government was formed which was capable of carrying out a purge of the State apparatus, granting a complete amnesty and compiling a fair electoral register, it would abstain from the elections.

4. THE ROLE OF BRITAIN IN GREECE.

The Varkiza Agreement having been signed, what was the role which Britain played in Greece? Was it to make or unmake Governments? "No!" answered Hector McNeil on February 6th of this year in the House of Commons. Said Mr. Ernest Bevin to the Security Council: "It is not power politics, it is not economic interest which attaches us to Greece." But did Mr. Bevin, when he made that remark, remember what he told the Labour Party conference in 1944: "The British Empire cannot abandon its position in the Mediterranean", and did Mr. Hector McNeil, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, overlook his remark when, in an off-the-record talk to the Second Wednesday Club on January 9th of this year, he said, "Britain must not lose Greece as she would lose Italy and Turkey as well."

But the dependence of Greece on Britain, in so far as it is of an economic character, is nothing new. The Royal Institute of International Affairs says: "This dependence, which is perhaps most remarkable in the case of Greece, may be illustrated by the fact that at the end of 1931 the proportion of ordinary budget expenditure allocated to debt service (almost entirely that of the foreign debts) . . . was actually over 30% . . . It was estimated by the financial committee of the League in 1933 that the amount in drachmas required to pay the full foreign debt service, including amortisation, was no less than 4,746.6 million drachmas, as against total draft estimates of

expenditure of that year of 7,054.6 millions." (*The Balkan States I. Economic*, 1936, pp. 9 and 103). The greater part of this debt burden was due to British capitalist interests.

The economic dependence of Greece on Britain is therefore obvious. Nor, whatever might be the expressed policy of the British Government, is that policy without decisive influence on the creation and composition of Greek Governments. It is an irresistible inference from the facts that not a single Greek Government has held office since December, 1944, without the consent of Sir Rex Leeper, the British Ambassador, or his successor. I well remember how Labour Members of Parliament complimented Mr. Hector McNeil on what then appeared to many to be his successful visit to Greece and the consequent setting up of the Sofoulis Government, as a result of his direct and personal intervention. No clearer proof, however, could be required of this policy of intervention than the way in which Mr. Bevin has imposed his views about the elections on the Greek Government. But of this I shall speak in greater detail later.

Britain's power of intervention in Greek affairs is, of course, based upon the presence of British troops, which number at least 40,000. A British "advisory" mission under General Rawlings has a direct say in all military questions. A police mission under Sir Charles Wickham has complete supervisory powers over the Greek gendarmerie and police. Greek currency is now under the control of the Currency Committee on which there are a British and a United States representative, and whose decisions must be unanimous. To complete the picture, there is a 'highly qualified consultative mission on financial, economic and industrial matters' under the leadership of Lt.-Gen. Clark. Nor must one forget the British representatives working in a number of Greek Ministries. Thus is justified EAM's complaint that "the colonization of Greece is complete."

If any further evidence is required of the nature and extent of British intervention in Greek affairs, it is provided by the former Vice-Premier, Mr. Kafandaris, who, on his resignation on March 9th of this year, declared that the British military and police missions had prevented the Greek Government from making changes of personnel in the police, army and gendarmerie, while the Greek people remained under the impression that the Government itself was refusing to make the necessary purge.

How long are British troops to stay in Greece? I quote the statement of Mr. Bevin at UNO on February 4th: "It is the policy of the British Government to try and get a stable Government out of the election and to carry out what we have told the Greek Government: as soon as they have got that over and they have got their government, they should by that time have the police organised and such army as they need—within a very short time anyway—and we want to withdraw."

That was what Mr. Bevin said at UNO. But on March 26th Premier Sofoulis announced that he wished the British troops to remain in Greece after the elections. And the Monarchists, who under existing conditions are guaranteed victory in the elections, have declared that they wish British troops to remain in the country even after the new Government assumes office.

In face of these facts, the holding of elections on March 31st cannot be justified, as the British Foreign Office has tried to justify it, on the grounds that it will speed up the withdrawal of British troops from Greece.

5. GREEK ECONOMIC CHAOS.

The British troops that landed in Greece in 1944 came to a country which had suffered the most appalling destruction during its occupation by the Germans. The Greek Resistance fighters had torn up railway lines and sabotaged industry. The retreating Germans had deliberately set out to destroy as much of the remaining productive resources of the country as they could. Here is an example of the effect which the war had on the economy of the country : on the main railway network in the north, where there were 218 railway locomotives before 1940, there were 30 at the beginning of this year. An additional 16 have only recently been added by UNRRA. As to agriculture, Mr. Maben, the UNRRA Chief in Greece, has stated that last year's harvest was only 60% of the sowing, and that the sown area was itself only 80% of pre-war. As to housing, there are at least 500,000 people homeless, 110,000 houses having been destroyed during the occupation. So far, UNRRA has assisted in the repairing of not more than 20,000 houses. And as to the health of the people, it is a sufficient indication to say that out of 7,000,000 of them, two and one-third million suffer from malaria.

Failure to attain a stabilised economy has caused intense suffering to the working class and those with fixed incomes. Early this year, prices on the Greek "Free Market" were 120 times those of the pre-war period. As to food prices, 2,000 calories are estimated to cost 40% of a man's wages. The vacillations in the value of the drachma have been fantastic. Before the war the gold sovereign was worth 1,100 drachmas. Last December it had risen to over 180,000 drachmas, but had fallen to 120,000 prior to the Anglo-Greek Economic Agreement. The Government is now attempting to stabilise wages at 60 times the pre-war level—and this while admitting that prices are 100 times those of pre-war. The Greek T.U.C., however, does not accept the government's figures and maintains that prices are now 150 to 200 times the pre-war level. It was as a protest against the government's stabilisation policy, that an all-Greek two-hour general strike took place on February 14th of this year.

I will end this very short description of the economic chaos in Greece with a quotation from Geoffrey Hoare, the *News Chronicle*

Athens correspondent, in the issue of that newspaper of March 14th :

"The economic situation is again causing concern. The British economic mission which came out after the conclusion of the Anglo-Greek Agreement then declared that they could 'hold' prices for one month. What happened thereafter depended upon the Greek Government's efforts. Hardly anything has been done ; there is grave danger of another inflation, unless a strong, stable government takes control . . . The Greek Government managed to stabilise the price of the gold pound by selling sovereigns with which they were supplied with 800,000. There are only 300,000 left, enough it is estimated for another month. When they have gone, the price of gold will soar, taking with it prices of all other commodities and economic collapse is likely to follow."

6. THE GREEK TRADE UNION MOVEMENT.

In the midst of this economic and political chaos it is important to arrive at a proper estimation of the make-up and power of the Greek Trade Union Movement. It was in January, 1945, that Sir Walter Citrine visited Greece, and he found that the only Trade Unionists he had known in the old days, prior to the Metaxas Dictatorship, were associated with EAM. They were Theos, Kalomiris and Stratis. Not one of them signed the Agreement with Citrine on the holding of Trade Union elections, because of the vast number of trade unionists in gaol or in hiding. On the other hand, an individual by the name of Hadjidimitriou, accused by the other leaders of having collaborated with the enemy, headed the list of signatories to this Agreement. In the light of subsequent events, these facts are not without significance.

From January, 1945, onwards the Greek Trade Unions have laboured under very great difficulties. Four groupings showed themselves within the Greek Confederation of Labour (the Greek equivalent to our T.U.C.). In addition there is the group of Hadjidimitriou, which was completely routed in the first Trade Union elections held in Greece after the departure of Sir Walter Citrine, and which thereafter worked outside the main body of the Greek T.U.C. The first of these elections in Athens and Piraeus, were supervised on behalf of the British T.U.C. by Messrs. Feather and Papworth.

Of these four groups, the largest, and one which incidentally received an overwhelming majority of votes in almost every Trade Union election, was led by Theos, and known as the ERGAS group, or the Workers' Anti-Fascist Coalition. Its close association with EAM explains its wide mass support.

Strangely enough, the second largest group was led by a declared supporter of the Monarchists—Makris. It is not, however, to be

wondered at that with this monarchical leadership of the working class, this group refused to participate in the Trades Union Congress held this March. That they have now been excluded from the Greek Confederation of Labour, with the full agreement of the representatives of the World Federation of Trades Unions, who were present at the Congress, is a sufficient pointer to the political quality of this group.

The two remaining groups are small, and were created by Stratis and Kalomiris who, after the events of December, 1944, decided to leave EAM.

The relative strength of these groupings is clearly illustrated in the voting which attended the elections to the Provisional Executive whose function it was to convene and organise the Congress held this March. ERGAS received 71% of the votes cast, Makris 21%, Stratis 5%, and Kalomiris 2.5%. Unfortunately the Voulgaris Government, pursuing its policy of preventing ERGAS, because of its association with EAM, from having a participation in the Greek Trade Union Movement proportionate to its actual strength, passed a decree which made it illegal for any single grouping to have more than five seats in the executive of 15. The Sofoulis Government did not repeal this decree and hence ERGAS's representation was limited to five seats. Thus does the State interfere in the affairs of the Trade Union Movement ! Notwithstanding this, the supremacy of ERGAS in the Trade Union Movement has been amply established, and they and the groups of Kalomiris and Stratis are now closely working together

7. THE POLITICAL PARTIES.

It is impossible properly to understand the policies of the different political groupings in Greece, and certainly quite impossible to understand the complications of Greek politics, without some knowledge of the numerous Parties which claim the attention of the Greek people. I think that they can be clearly divided into the Left, comprising Parties within the EAM Coalition ; then those Parties which, while not within the EAM Coalition, have some contact with it ; then the Centre and its Liberal associations, and finally the Right. The following is a summary of these different trends in Greek politics.

(a) The Parties of EAM.

There are five Parties within the EAM coalition, of which the Communist Party is the strongest :

(i) The *Communist Party* is led by N. Zachariades and had 400,000 members at the time of the liberation of Greece, an equivalent, in proportion to population, of 2,800,000 in this country. It held a Congress in October, 1945, at which it raised the question of the foundation of a new International to unite " all Labour Parties that believe in Socialism " , it stressed that the Greek people were

ready to reach agreement with Britain "on the basis of equality and mutual respect;" it sharply condemned the effects of British intervention; and it stressed the national claims of Greece—to be peacefully achieved.

(ii) *The Radical Democratic Party* was formed early in 1945, and is led by the former Populist Deputy Kyrkos, who worked with EAM during the Occupation, and A. Loulis, a former Liberal Deputy. The latter was a member of the EAM delegation to Britain and the U.S.S.R. I had the advantage of a long discussion with him as to the political set-up in Greece. The Radical Democratic Party is strongest in Epirus.

(iii) *The Agrarian Party*. The Agrarian Party is led by Gavriahides, a former Deputy. EAM has officially given encouragement to the peasants to enrol in the Agrarian Party, as a result of which it has grown considerably. Thessaly and Macedonia are its strongholds. It published a weekly newspaper by the name of *Neos Dromos*.

(iv) *The Socialist Party of Greece* is led by the veteran Socialist, J. Passilides, Professor Georgalas and others. The latter was a member of the EAM delegation to Britain.

(v) *The Democratic Union* has as prominent members Kritikas and Prominakis. The latter, while on a recent tour in the Peloponnese, was seriously injured by a terrorist gang.

(b) The ELD Socialists.

This Party was formed in 1941 after the Occupation, Tsirimokos being the Secretary at that time. They were among the first founders of EAM. After the Varkiza Agreement, the ELD Socialists left EAM. Those members of the Party, however, who chose to remain within EAM, formed the Socialist Party of Greece above mentioned. Professor Svolos is now the leader of the Party. In policy the ELD Socialists tend to work parallel with EAM while being opposed to unity with them. They publish the daily newspaper *Machi*.

The above Parties, together with the Left Liberals described below, roughly comprise the Greek Left.

(c) The Union of Democratic Clubs.

Led by General Othoneos, former Commander-in-Chief and former Premier, this "Union" includes many Liberals and also Socialists and Communists. It is not a political party, but a broad organisation of all democrats. They were responsible for recently staging a most successful demonstration in Athens, and they recently held an All-Greek Democratic Congress to discuss ways and means of achieving democracy and for the formation of a free Democratic Administrative Council.

(d) Greek Liberalism.

Greek Liberalism was founded by Eleftheros Venizelos, whose personality was the basis of the Party's unity from 1910 until his death in 1936. Since his death, Greek Liberalism has been constantly torn between the leftward and rightist tendencies, and has suffered grievously in the process.

With the passing of Venizelos, the Liberal Party came under the leadership of Themistocles Sofoulis, the present Premier, and remained united until the German occupation.

The Liberal Party opposed the Metaxas dictatorship, but did not carry on any active struggle against it. Sofoulis himself was never arrested or exiled by the dictatorship.

(i) *Left Liberals.* After the Occupation, the more progressive Liberals urged Sofoulis to play an active part in the Resistance. As he refused, the Left Wing of the Party broke away and formed the Left Liberal Group led by General Grigoriades (who was one of the recent EAM delegation to London), Hadgibeis, the former Liberal Deputy, and others. They played an active part in the Resistance, and have closely collaborated with EAM without actually joining the EAM coalition. They include some 30 former Deputies, lawyers and other prominent personalities. They form part of the Left in Greek politics.

(ii) *Gonatas Group.* During the occupation General Gonatas, deputy leader of the Liberal Party, became the unofficial promoter of the quisling Security Battalions, which kept "law and order" for the Germans. It was on the advice of Gonatas, that many Liberal officers of the Greek Army joined the Security Battalions.

After the Liberation, Gonatas broke away from the Liberal Party and together with some of the most Right-Wing elements of the Liberals, formed a new group called the National Liberals, now part of the Greek Right.

(iii) *Sophocles Venizelos.* Sophocles Venizelos owes his career to the great reputation of his father. After the formation of the Metaxas dictatorship, S. Venizelos volunteered to become Vice-President, but this offer was rejected by Metaxas. Venizelos's political creed stands exposed by his own declaration in an article published in *Eleftheria* on July 31st, 1939, when he said that he had assisted the Metaxas dictatorship and declared that he did not believe any longer in parliamentary government.

During the Middle East revolt of April, 1944, he was appointed Premier in Cairo, but held this office for only twenty days. He was succeeded by the reactionary Papandreou.

When Sofoulis became Premier in November, 1945, the Party elected Venizelos as temporary leader on Sofoulis's recommendation. It was in this capacity that Venizelos signed an agreement with the Populists, without the knowledge of the Party Executive

or of Sofoulis. Although this agreement was repudiated by Sofoulis and the Party, Venizelos was not expelled.

Venizelos has now formed a new party, the Liberal Venizelist Party, with the result that the original Liberal Party of Greece, built up by his father, has split into four fragments : the Left Liberals the Sofoulis Liberals, the Gonatas Group, who call themselves National Liberals, and now the new Liberal grouping of S. Venizelos. These last two are now openly united with the Right.

(e) The Smaller Centre Parties.

Apart from the Liberals there are a number of small parties of the Centre attached to the particular Ministers who have recently resigned from the Sofoulis Government. Thus, John Sofianopoulos leads a group now known as the Left Republicans ; Kafandaris, the Progressive Republicans; and Mylonas, the Agrarian Republicans.

(f) The Parties of the Right.

There is one main party, *the Populists* (Monarchists), together with the minor parties of Papandreou (see below), Gonatas (see above), and S. Venizelos (see above). There are also numerous armed terrorist organisations, foremost of which is the " X " organisation. There is also the secret Military League.

The Populist (Monarchist Party, for many years known as the Anti-Venizelist party, was until 1936 under the leadership of P. Tsaldaris. In the course of the occupation, the party leadership passed to a committee of three : C. Tsalderis (a nephew of the former leader), John Theotokis and Mavromichalis.

In the elections of April, 1936, they emerged as the second largest party after the Liberals. During the Metaxas dictatorship they remained completely inactive, many of their members even supporting the regime. John Rallis, one of the leading members of the Party, became quising Prime Minister in 1943, and was after the Liberation sentenced to life imprisonment. Theotokis remained in Corfu, his native island, all through the occupation, and was on good terms with the Italians. He is now a candidate in the election !

The Populist Party is closely collaborating with minor Monarchists and reactionary parties.

The *Socialist Democratic Party* of Papandreou was first formed in 1934. Up to that time Papandreou was a leading member of the Liberal Party. In the Parliament of 1936 Papandreou's Party was represented by two Deputies. It was first called a National Demo-

cratic Party. During the German occupation, Papandreou was asked by EAM to join it and was offered its leadership. Like all other Right Wing and Centre politicians, he did not accept. His attitude was that of indifference. It was after the Varkiza Agreement that a letter proclaiming Papandreou's allegiance to the King was published. Even his own paper, *Kathimerina Nea*, then disowned him.

The "X" organisation consists of armed Monarchists who are active throughout Greece. About the time of the Kalamata outrage they formed the *National "X" Party*. The "X" is the sign on the Gluecksburg crown. The leader of the organisation is General Grivas. Although the Athens and Piraeus offices of the "X"-ites were closed after the Kalamata events, they have now been allowed to re-open and take part in the election.

The Military League is a Monarchist secret organisation which was formed within the Army in Egypt. Tsouderos was the first publicly to denounce it, but no steps have been taken to suppress its activities.

8. GREEK FASCISM IN ACTION.

It would be possible to read through the whole of the above list of Greek political parties and yet ask "Where does Fascism come in, none of these parties are called Fascist?"

The answer is to be found in the fact that in 1936 a Fascist dictatorship was set up in Greece under General Metaxas, closely modelled on the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. Responsibility for this dictatorship rested with the King, King George II of the Hellenes. All the Parties of the Right that are demanding the return of the King to Greece are thus supporting a restoration of power to those responsible for Greek Fascism. This is why the question of the Monarchy in Greece is so important today.

The machinery of State in Greece is riddled with monarchist Fascists. The main official Fascist organisation, which has also a Monarchist basis, is the notorious "X" organisation. Illegal prior to the bloody battles of December, 1944, because of its collaboration with the enemy from whom it had received armaments, and with whom it had joined in punitive expeditions against the Greek National Liberation Movement, its members, with the arrival of the British Army "volunteered" for the so-called National Guard. Since then, they have come out more and more in the open. There are two other Fascist organisations which I ought to mention. The first is SAN (Military League) whose function it is to unite Fascist and Monarchist elements throughout the Army and Police. Its operations, however, are underground. The other is the Populist

Party who are supporters of the Monarchy and objectively Fascist in their policy and conduct.

It is the Prime Minister, Sofoulis, to whom we are indebted for an open confession of the extent of Fascist activity. On January 5th, speaking to representatives of the Greek Confederation of Labour, he stated that the "X"-ites had disgracefully worked their way into the State apparatus until they now dominated four-fifths of it.

What are some of the results of this Fascist domination of the apparatus of the State? The number of Fascist outrages is ever increasing, while neither the military nor the police take adequate measures to meet this menace. Murders kidnappings, the blowing up of Left-Wing newspaper premises and the homes of leading Left-Wing politicians, individual assaults against the leaders of the Left—all these, the authorities are seemingly powerless to prevent.

While the persecution of the Left proceeds apace outside the confines of the State prisons, within them the persecution continues by way of the confinement of vast numbers of political prisoners. And this, despite the much advertised "amnesty" of last December, officially known by the somewhat odious title of "law for the de-congestion of the prisons." It is difficult to give an estimate of the number of persons so imprisoned. According to some reports in the British Press on December 11th, 80,000 of these unfortunate people were to be pardoned. According to figures from official sources, on August 23rd last, immediately after Mr. Bevin had made his appeal for the "emptying of the prisons" in Greece, there were only 16,875 prisoners. Yet, at the Security Council, Mr. Bevin, on February 4th of this year, stated that "the total number of people at this moment imprisoned in Greece is just under 16,000." On the basis, therefore, of these official figures, it is quite clear that the so-called amnesty is a complete mockery.

9. THE GREEK PRESS.

The opportunity of the different political groups to express their views is illustrated, among other things, by the relative influence of their newspapers.

It must be fully appreciated that, except in the main towns, there is widespread terrorism to-day in Greece against newspapers of the Left. Indeed, in many country districts there is a complete suppression of all but the Monarchist and Fascist newspapers. Postmen are terrorised by "X"-ites and forbidden to carry newspapers disapproved of by the Fascists. The local gendarmerie think nothing of completely banning the Left-Wing press in their districts; and even in the large cities it is no novelty for the premises of Left-Wing newspapers to be raided or wrecked.

Below is a table which I have devised, showing the approximate figures of Athens daily newspaper circulation and their political complexion, excluding evening papers.

<i>Name of Newspaper</i>	<i>Observations</i>	<i>Circulation</i>
1 RIZOSPASTIS	Communist	Largest circulation in Greece : about 22,000 in Athens and about 25,000 in the rest of the country.
2 MACHI	Daily newspaper of the Socialists outside EAM	3,000 in Athens.
3 KATHIMERINI	The largest Right-Wing daily	An Athens circulation of between 27,000 and 32,000, and 10,000 in the provinces
4 ELFFTHERIA	Formerly supported the Regent, but now is democratic and anti-monarchist. Is connected with the ex-Minister of Supply, Kartalis, and opposes the holding of elections on March 31st.	10,000 in Athens and about 10,000 in the provinces.
5 TO VEMA	The most influential Liberal paper.	Has a circulation of about 9,000 in Athens and about 9,000 in the provinces.
6 KATHIMERINA NEA	Formerly the organ of Papandreou, but dissociated itself from him when he joined the Right. Now puts forward the views of Kafandaris.	3,000-4,000 in Athens and 2,500 in the provinces
7. ACROPOLIS	The monarchist "yellow press."	About 5,500 in Athens and 5,000 in the provinces
8. EMBROS	Organ of the Military League, financed by big industrialists	About 6,000 in Athens and 7,000 in the provinces.
9. ELLINIKON AIMA	Monarchist.	5,000 in Athens and 5,000 in the provinces.

There is a corresponding variety of evening papers. I will content myself with mentioning the *Eleftheri Ellada*, the largest evening paper in Athens, which supports EAM and has a circulation of about 25,000.

There are several weeklies, and in the provinces a wide range of newspapers, including those of the Left which in spite of Right-Wing terrorism still contrive to make their appearance.

10. THE KALAMATA OUTRAGES.

The revolt of Monarchists and "X"-ites which took place at Kalamata in January of this year deserves special mention as it is the outstanding example of Fascism rampant in Greece today.

The affair began on Friday, January 18th. Patrons of the Catsaros Cafe, situated in the centre of Kalamata and favoured by supporters of the Left, were attacked with automatic weapons and a hand grenade, which fortunately exploded outside the cafe. Four people were killed and a number were wounded. The police, compelled to take action, arrested 32 Monarchists.

On the following Sunday, armed men entered Kalamata and stormed the jail. They released more than 30 prisoners, took a number of imprisoned democrats as hostages, and surrounded the local authorities in the buildings of the Town Hall and the prison. Martial Law was declared in the provinces of Messinia and Laconia. The Minister of War stated that there were 1,000 armed "X"-ites in occupation of Kalamata, supported by some 3,000 additional armed Monarchists. Troops under the command of General Papadopoulos were sent against the rebels demanding that they hand over the 150 hostages that they had taken. The Minister of Public Security made a statement to the effect that the revolt in Kalamata was but the first manifestation of a Monarchist plot for a general uprising.

The rebels, threatened by Government troops, withdrew with their hostages to the village of Gardiki. Of these 150 hostages, it was on January 25th officially reported from Athens that 65 had been released, and officially admitted that 14 had already been murdered. The Government proceeded to make an order closing down the "X"-organisation in Athens and Piraeus. This did not prevent armed "X"-ites from leaving Athens for the provinces. Many of them went to Thessaly to join the Monarchist bandit Sourlas, still at liberty in spite of the fact that the Government had put a price on his head.

The official figures as to the numbers taking part in the revolts are controverted by journalists who visited Kalamata. For example, the Special Correspondent of "Rizospastis" expresses the opinion that the official figures are grossly inflated. Whereas the Government states that one thousand armed men seized the town, this correspondent puts the number at not more than three hundred. Bearing in mind that Kalamata was "protected" by a security force of some 580 police and gendarmes, it would appear that the police enjoyed numerical superiority, but in spite of that did nothing to stop the "X"-ites from taking control of the town.

Perhaps one of the most fantastic features of the entire episode was the fact that the forces allegedly sent to suppress the Kalamata revolt were under the command of Colonel Papadopoulos. The innocent Englishman might well be pardoned if he believed that this Greek officer was, as propaganda had it, ably fitted to undertake

this task. In truth, this Colonel had actually been responsible for forming a Security Battalion under the quisling Premier Rallis, and as Premier Sofoulis subsequently admitted, Papadopoulos had fraternised with the rebels.

Questioned about the revolt, Mr. Philip Noel-Baker in the House of Commons on January 28th gave an account of this revolt "according to the police report" which he had received. When challenged by me as to whether he had no better information than that emanating from a Fascist-controlled organisation (Hansard, volume 418, column 532), he answered: "I have very little reason to doubt that that report is entirely true." Having regard to what I have already said about the Fascist activities in Greece, I leave the reader to draw his own conclusions on this point. However, Mr. Noel-Baker in his statement did refer to the fact that "armed bands of the organisation in uniform, armed with automatic weapons and acting in military formation, took control of the town" and that "the outbreak was dealt with promptly and efficiently by the Greek gendarmerie and by units of the Greek army." He further added that "British troops would, of course, have given their help had it been required to restore order."

It is difficult to tally Mr. Noel-Baker's statement that British troops would have given their help, had it been required to restore order, with that of Mr. Bevin to the security Council that "there were no British troops in the vicinity or anywhere near it." Further, it is difficult to reconcile Mr. Noel-Baker's claim that the outrage was dealt with "promptly and efficiently" with the fact that by February 11th only eleven arrests had taken place, although the monarchists were officially admitted to have murdered fourteen hostages. We are indebted to Mr. Hector McNeil for this information as to the arrests. Again, the leader of the Kalamata revolt, Manganas, was on February 4th reported by the Minister of Public Security as being still at liberty, and responsible for the rounding up of another twenty democrats in the Kopti district, and the murder of three of them. Manganas is still at liberty to-day. Thus was this outrage dealt with promptly and efficiently!

What are the conclusions which we can draw from the Kalamata revolt? I think that the following are some of the most important of them. First, that the events at Kalamata represent an extreme example of a situation which prevails throughout Greece to-day. It is symbolic of the reign of terror instigated by the Fascist elements in Greece. Second, that the police and army refused or, what is equally culpable, are unable to take any serious measures against such outrages. Indeed, not only are murderers and bandits free to continue their activities, but are sometimes openly helped by the Monarcho-Fascist elements in the police and army. Third, the non-intervention of British troops on the ground that the Greek authorities are dealing with the situation "promptly and efficiently," is a policy which, whatever its subjective background may be, is objectively helping the Extreme Right, just as was the case with the

policy of non-intervention in Spanish affairs. Fourth, and last, any move by Greek Ministers to purge the State, army or police, of pro-Fascist elements is opposed by the British "advisers" on the ground that this would be introducing politics into "non-political" questions of the army and police ! This indeed is a logical conclusion of a policy of non-intervention in favour of the Right.

11. FORGED ELECTORAL REGISTERS.

The forging of electoral registers is but one further manifestation of the Fascist intrigue which grips the Government of Greece to-day. The very people who control the state machine have taken in their hands the compilation of the registers. I have myself spoken to a number of reputable journalists who have told me how they were able to purchase voting cards from monarchists without the slightest difficulty. Persons known to be supporters of the Right are able to obtain a duplicity of voting cards, whereas a known supporter of the Left has difficulty in getting even the one card to which he is lawfully entitled.

That the electoral registers are faked was admitted by the present Ministers of the Sofoulis Government—before coming to power ! Having tasted the sweets of office, EAM's demand for the preparation of new registers was turned down, and the Sofoulis Government offered instead a revision of the registers.

A promise of a complete revision of the registers having been given by Sofoulis and Rentis, respectively Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, EAM called on its members for the first time to enrol in the registers on January 16th. EAM, however, made a proviso that they would not vote unless the revision of the registers was properly carried out.

What happened ? On February 6th it was reported from Athens that the Regent had refused to sign a law for the revision of the electoral registers, and EAM again stressed that the Government had done nothing to correct the faked electoral registers.

On February 7th, EAM declared that it would not take part in the elections on March 31st unless certain conditions were satisfied. They were :

- (a) A representative democratic government must be formed, with a substantial representation of EAM.
- (b) Terrorism must cease, and there must be a real disarming and disbanding of the terrorists.
- (c) A general political amnesty must be given to the resistance fighters.
- (d) There must be a genuine purging of the electoral registers.
- (e) There must be a purge from the Army and Security Forces of at least those who served in the quisling Security Battalions.

These demands were first voiced by EAM only, but since February 7th there has been a flood of support from all democratic quarters. But even before February 7th John Sofianopoulos, at one time the leader of the Greek delegation to the United Nations, in the

interview which he gave to the *News Chronicle* on February 4th, quoted earlier in this pamphlet, made the same allegations about the elections which three days later were reiterated in the concrete demands of EAM.

The Greek Liberal Press is repeatedly stressing the impossibility of fair elections on March 31st. Thus, for example, the leading Greek Liberal newspaper, *To Vima*, wrote on February 22nd that, in view of the difficulties facing the Government in its attempts to make changes in the Armed Forces and Police, it was doubtful whether Sofoulis could restore law and order by March 31st. The newspaper *Eleftheria*, closely connected with the Minister of Supply, Kartalis, on the same day wrote that elections would be "sheer comedy" under existing conditions.

There then followed the wave of resignations from the Government, so that by March 15th, out of a cabinet of 35, 10 had resigned in addition to John Sofianopoulos, who was forced out of the Government at the beginning of February because of his attitude to the Soviet protest to the United Nations. The following are the names of those who had resigned by March 15th: Kafandaris, Deputy Premier; Mercouris, Minister of Public Works; Novas, Minister of Education; Mylonas, Minister of Finance; Evripaios, Minister for Air; Bourdaras, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; Kartalis, Minister of Supply, and his Under-Secretary Pappas; Georgakis, Governor of the Ionian Isles, and Petmezas, Minister of Information. In addition to this formidable list of Cabinet resignations, Tsouderos, the second Vice-Premier, had offered his resignation, but this was not accepted by the Premier. Thus a total of fourteen Ministers had by March 15th publicly opposed the holding of elections on March 31st.

But not only did Ministers resign. On Sunday, March 17th, the Premier, Sofoulis, made his first election speech. According to *The Times* (18.3.46) he declared "that he felt obliged to admit that the necessary prerequisites for fair elections—law and order—did not exist in Greece to-day. 'All over the country,' he said, 'Monarchist candidates alone are able to move about freely.' . . . M. Sophoulis, who was launching the Liberal Party's election campaign, said that the results of the elections would not reflect freely expressed political convictions." Has a Prime Minister ever before launched an election campaign with such words?

Thus, not only have members of the Cabinet resigned in protest against the election on March 31st, not only do others, who remain in the Government, oppose such elections, but the Premier himself has condemned them in advance as not likely to reflect the will of the people! The situation is perhaps unique in history.

When it is realised that this Cabinet does not include a single Member of EAM, the breadth of the crisis in Greek affairs is made manifest.

Further, if we examine the summary of political parties in Chapter 7 above, we will find that while the Right and the Liberals

are participating in the elections ; not only the Left, but also the parties of the Centre are refusing to take part on the ground that terrorism reigns throughout the country.

It is in the face of all this opposition to elections on March 31st, seen against the background to Greek affairs which I have already sketched, that Mr. Ernest Bevin's instruction to Premier Sofoulis, that the elections must take place, ought to be viewed.

12. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY.

The foreign policy advocated by the different political parties in Greece is, as one would expect, a reflection of their pro- or anti-Fascist tendencies. While all parties have gone on record in support of "Greece's national claims" to Northern Epirus (Southern Albania), Eastern Thrace, the modification of the Bulgarian frontier in favour of Greece, and the return of the Dodecanese, there is the greatest difference in the way in which the Right and the Left propose to implement this policy.

The "X"-ites and the Right Wing, uttering threats of war, demand the immediate and armed occupation of these territories. The EAM, on the other hand, insist that all settlements must be peacefully concluded by arbitration and negotiation.

I could give no better example of the danger to the peace of Europe if the Greek Fascists were to be allowed undisputed sway than to refer to the monarchist demonstrations at which the shout "Sofia, Belgrade, Moscow," rends the air, and the ravings of the monarchist evening paper „Vradyni," which, for example, on November 14th, 1945, wrote as follows . "If EAM and the Communists did not exist in Greece to-day, we would not be talking about Northern Epirus. Northern Epirus would have been occupied by the Greek Army."

One further example of the difference of outlook, as regards foreign policy between the Right and the Left, is to be found in connection with the problem of the British Colony of Cyprus. The people of Cyprus are almost wholly Greek in speech, and have always looked upon Greece as their mother country. As long ago as 1919, the British Labour Party called for the freedom of Cypriots to decide their own form of government and to unite with Greece. Nevertheless, as I stated in my speech in the House of Commons on this matter on March 5th of this year (Hansard, volume 420, paragraph 298 onwards), Cyprus has been the subject of a naked despotism. "It is a fantastic state of affairs," I said, "that Labour rules at Westminster and Socialism is a crime according to the law of Cyprus !" It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the Greek politicians of the Right, dependent as they are upon the good will of the British Foreign Office, and having no desire to offend their protectors, make no claim to Cyprus. EAM, on the other hand, have no reason to, and do not, avoid placing Cyprus on the same plane as all the other national claims of Greece.

13. WHAT THE GREEK PEOPLE DEMAND.

A study of the Greek press will show that the demands of the Greek people can be crystallised in the call for a democratic front. In this, they are being led by the EAM.

Thus in Athens on January 20th of this year, a demonstration of record size took place, called by the Union of Democratic Clubs, led by the former Commander-in-Chief and former Premier Othoneos, and by the EAM. The size of this demonstration is staggering. It is estimated that there was a crowd of nearly 400,000. It is noteworthy that, although EAM participated in the sponsoring of the meeting, the sole speaker was General Othoneos.

With tremendous enthusiasm the demonstration carried a resolution calling on all democrats to unite ; demanding the cessation of terrorism against democrats, requesting the purging of the Army, Police and State apparatus of Fascist influences, and claiming that genuine electoral registers should be compiled.

The resolution went on to say that these demands could only be obtained by a government fully representative of all the democratic Parties, including the National Resistance Movement. There was also a protest against the foreign reactionary influences " which hinder the country's free political life by protecting local tyrants, thus offending against the country's independence and national dignity."

14. THE ATTITUDE OF EAM.

In view of the importance of the role which EAM is playing in Greek politics and of its mass support which, whether we like it or not, cannot be controverted, it is essential for a proper understanding of the Greek situation to indicate the position taken up by EAM.

When the EAM delegation were in London, they made clear their attitude on the question of the presence of our troops in Greece at a Press Conference on December 31st. This they repeated to me and other Labour M.P.'s when we were given the opportunity of meeting them. They stated that the British troops must *either* assist in the restoration of democracy *or* leave Greece." "One thing or the other " was their plea.

On January 7th of this year the Central Committee of EAM declared that " the main reason for the present difficult crisis is the British military occupation, which supports reactionaries and quislings." I have already referred to a large number of facts which would support the thesis that, whatever might be the intentions of the Labour Government, objectively our policy has strengthened the hands of the reactionaries.

In so far as suggestions have been made that EAM's demand for the withdrawal of troops from Greece was " dictated by Moscow," it is only fair to indicate that this question of the withdrawal of troops was always present to the mind of EAM, as I have above indicated. To-day it is not only the EAM, but the ELD Socialist

Party (who are outside the EAM Coalition), and the Union of Democratic Clubs which are all united in the demand for the withdrawal of British troops from Greece.

15. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BRITAIN.

It is the Greek view, and one with which it is difficult to quarrel, that the situation in Greece is the direct consequence of our policy, and necessarily our own responsibility. As Kafandaris said, when on March 11th he resigned his Vice-Premiership in the Sofoulis Government, "The responsibility rests undoubtedly with the British Government," because its armed intervention in December, 1944, and the defeat of the Left gave full freedom to the Right Wing to establish a terrorist regime. Point is added to this contention by the speech of Sofianopoul's, former Foreign Minister, reported in *Reynolds News* of March 17th, who said, "Had I known that the honoured ELAS armies would have had their arms handed over to the royalist 'X'-ites, I would never have signed the Varkiza Agreement."

Even the Premier, Sofoulis himself, when asked by journalists on February 10th what measures he was proposing to take against the terror of the Right, rhetorically replied, "Who can enforce such measures?" This will cause no surprise to readers, who will remember that I have already quoted Sofoulis, both in his election speech and earlier, when he said that the "X"-ites had worked their way into the state apparatus until they had dominated four-fifths of it. But perhaps the most fantastic confession of the impotency of the Greek Government is the statement of Sofoulis to the Press on March 12th, that a purge of Fascists and collaborators from the Army and Police was impossible, because this would mean the "virtual abolition" of these forces.

We are pledged under the Crimea Agreement, together with the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., to assist the peoples of liberated Europe "to wipe out all vestiges of Fascism." Have we assisted the people of Greece to wipe out Fascism? I will leave the answer to the reader. But if the U.S.S.R. takes the view, as she does, that our policy in Greece is not leading to the annihilation of Fascism, but on the contrary to its consolidation, then have we not here a clue to one of the more fruitful sources of friction and distrust between us and the U.S.S.R.?

Yet Mr. Bevin insists that elections should be held, even although, as the *New Statesman* of March 16th says, and as I have already quoted at the very beginning of this pamphlet, "Elections under present conditions, with the Left abstaining, can have no other possible results than a Right-wing dictatorship or civil war." The views of Mr. Bevin on the declaration of Premier Sofoulis that fair elections were impossible on March 31st, are naturally of great interest. I give the following extracts from Bevin's reply, which was published in *The Times* on March 11th: "I am much surprised by

your statement that armed 'X' organisations will be reinforced by almost the whole of the police and gendarmerie. Such a statement is not borne out by reports which I have received. In any case, I cannot see how 'X' organisations can compel the electors in the countryside to vote in a manner contrary to their convictions, provided a reasonably secret ballot is secured."

While Mr. Bevin expresses surprise at the information given to him by Sofoulis, it is probably not less than the surprise which the reader of this pamphlet will experience, bearing in mind what I have already said about the "X" organisation, the police and gendarmerie and the Right Wing terror, reinforced, as it is, by quotations from eminent Greek politicians—many of them far from being Communist or even of the Left—who unlike Mr. Bevin are able to rely upon their own observations for first-hand evidence of Greek conditions. Can it be that Mr. Bevin is relying on police reports like those which formed the basis of Mr. Noel-Baker's statement in the House of Commons on the Kalamata revolt, or reports of a similar character? If so, I must repeat the observation which I made in the House on that occasion, and to which I have already referred, "Has His Majesty's Government no better information than that emanating from a Fascist-controlled organisation?"

The reader will now probably be in a position, if he was not so before reading this pamphlet, to answer some of the questions which I posed at the very commencement of this work: Why are we in Greece? What is the truth about Greece? What are the facts? I do not propose, however, to put forward any personal view here except to say that I believe that the *effect* of our policy in Greece is to continue the policy of Mr. Churchill: that our policy has the *effect* of favouring the forces of the Right, of Fascism and of the collaborators with the enemy.

The prestige of Britain as a great anti-Fascist democratic power is at stake. As we permit elections to take place in Greece on March 31st, under the present conditions of Fascist terror, I venture to prophesy that there may well be civil war, indeed, there may well be another Spain in Europe. At the moment, when world opinion is demanding that Franco's rule in Spain shall come to an end, it would be a tragedy if we were misguidedly to assist in the setting up in Greece of a Fascist regime.

There must be a complete abandonment of Mr. Churchill's policy in Greece. In addition, those members of our Embassy and Military Mission who have preferred to work hand in hand with collaborators and "X"-ites rather than with the Greek Resistance Movement must be removed from the positions they now occupy, and replaced by representatives who have taken cognisance of the fact that the people of this country have returned to power a Labour Government, and expect their representatives abroad to pursue a true democratic policy. Only in this way can we once again restore Britain's prestige as a defender of the democratic rights of the great people of Greece.

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